Effective finance for food security under climate change by Wright, Helena Louise
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effective Finance for Food Security under 
Climate Change 
 
 
A thesis submitted to Imperial College London for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
By Helena, Louise Wright 
 
 
 
 
Centre for Environmental Policy 
Faculty of Natural Sciences 
Imperial College London 
2015 
 
2 
 
 
Declaration of Originality 
 
I hereby declare that this thesis is entirely my own work, except for that which has been 
appropriately referenced. 
 
 
Helena,Wright 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright Declaration 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and is made available under a Creative 
Commons Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives licence. Researchers are free to copy, 
distribute or transmit the thesis on the condition that they attribute it, that they do not use it 
for commercial purposes and that they do not alter, transform or build upon it. For any reuse 
or redistribution, researchers must make clear to others the licence terms of this work. 
3 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude everyone who has helped me during the course 
of the thesis, including all those at CEP. Many thanks to all those who helped me conduct my 
fieldwork in Bangladesh, including everyone I interviewed as part of the research. 
 
This thesis is dedicated entirely to my mum Hilary Wright who has been a constant source of 
inspiration, guidance and encouragement in everything I do.  
 
xxx 
 
4 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Climate change threatens food security and livelihoods throughout the world. Under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, developed countries have 
committed to providing additional resources for adaptation to climate change in developing 
countries. This thesis explores how this finance can be most effective. Importantly, a multi-
level case study approach was adopted because this enabled institutional arrangements for 
adaptation finance to be explored at multiple scales (international, national and local-level). 
The national case study of Bangladesh was selected as a country highly vulnerable to climate 
change impacts including sea level rise and intense cyclones, whilst a local-level case study 
was also selected in coastal Kalapara.  A criteria-based framework for analysis was adopted 
to analyse the three levels. 
At the local-level, day labourers, many of whom owned no land, were found to be 
particularly vulnerable to food insecurity. There was evidence of climate-related poverty 
traps and many households found it extremely difficult to recover from severe cyclones. 
However, a recent community-based adaptation project had engaged with local government 
and built infrastructure to protect croplands. At national-level, priorities aligned well with 
those identified in the local case study, but concerns were expressed regarding national 
ownership and capacity. At international-level, concerns were expressed about the lack of 
transparency and stakeholder engagement in decision-making on climate finance.  There 
seemed to be more progress against criteria of ownership and equity at local-level.  A set of 
policy recommendations have been developed, including the need to mainstream gender into 
adaptation planning at all levels, and the need for climate funds to engage more fully with 
local government. Future research is required on how to strengthen synergies between 
adaptation and mitigation, whilst exploring a wider range of case studies could provide useful 
insights for the Green Climate Fund. 
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Introduction 
1.1. Research Premise 
Currently around 1 billion people around the world already suffer from food insecurity and 
malnutrition (WFP, 2012). Climate change poses great risks for food security globally, and 
will particularly affect developing countries. The effects of climate change on food 
production are already evident in several parts of the world (IPCC, 2014). Adaptation to 
climate change has now been recognised as a key priority in international climate 
negotiations. However, analysis of flows of climate finance point towards insufficient 
progress in scaling-up finance for adaptation (Buchner et al., 2013; Nakhooda et al., 2013). 
At both international and national-level, there has been a particular emphasis on public 
adaptation finance, with commitments being made by developed countries under the United 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to support efforts to address climate 
change in developing countries. Due to limited availability of resources, it is necessary for the 
available financial resources to be used wisely and effectively.  This thesis aims to contribute 
to this subject, by identifying whether and how climate finance can be effective in ensuring 
food security under climate change; and what kinds of frameworks can facilitate effective 
finance. The purpose of the research is to contribute to new human understanding of public 
adaptation finance with respect to a multi-level criteria-based approach using original case 
studies. 
Importantly, this research adopts a multi-scalar approach, because vulnerability is determined 
at multiple scales (Smit and Wandel, 2006) and adaptation is therefore increasingly observed 
at different spatial and societal scales (Adger et al., 2005) (see Section 2.1).  Barrett (2012) 
argues a multi-scalar construct is required to appraise the distribution of finance for 
adaptation, in order to ascertain whether international finance flows are distributed to local 
actors. 
1.2. Thesis Structure 
The methodology chapter outlines the research questions (Section 2.2) and explains how the 
theoretical framework was developed during the research. The chapter also outlines the 
various methods that were applied in conducting fieldwork at the various scales of analysis. 
Interdisciplinary mixed-method research was undertaken at three levels.  At local-level, a 
case study was selected in Kalapara, Bangladesh as it is a vulnerable coastal area and a target 
18 
 
of various adaptation interventions including a community-based adaptation project. At 
national-level, Bangladesh was identified as a case study as it is considered highly climate-
vulnerable and has a range of emerging experience in utilising climate finance. At 
international-level, semi-structured expert interviews were undertaken with key informants 
and UNFCCC negotiations were observed as this is the primary forum for discussions 
relating to international climate finance.  
The literature review in Chapter 3 provides background and theory on adaptation, mitigation 
and food security. The chapter defines several key terms and explores the interactions 
between adaptation, mitigation and sustainable development. The chapter also explains the 
interaction between climate change impacts and food security. 
Chapter 4 gives an overview on the topic of community-based adaptation (CBA), providing 
the theoretical background to the analysis of the local-level case study. Subsequently, Chapter 
5 provides an extensive review of literature and background relating to the national-level case 
study of Bangladesh, including reviewing the various projected climate impacts, and 
analysing climate finance and policy responses, using relevant policy documents.  Chapter 6 
provides an overview of literature relating to the international-level analysis. 
In Chapter 7, an indicative framework of criteria to be taken into consideration for effective 
adaptation financing is developed, drawing on a comprehensive literature review. This is 
relevant for the first research question. The framework is used to inform the forthcoming 
fieldwork including semi-structured interviews with key informants, and an effort is made to 
assess climate adaptation finance against these criteria in the subsequent three chapters.  
In Chapters 8 to 10 the results of the fieldwork undertaken at the three scales of analysis 
(local, national and international) are analysed and discussed using the framework of analysis 
(Chapter 7), informed by the literature review in preceding chapters.  At local-level, methods 
include household-level interviews, focus group discussions, and semi-structured interviews 
with key informants including local officials.  At national-level in Bangladesh, interview data 
has been used track progress against the framework, focusing on predominantly on the 
Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund (BCCRF) and domestically-funded Bangladesh 
Climate Change Trust Fund (BCCTF).  At international-level, climate finance negotiations 
under the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) of the UNFCCC reveal the process by 
which decisions were taken on the criteria against which the financial mechanism is 
reviewed.  Various multi-scalar linkages are observed between local and national-level but 
19 
 
also between national and international-levels.  Finally, the concluding chapter summarises 
the research and highlights potential topics for further research as well as key 
recommendations which could be useful in informing future policy and practice. 
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2. Research Methodology 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter describes the methodological approach adopted by this study for collection and 
analysis of data.  The study aims to explore the primary research question: In what ways can 
climate finance across scales (international, national, and local) effectively ensure food 
security under climate change?  The study explores and analyses the institutional settings and 
frameworks through which public climate finance is directed and prioritised at international, 
national and local-level, taking the national case of Bangladesh.  This chapter outlines the 
research questions (Section 2.2.) and the methodological approaches adopted during the 
study, taking each level of analysis in turn. 
2.1.1 Mixed Methods: A Multi-Level Multi-Case Study Approach 
This research can be defined as mixed methods research which combines elements of 
qualitative and quantitative research approaches (Cresswell and Clark, 2011). The central 
premise of this approach is that the use of quantitative and qualitative data in combination 
provides better understanding than either approach alone (ibid).  It has been argued that the 
methodological pluralism of mixed methods research frequently results in superior research 
compared to monomethod research, as it allows researchers to mix design components that 
offer the best chance of answering their specific research questions (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  Furthermore, researchers adopting this approach can use all of the 
tools available to them rather than being restricted to a particular set of approaches (ibid).   
The impacts of climate change are often cross-cutting and multi-sectoral, bridging social and 
environmental concerns, so this is ideally suited to a pragmatic multi-disciplinary approach.  
Qualitative research methods also manage to deal with ambiguity (Merriam, 2009) which will 
be valuable in dealing with many of the uncertainties surrounding climate change and its 
policy responses. It has been argued the distinction between qualitative and quantitative 
methods of research is based on the distinction between the sciences and humanities, but in 
fact it is still possible to be scientific without being quantitative (Potter, 1996). The research 
question has both qualitative and quantitative dimensions since it is necessary to look at both 
governance and distribution issues relating to climate finance. 
Qualitative research methods are appropriate in the context of climate change adaptation and 
mitigation, because qualitative methods can be used to study “phenomena in terms of the 
21 
 
meanings people bring to them” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005:p.3).    Qualitative researchers 
are described as being interested in “how people interpret their experiences, how they 
construct their worlds, what meaning they attribute to their experience” and may draw from 
various philosophies including constructivism, phenomenology and symbolic interactionism 
(Merriam, 2009:p.14).   Ethnographic approaches are drawn on in this study.  Qualitative case 
study research is an empirical attempt to investigate a phenomenon in its real-life context 
(Merriam, 2009; Yin, 2008).  Therefore, this type of research will be highly relevant for 
exploring climate change vulnerability. Direct observations will be made in the field setting 
during the case study, as well as incorporating semi-structured interviews (Yin, 2008). 
Overall, qualitative research methods are valuable in recognising the presence of multiple 
sources of evidence, and multiple opinions and perceptions of the same evidence, which 
sometimes involves conducting open-ended interviews in multiple settings (Yin, 2011).  
Ethical standards of conduct are vital for this approach in a field-based setting in order for the 
research to have integrity (Yin, 2011). Cresswell and Clark (2011) explain that where the 
qualitative and quantitative strands of research are separate initially, but connected, these may 
have to be brought together and merged at the end.  Taking this into account, this mixed 
methods research also brings together different strands of the research at the end of the 
analysis. 
Case study research has been described as being valuable for generating practical and expert 
knowledge, including “concrete, context-dependent experience” that is “more valuable than 
the vain search for predictive theories and universals” (Flyvbjerg, 2006:224).  This is 
achieved due to proximity to the studied reality.  Although it has previously been argued that 
it is difficult to generalise from a particular case, this is dependent largely upon the case one 
is speaking of, and how it is chosen, since the strategic choice of a case may add greatly to 
generalizability (ibid). Furthermore, case studies can be ideal for the ‘falsification’ of 
propositions as proposed by Karl Popper.   On the identification of case studies, it has been 
observed; “atypical or extreme cases often reveal more information because they activate 
more actors and more basic mechanisms in the situation studied” (Flyvbjerg, 2006:229).  In 
studying climate adaptation, the selection of a case study from a country or region that is 
considered particularly vulnerable to climate change could therefore reveal a range of useful 
insights in this regard (see 2.4.1). Drawing upon the insight; “good social science is problem 
driven and not methodology driven (Flyvbjerg, 2006:p242), this research seeks to overcome 
the restrictions of a particular discipline and embraces a combination of qualitative and 
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quantitative research methods. This study thus uses mixed methods including semi-structured 
key informant interviews and household-level survey data as described in following sections. 
The research draws upon the concept of ‘phronetic social science’ because the point of 
departure is ‘bottom-up’, contextual and action-orientated knowledge (Flyvbjerg et al., 2012). 
The term ‘phronesis’ comes from the Greek word in Aristotelian ethics which is sometimes 
translated as “practical wisdom” and which Aristotle pointed out facilitates ‘sophia’ 
(wisdom). It draws upon public deliberation in the public sphere, and this bottom-up 
approach can be useful in highlighting perspectives or policy responses that are neglected or 
marginalised in public policy-making (ibid).  Furthermore, since this type of research is 
grounded in contextual policy decisions, it also supports the use of mixed-methods research. 
In relation to climate vulnerability and adaptation, the approach highlights the need to include 
and incorporate the perspectives of climate-vulnerable groups. 
A theoretical underpinning of the research is systems thinking.  A system is basically “an 
entity with certain properties that can be distinguished from its surrounding environment” 
(Halliday and Glaser, 2011:p.1). Fiksel (2006) suggests in sustainability research there is a 
need to understanding the dynamic, adaptive behaviour of complex systems and their 
resilience. Both global climate and food systems are integrated natural-human systems. 
Without an understanding of system implications, Fiksel (2006) points out there is a risk of 
unintended consequences. For instance, uptake of biofuels could affect agricultural 
productivity.  This is, once again, highly relevant in the context of avoiding maladaptation.  It 
is important to consider vulnerability at the whole-system level, where the influence of 
governance and institutions might be more relevant than it is at household-level (Adger, 
2006).  This research utilised systems thinking in the analysis of findings in order to identify 
how different factors link to each other.   
Hence this research adopts a multi-disciplinary approach that analyses and recognises the 
inter-linkages between social, economy and natural systems.  This is informed by the concept 
of ‘resilience’ in systems, which has emerged as a concept in ecology, as well as economics 
and risk management (see Fiksel, 2006).  Applied to food security, this informs an 
understanding that the resilience of food systems under climate change will inherently require 
an understanding of the complexity of coupled natural-human systems. 
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2.1.2. Literature review 
An extensive literature review was undertaken on the areas identified as relevant to the study.  
The literature review was used to identify the major issues and debates around the topic 
(Hart, 1998) including key concepts and theories, as well as the major impacts of climate 
change.  Critical evaluation of the literature was linked to the research questions, including 
identifying various areas in which there were gaps in the literature (ibid).  In particular, an in-
depth literature review was undertaken to analyse articles relevant to the effectiveness of 
climate finance and specific issues relating to climate adaptation finance in Bangladesh.    
Policy documents and reports were analysed to gain a broad understanding of the subject, 
including various unpublished documents recommended in person by key informants.  The 
thesis includes several appendices provided for the interest of the reader; these are relevant to 
the thesis but non-essential to understanding it. 
During this stage, research questions were developed and various hypotheses were then 
developed which were investigated in the primary research. In particular, the literature review 
on climate finance was used to develop the indicative framework of principles (Chapter 7).  
The term ‘framework’ is used to describe the set of criteria that could be used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of climate finance. These issues were explored in semi-structured interviews 
with key informants during the case study research.  Similarly, the case studies helped to 
confirm or disconfirm the theoretical propositions put forward in the literature review and 
evaluate the accuracy of that analysis. 
2.1.3. Overview of the Methodological Approach 
Since environmental research explores human-environment interactions, this supports the use 
of interdisciplinary approaches as discussed above.  Furthermore, the focus on climate change 
lends itself to multi-scalar analysis for various reasons. Firstly, while climate change is a 
global phenomenon, the impacts manifest themselves at local-level.  Vulnerability and 
adaptive capacity are both determined at multiple scales (Smit and Wandel, 2006). General 
Circulation Models (GCMs) are the means through which climate change projections have 
been developed, although these are only downscaled to local-level with higher levels of 
uncertainty. Hence, a local-level analysis provides valuable insights and perspectives on how 
climate variability manifests itself and is experienced.   
Although there is a growing body of scholars who view scale as ‘socially constructed’, there 
is also a rich literature discussing the importance of scale as a fundamental concept in 
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describing the hierarchical organisation of the world (Moran, 2010).  Multiple definitions of 
scale include institutional, spatial as well as temporal scale.  It has been argued we live in a 
‘multilevel’ world (Cash et al., 2006) and environmental problems such as climate change 
require an understanding of how processes operate at different scales and might be related 
across scales (Moran, 2010).  Gupta et al (2007) argue climate change is a ‘glocal’ problem 
with global impacts that are experienced locally, thus requiring a multi-level governance 
solution. It is also vital to understand how related policy processes at each level (global, 
national and local) feed into each other (ibid).   
In studying climate finance in particular, international channels of public climate finance are 
based on commitments at international-level and involve financial transfers from developed 
to developing countries. Adaptation is increasingly being observed at different spatial and 
societal scales (Adger et al., 2005) and therefore the effectiveness of adaptation may be 
judged at different scales.   In terms of food security, globalisation of agricultural trade also 
means market or price shocks have implications across scales.  Hence, this study aims to 
analyse the research question at three levels: incorporating an international, national and 
local-level analysis (see Figure 2.1).  Analysis of case studies was undertaken to answer the 
research question at those levels. 
In relating to climate justice, Paavola (2005) argues both distributive and procedural justice 
have cross-level dimensions. Barrett (2012) argues a multiscalar and interdisciplinary 
construct is required to appraise the distribution of climate finance for adaptation, and 
analysis of adaptation finance is particularly illuminating for analysing climate justice, in 
terms of analysing whether flows of finance are distributed to vulnerable actors.  Barrett 
suggests utilising literature from international relations (global level), political economy 
(national-level) and political ecology (local-level), disciplines which were also used to inform 
this research.   
It is recognised that in some sense the identification and definition of the scales at 
‘international’, ‘national’ and ‘local’ level are social constructs, and the definition of ‘local’ 
is also a subjective decision, but it is considered that these levels of analysis will be revealing 
for analysis of climate finance. Refer to Figure 2.1 for a diagrammatic representation of the 
methodology. The term ‘scale’ is used synonymously with the term ‘level’ in this research. 
Jurisdictional (administrative) levels (Cash et al., 2006) were identified as appropriate units 
of analysis due to the institutions at these levels.  Regional or supra-national institutions were 
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not included due to the absence of adaptation funds at this scale, but may be identified in 
other localities. The findings and conclusions also enabled a consideration of the linkages 
between these scales. 
The initial table (below) takes various steps of the methodology (outlined in Figure 2.1) and 
maps these steps against the research methods which are discussed in this chapter as 
executed. Sections 2.3-2.5 give an overview of the different methods at each stage. 
Table 2.1  Steps of Methodology 
Methodological Step of Thesis Theoretical/practical underpinnings
Literature Review
International relations, political economy, political 
ecology, systems thinking
Fieldwork – Local (in Kalapara) 
(Chapter 8)
Semi-structured interviews with key informants, 
household survey questionnaire, focus group 
discussions, informed by political ecology literature 
and systems thinking
Fieldwork – National (Bangladesh) 
(Chapter 9)
Semi-structured interviews with key informants and 
analysis of secondary household survey dataset, 
informed by political economy literature and systems 
thinking
Fieldwork – International (UNFCCC) 
(Chapter 10)
Semi-structured interviews with key informants and 
participant observation, informed by international 
relations literature
 
As seen in the table above, some methods were used at several levels, for example, semi-
structured interviews with key informants were undertaken at international, national and local 
level.  Finally, the outcomes of the research were a set of findings and conclusions logically 
derived from the case studies and related fieldwork, as well as a set of policy-relevant 
recommendations. 
2.2. Research Questions 
As previously mentioned, the study aims to explore the primary research question: “In what 
ways can climate finance across scales (international, national, and local) effectively ensure 
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food security under climate change?”  The study explores and analyses the institutional 
settings and frameworks through which public climate finance is directed and prioritised at 
international, national and local-level. 
Sub-questions are:  
 What issues should be taken into consideration in evaluating the effectiveness of 
adaptation finance? 
 What progress has been made across scales (local, national, international) in 
effectively financing adaptation? 
 What kinds of frameworks, institutions and policies are recommended to facilitate 
effective adaptation financing across scales? 
Each of these research questions are answered explicitly or implicitly throughout the thesis at 
each level (local, national, international).  At both international and national-scale, particular 
focus is placed on public adaptation finance as these are the climate finance flows available 
under UNFCCC mechanisms, but private finance is also explored in order to further 
understand how private adaptation action can be mobilised. Taking the national case of 
Bangladesh, institutional mechanisms and channels of publicly-provided climate finance are 
explored with the aim of exploring the key issues surrounding adaptation finance and 
identifying recommendations for the kind of frameworks, institutions and policies, which can 
facilitate effective finance.  At the local-scale, the study explores local perceptions of climate 
change impacts from key stakeholders and analyses local efforts to adapt with the aim of 
drawing bottom-up insights into these research questions from on-the-ground experiences.  
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Figure 2.1 Outline of the methodology of the thesis 
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2.3. Local Level  
2.3.1. Selecting a local case study 
Kalapara, a sub-district within Patuakhali District is an area in a tidal floodplain in coastal 
Bangladesh that is highly vulnerable to climate change and food insecurity issues.  One case 
study was identified because the aim was to conduct an in-depth analysis of the local issues, 
rather than to be representative of a particular area.   
 
Figure 2.2 Map to show Kalapara Upazila (Sub-district), Patuakhali  
(Authors’ own: produced using QGIS software) 
The area was selected as an ideal study location due to various factors, including high 
likelihood of coastal climate change impacts (sea level rise, cyclones, and salinity intrusion), 
high incidence of poverty and food insecurity, feasibility, and availability of data.  This area 
also suffers from geographical isolation from urban centres and markets, factors which may 
exacerbate vulnerability.  Patuakhali is a target area for the Comprehensive Disaster 
Management Programme (CDMP) project to construct multi-purpose schools and cyclone 
shelters, which was the first project funded by the multi-lateral Bangladesh Climate Change 
Resilience Fund (BBCRF). Furthermore, the selected area of Kalapara also overlapped with 
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an area for which there was secondary household survey data already available from CCAFS 
(Climate Change Agriculture and Food Security), an international research project by CGIAR 
(Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research).  CCAFS provided an existing 
survey dataset on household vulnerability from various sites across coastal Bangladesh which 
could be analysed, and one of these sites was Kalapara.  Furthermore, ActionAid Bangladesh 
had been conducting a local-level community-based adaptation (CBA) project in the locality 
for several years and were selected as a local-level research partner for practical reasons as it 
provided an entry point to local organisations and facilitated introductions with key 
informants. The village of Poshurbania was targeted for the detailed household survey due to 
its location in the vulnerable Sidr-affected coastal belt, as the site of the CBA project, and as 
a target area for various government-linked adaptation interventions, including improvement 
of embankments and introduction of saline-tolerant rice varieties.  Whilst Poshurbania was 
the unit of analysis for household interviews, it was important to understand the Upazila-level 
governance context (see below).   Therefore, after deliberation on the choice of local case 
study, against a number of criteria (vulnerability, feasibility, and data availability), this was 
selected as the local-level case study.  
2.3.2. Semi-structured interviews with key informants 
At local-level, key stakeholders were identified for semi-structured interviews from relevant 
institutions, primarily those responsible for local government services in the selected case 
study village.  In-depth interviews with a local non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
respondent informed the design of the household survey.  The ten interviewees included the 
Union Parishad Chairman, Upazila Chairman, Local Government Engineering Department 
official, Water Development Board, and Department of Agriculture Extension.   Presence of 
Upazila-level government institutions meant these interviews were primarily conducted in 
Kalapara. A Bengali-English interpreter was used where necessary, as for the household 
survey (see 2.3.4).  Use of semi-structured interviews alongside focus group discussions also 
enabled a form of methodological triangulation to occur (see Denzin and Lincoln, 2005).  
2.3.3. Participatory research tools 
A range of approaches are used in the assessment of proposed adaptation interventions. The 
climate finance chapter (Chapter 7) explains these include multi-criteria analysis, cost-
effectiveness analysis, and cost-benefit analysis (UNFCCC, 2011a).  In cost-benefit analysis, 
the benefits of the proposed adaptation action can be compared to the costs to determine 
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whether it is worthwhile.  Usually, market and non-market costs and benefits are expressed in 
terms of monetary terms and compared in this way.  Relevant gains and losses are aggregated 
together, either across people or across time (Hanley and Barbier, 2009).  Analysing the costs 
and benefits of adaptation could help answer the broad research question regarding how 
climate finance can be effective.   
In local contexts, the social value disparate groups of individuals place on community assets 
poses challenges to a traditional cost-benefit approach. For example, in Morocco, 
stakeholders ranked the non-monetary benefits of irrigation more highly than monetary 
benefits (Chambwera et al., 2011).   There are challenges associated with monetising costs or 
benefits associated with environmental goods and services, social or cultural values, or 
common pool resources (UNFCCC, 2011a; Chambwera et al., 2011).    Furthermore, it is 
important to consider equity and distribution of costs and benefits, i.e. who benefits from 
adaptation interventions (UNFCCC, 2011a), especially since poorer groups are most 
vulnerable.  For these reasons it was decided conventional cost-benefit analysis was not 
appropriate to the local context, but the study aimed to discuss costs and benefits of different 
adaptation strategies with stakeholders in a qualitative way, drawing on participatory cost-
benefit analysis (Chambwera et al., 2012). 
Participatory cost-benefit analysis is a tool that has recently been used in the context of 
adaptation, drawing on participatory research appraisal methods to ensure all financial, social 
and environmental costs and benefits are identified.  An example from Khulna, Bangladesh 
showed participatory cost-benefit analysis can be used to complement quantitative analyses 
and may even reduce the cost of adaptation by requiring a balancing of benefits across 
stakeholders (Haque, 2013).  The value of adopting a stakeholder-focused approach also lies 
in facilitating dialogue among stakeholders who may not otherwise interact (Chambwera et 
al., 2011).  The focus is less upon solely economic and monetary costs and benefits, it 
incorporates social and environmental costs and benefits identified by stakeholders 
themselves (ibid).   Participatory cost-benefit analysis draws from the established technique 
of rapid rural appraisal, developed by Robert Chambers and others. This technique is widely 
used by NGOs and international organisations, especially in agricultural development, and 
has transformed into participatory rural appraisal (PRA) and participatory learning and action 
(PLA).  The approach can be adapted to local circumstances, overcoming literacy barriers, 
and aims to empower communities to engage effectively with researchers in influencing the 
direction of research. Important questions and issues emerge as information is collected. 
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These approaches are flexible and participatory to avoid the difficulties that emerge from 
rigid “top-down” application of fixed methods (FAO, 1997).  PLA aims to be useful to 
participants themselves and involve mutually-beneficial shared learning.   
However, participatory approaches have also been criticised for the potential to be ‘hi-jacked’ 
by the most influential or powerful members of the community, and therefore to ultimately 
legitimise existing structures of power. Part of this critique draws from utilisation of 
participation by powerful organisations like the World Bank (Cooke and Kothari, 2001).  
Further criticisms arise from the potential for research to be patronising in a post-colonial 
context, with a dichotomy between ‘subjects’ and ‘objects’ of research which is disguised but 
never really overcome, or for participatory research to ignore the role of the ‘state’ (ibid).   In 
this research, such objections were carefully considered in research design, ensuring all 
discussions were inclusive of women as a marginalised group (Cannon, 2002), remaining 
cognizant of the key role of governance, and inviting participants to ask their own questions 
at the end of each survey.  
The PRA approach was utilised to some extent, although due to resource constraints it was 
not possible to use a multi-disciplinary research team. However the household survey was 
checked by three academic staff from different discipline backgrounds (law, economics and 
engineering) as well as being cross-checked by a team of PhD colleagues, before piloting and 
adjustment during the actual fieldwork (see next section).   
2.3.4. Local-level questionnaire design 
The local-level household survey was designed with the following principles in mind; using 
simple, familiar language, avoiding ‘leading’ questions, avoiding double negatives, 
considering the types of response categories, ensuring the questionnaire was easy to use, and 
piloting the survey before use (Johnson and Turner, 2003).   Household surveys undertaken at 
village-level were piloted by interviewing several community members in the initial days to 
field-test the survey and inform the final design of the survey.  The pilot also ensured the 
survey was suitable to the local context and of suitable length.    
Upon piloting the survey, several aspects had to be adapted because there were certain 
sections that were too extensive, irrelevant, or inappropriate.   For example, it was found 
through Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and the pilot survey that most participants 
experienced salinity as a consequence of cyclones, so there was no need to treat these 
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climatic impacts separately.  When discussion began on the impacts of cyclones, participants 
quickly mentioned the salinity problem resulting from the cyclonic storm surge, which 
affected the crops. Therefore, these two sections of the survey were eventually merged, along 
with additional questions on salinity. Furthermore, although river erosion was not mentioned 
during the FGDs, which could be owing to the specific location of this village, this issue was 
brought up in the local government interviews, and hence river erosion was incorporated into 
the household survey.  Furthermore, during adjustment and piloting of the survey it was 
necessary to focus the questionnaire on the social benefits of adaptation options and adopt 
more qualitative approach due to feedback from respondents that cyclone shelters and 
embankment primarily had non-monetary benefits. Thus a qualitative open-ended and semi-
structured format was adopted, moving away from the initial focus on economic costs and 
benefits. This confirmed findings from the literature review that cautioned against use of 
conventional cost-benefit analysis.   
In total, 32 household interviews were completed comprising around a third of the total 
population of Poshurbunia village.   It was found important to retain the engagement of 
interviewees throughout the survey to avoid research fatigue by ensuring the interview did 
not take up too much time. Hence the survey was streamlined to be conducted as efficiently 
as possible to avoid research fatigue as far as possible.  The survey questions also had to be 
culturally sensitive as well as sensitive to the fact many of the respondents were illiterate. 
Therefore, the household survey was simplified to include losses from previous disasters, 
ranking of issues and ranking of adaptation options.  Refer to the limitations section, below, 
which discusses how issues of bias were avoided. 
Since a list of households in the village was not available, household survey respondents 
were randomly sampled from the village.  The household survey was undertaken by every 
third household encountered on foot.  As previously mentioned, the sampling was stratified 
by gender: representation of women was ensured by encouraging female household members 
to respond on behalf of the household wherever possible, resulting in approximately half the 
responses from women. Use of mapping (both using Google Earth and the participatory 
village map) ensured the whole village had been surveyed.  The response rate was high as 
every household asked to take part in the household survey accepted, and villagers felt 
comfortable discussing the environmental challenges they were facing. Since there was only 
one principal investigator and interpreter conducting the survey, there was no chance of 
duplication of responses.   
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2.4.5.  Focus group discussions (FGDs) 
Focus groups are useful in exploring ideas and concepts, as well as obtaining in-depth 
information about what people think about an issue (Johnson and Turner, 2003).    The 
benefits of FGDs are that the discussion enables participants to have greater control over the 
issues raised, and spontaneous issues can arise that were unanticipated by the researcher 
(Hennick, 2007).  FGDs were undertaken with the main livelihood groups identified in the 
locality of the village; farmers, fishermen and agricultural labourers.   In addition, separate 
FGDs were conducted with women’s research groups launched by Actionaid (GGDs known 
as Gonogobeshona Dol) which had previously developed community action plans.  Separate 
FGDs were conducted with women to ensure their views and perspectives were fully 
considered as a marginalised group and ensure women felt able to speak openly. The use of 
FGDs alongside the local-level household survey and semi-structured interviews also enabled 
a degree of triangulation to occur (see Section 2.6.2). Group interviews through FGDs also 
enable “indefinite triangulation” whereby individual responses were put into context (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 2005).   
FGDs with the community groups informed the design of the household survey as 
participants prioritised the main risks faced locally, including cyclones, salinity intrusion, and 
river erosion. This enabled the local population to input into the study, and enabled local 
perceptions and knowledge to be brought into the design of the survey itself. 
2.4. National Level  
2.4.1. Selection of country case study 
Selection of the country case study was based on identification of a location considered 
highly vulnerable to climate change that also provided a rich source of emerging experience 
in international climate finance.  Criteria used to select the country case study were; 
vulnerability to current and future climate change impacts, food insecurity issues, and 
emerging experiences with climate change finance.  Bangladesh was identified as highly 
vulnerable to climate change.  Under the Climate Change Vulnerability Index (CCVI), 
Bangladesh was ranked as most vulnerable country in the world to climate change in both 
2011 and 2013 (Maplecroft, 2011; Maplecroft, 2013). The CCVI ranking is based on 
indicators for exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity (ibid).  Bangladesh also suffers 
from a range of food insecurity and poverty issues, and some 40% of the population live 
below the food poverty line (WFP, 2014).  The availability of relevant data and information 
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was also taken into consideration, including practical considerations, and the feasibility of 
conducting fieldwork.  Following a process of deliberation, Bangladesh was selected as the 
case study country for the research.   
Bangladesh is also an interesting case study for adaptation finance as it has established 
institutions for climate finance, the Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund (BCCTF) and the 
Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund (BCCRF).  There is broad awareness of the 
linkages between climate change and development in Bangladesh, and Bangladesh is also a 
significant player in the UNFCCC negotiations as a Least Developed Country (LDC) 
(Hedger, 2011).   Furthermore, Bangladesh is also recognised as a leader in the field of 
community-based adaptation to climate change, having hosted a number of conferences on 
this subject.  For all these reasons, Bangladesh was selected as the national case study for the 
research. 
2.4.2. Analysis of household dataset 
At national level, CCAFS household survey was designed with the intent of developing 
simple, comparable cross-site household-level indicators for food security, household assets, 
agricultural production diversity and other indicators across 980 households in total (see 
Kristjanson et al., 2011; Wright et al., 2012 and Chapter 9).  The open-access dataset 
provided a useful resource for statistical analysis with SPSS Software.  
2.4.3 Semi-structured interviews with key informants  
At national-level in Bangladesh, key informants were identified for interview including 
representatives of various institutions involved in the climate finance architecture. Similar to 
the international-scale interviews, a series of open-ended questions were asked based on the 
research questions, informed by the literature review.  24 key informants were selected for 
interview based upon their knowledge and expertise on adaptation finance, and the 
stakeholder groups represented included those from international organisations, government, 
NGOs, academia and media.  It was more difficult to identify private sector stakeholders as it 
was noted in the literature review that private companies have not yet become involved in 
public adaptation finance in Bangladesh (except in the PPCR). Efforts were made to be 
sensitive to cultural differences and sensitivities, including dressing appropriately, as well as 
recognising the need to avoid ethnocentrism (Clifford et al., 2010).  As with international 
interviews, key informants were asked different questions depending on the relevant context 
and specific expertise of the individual.  
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The semi-structured interviews provided a degree of flexibility in exploring the research 
questions, while at the same time, making the most of the time available with the interviewee 
(Fife, 2005).  This enabled the interview to unfold in a conservational manner offering the 
participants the chance to explore issues they felt were important (Clifford et al., 2010).   
This flexibility was useful in order to explore and learn about new and emerging issues, 
particularly since climate change adaptation is an emerging and dynamic field.  The semi-
structured approach enabled “follow-up” questions to be asked where necessary to elicit 
further details about specific responses from interviewees (Wengraf, 2001).   At the end of 
each interview, interviewees were asked to suggest any further literature or provide related 
documents, if possible, which in some cases enabled further information to be gathered.  
Following the interviews, the content of the interviews was transcribed, coded and analysed. 
2.5. International Level 
2.5.1. Participant observation 
Drawing on ethnographic research methods, the international-level research at UNFCCC 
negotiations involved participant observation of the international discussions on climate 
finance. At the UNFCCC negotiations, attendance of the talks and registration as an 
‘Observer Delegate’ offered various benefits, enabling a combination of involvement and 
detachment from the international negotiations under the umbrella constituency for 
researchers known as ‘RINGO’s (Research and independent NGOs).  The following 
UNFCCC meetings were attended as an observer delegate: 
 UNFCCC informal sessions at United Nations Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), Bangkok, Thailand, 30 August-5 September 2012 
followed by the first meeting of the Adaptation Committee, Bangkok, Thailand, 7-10 
September 2012 
 The eighteenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP-18), in Doha, 
November-December 2012 
 Bonn UNFCCC Intersessional Meeting of the UNFCCC, in Bonn, Germany, June 
2013 
 The nineteenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP-19) in Warsaw, Poland 
in November 2013 
As recommended by Merriam (2009), participant observation was undertaken in this research 
with the aim of avoiding subjectivity and remaining sensitive to any effect the research may 
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be having on the situation.  Participant observation enabled first-hand experiential evidence 
(ibid) to be gathered of UNFCCC climate finance negotiations and decision-making 
processes. The UNFCCC is the primary forum for discussions relating to international 
climate finance.  Accreditation at the talks enabled access to government officials and access 
to various discussions which were not available by any other means. Other benefits included 
being permitted to view documents relating to the negotiations in this dynamic and political 
context.  Analysis of draft texts before and after the process of negotiation at Warsaw (COP-
18), as well as observation of meetings, enabled observation-based learning with an actor-
specific focus grounded in negotiations between human decision-makers (Hudson, 2005).  
Insights have thus been elicited drawing upon negotiation theory (Alfredson and Cungu, 
2008).  Other non-UNFCCC meetings which were attended included the 7
th
 Annual 
Community Based Adaptation Conference (CBA7) held in Dhaka, Bangladesh in April 2013 
and the 8
th
 Annual Community Based Adaptation Conference (CBA8) in Nepal in April 
2014. 
2.5.2. Semi-structured interviews with key informants 
In addition to participant observation, semi-structured interviews were undertaken with key 
informants. A series of open-ended questions were asked on the various key issues, informed 
by the literature review.  UNFCCC meetings provided a forum for identifying stakeholders 
for interview as this is the single most important forum for international climate finance 
discussions.  18 key informants were selected based on their knowledge in the field, and 
purposive sampling (Tongco, 2007) was used to ensure representation of different 
stakeholder groups in these interviews, including international organisations, civil society 
(NGOs), and media, as well as maintaining balance between developing and developed-
country government officials.  By participating at relevant conferences, as well as using 
‘snowball sampling’, it was possible to interview at least 1 high-level stakeholder involved 
with each of five major global institutions engaged in financing adaptation to climate change; 
the Kyoto Protocol’s Adaptation Fund, the Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience (under 
the World Bank’s Climate Investment Funds), the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and the newly-launched Green 
Climate Fund (GCF).    
This study utilised a purposive sampling technique due to the need to identify knowledgeable 
experts for interview (Tongco, 2007). This form of targeted sampling (Wilson, 2000) was 
identified as suitable for the case study research as key informants were identified based on 
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expertise and familiarity with the area of study.  Within key institutions, in certain cases, 
snowball sampling (also known as chain referral) was utilised for practical reasons because 
this enabled further access to officials or experts who might have otherwise proven difficult 
to contact.  Due to time constraints, at times the contact details of interviewees were taken 
and interviews were undertaken at a later date.   Documents and materials from the UNFCCC 
were obtained during the interview process and provided a source of primary material.  Semi-
structured interviewing was selected as a research method as it enables sufficient flexibility to 
approach different respondents differently while still covering the same subject areas (Noor, 
2008).  Thus, key informants were asked different context-specific questions, and additional 
follow-up questions were asked where necessary. 
2.6. Interpretation of Findings 
All semi-structured interviews were transcribed verbatim from notes and audio to maintain 
the quality of data. The next step in the process of systematic analysis of the data was a 
process of manual “coding” of texts, which describes the attachment of codes to segments of 
texts which represent signposts or labels to the transcription.  Drawing on Hay (2005), a two-
step process was adopted in which basic coding was initially done in order to distinguish 
overall themes, followed by a more in-depth process in which more specific patterns were 
interpreted. According to Denzin and Lincoln (2005), the initial coding phase in grounded 
theory is the first step in an analytic stance towards the data, and this gives a researcher 
analytic scaffolding on which to build.   A predominantly ‘inductive’ style of inquiry was 
adopted during the process of analysis, as this enabled new and emerging issues to be 
identified from the data rather than ascribing meaning based on preconceived hypotheses.  
This drew on ‘grounded theory’, which is often referred to as the “constant comparative 
method of analysis” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967:101).   
In Strauss and Corbin (1990), categories can come from the pool of concepts drawn from the 
literature review, while others are drawn from other sources or from phrases used by key 
informants themselves. Hence, the pool of concepts for analysis was ultimately developed 
using a combination of both inductive and deductive approaches.  Coding has a crucial role in 
analysing and making sense of data (Basit, 2010).  Coding was done manually in this study, 
because although this process can take longer (ibid), it was felt manual coding was more 
appropriate than computer-assisted coding due to the ‘open’ style of inquiry in which it was 
important for the codes to be flexible and in which new themes could emerge spontaneously.  
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2.6.1. Validity of Findings 
Yin (2009) argues case study research needs to be designed to maximise the quality of the 
research through four critical conditions; construct validity, internal validity, external validity 
and reliability.  These are described as evaluative standards for conducting case study 
research. There are various ways to increase the reliability of case study research, including 
triangulation through using multiple sources of evidence, multiple cases or cross-case 
comparison. With regards to ‘construct validity’ investigators can use multiple sources of 
evidence during data collection, to encourage convergent lines of enquiry (Yin, 2009) and by 
maintaining a ‘chain of evidence’ which provides validity in reconstructing the study from 
the research questions to the conclusions.  In this research, multiple sources of evidence were 
used throughout (for example, World Bank documents, stakeholder interviews, articles) while 
a cross-case syntheses was not done because a single case study country was used at national-
level. Moreover, multiple methods were also used to provide ‘methodological triangulation’, 
as described below. Use of multiple sources in data collection improves the accuracy, quality 
and trustworthiness of the research. 
Secondly, with regards to ‘internal validity’, it is suggested this can be achieved by pattern 
matching, explanation building, addressing rival explanations and using logic models (Yin, 
2009). In pattern matching, the chain of evidence results in comparison of predicted 
(theoretical) patterns with observed (empirical) patterns, and in ‘explanation building’ the 
theoretical pattern is modified by several iterations. In analysis of the case of Bangladesh, 
explanations were built up as it was observed that in various areas, initial theoretical 
statements or propositions from literature review were confronted with observed findings. 
Furthermore, alternative explanations for the findings were taken into consideration. It was 
crucial to consider alternative explanations due to the complex nature of the research relating 
to adaptation finance governance.   
Thirdly, ‘external validity’ is addressed by considering the extent to which results are 
generalizable beyond the immediate case study – an issue that will be addressed in the next 
section. Finally, ‘reliability’ is ensured by documenting the research procedures and methods 
that were used, to ensure that if these procedures were followed by another investigator, they 
would come to the same findings, including precise documentation of the data base (Yin, 
2009).  In particular, it was important to disclose when and how the evidence was collected 
and refer to any related circumstances. All of these standards are designed to mitigate bias in 
case study research, including the investigator bias.  
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2.6.2. Methodological Triangulation 
The process of triangulation is generally considered to be a process of using multiple 
perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an observation or interpretation 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2005).  As described above, this research used a range of different 
qualitative and qualitative methods to explore the research questions at multiple scales, 
including at national-scale in the case of Bangladesh.  Following Denzin’s framework of 
triangulation (1978), this can be described as a form of “methodological triangulation”, in 
which different methods are used to validate the findings.  From a post-modern perspective, 
triangulation was originally regarded as an instrument of validation, but is now discussed as a 
technique leading to deeper and broader understanding by recognising a plurality of 
perspectives (Flick et al., 2004).   
2.6.3. Generalisability of case study research 
The study does not assume the results obtained within the case study of Bangladesh are 
generalizable to other countries or contexts. A key disadvantage of the case study method 
relates to the limited external validity (Poteete et al., 2010).  On the other hand, the fine-
grained observations support conceptual refinements and theory development, and enhance 
internal validity and concept validity (ibid).  While other countries under similar conditions 
were taken into account and considered in the literature review, generalisation of the case 
study to other contexts is only possible to a certain degree and may depend upon context-
specific socio-economic and political conditions, which differ from case-to-case. Therefore it 
is accepted that the application of these results to other contexts may not be possible. 
Similarly, the results and recommendations from the international-level analysis do not seek 
to pose a generic framework, but to offer insights into a specific snapshot at a specific time. It 
is recognised the field of climate finance is rapidly-changing and the climate finance 
institutions, and their conditions, exist in a dynamic environment. 
2.7. Research Challenges and Limitations  
2.7.1.  Challenges of multi-scalar research 
The heart of the challenge posed by multi-scale analysis lies in the difference between 
microscopic analysis (focusing on community interactions) and macroscopic analysis which 
focuses on structural conditions and institutions (Moran, 2010).  In analysis, these scales are 
treated as largely distinct, while in reality there is interconnectivity between local-level 
process and larger scales, as well as between events in time and space (ibid).   Higher-level 
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institutions have an impact on the ability of local-level institutions to manage their resources, 
including for adaptation.  A challenge in this research was to recognise interconnectivity 
without drawing generalisations. Analysing the behaviour of coupled human–environment 
systems is difficult even where there is data available, due to the diversity of local conditions 
(Moran, 2010). To address this problem, insights were drawn from local observations without 
making the assumption that these were general in nature or could be applied elsewhere.  The 
problem of comparing within and between cases was overcome by having only one case 
study from the national and local-level, avoiding the need to compare between cases that may 
be largely incomparable.  Although mixed-level can be methodologically “messy” (Rousseau, 
1985) arguably this reflects the reality of policy and decision-making on environmental 
issues, as policy questions are always difficult to answer. Adaptation occurs at multiple scales 
(Adger et al., 2005) so while challenging, the multi-scalar research method was relevant in a 
context where international climate finance is used to tackle climate issues at local-scale. 
2.7.2. Challenges during participant observation 
One possible drawback of participant observation is that it resulted in the ‘Hawthorne effect’ 
(also known as the ‘observer effect’).  This is a psychological phenomenon whereby the 
subjects under study alter or modify their behaviour due to the fact they were being observed.  
The effect is not likely to have been significant because the UNFCCC climate change finance 
negotiations are already observed by multiple observers, except during closed meetings.  
Furthermore, researchers, as part of the RINGO constituency, are indistinguishable from 
other delegates at these meetings.  However it is accepted the observer effect might have been 
an issue in the local-level household survey, as discussed below. 
2.7.3. Challenges during field research 
The fieldwork in Bangladesh encountered a range of difficulties including, inter alia, 
challenges relating to translation, security, health issues and political uncertainties. The onset 
of field research (February 2013) coincided with the sentencing of various officials under the 
International Crimes Tribunal, which triggered political demonstrations. Travel around 
Bangladesh was limited during the ‘hartals’ (strikes) and fieldwork had to adapt to these 
circumstances. Accessibility to the rural field sites in Patuakhali was also hindered by the 
lack of paved roads and frequent river-crossings.  Other limitations to the study included 
available resources, time constraints, and attention to personal safety as a lone researcher.  
Another limitation was the language barrier, which necessitated the use of an interpreter for 
the duration of the fieldwork, raising the risk of mistranslation.  
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Every effort was made to reduce this risk by hiring of experienced and qualified interpreters, 
who were trained and given an orientation to the research. A trained interpreter was 
particularly important for FGDs, where it is vital to have good facilitation (Hennick, 2007).  
Furthermore, having a basic working knowledge of Bengali vocabulary also enabled the 
general topics of conversation to be followed during interviews and FGDs.  
An additional concern arose from the lack of availability of a local map in Kalapara. This 
limitation was overcome through the use of Google Earth to map the vicinity as well as the 
help of NGO representatives (as key informants) in identifying key landmarks (buildings, 
sluice gates and community boundaries) on the aerial map.  GIS software was used to 
produce a local map (Figure 1.2).  In addition, community members pointed out the location 
of relevant landmarks.  Thus, visual documentation was a part of the process of research 
triangulation (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). 
2.7.4. Challenges during focus group discussions 
As described above, FGDs were conducted with the main livelihood groups in the local-level 
case study.  Drawbacks included possible reactive or investigator effects if participants feel 
they are being watched, as well as the difficulty of generalising if small unrepresentative 
samples are used (Johnson and Turner, 2003).  Other drawbacks are that FGDs are time-
consuming.  To reduce possible observer effects, participants were fully informed the FGD 
was for independent research. Good moderation and facilitation was important, including 
development of a permissive, non-threatening environment where participants felt 
comfortable to share their views and experiences without fear of judgement (Hennick, 2007).   
Other challenges include potential domination of the discussion by the most vocal group 
members (Johnson and Turner, 2003).  This was avoided by encouraging all participants to 
have their say and contribute to the dialogue.  Elite capture of FGDs was also avoided by 
ensuring the representation of marginalised groups, and inviting less-vocal participants to 
speak.  Bias was also avoided through careful facilitation, alongside the trained interpreter.  
As noted previously, holding FGDs also enabled a form of methodological triangulation to 
occur (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005.) 
2.7.5. Reliability and validity of household surveys 
A potential response bias could have occurred if respondents had an expectation the research 
would result in activities by donors. Response bias occurs when respondents respond 
strategically to the questions to maximise their gains or minimise losses (FAO, 2003). Thus, 
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it was explained at the outset that the survey was for independent research purposes.   Social 
desirability issues arise if poor households try to downplay their poverty, and cognitive bias 
can occur if respondents fail to understand the questions (ibid).  Response bias (including the 
risk of social desirability bias and acquiescence bias) were avoided through carefully wording 
questions, and not using leading questions.  
There was a risk of ‘gender bias’ as the survey was targeted at households, and some 
households might have felt the husband should speak on behalf of the family.  Gender bias is 
a particular risk in Bangladesh, which was avoided by deliberately encouraging women to 
take part wherever possible.   40% of the final respondents were women and two separate 
FGDs were undertaken with women. At certain times throughout the day, representation of 
women was facilitated by the fact men were working. However, whilst efforts were made to 
avoid gender bias in the household survey, it was not possible to avoid a gender bias in 
interviews with local government because there were few women working in these positions. 
Other potential weaknesses include the risk of open-ended questions resulting in vague 
answers, and the problem of missing data (Johnson and Turner, 2003).  ‘Non-response bias’ 
can occur if the answers of respondents differ from potential answers by non-respondents.  
Households were approached directly to take part, but it is possible a few household members 
were absent, for example, due to ill-health or poverty, or if they had temporarily migrated for 
work.  In these cases, a possible non-response bias occurred. This bias was avoided as far as 
possible by asking respondents whether it was a convenient time to take part, and offering to 
return at a time more suitable for them.  It is accepted the risk of a non-response bias could 
not be removed entirely.  
2.8. Summary 
This chapter has outlined the methodological approaches used in this thesis, including the 
means of data elicitation, and analysis and interpretation of findings. Recognising that climate 
change is a problem that occurs at multiple scales, the study adopts a multi-scalar analysis to 
analyse the research questions at international, national and local-level. Bangladesh is taken 
as the national-level case study.  A case study approach has been described as being valuable 
for generating practical and expert knowledge (Flyvbjerg, 2006) and was used because this 
research question is grounded in contextual policy decisions.   
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Mixed methods were used combining elements of qualitative and quantitative research 
approaches, enabling flexibility in the design and selection of research methods.  Furthermore 
the research drew on systems thinking, built on an understanding of the integration between 
natural and human systems. The methods used for data elicitation included semi-structured 
interviews, participant observation, focus groups, and analysis of household survey data, as 
well as a comprehensive literature review.  The findings and conclusions have been logically 
derived from the case studies and related fieldwork. 
The greatest methodological challenges were in the use of household surveys and focus 
groups at local-level, as these interviews were largely reliant on translation from Bengali to 
English. Efforts were made to minimise issues relating to mistranslation by using experienced 
interpreters. Furthermore there were practical challenges during the fieldwork due to poor 
transport links and challenging political circumstances at times. Despite these challenges, the 
local case study provided valuable and practical insights into access and governance of 
adaptation resources in a local community that was highly vulnerable to climate-related 
hazards.  
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3. Adaptation, Mitigation and Food Security: Theory and Background 
3.1 Introduction to Adaptation and Mitigation 
Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which 
was adopted in 1992 as the basis for a global response to climate change, adaptation and 
mitigation are identified as two distinct policy responses to climate change.   Hence Article 
4.2 of the UNFCCC Convention states the developed-country Parties to the Convention will 
adopt measures on the mitigation of climate change by limiting “anthropogenic emissions of 
greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs” 
(UNFCCC, 1992) whilst Article 4.4 states that developed-country Parties shall assist 
developing-country Parties in meeting the costs of adaptation to adverse effects of climate 
change.   
Implicit in the UNFCCC Convention is the separation of adaptation and mitigation.  Article 
3.1 states that “on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities” the “developed country Parties should take the 
lead in combating climate change” (UNFCCC, 1992).  Thus, it is implied developed countries 
should take the lead in reducing emissions on the basis of their historical responsibilities for 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions since the start of the Industrial Revolution. The separation 
of adaptation and mitigation in international policy and negotiations is reinforced in the IPCC 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) Reports, where WGII (Working Group II) 
addresses adaptation and WGIII (Working Group III) addresses mitigation (Ayers and Huq, 
2009; Ravindranath, 2007). 
At COP-16 in Cancun, Mexico in 2010, Parties agreed to establish the Green Climate Fund 
(GCF) to distribute $100Bn of climate finance per annum by 2020, to support both adaptation 
and mitigation actions.  Article IV(A) of the Cancun Agreements takes note of the promise 
for $30Bn USD in new and additional financial resources for the period 2010-12 with a 
“balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation” whilst “funding for adaptation will 
be prioritised for the most vulnerable developing countries” (UNFCCC, 2010). The Cancun 
Agreements (1/CP.16, Appendix III) also state the GCF should address the objective of 
“achieving a balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation” (ibid).  Whilst the need 
for balancing adaptation and mitigation is recognised, integration and coordination between 
adaptation and mitigation has not been fully considered or implemented.  
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Box 3.1: Definitions of Key Terms (Source: IPCC, 2014)
Adaptation
The process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects.  In 
human systems, adaptation seeks to moderate harm or exploit beneficial 
opportunities. In natural systems, human intervention may facilitate 
adjustment to expected climate and its effects.
Mitigation
A human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of 
greenhouse gases.
Vulnerability
The propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected. Vulnerability 
encompasses a variety of concepts including sensitivity or susceptibility to 
harm and lack of capacity to cope and adapt.
Adaptive 
Capacity
The ability of systems, institutions, humans, and other organisms to adjust 
to potential damage, to take advantage of opportunities, or to respond to 
consequences.
Resilience
The capacity of a social-ecological system to cope with a hazardous event 
or disturbance, responding or reorganizing in ways that maintain its 
essential function, identity, and structure, while also maintaining the 
capacity for adaptation, learning, and transformation.
 
Adaptation can be anticipatory or reactive, and can be either autonomous or planned (IPCC, 
2007).  Whilst autonomous adaptation may take place by private individuals, public 
intervention can also be important in “providing the proper environment for adaptation… by 
stimulating research and development, diffusing information and making markets and policy 
conditions conducive” (OECD, 2008:44).  It is argued anticipatory, planned adaptation 
deserves particular attention from the international community (Klein and Tol, 1997). 
For mitigation, there are a range of policy measures that policy-makers can take including 
encouraging energy-efficiency, encouraging low-carbon and renewable energy sources, 
reducing fossil fuel emissions from transport, and reducing deforestation.  Moreover, it is 
recognised that energy access is a key priority to enable developing countries to develop and 
renewable sources will enable sustainable access to energy in the long-term, which can 
arguably strengthen adaptive capacity. The UNDP-WHO report recognises that almost two 
billion people need modern energy services by 2015 to achieve the Millennium Development 
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Goals (UNDP-WHO, 2009). Nearly 2 million deaths occur globally from indoor air pollution 
resulting from solid fuel use (ibid). Use of traditional biomass such as firewood also 
contributes to deforestation and this can make poor communities even more vulnerable to 
flooding.  Therefore, it seems appropriate adaptation, mitigation and sustainable development 
should be seen together in an integrated approach that explores linkages and trade-offs 
between these priorities. In terms of equity, there is a strong possibility that if developing 
countries insist upon a “right to catch up” in terms of emissions then this may push the world 
into “dangerous” climate change (Schneider and Lane, 2006:42) which demonstrates the need 
for mitigation and emissions-avoidance in developing countries. Participation of all countries 
to some extent is therefore essential for emissions stabilisation. 
It is also recognised in the IPCC that adaptation faces significant limitations and barriers, 
especially in vulnerable nations and communities. For example, in the worst case roughly 400 
million people (or about 8% of global population) are threatened by a 5-m rise in sea level, 
based on 1995 data (Nicholls et al., 2008).   Even if global warming is limited to 2
o
C, global-
mean sea level could continue to rise, reaching between 1.5 and 4 metres above 2000 levels 
by 2300, with the best estimate being at 2.7 metres (Schaeffer et al., 2012). Such rises would 
be difficult to adapt to.  Other extreme possibilities include the existence of climatic ‘tipping 
points’ at which the climate system will at some point cross a critical threshold and transition 
rapidly into a new state with some degree of irreversibility or non-linearity (Scheffer et al., 
2009; Lenton et al., 2008).   This could happen due to positive feedbacks such as rapid sea-
ice melt which causes further warming due to the ‘albedo’ effect.  Lenton et al (2008:1789) 
argue “a critical threshold for summer Arctic sea-ice loss may exist” and for the Greenland 
Ice Sheet it is suggested a critical threshold beyond which it eventually disappears lies at 3
o
C 
of local warming above preindustrial levels, a level possible this century, whilst die-back of 
the Amazon rainforest is predicted at 3-4
o
C of warming (ibid).  Drought and forest dieback in 
the Amazon would further amplify the drying which caused it and release CO2, though the 
threshold is uncertain (Cox et al., 2004).  Feedbacks in the climate system might make 
emissions reduction both more urgent, and more expensive than previously assumed.  
Adaptation is linked to several related concepts; vulnerability, resilience and adaptive 
capacity (see Box 3.1). Vulnerability is influenced by factors such as the development 
pathway, physical exposure, distribution of resources, prior stresses and social and 
government institutions (IPCC, 2007).  Poor, underdeveloped countries therefore have been 
recognised as more at risk to the impacts of climate change, with marginalised communities 
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within those countries particularly at risk. Key factors that increase vulnerability include 
geographical vulnerability due to prevalence of pre-existing climate extremes such as 
susceptibility to flooding or drought, dependence upon agriculture or natural resources, and 
low political capacity. Overall developing countries have a higher share of assets tied up in 
natural resources, since around 75% of people in developing countries live in rural areas and 
are dependent on agriculture for their livelihood (WFP, 2010).  Additionally, many 
developing countries are SIDS (Small Island Developing States). 
In the academic literature, both 'community-based adaptation’ (CBA) and 'ecosystem-based' 
adaptation (EbA) are discussed; with CBA focusing on empowering vulnerable communities 
to increase their own resilience, whilst EbA recognises ecosystems as the basis of life-support 
systems. Both approaches may be mutually reinforcing (Wright, 2010) particularly where 
communities’ livelihoods are based on ecosystem services. Climate change results in rapid 
changes to ecosystems and biodiversity, which is already subject to other anthropogenic and 
biological pressures, so conservation efforts may have to provide biological corridors within 
habitats for wildlife at the landscape-level so that biodiversity can be protected in a changing 
climate (RCEP,  2010).  
Climate hazards can either be sudden unpredictable rapid-onset shocks, like cyclones and 
storm surges, or slow-onset changes like temperature change or glacial melting that may 
build up to a critical point.  Even changes that appear to be slow-onset can be too rapid for 
ecosystems to withstand.  In relation to disasters, resilience is often determined by the extent 
to which “the degree to which the social system is capable of organising itself...learning from 
past disasters for better future protection and to improve risk reduction measures” (HFA, 
2005:4). This applies to both man-made and natural disasters. 
With regards to preparedness and resilience to climate changes, uncertainty in projected and 
expected climate changes make adaptation much more difficult.  Whilst countries agreed in 
the Copenhagen Accord to keep the increase in global temperature rise to below 2
o
C above 
pre-industrial levels (UNFCCC, 2009), so far the international community has not reached an 
agreement that would limit the temperature rise to 2
o
C.  More recent analysis shows current 
government pledges put the world on track for 3.7
o
C of warming (Hare et al., 2013).  The 
target of stabilising global greenhouse gases at 450ppm CO2eq in the atmosphere would 
itself only yield roughly a 26-78% (mean of 47%) risk of overshooting 2
o
C; still a significant 
risk (Meinhausen, 2005).  It is argued “mitigation and adaptation are not alternatives” 
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because even if rapid and deep cuts of emissions take place, the science suggests the planet is 
locked into a further 1.4
o
C rise (RCEP, 2010:3).  Thus, we face the challenge of adaptation 
even if mitigation is successful.  Only at levels around 400ppm (parts per million per volume) 
CO2eq are the risks of achieving the 2 degree target termed “likely” (ibid).  Others argue 
350ppm is a more suitable target, and if the present overshoot of 350ppm is not brief, there is 
the possibility of irreversible catastrophic consequences (Hansen et al., 2008). 
Rockstrom et al (2009) argue humanity has already crossed over the ‘planetary boundary’ 
when it comes to climate change. The authors also recommend the upper boundary of 
atmospheric carbon dioxide levels on earth should be kept at 350ppm. However the current 
status of the annual mean is currently upwards of 396ppm (NOAA, 2013).  Furthermore the 
change in radiative forcing has been found to have reached 1.5 watts per metre squared, 
whilst the proposed boundary is 1 W/M2 (ibid).  Global biodiversity loss is currently 
estimated at over 100 extinctions per million species years - 10 times the proposed ‘safe’ 
boundary level (Rockstrom et al, 2009).  Boundaries for the nitrogen cycle, stratospheric 
ozone depletion and ocean acidification have also been overreached (ibid) which are all 
influenced by global food systems. 
 
There is also a level of uncertainty in the climate models projecting the changes, making 
adaptation more difficult.  The IPCC 4
th
 Assessment Report (AR4) recognised the scarcity of 
data and lack of evidence of observed changes in Africa, Latin America, South-East Asia, the 
Indian Ocean and Pacific, which is possibly due to lack of access to data, lack of research and 
published studies, or lag effects in responses (IPCC, 2007).  The report recommended an 
improvement in observation networks and enhanced research capability in regions with 
sparse data (ibid).  There is particularly sparse local weather data in central Africa. Where 
forecasts are given, these “give only probabilities not certainties” and more distant forecasts 
are even less likely to be accurate (IASC, 2009:19).  Tropical convention currents, monsoons 
and the ENSO (El Niño-Southern Oscillation) phenomenon are not well understood.  Current 
models do not agree on the nature of changes in frequency or intensity of El Nino (Conway & 
Waage, 2010).  Furthermore, climate models have a low resolution making it more difficult 
to assess local impacts, for example when the resolution is 25-50km. Downscaling GCMs to 
the finer scale of local areas, for example using the PRECIS model, amplifies uncertainties 
(ibid).  There is a need for better, fine-grained models and better ground data.  All these 
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factors make adaptation more difficult.  There is a need to plan adaptation measures to cope 
with high levels of uncertainty. 
It is argued that even if rapid emission reductions take place, current concentrations of GHG 
emissions mean the climate will continue to change for decades to come.   Lowe et al (2006) 
found by modelling the Greenland ice sheet and thermal expansion that sea levels are likely 
to continue rising for more than 1000 years after greenhouse gas levels have stabilised.  
Furthermore, four-fifths of the energy-related CO2 emissions permissible by 2035 are already 
‘locked-in’ by existing infrastructure and capital stock, meaning that if stringent action is not 
forthcoming by 2017, there will be no room for additional power plants unless they are zero-
carbon (IEA, 2011).   
 
3.2. Adaptation, Mitigation and Sustainable Development: Interactions and 
Theory 
It is recognised economic development raises the capacity to adapt to climate change.  This is 
recognised under Article 3.4 of the UNFCCC Convention, which states “ economic 
development is essential for adopting measures to address climate change” and thus policies 
to protect the climate system should be “integrated with national development programmes” 
(UNFCCC, 1992).  It is argued “if people are better fed and in better health, and have access 
to education, jobs and markets” they will have capacity to be more resilient (Conway & 
Waage, 2010).  However, the path of economic development so far has also increased GHG 
emissions, thus creating a certain tension and complex relationships between adaptation, 
mitigation and sustainable development.  However, development may also increase the 
potential for ‘mitigative capacity’ - the capacity to mitigate. 
It is argued emissions reductions that hamper development could increase vulnerability to the 
impacts of climate change (Tol and Yohe, 2006, IPCC 2007).  Thus Goklany (2000) argues 
“aggressive mitigation would fall foul of the precautionary principle” (in IPCC, 2007:755).   
The economic impacts of mitigation could particularly impact on countries that are exporters 
of fossil-fuels, like Nigeria. This became the basis for the ‘“response measures’ negotiations 
under the UNFCCC Convention as Article 4.8 specifies the impact of response measures 
should be taken into account, including on economies “highly dependent” on fossil fuels 
(UNFCCC, 1992) . Under Article 1(b) of the Bali Action Plan (decision 1.CP/13) countries 
also agreed to consider the “economic and social consequences of response measures” 
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(UNFCCC, 2007).  This has become a contentious issue as some countries have opposed the 
inclusion of focusing on response measures or regarded it as inequitable. Moreover, AOSIS 
(Alliance of Small Island States) argued in 2011 there is the need to explore the “potential 
positive impacts of response measures… taking into account the growing literature on green 
growth” (AWG-LCA, 2011:1).  
 
Figure 3.1 Interactions between adaptation, mitigation and development 
The diagram above indicates it is possible for mitigation and development to conflict, where 
mitigation increases emissions or where a country’s economy is dependent upon fossil fuels 
and is undiversified.  However this tension between mitigation and development depends 
upon the type of development pathway under consideration. ‘Synergies’ are possible where 
mitigation has positive effects for economic development under a “green growth” pathway.  
It is also possible for sustainable development to increase capacity to mitigate and it is this 
elusive ‘sustainable development’ pathway that is the target of policy-makers.  Climate 
change and sustainable development also have to be understood in a ‘place-based context’ 
where we must appreciate there are multiple stresses apart from climate change, including 
population growth, economic and institutional changes (Wilbanks, 2003). 
Commentators have also argued it is inequitable for developing countries to make deep cuts 
in emissions when developed countries, with greater capacity, are not showing leadership. 
This is the crux of the North-South division in the climate negotiations, which recurred again 
at the COP-17 negotiations in Durban in 2011, where countries cautioned against any 
weakening of the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ (IISD, 2011). It is 
therefore argued developing countries ought to be compensated for taking a greener 
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development pathway and given the means, technical assistance and technology in order to 
do so. Provision of climate finance for mitigation and adaptation may thus offer the way out 
of this conundrum.  
In the IPCC-AR4 chapter on inter-relationships between adaptation and mitigation (Klein et 
al., 2007) the authors question whether adaptation and mitigation are substitutes or 
complements, and whether there can be synergies (or trade-offs) between them.  Synergies 
between adaptation and mitigation are “greater in some sectors (e.g. agriculture and forestry, 
buildings and urban infrastructure)” but limited in others such as coastal systems, energy and 
health (Klein et al., 2007:747).  This research will focus primarily on the food and agriculture 
sector, where synergies have already been identified as possible and practical.   There is a 
lack of “both conceptual and empirical information that explicitly considers both adaptation 
and mitigation” making it difficult to assess the need for and potential of synergies in climate 
policy (Klein et al., 2007:747).   
Whilst mitigation has hard, quantifiable outcomes, adaptation is necessarily qualitative in 
nature and it has been difficult to establish metrics for adaptation.  Since it is related to 
processes on development and disaster risk reduction, adaptation is “complex and messy, 
context-specific, and difficult to quantify” (Ayers and Huq, 2009:755).  Adaptation is less 
clear cut because it involves actions such as policy-based institutional arrangements, land 
tenure policies, infrastructure, irrigation, and also livelihood-based approaches (ibid).  
Furthermore it has been argued while mitigation efforts are effective at global level, 
adaptation is “primarily local” (RCEP, 2010:3).  Thus, adaptation and mitigation have been 
distinguished as distinct spatially, temporally and socioeconomically.  Mitigation benefits are 
usually perceived at global-level at long time scales, compared to adaptation actions which 
often occur at local-level over shorter time scales.  
 
Taking a ‘systems’ approach may enable us to highlight some key areas of inconsistency and 
incoherence in policy-making on climate change planning and finance.  It is clear that the 
realms of ‘adaptation’ and ‘mitigation’ are based on distinctions under the UNFCCC 
framework but that both of these ultimately remain part of the complex socio-economic and 
environmental system.  Fiksel (2006) argues a comprehensive systems approach is essential 
for decision-making with regards to sustainability, since industrial, ecological and social 
systems are closely coupled. To address this inherent complexity, Fiksel (2006:20) 
recommends development of modeling and decision-making approaches that support 
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“dynamic, adaptive management”, multi-objective decision-making involving trade-offs 
among conflicting goals, and simultaneous use of models that reflect different system 
interpretations or stakeholder perspectives.    
 
Figure 3.2  Schematic overview of inter-relationships between adaptation, mitigation 
and impacts.  Based on Holdridge’s life-zone classification scheme (Holdridge, 1947, 
1967; M.L. Parry, personal communication, Source: Klein et al., 2007 
In the diagram above, it is clear ‘no action’ on mitigation and adaptation leads to increased 
costs of climate change impacts.  This links us to the recent policy debates on ‘loss and 
damage’ that have emerged in the UNFCCC as a response to the perceived risk of insufficient 
action on both adaptation and mitigation of climate change.  
This discussion also links to climate finance allocation. Some have argued the spatial 
prioritisation of adaptation and mitigation should be different. For instance, in African 
countries, the impacts of climate change are so high that money might be better spent on 
vulnerability reduction than emission abatement (Tol, 2005). However, mitigation finance 
may also be better spent in developing countries where it will go further. Ravindranath  
(2007) suggests the costs of addressing climate change can be reduced by exploring synergies 
between adaptation and mitigation, because co-benefits are created.  Yet, there are risks in 
creating synergies between adaptation and mitigation, because greater institutional 
53 
 
complexity could limit efficacy (ibid).  Thus the net effect of investing in synergistic 
measures, with regards to finance, may be smaller than when half the money is invested in 
mitigation and half in adaptation (Klein et al., 2003). Further research would be needed to 
determine whether this is true. The IPCC states “large scale modelling of adaptation-
mitigation feedbacks is needed but still lacking” (Klein et al., 2007:756).  Modelling 
interactions is difficult and the complexity and inter-disciplinary nature of climate change 
explains why it has been described as a “super wicked” problem (Lazarus, 2008; Levin et al., 
2010). Overall, Klein et al (2003) argue it is contrived to identify synergies, and instead the 
focus ought to be upon integration of adaptation and mitigation with development.   
There has been effort also towards “mainstreaming” adaptation and mitigation into official 
development assistance (ODA), despite some concerns this would divert money from ODA 
away from more pressing challenges (Klein et al., 2007:768).   Klein et al (2003) argue 
mainstreaming is a more effective and efficient use of finance and resources than 
implementation of climate policy separate from ongoing activities. Yet, since development 
and the components of mitigative and adaptive capacity must also consider equity; equity is 
another important consideration, as well as efficacy.  
The term ‘mainstreaming’ has emerged to describe integration of climate adaptation and 
mitigation into national or sectoral development planning, to build efficiency.  This term 
emerged from development literature which sought to mainstream gender into development 
(Klein et al., 2003) through ‘gender mainstreaming’.   Later, the term ‘environmental 
mainstreaming’ evolved, promoting inclusion of environmental concerns into decision-
making of institutions that drive national and sectoral development policy, including, 
investment and finance (Dalal-Clayton and Bass, 2009).  Mainstreaming has been held to 
include ‘climate-proofing’ of development portfolios and investments (Tanner, 2008). 
However, a more holistic approach would also involve ‘adaptation as development’ which 
means addressing the underlying drivers of vulnerability (Ayers and Dodman, 2010). This 
may also mean mainstreaming adaptation into national development “policies, programmes 
and projects,” as well as external aid (Gupta and Van Der Grijp, 2010:77).  In terms of simply 
‘climate-proofing’ development aid, there is concern this could undermine progress made in 
integrating the OECD-DAC principles of national ownership and participation (Klein, 2008).  
There is also a danger mitigation has been somewhat sidelined in this discussion of 
adaptation mainstreaming. This mainstreaming of climate change in food security policies 
and provision may need to be addressed in further depth. 
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3.2.1. Trade-offs and Synergies between Adaptation and Mitigation 
As noted above, achieving synergies between adaptation and mitigation may develop co-
benefits that reduce the costs of policy action. Ravindranath (2007) explores the co-benefits 
achievable in the forestry sector through combining adaptation and mitigation.  Forestry 
mitigation projects often have benefits for increasing the resilience and adaptive capacity of 
ecosystems, biodiversity and endangered species.  Agroforestry also has potential to 
sequester carbon whilst reducing vulnerability of crops to climate change, whilst in other 
places forests and trees may act as buffer to increased cyclones, rising temperatures or 
extreme weather conditions.  Yet it has also been pointed out that where there are synergies, 
these may not be complete synergies. For instance, the tree species preferred for carbon 
sequestration may not be the preferred species for watershed management and biodiversity 
protection (Dang et al., 2003). 
 
In Vietnam, it was found feasible Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) options exist that 
have co-benefits for climate resilience, including water management for reducing methane in 
rice fields, protection of forests, forest nursing and regeneration, and small-scale hydropower 
(Dang et al., 2003). However some adaptation options, such as improving sea dyke systems, 
can lead to increased emissions or energy demand. Thus it is recommended that policy-
makers adopt a comprehensive national climate policy to strike a rational balance between 
mitigation and adaptation that maximises potential synergies through ‘mainstreaming’ into 
national policy (ibid). 
 
In supplementary material in Chapter 18, IPCC-AR4 (2007), authors provided a matrix of 70 
examples of adaptation-mitigation linkages. Of the 40 studies analysed for their impacts on 
poverty, 43% had neutral or ambiguous effects on poverty while 40% were consistent with 
poverty reduction (ibid).  While this list of examples was clearly non-exhaustive, it does 
indicate that a large number of mitigation projects do have potential for increasing adaptive 
capacity by reducing poverty. Please refer to Annex II for a table of theoretical examples of 
conflicts and synergies between adaptation and mitigation. 
3.3. Costing and Equity in Climate Adaptation and Mitigation 
The 2007 Stern Review offered a comprehensive assessment of the costs of mitigation 
compared to the costs of inaction.  It found that without any action on climate change, the 
costs of climate change could be equivalent to 5% of global GDP (Gross Domestic Product) 
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each year which could increase to 20% or more. By contrast, stabilising climate change at 
500-550ppm could cost just 1% of GDP by 2050 which is “significant but manageable” 
(Stern, 2007:644).  Further recommendations were that adaptation needs to be integrated into 
development policy and planning. 
The Stern Review was criticised for having a low discount rate, which was combated by 
commentators, like Nordhaus and Dasgupta (Nordhaus, 2007; Dasgupta, 2006).  Stern used a 
rate of 1.4% similar to that previously used by Cline in 1992 (Dasgupta 2006, Cline, 1992). 
Stern justifies the low discount rate on grounds of intergenerational equity. Furthermore, it 
could be argued that reducing consumption does not actually lower well-being. Therefore, 
when economists argue that we would have to make ‘sacrifices’ to lower emissions, some of 
these may not actually impact on well-being. This is evident in recent debates and discussions 
on GDP and happiness. Frequently we find economic models are ineffective in capturing true 
value of lives and ecosystem services. It has been suggested that a pure cost-benefit analysis 
must not be applied over and above a common sense approach.    
Biodiversity and ecosystem services are also not valued in the conventional cost-benefit 
analysis approach, meaning climate impact estimates are underestimates.  Neumayer argues 
the real issue is non-substitutable loss of natural capital; that is to what extent climate change 
inflicts irreversible and non-substitutable damage to and loss of natural capital (Neumayer, 
2007).  Arguably, the loss of natural capital cannot be substituted by growth in consumption. 
In many of the Integrated Assessment Models, the monetary valuation of health and 
ecosystems is not included because their monetary valuation is “speculative and uncertain” 
(Dietz et al., 2007).  Dasgupta (2008) also admits his viewpoint is anthropocentric and 
natural capital is not considered because the models do not consider it.  
The balance between adaptation and mitigation has been a source of tension and controversy 
in UN climate negotiations, where the use of aggregated market damages has been challenged 
by members of the South (Schneider and Lane, 2006).  This is because if the impacts of 
climate change were predicted to have a monetary gain in the North due to extending 
growing periods and yet a monetary loss of the same amount in the South, this could hardly 
be regarding as a ‘neutral’ outcome (ibid).  Cost-benefit analyses are therefore, 
conventionally devoid of equity considerations. Under the “market-aggregation-only” 
analysis, the loss of 80% of the GDP of Bangladesh amounts to 0.1% of global GDP.  The 
same criticisms could be applied to integrated analyses that compare adaptation and 
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mitigation as in conflict with one another, because models that show the ‘mitigation only’ 
scenario as being more economically efficient may not be considering the distribution of 
impacts. 
 
The IPCC states that cost-benefit models have been criticised for “ignoring the sectoral 
(economic and social), spatial and temporal distances between those who need to mitigate 
versus those who need to adapt to climate change” (Klein et al., 2007:754).  The IPCC-AR4 
concluded it is difficult to operationalise the notion of an “optimal mix” of adaptation and 
mitigation, because this would require the “reconciliation of welfare impact on people living 
in different places and at different points in time into a global aggregate measure of well-
being” (Klein et al., 2007:747). 
3.4. Planning Under Uncertainty 
As discussed previously, there are levels of uncertainty in adaptation to climate change which 
must be dealt with by decision-makers. Uncertainty can be due to the inherent uncertainty in 
the complex climatic system, lack of data availability in areas with few meteorological 
stations, and also due to the low resolution of existing climate models.  If these uncertainties 
are not considered there is a risk of ‘maladaptation’ for instance ‘under-adaptation’, ‘over-
adaptation’ (where investments were made that are unnecessary) or ‘incorrect adaptation’.  
Consideration of uncertainty, therefore, will be crucial in the effectiveness of climate 
adaptation finance (Ranger and Garbett-Shiels, 2011).   
 
Hence, experts argue it is logical to start with the adaptation problem on the ground itself 
rather than climate models in order to reduce the data and resources needed. Under the PPCR 
(Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience) there were efforts to integrate adaptation processes 
with existing programmes in order to improve coordination whilst exploiting synergies and 
co-benefits (Ranger and Garbett-Shiels, 2011). Decision-makers will also have to resolve 
trade-offs with other policy goals.  This supports the view adaptation must address core 
development objectives as a driver of underlying vulnerability (McGray et al., 2007) like 
poverty alleviation and sanitation. Furthermore, risk reduction to existing disasters should be 
strengthened. For example, disaster preparedness efforts in Bangladesh have arguably paid 
off since Cyclone Sidr (2007) had a lower mortality than an equivalent cyclone in Myanmar 
in 2008 (IPCC, 2014). 
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In terms of selecting adaptation options, decision-makers can weigh up the costs and benefits 
of different options and calculate a cost-benefit ratio using existing decision tools. However, 
other factors may be crucial to consider such as equity and distribution of benefits, 
environmental co-impacts, and robustness to uncertainty.  Measures that are highly robust to 
uncertainty are known as ‘no-regrets measures’ (Ranger and Garbett-Shiels, 2011). Yet it is 
clear that low-regrets measures may not be adequate (ibid); adaptation options may be non-
substitutable and in many cases may be complementary.  Adaptation processes can therefore 
be designed with built-in flexibility to address long-term uncertainty; for example, a sea wall 
with larger foundations could be adjusted later if impacts increase (ibid). Inflexible options 
should be avoided which could ‘lock-in’ future risk. For example, according to the typology 
developed by UKCIP (UK Climate Impacts Programme) adaptation is divided into four 
categories of options; low-regrets, no-regrets, win-win and flexible (UKCIP, 2011). 
3.5. Emerging Risks of Loss and Damage 
As discussed previously with reference to the costs of adaptation, mitigation and no action 
(see Klein et al., 2007)  there is a growing debate on the implications of minimal action on 
adaptation and mitigation on the potential for ‘loss and damage’ resulting from climate 
change.  Under the UNFCCC framework, this has led to calls by developing countries for a 
compensatory mechanism to address the residual damages caused by climate change, as some 
of these impacts cannot be addressed due to the ‘limits of adaptation’.   
 
However, UNFCCC negotiations have been fraught with tension and developed countries 
Parties have made it clear that any discussion of implications for additional finance is not 
under discussion. Although the Bali Action Plan (2007) contained an entire section on risk 
management and loss and damage associated with climate change, any association or mention 
of compensation or liability for loss and damage caused discomfort for industrialized 
countries (Warner and Zakieldeen, 2012).   COP-16 established a work programme to 
consider approaches to address loss and damage associated with climate impacts in 
developing countries as part of the Cancun Adaptation Framework in COP decision 1/CP.16.  
Thematic areas were agreed under the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), including a 
literature review and a technical paper on the impacts of ‘slow onset’ events 
(FCCC/TP/2012/7).  At SBI-34 in Bonn, 2011, the work programme was structured into three 
thematic areas: assessing the risk of loss and damage, approaches to address loss and damage; 
58 
 
and the role of the Convention in enhancing implementation. In COP-18, Parties agreed to 
continue the work programme to improve understanding of several key issues, including non-
economic losses and slow-onset climatic processes like sea-level rise (Huq et al., 2013). The 
work programme on loss and damage includes discussion on risk assessment and risk 
management as a key component, including disaster preparedness, risk reduction, emergency 
response and rehabilitation (covering the whole disaster risk management cycle) (Warner and 
Zakieldeen, 2012).  It has also been recognised that there is an opportunity for learning from 
good practices in the private sector - including the insurance industry. 
 
It is possible this discussion could reinvigorate existing efforts on adaptation and mitigation; 
but there is also a need for further research on important issues like the ‘limits’ to adaptation 
(Huq et al., 2013).    The topic is of key relevance to this research thesis, since any 
understanding of the effectiveness of adaptation will have to come to terms with the issue of 
limits to adaptation.  Drawing on the IPCC (2014), the following theoretical framework was 
drawn to illustrate the concept of loss and damage. 
 
 
Figure 3.3  Theoretical framework to illustrate the concept of loss and damage 
(Authors’ own) 
The issue of residual damage further emphasises the need for mitigation, as it can reduce the 
level of adaptation needs by reducing climate stressors (see Figure 3.3). 
3.6. Impacts of Climate Change on Food Systems 
Projections of population growth and consumption patterns have shown agricultural 
production will need to increase by 70% by 2050 to meet demand for food (FAO, 2010).  
More recent projections forecast a 100-110% increase in global crop demand from 2005-2050 
(Tilman et al., 2011).  World population is expected to grow to 9 billion by 2050, as well as 
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growing household incomes and demand.  Meanwhile, climate change is likely to reduce 
agricultural productivity and poses a particular threat to areas already suffering from food 
insecurity.  The effect is particularly severe when we consider almost 1 billion people 
globally are already suffering from food insecurity and malnutrition, with hunger being 
categorised as the greatest global risk to human health (WFP, 2012) and undernutrition the 
leading underlying cause of death in children (Bryce et al., 2005).  Climate change is 
projected to add another 10-20% to the world’s hungry by 2050 (WFP, 2009).  Considerable 
research has already been conducted on how climate change is likely to affect future food 
production, particularly focusing on mitigation potential, and crop yields under different 
climate scenarios (Rosenzweig & Parry, 1994; Lobell et al., 2008).   Climate impacts include 
long-term changes to temperature and precipitation patterns, production seasons, pests and 
diseases (FAO, 2010) as well as extreme events.  This demonstrates the need for further 
investment, research and institutional support to tackle these problems in coming decades, as 
well as research on adaptation policies and finance. 
In the meantime, global demand for increased food production, resulting from increased per 
capita calorific or protein content and increased per capita income, is forecasted to result in 
increasing trends of land clearing for agriculture (Tilman et al., 2011). Consumption trends 
such as the rise of meat and dairy consumption associated with rising incomes are known to 
affect global food security and the demand for agricultural production (Godfray et al., 2010).  
Future food security is threatened also by the depletion of rock phosphate that is used for 
NPK fertiliser, as phosphate deposits are projected to peak in production in 2030 and be 
depleted in 50-100 years (Cordell et al., 2009). A further threat is the rising oil prices.  Loss 
of soil fertility poses a major threat to agriculture and global mismanagement of soils may 
already cost €1 trillion/year (EC, 2009b). On top of this, loss of insect pollinators such as 
bees is looming as these pollinators have been affected by pesticide use (Whitehorn et al., 
2012), and yet are responsible for pollinating 84% of EU crop species (Williams, 2002). 
Rosegrant (2008) argues the world food economy now has to meet increased demand for 
food, feed and fuel.  If trends of greater agricultural intensification in rich nations and greater 
land-clearing in poorer nations continue, there will be a ~3Gt y-1 (Gigaton/year) increase in 
CO2e emissions (Tilman et al., 2011).  Therefore, there could be a positive feedback loop as 
increased demand results in increased land clearing and therefore increased rates of climate 
change.  A more sustainable pathway would involve sustainable intensification, moderate 
intensification focused on existing croplands, efficient management practices and 
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technological improvements (ibid).  Attaining high yields on existing croplands is important 
in this scenario. However, the achievement of high yields may be threatened and impacted by 
climate change itself, emphasising the need for an integrated approach to both adapt to and 
mitigate the impacts of climate change in agriculture. 
Thus, climatic impacts are additional to the other existing threats to food security, such as 
population, increased consumption and demand, soil erosion, and depletion of resources such 
as oil and phosphate. The various aspects of climate change include temperature impacts, 
precipitation changes, and extreme weather events.  The EACC (Economics of Adaptation to 
Climate Change) study by the World Bank found that changes in temperature in precipitation 
under both climate scenarios (the NCAR wetter scenario and CSIRO drier scenario) would 
result in decreased crop yields and production, with  irrigated and rainfed wheat and irrigated 
rice hardest hit (Narain et al., 2011). It was also found that South Asia shoulders the biggest 
losses in production (ibid).  
Food security is defined by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations 
(FAO) as; “a situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and 
economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food 
preferences for an active and healthy life” (FAO, 2002:49).  Four factors influence the food 
supply: availability, access, stability and utilization. Major attention has been concentrated 
so far on the impacts of climate change on the first factor, food availability, which is directly 
connected to food production (Ziervogel & Ericksen, 2010; Schmidhuber & Tubiello, 2007).  
These effects can be both positive and negative.  However, this might not be the most 
important factor in the way climate change affects food security.  Schmidhuber and Tubiello 
(2007) assessed the impacts of climate change across the four elements of food security; 
availability, stability utilisation and access. They found that almost all quantitative 
assessments find that climate change impacts significantly on food security. 
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Figure 3.4  Linkages between climate change and food security (Source: Ziervogel & 
Ericksen, 2010). 
The diagram above demonstrates there are multiple pathways by which climate change can 
impact on food security, through the various drivers. These pathways can theoretically be 
subdivided into positive and negative impacts, direct and indirect impacts, as well as into 
short-term and long-term effects.   
In terms of availability, climate change has a direct effect on agricultural productivity and 
thus food availability through changes to temperature, precipitation and weather patterns, as 
well as extreme weather. In terms of access to food, extreme events such as droughts or 
floods can damage infrastructure and limit access to food supplies.  Distribution of food to 
the marketplace is affected if roads and transportation are impacted by flooding, for example.  
Climate variability in the form of drought can also reduce the need for seasonal agricultural 
work and thus reduce the income of these daily labourers and their purchasing power in 
obtaining food.  These are all indirect ways in which climate change can affect food security, 
which can be difficult to quantify due to the inherent complexity.  Positive impacts are also 
possible, such as increased water availability. Particular attention must be paid to the work of 
Amartya Sen, who showed that food insecurity and famine is often linked to political and 
institutional factors including rights and entitlements (Sen, 1981; Sen, 1984). Income 
distribution and inequality are important in this regard. 
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On the third factor, food stability, food security is impacted by the volatility of food prices.  
Droughts, flooding and lost productivity all lead to increased food prices.  Other factors such 
as competition with biofuels, speculation, and export bans or protectionist reactions to food 
crises can promote the fluctuation of food prices. Price instability may mean producers do not 
have the confidence to invest in increased production.  Increasing food prices may also 
impact on the nutritional quality of dietary intake (Lake et al., 2012). 
Lastly, food utilisation can be impacted by changes to the nutritional value or quality of food 
produce, as well as food safety, caused by climate change. For instance, farmers might 
change their cropping systems to include new varieties that are more adaptable to climate 
change. This can cause impacts on the nutritional value of the diet. Elevated CO2 levels have 
been directly linked to lower nutritional quality of food (DaMatta et al., 2010) and new pests 
and pathogens also have impacts on food safety.  Food-related health problems like 
diarrhoea, which can be triggered by flooding and spread of water-borne disease, can affect 
food utilisation irrespective of food availability.  Increased malnutrition has been found by 
the IPCC to be a likely and significant impact of climate change on human health (IPCC, 
2007).   In fact, the term ‘ecological public health’ has arisen in recognition of the key links 
between environmental and human health underpinned by our food system (Lang, 2009). 
Food systems have been conceived of as a system ranging from production (field) to 
consumption (fork). There are marked differences between 'traditional' food systems with a 
local supply chain and 'modern' food systems which have many food miles (Ericksen, 2008). 
Availability, accessibility, stability and utilization may all be affected by the impacts of 
climate change. Globalised food systems can also be vulnerable to “income shocks leading to 
food poverty” (Ericksen, 2008:2).  As well as the severe impact on producers, there are also 
impacts of climate change all the way down the supply chain.  For instance, taking as an 
example the food and beverage sector in Asia, one study found that climate impacts can raise 
agricultural commodity prices, increase price volatility by decreasing yields, impact on 
availability, quality and price of key commodity inputs, with food commodity prices being 
particularly vulnerable to shocks from unpredictable extreme weather events (WRI, 2010). 
One case study of a sugar producer in India found that a 1% increase in agricultural input cost 
leads to a 3-10% decline in profits (ibid). 
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Figure 3.5  Conceptual Diagram to show the interactions between climate change and 
food systems, and appropriate responses 
There are potential impacts on food safety at all stages of the food chain, which have 
associated effects for food security (FAO, 2008) by preventing the utilisation of safe food.  
This includes the impact of wastage due to moulds and toxins.   The Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Point system could perhaps be taken as a model to look at climate impacts 
down the food value chain.  The benefits of this approach have been in enhancing food safety 
and preventing many cases of foodborne diseases, primarily in preventing human health risks 
(FAO, 2004), but the same could be applied to tackling adaptation and mitigation in a ‘life-
cycle’ approach. There has been some attempt to integrate climate adaptation into life-cycle 
costing and planning, where the costs of climate change can be seen under the ‘triple bottom 
line’ which includes financial, social and environmental costs (Allbee, 2009). Although 
previously life-cycle approaches have been used primarily to look at mitigation, life-cycle 
approaches can also be used for adaptation, for example identification of climate risks down 
the food supply chain (Koehler, 2012).  Feedback loops can also occur, for instance, 
adaptating the food sector may result in increased emissions from application of fertiliser 
(Bows et al., 2012). Synergies can also occur for example managing soil organic carbon, 
increasing water-use efficiency (WUE) and nutrient-use efficiency (NUE). 
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Overall, climate change has been identified as one of the greatest threats to the global 
economy and sustainable development in the decades ahead, and it is possible to identify 
many pathways through which this threatens food security. The triple food, fuel and financial 
crisis of 2008 may be a precursor for the future.   Climate change is projected to alter patterns 
of water availability by intensifying the water cycle (Stern, 2007), increasing rainfall intensity 
and variability, and increasing the risks of extreme events like flooding and drought in many 
areas (IPCC, 2008).  A rise in the sea surface temperature of 2-4
o
C is projected to lead to an 
increase of 10-20% in tropical cyclone intensities (Knutson and Tuleya, 2004). Impacts of 
sea-level rise include permanent inundation of low-lying deltas and estuaries, salinity 
intrusion and retreat of shorelines (IPCC, 2001). Salinisation and flooding particularly 
threaten agricultural systems in coastal areas (Hosterman et al., 2009).  However, in some 
cases increased evapotranspiration might be offset by the CO2 fertilisation effect (ibid). 
Climate change will affect different crops differently. C3 crops like wheat and rice can 
experience a CO2-fertilisation effect under experimental conditions, but C4 crops like maize 
do not (Schmidhuber and Tubiello, 2007). C3 crops respond to higher CO2 levels and 
increase photosynthesis while C4 plants do not. However, adaptation also depends on habitat 
changes and rates of movement. C3 crops make up the majority of species globally, 
especially in cooler wet climates, and include rice, wheat, barley, cassava and potato (and 
trees), while C4 crops include maize, sugar cane, sorghum and millet, important for many 
developing countries. Conversely, C4 crops are more water-efficient and respond better to 
water stress. C4 plants account for 20-30% of global terrestrial carbon fixation, even though 
under 5% of plant species use the C4 pathways (Osborne and Beerling 2006).  This illustrates 
a possible trade-off between adaptation and mitigation, as C3 crops may be more adaptable 
under higher CO2 but less beneficial for carbon sequestration. 
Changes have already been observed, for example, in South-East Asia, extreme weather 
events associated with El Niño have reportedly become more frequent and intense in the last 
20 years (IPCC, 2007). Agricultural productivity is sensitive to changes in hydrological 
regimes, as well as temperature increase (ibid), so farmers may have to adapt by changing 
crops.  Higher temperatures can also raise crop water demand and alter susceptibility to crop 
pests and diseases.   Changes in temperature, sea level, ocean chemistry and circulation can 
also affect fisheries and marine ecosystems (Roessig et al., 2004; Harley et al., 2006), and 
several tropical Asian countries, including Bangladesh have been found to be particularly 
vulnerable due to higher reliance on fisheries for national economies and diets (Allison et al., 
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2009).  It is also possible climate change could lead to ‘hypoxia’ or dead zones in the oceans 
(Gewin, 2010).  Thus climate change threatens fish resources, making it more difficult to 
increase productivity to meet growing demand. Changes to water resources are expected to 
affect agriculture and food security, since 70% of all freshwater is used to produce food, and 
thus the crucial interactions between food security, water security and energy security require 
consideration. 
3.7. Impacts of Food Systems on Climate Change 
Food and agriculture constitutes a major GHG-emitting sector worldwide.  Agriculture in its 
strict sense contributes around 10-14% of global emissions (IPCC, 2007a). In addition, 
emissions from land use change in the tropics, including logging and conversion of forests to 
croplands and pastures, were estimated at around 15-35% of global fossil fuel emissions 
during the 1990s (Jorgensen and Fath, 2014).   Land use change and deforestation are driven 
by demand for agricultural products such as beef and maize, as well as logging.   For 
instance, in 1999 in Brazil, increased world prices for beef, soya, beans and pig iron 
increased the incentive for deforestation by 33% over the following five years (Stern, 2007).  
In fact, four-fifths of EU soymeal imports come from Brazil and Argentina, where the 
demand has been a key driver of deforestation of 44.5 million acres of rainforest (FWW, 
2011).  Furthermore, the bulk of emissions from deforestation occur when land is converted 
to agricultural production since mature forests like dense tropical forests have high carbon 
stocks (Stern, 2007). Conversion to agricultural land often occurs by burning, a cheap way of 
clearing land.  Clearly, deforestation also makes species’ more vulnerable to climate impacts 
as habitat is destroyed.  In South America, the main drivers are farming enterprises selling 
beef and soya (primarily for animal feed) for export, whilst in South Asia oil palm, coffee, 
and timber are produced. Logging in certain areas (high value trees) also leads to road-
building which make forests more vulnerable to conversion to agricultural production (ibid). 
Global drivers include population, income, agricultural prices and subsidies. 
Agricultural emissions totaling 5.1–6.1 GtCO2e y-1 are basically made up of 3.3GtCO2e 
methane (CH4) emissions and nitrous oxide (N20) emissions of 2.8GtCO2e (IPCC, 2007a).  
Agriculture accounted for about 60% of global N20 and 50% of CH4 (ibid). The net flux of 
CO2 was minimal and described as “approximately balanced” with net of 0.04Gt, not 
including CO2 from electricity and fuel of agriculture or associated transportation.  However, 
high uncertainty remains about CH4 and N20 emissions in particular. The IPCC states the 
error margin for CH4 and N20 is in the order of 30-50%, with CO2 emissions from 
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agriculture and forestry having an even higher error margin (IPCC, 2007a).    Thus, 
uncertainty about global agricultural emissions is very high, emphasizing the need for further 
research.  CH4 emissions are 34times as potent as CO2, and N2O is 298 times more potent 
than CO2 over 100 years (including climate-carbon feedbacks) (IPCC, 2013), making 
emissions reductions from this sector potentially cost-effective.  
Hence it is possible that agriculture may amount to more than 30% of global emissions, 
which exceeds the amount coming from the supply of energy and electricity, or global 
transport.  Moreover, as recognized by the IPCC, transport emissions contain a certain 
percentage of food transport emissions.  For example, UK food transport emissions accounted 
for 1.8% of total UK CO2 emissions in 2002 (DEFRA, 2005) and accounted for 25% of 
journeys of heavy goods vehicles, but these would have been counted in the ‘transport’ 
sector. Other sectors (energy, transport) may thus contain a certain percentage that is 
associated with food electricity and fuel use.  Oil accounts for between 30-75% of energy 
inputs in UK agriculture, depending on the cropping system (Woods et al., 2010). 
Please refer to the Annex III for further discussion of emissions and mitigation in agriculture. 
Stern (2007:Annex 7G) argues compared to other sectors, “relatively little work” has been 
done on how to cut agricultural emissions.  Livestock emissions can be altered by factors 
such as the feeding schedule and feed additives.  Ironically, switching the diet for ruminants 
in the EU from roughage to concentrates was originally proposed as a cost-effective way to 
reduce GHG emissions in the EU (Bates, 2002) but this did not consider the life-cycle 
emissions of animal feed.  Reforming subsidies has not been effectively tackled as a way of 
reducing agricultural emissions and the EU still subsidizes agriculture, much of which ends 
up going towards intensive livestock farming (FOE, 2009; Westhoek et al., 2012). There is 
more on this in Chapter 6.   
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Box 3.2: Mitigation and food security conflicts: Case of EU Biofuels
Biofuel production as a low-carbon energy source may have resulted in negative impacts on 
food security in some places due to conflicts with land for food production.   Indirect Land 
Use Change (ILUC) can occur when energy crops are grown on agricultural land, resulting in 
higher food prices and forest conversion to agricultural land elsewhere (Searchinger et al, 
2008).  This can also increase GHG emissions (ibid).   Biofuels may have contributed to the 
2007-8 food price rises.  Rosegrant (2008) estimated that over 2000–2007, biofuel demand 
made up 30% of the average grain price rise; including 39% of the maize price rise, 21% of the 
rice price rise and 22% of the wheat price rise. Thus, there may be conflicts between 
adaptation (including food security) and mitigation, demonstrating that negatives 
consequences can arise from insufficient policy integration.
The EU Renewable Energy Directive (2009/28/EC) included a mandatory 10 % minimum target 
for the share of biofuels in transport petrol and diesel consumption by 2020 (EC, 2009). The 
Directive originally mandated a minimum of 35% GHG saving from biofuel consumed in 2009, 
rising to 50% in 2017 and 60% in 2018, compared to fossil fuels (ibid). This did not include 
emissions from ILUC.  Social sustainability criteria were also not set.  Article 17(3) states the 
biofuel should not come from land with high biodiversity value, including “primary forest”, 
protected areas, or “highly biodiverse grassland” or, in Article 17(4), lands with high carbon 
stocks including wetlands, forested areas with a canopy cover of over 30%, and drained 
peatlands.  However, critics noted a lack of verification and implementation measures. The 
EU Fuel Quality Directive (FQD) (2009/30/EC) mandates a lifecycle reduction of GHG 
emissions in EU fuels of 6% by 2020 (EC, 2009a).  Carre et al (2010) developed guidelines by 
which operators can determine changes in land carbon stocks based on IPCC guidelines, but 
there is uncertainty in many estimates, including uncertainty of +/- 100% for figures for 
conversion of degraded forests.
According to the GTAP model, the EU biofuel mandate caused world cropland to increase by 
0.07% (IFPRI, 2010).  Food prices rises caused an estimated loss of real income in Sub-
Saharan Africa of -0.12%.  Another study found biodiesel production from Malaysia and 
Indonesia would be increased by 24% and 23% respectively (Fonseca et al, 2010).  These 
countries are biodiversity hotspots (Melillo et al 2009) with high conversion of forests to 
palm oil.  Non-ruminant animal production would benefit from lower feed costs; which may 
cause another indirect impact on emissions. Andriana et al (2011) found biofuel plantations in 
Malaysia and Indonesia have led to water pollution, flooding, and conflict with indigenous 
communities, but created jobs. Biofuel from palm oil may be responsible for over 6.5% of 
deforestation in Indonesia and 2.8% in Malaysia (Gao et al 2011). Hence, this could affect the 
adaptive capacity of ecosystems. Under Article 2.4 of EC (2010), biofuel sustainability 
standards are harmonised at EU-level, meaning individual States cannot set stronger 
standards.  Standards come under Article 95 (internal market) of the EC Treaty. The 
justification for this is that differing standards could lead to trade distortions.  If standards 
were adopted under Article 193 (Formerly Article 176) of the EC Treaty, it would be possible 
for Member States to adopt more stringent sustainability standards (Douma, 2005).  
In response to these concerns, the Commission published on 17 October 2012 a proposal to 
limit ILUC and promote the use of advanced biofuels (such as wastes and algae) (EC, 2012a). 
Advanced biofuels can provide high GHG savings with low risk of ILUC, that do not compete 
directly for land with food or feed markets.  ILUC emissions are now included in the reporting 
of GHG emissions (EC, 2012a).  Under Article 7(b), the GHG saving shall be “at least 60% for 
biofuels produced in installations starting operation after 1st July 2014” (ibid).  Installations 
in operation before this date do not have to meet this target. Their GHG savings are set at 
35% until 31st December 2017.
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Overall, the food sector currently accounts for around 30% of the world’s total energy 
consumption and over 20% of global GHG emissions (FAO, 2011).  Mechanized farming and 
fertilizer production both require energy. Thus rising energy prices can impact on food prices. 
 
Figure 3.6  FAO Food price index against Brent crude oil price. (Authors Own, Data: 
FAO, EIA). 
Figure 3.6 shows the prices of food oils and cereals are particularly well linked to the crude 
oil price. This could be occurring partly due to the fact that the oil price index includes palm 
oil and soybean oil, used as feedstocks for biodiesel. Certain forms of biofuels can increase 
interdependencies between food and energy, since feed commodities are used for biofuels, 
and higher oil prices increase biofuel demand (Nellemann et al., 2009).  Biofuel demand also 
feeds back into increased water demand.  Thus, there is an emerging ‘water-food-energy 
nexus’ and a nexus-orientated approach, informed by systems thinking, may be required to 
identify mutually beneficial solutions without compromising sustainability (WEF, 2011).  
There are trade-offs to be made between technology options and solutions, for example drip 
irrigation is more water-efficient than flood irrigation, but more energy-intensive as the water 
is pressurized.  Inefficiency in one area can also lead to problems in another, for instance, in 
India it is common to leave irrigation pumps on all the time because of lack of energy 
security which contributes to inefficient water use (Hoff, 2011).  Arguably, understanding 
these inter-linkages could be vital to managing trade-offs and ensuring efficient resource use. 
3.8. Adapting and Mitigating through Climate-Smart Agriculture 
FAO argues potential losses due to climate change can be avoided by ‘climate-smart 
agriculture’ (CSA) (FAO, 2010), a term coined to demonstrate the fact that addressing the 
climate change impacts on agriculture will require both adaptation and mitigation.  Ensuring 
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food security, adaptation and mitigation has been described as a ‘triple-dividend’ or ‘triple-
win’ solution and methods for ‘sustainable intensification’ such as drip irrigation or inter-
cropping have been examined (Murphy, 2011).  Suggested improvements include soil and 
nutrient management, improved soil nutrient content (intercropping with leguminous plants), 
water harvesting and use, pest and disease control, preservation of genetic resources and 
seeds and reduction of post-harvest losses (FAO, 2011a). 
Soil carbon sequestration contributes to around 90% of the technical mitigation potential of 
agriculture (IPCC, 2007a) which can also promote climate-resilient growth in agricultural 
production.  Finance needs to be targeted to agriculture in order to capture these multiple 
benefits, reward synergistic action and leverage investment for up-scaling (FAO, 2009a). 
Based on experience with land-based carbon finance, it is estimated carbon finance revenues 
of $30Bn may incentivise US$150Bn of climate-smart agricultural investments in developing 
countries (ibid). However, CSA has come under fire from some civil society groups who 
oppose the inclusion of agriculture under the UNFCCC based on uncertainty in soil carbon 
sequestration science and suspicion about extension of carbon markets (Anderson, 2012).  At 
COP-17, text referring to agriculture under the UNFCCC was controversial since the text was 
under the ‘enhanced action on mitigation’ section (II.D, Art.75, Decision 2/CP.17) rather than 
adaptation section (UNFCCC, 2012).  
Box 3.3: The Case of Conservation Agriculture in Lesotho: Climate-Smart?
‘Conservation Agriculture’ (CA) is a farming method that involves three key 
characteristics; (1) minimal mechanical soil disturbance (2) maintaining carbon-rich 
mulch (3) crop rotation including nitrogen-fixing plants.  About 8% of global arable 
cropland is currently covered by these systems, ranging from small to large farms 
(FAO, 2010).  In Lesotho, conservation farming practices have transformed 
agriculture and made food systems much more resilient.  A planting basin system 
known locally as ‘likoti’ (Sesotho word for “holes”) has been adopted widely (Silici, 
2010). In dry conditions, the layer of mulch reduces evaporation of water, reducing 
crop water requirements and preventing soil erosion.  Studies in Lesotho found 
human capital (education and literacy) and social capital (trust and networks) were 
both important in the adoption of CA; confirming the relevance of education in 
adoption and diffusion of innovations generally (Silico, 2010). In some areas, maize 
yields by CA farmers were more than three times the district average yield for that 
growing season, and food security level were higher for the CA sample (ibid).  The 
human workload was found to be higher in the initial stages, requiring use of 
available labour, but this could also be spread out over time. 
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Adaptation technologies include sustainable water use and management (including efficient 
irrigation), soil management (including conversation tillage) and sustainable crop 
management (e.g. crop diversification and grain storage) (see Clements et al., 2011; based 
primarily on the concept of agro-ecology).  However while there has been an emphasis on 
‘hard’ technologies under the ‘technology needs assessments’ (TNA’s) under the UNFCCC 
framework (Wright, 2010), it is clear that both ‘hard’ technologies (infrastructure and 
hardware) as well as ‘soft’ technologies (practices and information) will be needed to ensure 
food security under the changing climate. 
3.9. Summary 
This chapter introduces key issues and terms. In summary, we can observe various 
interactions between adaptation and mitigation, including trade-offs and synergies, although 
these objectives have been distinguished markedly under the UNFCCC. Cost estimates have 
been used to compare the two, even though there are issues relating to equity. There have 
been recent efforts towards mainstreaming both adaptation and mitigation into development.   
Furthermore, adaptation and mitigation both interact with food systems. There are various 
direct and indirect impacts of climate change on food security. The literature emphasises the 
impacts of climate change on food availability, but more attention may be needed to food 
access, stability and utilisation. Utilising a whole system perspective we can observe this 
issue as part of a water-food-energy nexus, in which the climate change impacts often 
manifest themselves through water resources. Understanding these interactions can enable 
identification of integrated solutions for effective responses to climate change.  
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4. Community-Based Adaptation  
In the previous chapters we noted how adaptation to expected climate changes can occur 
through either anticipatory or reactive actions, and be either autonomous or planned.  In this 
chapter we will focus on anticipatory, planned adaptation that can be initiated and supported 
by organisations or local government.  This chapter provides background to the local-scale 
case study analysis. Community-based adaptation (CBA) is an approach which has emerged 
to guide and support the adaptation actions of local communities in the face of climate 
change. 
CBA can be defined as a bottom-up approach whereby a community is the main entity to 
implement adaptation (Sekine et al., 2009). It is a process which focuses on communities 
most vulnerable to climate change and is based on understanding how climate change will 
affect a community’s capacities and assets (Huq and Reid, 2007).  CBA generates adaptation 
strategies through participatory processes including local stakeholders and development and 
disaster risk–reduction practitioners (Ayers and Forsyth, 2009).  Community-based 
approaches have been found to be highly effective in agricultural development, where 
participatory approaches “have higher initial costs, but improved efficiency in technology 
development, capacity strengthening and learning” (IAASTD, 2009:204). In Malawi and 
Zimbabwe, it was found that participatory approaches improved efficiency and impact both 
in terms of technology development and “building farmers’ capacity for experimentation and 
collective learning” (Rusike et al., 2006:176). 
Indigenous knowledge, social capital and local context are important in determining local 
adaptation options (Sekine et al., 2009).   The literature on development and natural resource 
management posited that local participation and engagement are essential for success.  Reid 
et al (2009) argue that until relatively recently, adaptation efforts were ‘top-down’ with little 
attention paid to the experiences of local communities.  However, marginalised and 
indigenous systems, including local rice varieties, have been found to provide solutions for 
adapting to changing conditions like salinity changes (Berger et al., 2009). Yet there is 
evidence that indigenous systems for predicting the weather, for example the ‘litha’ system in 
Sri Lanka, may be falling out of use (ibid).  It is unclear whether this is because climate 
change is making such systems less reliable, or because modern forecasting methods are 
becoming more widespread since they are preferred by the younger generation (ibid).    
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CBA is seen as a process undertaken by people at community-level based on the principles of 
participation, empowerment, and consideration of local priorities, needs and capacities (Reid 
et al., 2009). In that sense there is a downward accountability of projects to stakeholders.  As 
described above, there is a need to integrate traditional knowledge with scientific knowledge 
and technology.  CBA draws on participatory disaster risk reduction (DRR) frameworks and 
community development work, as well as sectoral-specific approaches such as farmer 
participatory research and ‘Farmer Field Schools’ (Reid et al., 2009). The CBA approach 
recognises communities are facing many hazards and risks, including food and energy prices, 
market exclusion, unemployment, conflict and health hazards, and climate change is only one 
amongst these risks.   Integrating scientific and local knowledge is challenging since, for 
example, climate models are often uncertain or unavailable at appropriate resolutions. 
Often a community-risk assessment is used for grassroots adaptation assessment, focused on 
people’s vulnerability, livelihood, coping and adaptive capacity; for example the vulnerability 
and capacity assessment adopted by the Red Cross (Aalst et al., 2007).  This built upon the 
work of Sen which highlighted the significance of entitlements, as well as ‘access’ to 
resources as a determinant of vulnerability (Blaikie et al., 1994), and thirdly, the sustainable 
livelihoods approach (Aalst et al., 2007). Tools and methods, such as risk mapping and 
hazard calendars have therefore been adapted from the realm of community-based disaster 
preparedness (ibid).  Ebi and Semenza (2008) argue the theoretical underpinnings of CBA lie 
in the concept of ‘social capital’, in which the social relationships of a community enable it to 
achieve shared goals such as increasing resilience. Social capital can be; structural (through 
social networks), cognitive (consisting of norms and values), bonding (through homogenous 
groupings), bridging (connecting heterogenous groups), or linking (connecting different 
levels of power) (ibid). It is also important to consider the specific role of culture (Ensor and 
Berger, 2009) which can have a productive role in defining opportunities for adaptation.  
However, the term ‘community’ is multi-functional and can have various meanings 
depending on the context, so it may not be possible to devise a comprehensive definition 
(Sekine et al., 2009). Moreover, communities can have different objectives and can come into 
conflict either internally or externally. Therefore, it must not be assumed there is one single 
overarching decision or preferential option for adaptation to benefit all actors and 
stakeholders.  Instead, there may be a series of trade-offs that must be made in terms of costs 
and benefits for different actors. 
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4.1. Understanding Community-Based Adaptation 
4.1.1.Vulnerability and Local Adaptive Capacity: A Theoretical Framework 
Indicators have been developed for vulnerability and adaptive capacity (Adger et al., 2004) 
and under the NAPA’s (National Adaptation Programmes of Action), support materials were 
made available for identification of vulnerable sectors and stresses.  A ‘formal framework’ 
has been suggested as necessary for vulnerability (Ionescu et al., 2009).  Understanding 
vulnerability and adaptive capacity will help policy-makers understand how climate finance 
and policies can be best targeted to protect communities against the impacts of climate 
change.  Chapter 3 included definitions of vulnerability and adaptive capacity. Adaptive 
capacity can be seen as the inverse of vulnerability, since the lower the adaptive capacity, the 
higher vulnerability will be.  Determinants of adaptive capacity include not only economic 
development, technology and innovation, but also social factors such as human capital and 
governance structures, and community organisations (ibid). Please refer to Annex IV for 
further details on measuring risk and adaptive capacity. 
The tradition of sustainable livelihoods research has been applied in the context of climate 
change, and within this entitlements are an important variable. This research evolved as a 
result of the need to explain phenomenon such as food insecurity, for example, Sen showed 
vulnerability to food insecurity and famine is often linked to political, institutional factors and 
entitlements (Sen, 1981; Sen, 1984).  Livelihoods are conceptualised as stemming from 
capital assets that include ecosystem services (natural capital), as well as physical and 
ecological dynamics of risk (see Annex V). 
The goal of CBA is primarily to reduce vulnerability and increase the adaptive capacity of 
vulnerable groups.  Adaptive capacity can also be conceptualised as being made up of 
components of assets or resources, building upon the conceptual ‘sustainable livelihoods 
approach’ (SLA) (see Annex V; DFID, 1999). In the SLA, communities’ assets are made up 
of both tangible and intangible assets, including rights and entitlements. Therefore a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative indicators could be used to capture ‘adaptive 
capacity’.  Knutsson and Ostwald (2006) argue the different types of capitals can either be 
seen as substitutable with each other (for example, financial capital is used to buy physical 
assets), or they can be complementary; and the degree to which they are transferrable may 
depend on the context. Knutsson and Ostwald (2006) argue there is more flexibility for an 
asset to support a livelihood system when it can be transferred, because the actor can react to 
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changes in value.  McDowell and Hess (2012) support the argument the asset base is the 
foundation of adaptation; and vulnerability can be seen as a function of lack of access to 
assets or resources.  Furthermore, the asset base must be seen as dynamic and fluid, since the 
process of adaption can erode future resources or reallocate resources which may increase 
future vulnerability. 
It is argued that asset-orientated approaches which use assets and capitals as indicators, such 
as the SLA typically mask the role of process and functions in supporting adaptive capacity 
(Jones et al., 2010). Thus the ‘Local Adaptive Capacity (LAC)’ Framework which developed 
out of the Africa Climate Change Resilience Alliance tried to incorporate intangible and 
tangible dimensions of adaptive capacity (ibid) into a more holistic conception. The LAC 
incorporates institutions and entitlements, governance, innovation and knowledge as well as 
assets (Jones et al., 2010). Indicators are not yet available for each of the above features in 
the framework, but might be developed in due course. Further analysis of empirical data 
drawing on the SLA is shown in Chapter 9. 
It is argued the different determinants of adaptive capacity, as well as strategies to reduce 
them, should not be viewed independently. Paavola (2008) argues that complementary 
strategies are needed, including governance, since a single strategy, for example enhancing 
market participation, is not only about physical access to markets but also about institutions. 
Furthermore, ability to participate in markets depends on human capital in both tangible and 
intangible respects, such as health, nutrition, education and skills (ibid).  Focusing 
exclusively on market access might actually increase the vulnerability of the most vulnerable 
groups who rely upon the natural resource base (ibid) leading to the importance of holistic 
strategies recognising social, economic and environmental considerations.  
Pelling and High (2005) argue social capital offers a useful lens with which to examine 
adaptive capacity. Within this framework, the types of social relationships which make up 
social capital are defined as “bonding, bridging and linking” relationships, and “trust and 
reciprocity” are important elements (ibid:p.310).   Social capital may help communities to 
adapt to changes in the environment because they can draw on others for support or to take 
collective action to access resources, including financial or social support. Within the 
Bangladesh dataset (see Chapter 9), this may be one reason why larger households were 
found to be marginally more food secure, compared to those in smaller households. This 
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lends support to the view that having a large family is a ‘coping strategy’ for poor families, 
including substituting for a pension. 
Eriksen et al (2005) show that smallholder farmers use livelihood diversification as a coping 
strategy to respond to drought in Kenya and Tanzania. However, Eriksen et al (2005) 
differentiate between households with a ‘principal’ or specialisation coping strategy, and 
households without a principal strategy who adopt a multitude of less-favoured activities 
categorised as opportunistic and often irregular. The Bangladesh survey (see Chapter 9) did 
not differentiate between principal and complementary activities but still found association 
between production diversification and food security. Diversification is arguably a positive 
strategy for adaptation as it reduces dependence on risky agriculture (Paavola, 2008).  
Adger (2006:274) also notes that equity is an important consideration in vulnerability and 
adaptive capacity, since “unequal distribution of vulnerability to climate change is therefore 
exacerbated by pre-existing inequalities”. This demonstrates why equity considerations must 
be a key element for effective adaptation finance distribution and policies. The literature 
review on vulnerability shows there is a close interdependence between environmental risk, 
resilience of systems, and the political economy of development (ibid). 
Overall, vulnerability to climate change, like adaptive capacity, is not easily reduced to 
simple metrics and not easily quantifiable. Critics argue that statistical analysis fails to 
capture the social differentiation of local conditions that mediate capacity to adapt (Cutter et 
al., 2003). However, statistical analysis does show us there are common elements across 
multiple dimensions and conditions.  In this context, Rawlsian principles of justice, as well as 
rights-based justice rules, may play an important role in guiding action for climate change 
adaptation (Adger, 2006). In this case, both equity within decision-making, as well as equity 
in outcomes will be crucial in reducing vulnerability, leading to the notion of ‘fair’ adaptation 
which reduces the vulnerability of the most vulnerable. 
4.1.2. The Adaptation Continuum 
McGray et al (2007) indicate it is useful to distinguish between adaptation and development, 
since there is in fact a continuum of approaches from ‘pure’ development at one end to 
explicit adaptation measures on the other.   At the development end, activities often reduce 
poverty and therefore address drivers of vulnerability, including efforts to improve literacy 
and improve women’s rights.  At the other end, actions may focus exclusively on addressing 
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climate impacts, with a broad spectrum of activities in between. Overall, efforts to draw a 
distinct line between adaptation and development could prove counterproductive (ibid).  
 
Figure 4.1  Development and Adaptation.  Adapted from McGray et al., 2007 
However, this continuum also poses a severe dilemma when it comes to adaptation finance: 
how can adaptation be determined as “new and additional” when it is so difficult to 
distinguish between adaptation and development? One answer could be to ensure funding 
streams are additional in volume whilst recognising that many of the activities at ground-
level look like development activities. The question has relevance for CBA, because while 
policies proliferate at national-level (e.g. on climate and desertification), which can lead to 
duplication, households tend to adapt to multiple stresses in an integrated way (Stringer et al., 
2010).   
4.1.3. Adapting to Multiple Stressors  
Yohe and Tol (2002) argue adaptive capacity must be broadly defined not just as adaptation 
to climate change but to adaptive capacity to a range of stresses (ibid).  There is clear 
evidence smallholder farmers must confront multiple stressors, of which climate change is 
only one of the environmental stressors that necessitate livelihood changes. For example, 
McDowell and Hess (2012) argue limited access to assets amongst Bolivian smallholders 
leads to greater exposure and sensitivity to stressors and hence limits capacity to adapt.  The 
multiple stressors faced by smallholder farmers include land scarcity, since land is a limited 
resource under the category of natural capital which limits householders’ flexibility and 
adaptive capacity to the stressors they face (ibid). The multiple stressors also include market 
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risks created by globalisation (O’Brien et al 2004).   In this context, the onus of vulnerability 
is on the social and institutional frameworks that produce the underlying causes of 
vulnerability. 
The asset-based perspective on adaptation (ibid) can therefore be seen as the process of 
broadening access to assets, both tangible and intangible. Overall, since multiple stressors 
include factors such as climate stress, market stress and land scarcity, policy-makers must 
explore ways to tackle these root causes of vulnerability in the context of adaptation to 
climate change. This will allow a process of adaptive development that expands food security 
by strengthening livelihood opportunities in the context of access to resources, including 
strengthening social and human capital and enabling institutions. 
4.2. Frameworks for Assessing and Prioritising Adaptation Options and Projects 
Various frameworks have been proposed for implementing CBA, including steps such as 
situation analysis, asset mapping and resource mobilisation (see Ebi and Semenza, 2008). 
Please refer to Ju Hui et al (2008) for description of the application of UKCIP’s ‘Adaptation 
Framework’ in Ningxia, China. The UKCIP framework was developed based on standard 
decision-making and risk principles, and includes steps for appraising options and evaluating 
outcomes (IPCC, 2014). Consultation and understanding the local context were vital for 
ranking adaptation options (Conway, 2012a) but this local specificity may be a barrier to 
application of regional responses or comparisons across regions. 
4.2.1. Assessing and Evaluating Adaptation Options for CBA Projects 
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) for CBA is a relatively new field and there is much work 
to be done to evaluate the success of locally-driven adaptation. Projects may need a series of 
performance indicators and to outline their means of verification. It can involve a process of 
“learning-by-doing” known as adaptive management.   The IPCC-AR4 called on researchers 
to provide “effective approaches for identifying and evaluating both existing and prospective 
adaptation measures and strategies” (IPCC, 2007:161). As previously mentioned, there is an 
overlap between adaptation and development so indicators for adaptation could in some 
circumstances be similar to those developed for monitoring success in development projects; 
in other cases different or new indicators may have to be developed. Fussel and Klein (2008) 
argue M&E of adaptation is more difficult than for mitigation. Moreover, assessing projects 
is essential for developing and recording lessons learnt so these can be translated to other 
regions. For instance, UNDP’s ‘Adaptation Learning Framework’ hopes to capture and 
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disseminate lessons learnt in a global learning platform (AdaptationLearning, 2010). 
Monitoring is essential, because where experiences are not recorded or evaluated, lessons on 
what works are lost (RIU, 2008).  It is impossible to up-scale projects without M&E; and you 
cannot explore the impact or learn from mistakes without establishing baselines (ibid). 
McGray and Spearman (2011) suggest an approach based on an ‘adaptive learning cycle’, 
where the project is implemented by various steps, including vulnerability assessment, 
adaptation hypotheses, a theory of change, indicators and baselines are set, and then an M&E 
system is used which incorporates flexibility.  CARE (2010) argues M&E should be an 
integral part of the project cycle at each stage, not just at the end. In practice, there has also 
been an attempt to bring an actor-orientated perspective to adaptation actions and evaluation, 
including multi-criteria assessment (Downing et al., 2004). 
Overall, effective indicators and some new indicators will be needed to identify the success 
or otherwise of CBA. The community-based approach means there may have to be flexibility 
in design of M&E frameworks to avoid an overly constrained or bureaucratic approach, and 
for tools to be practical. There may be a trade-off between the simplicity of top-down 
approaches versus the complexity and realism of bottom-up approaches that incorporate 
socio-economic drivers of risk (Jones and Preston, 2010).  Developing frameworks for 
assessing projects will be essential for improving the efficiency of projects, saving time, 
guiding prioritisation of donor funding (which applies to either public or public finance), as 
well as dissemination of lessons learnt that can be scaled-up and applied to other settings. 
These frameworks for assessment also encourages the building of trust and confidence to 
enable policy-makers in developed countries to convince the electorate climate finance is 
being well-spent. Hence this will contribute to the necessary scaling-up of adaptation finance. 
4.2.2. Participatory Approaches and Tools 
There are several participatory tools used in CBA including seasonal calendars, timelines to 
assess trends, community mapping and modelling, transect walks, stakeholder analysis and 
participatory video (see Reid et al., 2009; CARE, 2009).  For example, in Climate 
Vulnerability and Capacity Analysis (CVCA), communities fill out a ‘vulnerability matrix’ in 
which they identify their most important livelihood resources and then rank the hazards that 
most threaten these resources (CARE, 2009). This is based on the formula for risk 
management (Risk = Likelihood x Impact).  The discussion is then taken forward to identify 
coping strategies for the most serious hazards. By getting communities to assess existing 
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hazards themselves, it indicates these hazards have a likelihood of affecting them, and the 
relative impact of these risks can be assessed.  
Vulnerability Reduction Assessment (VRA) is a form of participatory impact assessment that 
takes a semi-structured and context-informed approach, based on community perceptions of 
vulnerability to climate change. VRA is a community-based tool involving stakeholder 
meetings with the affected population to assess vulnerability to existing and future climate 
variability and identify barriers to adaptation, as well as community’s willingness to maintain 
the project.   VRA can provide information to guide adaptive management, as well as holding 
projects accountable to communities (UNDP, 2008). The indication of relative change in 
vulnerability is assessed through the “degree of change in the VRA scores relative to baseline 
values established prior to commencement of project activities” (UNDP, 2008:2).  There are 
limitations due to a possible response bias.  UNDP recommends ensuring a representative 
composition of groups in VRA meetings (gender, age and livelihood groups); and avoiding 
leading questions (ibid), but some other sources of substantial bias have not been addressed; 
for example courtesy bias (FAO, 1997) or social desirability bias.  VRA produces 
quantitative outputs from qualitative information, and relies on participants perceptions of 
vulnerability; and therefore is a somewhat subjective analysis. However, other indicators may 
be needed if a project does not reduce participants’ perceptions of vulnerability, but does 
have other positive outcomes, e.g. long-term adaptability of ecosystems. 
4.2.3. Emerging Indicators and Metrics for CBA 
CARE suggests projects assess improvements in adaptive capacity in areas of climate-
resilient livelihoods, DRR, local capacity development and addressing underlying causes of 
vulnerability (CARE, 2010).   Project-level indicators may be process-orientated as well as 
result-orientated, and there may be a combination of both quantitative and qualitative 
indicators, often disaggregated by gender or other determinants of vulnerability (ibid). A 
framework of milestones and indicators at each level is suggested, including household and 
individual level, local government and community-level, and national-level (CARE, 2011). 
Household-level tools will be particularly useful in designing a baseline survey.  
In designing goals and objectives, it is suggested in the literature these should be SMART – 
“simple, measurable, achievable, realistic and time-bound” (CARE, 2010:55) but some add 
the term “area-specific” (Candwell, 2002).   In selecting indicators and metrics, Candwell 
(2002) argues ideal indicators should be measurable, technically feasible, reliable, valid, 
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relevant, sensitive, cost-effective and timely.    Some indicators describe the input of the 
project, others describe outputs or document activities, whilst others measure impacts or 
effects.  Most indicators require a “standard against which to measure” (ibid:p.108), thus 
there is a need for a baseline survey or study with important data.  Moreover, there is a 
distinction between aggregate (broad) indicators and more specific ‘operational’ indicators 
which may be a subset of the aggregate indicators.  Many organisations develop a logical 
framework which is then turned into an M&E plan.  In “action research”, research tends to be 
participative, qualitative and reflective (ibid:p.130) allowing for reflection on unanticipated 
effects and learning from mistakes (Candwell, 2002).  
 
Figure 4.2  Dynamic and Shifting Baselines (Source: Authors’ Own) 
As shown above, climate change poses a challenge for development and project-based 
initiatives due to the problem of shifting and dynamic baselines. This means that the 
pressures of climate change (along with other pressures) may change the baseline over time. 
Therefore, projects will have to counteract negative impacts, although some impacts can also 
be positive. CBA exists in a dynamic situation and external pressures and forces must be 
understood.   These challenges confirm it may be difficult to develop a set of generic 
indicators or metrics for local-level adaptation. We need to understand the counterfactuals 
and existing socio-economic changes already taking place, so it may be necessary to integrate 
adaptation into existing development planning. 
4.3. Local and Traditional Knowledge in CBA  
Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) has been recognised as crucially important in 
adaptation, particularly in ecological resilience and conservation of biodiversity (Berkes et 
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al., 2000) although it is recognised not all traditional knowledge is ecologically wise (ibid). 
Practices may include monitoring the state of the resource, agroforestry, crop rotations, 
watershed management, buffer reserves, or types of social institutions (ibid).  There is a need 
to integrate and bridge the gap between local and scientific knowledge to build enhanced 
resilience (Blanco, 2006). For instance, in the Canadian Arctic, traditional knowledge can be 
seen as local-scale expertise; a source of climate history and baseline data; in formulating 
research questions; as insights into impacts and adaptation… and for “long-term community-
based monitoring” (Riedlinger and Berkes, 2000:315).  It has been suggested the term 
‘traditional’ is not helpful as it implies knowledge is old and static, while it can be dynamic 
(WIPO, 2008a).  As noted above, TEK can be threatened as well as supported by external 
forces. Combining local and scientific knowledge can provide results that are greater than the 
sum of both, but this may require institutional reforms to strengthen ‘common property 
management’ regimes (Reed et al., 2007).  Building synergies amongst knowledge systems 
may enhance equity and effectiveness in environmental governance (UNESCO, 2012).   
TEK is protected to different extents by international treaties and law.  This is important 
because of the international finance which is supposed to benefit these communities, for 
instance for resilient seed varieties, and the verification processes that must follow.  For 
instance, under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Article 8(j) each Party is 
required to “respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices or 
indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity” and “encourage the equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising from the utilisation of such knowledge innovations and 
practices” (CBD, 2012).   
The CBD has also resulted in the ‘Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the 
Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from the Utilisation of Generic Resources’ 
adopted in October 2010. The Protocol has 92 signatories including the US and UK. Parties 
must ensure the ‘prior informed consent’ of communities as well as fair ‘access and benefit-
sharing’. National focal points were established to ensure information, grant access or 
cooperate on compliance (CBD, 2012a).  
However various ‘gaps’ remain where communities are not eligible to be protected, for 
instance where collective knowledge is not recognised (WIPO, 2008). TEK can be difficult to 
protect under intellectual property regimes because it often fails to meet the criteria to quality 
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for protection of being “new, original innovative or distinctive” (Simeone, 2004:5) and IPRs 
(Intellectual Property Rights) may also rely on individual property ownership.  Since 
negotiating Parties at the UNFCCC are countries rather than communities, traditional 
knowledge often gets marginalised (Swiderska et al., 2011) including the role of ecosystems 
in economic evaluation of adaptation. 
TEK is particularly important for food security under climate change, because with the 
potential for climatic change to change the range at which crops are adapted to grow, the 
genetic diversity of traditional varieties sustained by farmers is valuable (Swiderska et al., 
2011). Specific examples of TEK include knowledge relevant to sustainable use of 
biodiversity, plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, and animal breeding and 
production (WIPO, 2008).  Traditional varieties are genetically diverse so may be better able 
than modern varieties to withstand environmental stresses (Swiderska et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, biodiversity may well provide a valuable source of germplasm for species that 
tolerate extreme conditions (ibid).  Communities may well be able to identify resilient 
practices as well as varieties. Community seed banks for traditional varieties have therefore 
been suggested for adaptation.  CGIAR holds the worlds’ most important ex-situ collections 
of germplasm for major food crops, and CGIAR centres agreed in 1994 to hold designated 
germplasm “in trust for the benefit of the international community… not to claim ownership, 
or seek intellectual property rights” (WIPO, 2008a:9). Furthermore, customary laws often 
protect traditional ecological diversity, and the recognition and integration of customary laws 
with statutory governance systems is suggested, for example for non-timber forest products 
(Laird et al., 2009). 
The Nagoya Protocol is also relevant because biotechnology has been suggested as an 
opportunity for scientists and plant breeders to develop new climate-resilient varieties. The 
Protocol requires countries to support development of community protocols - charters of rules 
and responsibilities where communities set out their procedures for access and benefit-
sharing, as well as legally-recognised and customary rights to natural resources and land 
(Swiderska, 2012).  It requires countries to avoid ‘bio-piracy’ by taking measures to ensure 
communities give their ‘free, prior informed consent’ over use of knowledge or genetic 
resources (ibid).  This could apply to measures to use TEK for adaptation, and to ensure 
climate-resilient seed programmes benefit communities. However, rather than protecting 
communities, critics argue the Nagoya Protocol legalises biopiracy as it treats utilisation as 
“for research and commerce” and enables transfer of genetic material from communities to 
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corporations (Shiva, 2012). The Nagoya Protocol has so far not come into effect as it has 29 
signatories (as of 2014) out of the 50 required for it to go into effect, and the US is not yet a 
signatory.   
Under the Aarhus Convention, otherwise known as the Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to justice in Environmental Matters the 
public are granted rights to access to information and participation in environmental decision-
making. However the Convention, which entered into force in 2001, has not been signed by 
many Least Developed Countries (LDC’s).  As of 2014 it had 39 signatories including the EU 
and UK (UN, 2014a). There is also a differentiation between public participation in decision-
making and community engagement in national strategies and technological development. 
Processes for public participation and freedom of information offer a potential means to 
uncover information relating to climate finance. 
4.4. Gender in CBA 
Climate change has gender-specific implications in terms of vulnerability and adaptive 
capacity (IPCC, 2007). Therefore it will be important to consider gender issues in CBA.   For 
further details please refer to the co-authored book chapter on this topic (Wright and 
Chandani, 2014) from which this section is adapted. Women play a unique role in managing 
natural resources globally including being involved in agriculture, and collecting water and 
fuel (ibid).  Overall, poor women live on the frontlines of climate change, but also possess 
knowledge that may hold the key to adaptation in certain places (UNDP, 2010 in Wright and 
Chandani, 2014). It is therefore vital gender considerations, and men’s and women’s different 
needs, knowledge and skills are considered when planning CBA. 
Cannon (2002) argues there are specific gender attributes which increase women’s 
vulnerabilities. For example, drinking saline water in Bangladesh increases maternal health 
risks during pregnancy (Khan et al., 2011). According to GTZ (2010), globally, women and 
children are 14 times more likely to lose their lives in a natural disaster. During the 1991 
cyclone in Bangladesh, for example, 90% of fatalities were women (UNDP, 2010). Girls are 
often excluded from activities such as tree-climbing that reduce risks from floods (Plan 
International, 2011). In many countries, women lack land rights or lack the capacity to access 
finance, technology, training and information to cope with climate-related disasters (see 
Wright and Chandani, 2014).   
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It is therefore argued gender issues need to be mainstreamed into CBA. Gender 
mainstreaming can be defined as the “process of assessing the implications for women and 
men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at 
all levels” and is arguably the most crucial step towards scaling-up CBA projects in a way 
beneficial for both men and women (Wright and Chandani, 2014:227). Rooke et al. (2009) 
argue: “there will be no climate justice without gender justice” (cited in Wright and 
Chandani, 2014:228).   
Furthermore, there is evidence linking gender mainstreaming to efficient project 
development. Investing in adaptation that specifically targets women may lower financial 
risks (see Wright and Chandani, 2014).  In Bangladesh, women have been pioneers in 
microfinance (ibid).  Furthermore, it has even been suggested meeting unmet demand for 
family planning could slow population growth, which could alleviate climate-related 
challenges, so there could be lessons to learn from population-health-environment (PHE) 
projects (see Wright and Chandani, 2014).   
UNDP (2010) recommends integrating gender considerations in all the stages of the CBA 
project cycle, right from problem identification to M&E (below).  Refer to Wright and 
Chandani (2014) for further discussion on this topic.  
 
Figure 4.3  Project Cycle. Source: UNDP, 2010 (in Wright and Chandani, 2014) 
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4.5. Mainstreaming CBA in agriculture in Bangladesh 
At present it is not clear to what extent CBA has been mainstreamed into agriculture, 
including funding agencies across different levels. Mainstreaming has been highlighted as a 
more effective approach than stand-alone climate interventions, and practical guidance now 
exists for policy-makers to mainstream adaptation into development, including in agriculture 
(FAO, 2012). Yet most guidance fails to clarify whether ‘mainstreaming’ is a bottom-up 
process through which successful CBA actions are replicated or scaled-up, or a top-down 
process in which government plans deliver pre-determined adaptation benefits. For further 
understanding on this issue, refer to the journal article on this topic (Wright et al., 2014) from 
which this section is adapted. 
Multilateral funds are in the early stages of integrating mechanisms for managing climate 
risks. The World Bank has guidelines for mainstreaming of adaptation into agriculture 
(World Bank, 2010) while the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 
recently established a fund for smallholder adaptation. IFAD’s new Adaptation for 
Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP) provides a new source of grant co-financing to 
scale up and integrate adaptation across IFAD’s approximately US$1billion annual new 
investments (IFAD, 2012).  This includes a range of CBA components; participatory 
mapping and vulnerability assessment, delegation of priority-setting for spending of 
adaptation funds to community groups, and mechanisms for community-to-community 
learning across administrative and geographic boundaries (ibid).   These experiences have 
implications for international climate finance institutions like the Green Climate Fund (GCF), 
which recognised food security as a key priority in its initial results management framework 
(GCF, 2014a). 
In Bangladesh, initial steps have been taken to mainstream processes and lessons from CBA, 
but there are various institutional and market barriers.  Bangladesh is at risk of increasing 
flooding, more intense cyclones and sea level rise in a warmer climate (Huq et al., 2003). The 
‘Livelihood Adaptation to Climate Change’ (LACC) project, under the Comprehensive 
Disaster Management Programme (CDMP), promoted livelihood adaptation among 
Bangladesh’s most vulnerable communities, implemented jointly by the Department of 
Agricultural Extension (DAE) and FAO (Baas and Ramasamy, 2008). Project outputs 
included learning lessons from CBA. The project assessed existing locally-specific risk-
coping strategies, and downscaled climate scenarios (ibid), intending to link local and 
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scientific knowledge. As reliable downscaled climate data was lacking, pilot projects focused 
on ‘no regrets’ options (Baas and Ramasamy, 2008).   
An independent CDMP evaluation found LACC was successful and proposed further 
embedding climate-related knowledge in forthcoming projects, but argued gender require 
further attention (Russell et al., 2009). A programme review cited information and 
communication gaps, including illiteracy, bias towards production of printed materials, the 
absence of a communications plan, and underuse of information and communication 
technologies (ICT) (FAO, 2010a).  To overcome this, a deliberate effort was proposed to 
mainstream adaptation in national planning (ibid).  Collaboration with the Agricultural 
Information Service was recommended (FAO, 2010a). The limited reach of extension 
services remained a barrier (ibid).  General lessons were that integrating DRR and adaptation 
into operational local-level frameworks is crucial - not establishing separate institutions 
(FAO, 2010b).  
A further project under the BCCRF (see Chapter 5) builds on lessons from LACC, including 
collaboration with farmer field schools, as well as improving community-based EWS 
(BCCRF, 2014).  The project seeks to focus on community-based adaptive research and 
participatory extension approaches, drawing on local knowledge to develop community-
based DRR plans (DAE, 2013).  There is nascent evidence of mainstreaming of lessons from 
CBA.  However, while CBA approaches are articulated in project documents, it is too early to 
explore whether this will be effective. Mainstreaming of adaptation in agriculture is on-going. 
Scaling-up CBA in agriculture faces social, institutional, policy, market and financial barriers 
(Wright et al., 2014). Communication and literacy gaps were also highlighted in other studies 
(Spires et al 2014).  Proposed solutions that may be cost-effective and institutionally feasible 
include better use of communications media; and tackling market barriers through trade 
reform. However, channels for scaling-up local adaptation are constrained by the reach of 
extension services.  Addressing the existing ‘development deficit’ will therefore be crucial 
(Parry et al., 2009).  
4.6. Adaptive governance and CBA 
Based on extensive analysis of large numbers of case studies of common property regimes in 
the 1980s, Ostrom suggests that bottom-up locally-managed systems are more likely to 
design governance rules to suit local resources than top-down systems (Ostrom, 1999; 
Ostrom, 2007). This observation has relevance for CBA. 
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Other scholars have used concepts like social-ecological systems (SES) to emphasise human 
society are nature are integrated in complex adaptive systems, and that delineation between 
the two is artificial and arbitrary (Folke et al., 2005).  The term ‘adaptive governance’ is used 
to describe systems with a capacity to reorganise or renew themselves during periods of 
abrupt change or turbulence (ibid).   However, this tends to assume the ‘system’ requires 
stability rather than change.  Recognizing the inter-dependence of political and ecological 
systems, a ‘political ecology’ framing could be useful for analysing CBA in agriculture, 
where people are reliant on ecosystem services. In the political ecology discourse, Adger et al 
(2001a) argue there is often a global ‘managerial’ discourse that argues institutional and 
policy failure are the ultimate cause of problems, and a ‘populist’ discourse that portrays 
local actors as disempowered victims. However, CBA narratives tend to diverge with these 
dominant discourses, emphasising the role of bottom-up governance and the importance of 
local knowledge for adaptation. 
As noted above, social capital may be a useful lens through which to view adaptive capacity. 
In CBA, we can consider both NGOs and local government as ‘bridging organisations’ that 
bridge local actors with other scales of knowledge on adaptation, as well as link to climate 
finance.  This forms a conceptual basis that may help us to understand the cross-scale 
dynamics in the case studies. 
The IPCC introduces the concept of ‘transformational adaptation’ - defining this as 
adaptation that changes the fundamental attributes of a system in response to climate and its 
effects (IPCC, 2014).  Pelling and Manuel-Navarrete (2011) propose a stylised ‘adaptive 
cycle’ in which social systems pass through four transitional states of institutionalised, 
scattered, mobilised and then polarised (which can then tend towards scatter). Dow et al 
(2013) argue ‘transformation’ may be needed to facilitate adaptation in the face of its limits, 
but recognise this can also be negative, for example, tolerating lower yields, or having to 
migrate.  By contrast, adopting a vulnerability perspective, this study argues 
‘transformational’ adaptation includes changes towards more inclusive governance that 
reduces vulnerability and enables CBA. 
4.7. In-Depth Local Study: Kalapara 
The area of Kalapara Upazila, Patuakhali District, Bangladesh has been selected for the in-
depth local fieldwork study. This area was selected for detailed study due to various factors, 
including the high likelihood of climate change impacts (sea level rise, cyclone, and salinity 
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intrusion), high incidence of poverty and food insecurity, and availability of data, and 
presence of adaptation interventions. Furthermore, access to community organisations and 
officials and data access were facilitated by organisations working in the area including the 
NGO (non-governmental organisation) ActionAid. Various projects are also being 
implemented in the area by a variety of agencies, including the Comprehensive Disaster 
Management Programme (CDMP) cyclone preparedness programme and a CBA project in 
Poshurbunia village. Furthermore, the Emergency 2007 Cyclone Recovery and Restoration 
Project (ECRRP) was ongoing to improve polders (embankments) and construct 
multipurpose cyclone shelters: the first project funded by the BCCRF donor fund.  As 
described in Chapter 2, a household-level questionnaire was undertaken. The literature 
review in this section informs the local-level results and analysis (Chapter 8). 
4.7.1. Vulnerability in Kalapara Upazila, Patuakhali District 
According to the 1991 Bangladesh census, Kalapara Upazila has a population of 174,921. By 
2012 this reportedly increased slightly to 212,835 according to the Kalapara Upazila Health 
Complex bulletin (MoHFW, 2012).The observed climate change data is found in Annex VI, 
which appears to show a gradually increasing trend in observed annual mean temperature, but 
no observable trend in precipitation. Kalapara is in Barisal Division, an area with high 
poverty. The poverty level in 2010 was between 21-27%. Malnutrition levels were also high 
at 10.2-11% in 2011. 
Salinity 
Salinity intrusion is an additional problem in this area, affecting freshwater supplies. Figure 
4.4 shows soil salinity levels in this area, using ArcGIS data from the Soil Resources 
Development Institute (SRDI). The salinity boundaries have moved inland since 1973.  The 
green area in the bottom left of the map is the Sunderbans forest. 
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Figure 4.4  Soil salinity levels in this coastal area of Bangladesh (Source: Authors Own, 
with data from SRDI, 2010) 
Cyclones 
Patuakhali was affected by cyclone 9 times between 1970-2007 and 34.41% of households 
were involved in agriculture and so were expected to be exposed to cyclones (UNDP, 2009). 
After Cyclone Sidr in November 2007, 98 primary schools in Patuakhali were fully destroyed 
by the cyclone and 550 were partially destroyed, with most affected buildings made from 
corrugated iron roofing and wooden pillars (ibid).  Therefore the plan to build multipurpose 
cyclone shelters has been welcomed. 
 
Figure 4.5  Figure to show the 
surge water intrusion in 
Kalapara due to breaching of the 
embankment during cyclone Sidr 
(from Choudhury, 2008) 
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During Cyclone Sidr, an estimated 611,125 people were affected in Patuakhali (CDMP, 
2008a), one of the worst-affected regions in Bangladesh.  In May 2009, the area was again 
ravaged by cyclone Aila, reportedly affecting almost 800,000 people in Patuakhali alone, 
according to the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management (MoFDM), including 93,695 
people in Kalapara (DMIC, 2009), nearly half the population.  
According to the district administration, 54,006 families became shelterless due to cyclone 
Sidr but only 23,639 of these families got new houses from government or donor agencies 
(Dailystar, 2012). According to the Water Development Board, at least 816km out of 1209km 
of embankment and 355 out of 412 sluice gates were damaged by Sidr (ibid). More than 
300km of flood control embankment and 33 sluice gates had yet to be repaired in 2012 (ibid) 
meaning 300,000ha of agricultural land were under threat. 
After the 1970 cyclone, shelters were built in Patuakhali.  However, only around 7.3% of the 
coastal population are protected with usable shelters (World Bank, 2010a).  ‘Pucca’ (solid) 
houses remain structurally intact during a cyclone and this can effectively substitute for 
cyclone shelters in areas with flooding less than 1 metre. Economic development may result 
in increasing numbers of these houses being built (ibid), since census data found those with 
annual incomes of $470 and above live in such houses.  
The multipurpose shelters constructed in the World Bank ECRRP project in the aftermath of 
Cyclone Sidr are highly economically effective with a capacity to shelter 1,600 people, 
costing around $214,000 (about $134 per person accommodated) (World Bank, 2010a). 
Focus groups have found people are more willing to access these shelters when they are 
closer, accessible, less crowded and have separate facilities for women and sanitation 
facilities (ibid).  
The mapping of vulnerable infrastructure in Kalapara, completed under the CDMP, is shown 
in Annex VII.  The CDMP surveyed a number of buildings in the area including 34 cyclone 
shelters, 109 schools, 4 colleges and 1 hospital (CDMPR, 2008) within data collection areas 
based upon the Risk Zone and High Risk Area zones as defined by the Multipurpose Cyclone 
Shelter programme and Sidr-affected areas.   37% of Kalapara is vulnerable to storm surges 
between 3-6 metres high and 38% is vulnerable to surges between 1-3 metres (CDMPR, 
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2008).  However it is important to note this report was based upon vulnerability to tsunami 
rather than long-term climate change trends or risks. 
Food security is a problem in this area, for example a study in 2010 in nearby Mirjagonj 
Upazila found 56% of marginal farmers were food-insecure and only 13% were food-secure 
(Uddin, 2012).  There was limited economic access to food and poor utilisation capacity due 
to lack of knowledge on human nutrition, as well as unhygienic water and sanitation. Farmers 
cultivated mainly rain-fed Aman rice and Aus rice, but were reluctant to use high-yield Boro 
because of lack of fresh irrigation water and lack of salt-tolerant rice varieties (ibid).  The 
Aman rice period (July-November) is susceptible to flood, cyclone and storm surges.  In 
terms of the vulnerability of different livelihoods in the region, crop farming was found to be 
most vulnerable to storm surges, followed by fishing, livestock and day labouring. 
Self-coping and assisted coping strategies to address storm surge were also summarised by 
Uddin (2012) who found all farmers coped with storm surges by decreasing meal sizes and 
number of meals, half of marginal farmers took a new loan at a high interest rate, and half 
would consume uncultivated food from wild sources like water lily, leafy weeds, and banana. 
Additionally, 40% would sell their fixed and moveable assets, while a few (20%) would sell 
their day labour at a low rate, and some would cultivate short duration crops like red 
amaranth, amaranth, and radish (ibid).  In terms of assisted strategies, the majority took relief 
food (76%) while half got food from communities and relatives in their social network, and a 
few resorted to begging. However, Bala and Hossain (2012) estimate the overall food 
security and ecological status was generally good in Kalapara compared to nearby regions, 
but environmental and social sustainability was hindered by shrimp aquaculture.  
4.7.2. Local Adaptation Activities  
The NGO Actionaid has been working on community-based adaptation in four villages in 
Patuakhali District in a project from 2008-2010 entitled ‘Assistance to Local Communities on 
Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction in Bangladesh’ with assistance from 
the Embassy of Denmark in Bangladesh (Raihan et al., 2010). The project focused on local 
government annual plans and budgets, development governance, and the main hazards 
(cyclones, river erosion, saline intrusion and tidal surge).  Researchers found adaptation can 
only happen through addressing poverty and basic needs first, concluding; “people cannot 
worry about their future when their stomachs are empty right now” (Raihan et al., 2010:9). 
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The project built on the emerging principles of CBA and helped communities to organise 
community research groups known as Gonogobeshona Dol (People’s Research Teams or 
‘GGD’) which worked with local government to produce Community Adaptation Plans 
(CAPs) (Christensen et al., 2012). This community-led research was based on the premise 
that communities are most suited to articulate their adaptation needs in a changing climate, 
and utilised a range of PRA tools (Faulkner and Ali, 2012).  
It was found saline water intrusion was causing uncertainty for farmers, putting traditional 
practices in peril, threatening water supplies through tube wells, and threatening the 
sanitation system (Actionaid, 2009) causing health hazards. This may force people to take out 
high-interest loans from NGO and banks which can increase vulnerability (ibid). There was 
reportedly migration into Charipara village due to river erosion, again causing migrants to 
take out loans (ibid). Rice cultivation is threatened and people reported salinity intrusion 
occurs when the winter starts, compounded by broken sluice gates and embankments, shrimp 
culture and insufficient irrigation, making fields more saline in the winter and part of the 
summer (ibid). Climatic hazards that threaten food security in this particular area have been 
mapped out in Chapter 8. 
The research by the GGD highlighted that crop activities generate more income opportunities 
for the poor than shrimp activities. Thus, along with advocacy, the government closed sluice 
gates to reserve sweet water (pani) in 16 canals to support Boro (winter crop) cultivation, 
piloting the use of saline-tolerant Boro rice using improved seeds from BRRI (Bangladesh 
Rice Research Institute) (Actionaid, 2009).  The project highlights the need for enabling 
factors to enable adaptation to occur. Project initiatives included homestead gardening with 
the Agricultural Department, climate-resilient latrines, raising pond banks to save sweet 
water, and provision of ducks and goats for alternative livelihoods (ibid).  During Cyclone 
Aila (2009) there was provision of emergency relief and advocacy work, but farmers in 
Poshurbunia and Charipara villages were particularly vulnerable having lost all crops (ibid). 
Recent developments in the area involved tidal waters washing away coastal flood-defence 
river embankments, compounding flooding and saline intrusion which caused damages to 
crops and homes (Dailystar, 2012a; Dailystar, 2012b). There were allegations regarding 
corruption in scheduled embankment repair works in Kalapara (Independentbd, 2012).  
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4.7.3. Local Flood and Salinity Management 
Flood and salinity management in Kalapara has historically been done through a system of 
embankments (polders and sluice gates). Embankment (polder) building in the coastal area 
has a controversial history in Bangladesh, with most being built in the 1950s and 60s by the 
water development board intending to protect agricultural land from saltwater. This process 
has been reversed with many polders being willingly opening to allow shrimp cultivation 
(Banglapedia, 2012) with environmental and social consequences for the population. A ‘gher’ 
is a small piece of land surrounded by a raised dyke. 
Between 1959-1988, 6,130km of embankment, 4,521 hydraulic structures and 985 river 
closures were constructed all over the country, but due to lack of maintenance most are in 
poor repair (Salahuddin, 1995). There was a focus on construction and technical aspects but 
according to Salahuddin (1995) there was lack of resources, staff, and facilities allocated to 
operations and maintenance (O&M).   
Polders have a high return on investment, with the internal rate of return of an LGED polder 
at 38% at prevailing market prices (Chowdhury et al., 2010), aiming to support rice 
production by reducing salinity, enabling ‘aman’ rice to be grown.  However, it is clear when 
polders and associated structures (including sluice gates) fall into disrepair, these advantages 
are not available. Under the ECRRP, various polders (embankments) are being improved in 
Kalapara with multilateral finance under the BCCRF (see Chapter 5). 
4.8. Summary 
This chapter explores frameworks for planned local-level adaptation to climate change under 
the process of community-based adaptation (CBA). Various theoretical frameworks were 
explored which may facilitate understanding of local-level adaptation including concepts of 
adaptive capacity, the sustainable livelihoods approach, and the recognition of multiple 
stressors affecting vulnerability.  Various frameworks have been used by researchers and 
NGOs to evaluate adaptation options at local-level, including participatory tools.  Overall it 
was noted it may be difficult to develop a set of generic indicators or metrics to evaluate the 
effectiveness of CBA since vulnerability to climate change tends to be context-specific and 
because the baseline is shifting as development takes place.  Therefore it was decided a 
generic set of indicators for CBA effectiveness would not be developed; instead this chapter 
provides insights into a number of issues that were valuable in analysing the local-level case 
study. 
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In particular, the chapter explored two themes that emerge in literature on CBA; the role of 
traditional ecological knowledge (TEK), and the importance of gender sensitivity.  TEK has 
huge potential for adaptation since local communities often have experience in adapting to 
changing climatic conditions, but this knowledge is often not recognised by institutions 
higher up, and without adequate legal protection it can also be misappropriated.  Gender 
equity is another crucial issue for climate vulnerability, yet problems relating to gender might 
be difficult to tackle if they are related to social barriers to climate change (both cultural and 
cognitive). 
Taking the case of Bangladesh, secondary literature was used to explore whether lessons 
from CBA projects have been incorporated in national agricultural planning. There is nascent 
evidence that experience with projects on livelihood adaptation have influenced policy-
making as recent projects have tried to mainstream participatory adaptation mechanisms. 
However challenges remain, including communication and literacy barriers to disseminating 
information. 
Finally, the chapter provides background to the local-level case study, where existing and 
projected climate-related challenges include salinity intrusion, cyclonic activity, and regular 
flooding. It will be useful to find out if one impact is experienced more than another by local 
people. The literature review reveals various emerging challenges relating to adaptation in 
this region, as well as for water management, which will be explored in greater detail in the 
local-level analysis (see Chapter 8). The locality is also highly vulnerable to food insecurity. 
Various interventions and projects already exist in this area to tackle these emerging issues, 
making this an interesting case study. 
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5. Case Study: Background to Climate and Food Security in Bangladesh 
5.1 Introduction  
Bangladesh has been recognised as one of the countries most at risk of dangerous climate 
change (Ali, 1999; World Bank, 2010a).  In the list of the most vulnerable countries compiled 
by Maplecroft, Bangladesh tops the list (ADB, 2012). Bangladesh is a densely populated 
country with a population of around 154 million (UN, 2014).   As the largest LDC (Least 
Developed Country) Bangladesh has had a period of significant economic development. 
Around 65% of Bangladesh is located in the Ganges-Brahmaputra Delta (Alam, 1996) - the 
largest megadelta in the world by population with 111 million people and the second most 
densely populated delta with 1,280 people per km
2
 (IPCC, 2007; Ericson et al., 2006).  
Deltaic regions, which are densely populated and low-lying, have long been recognised as 
sensitive to sea level rise and as ‘hotspots’ for vulnerability to climate change (IPCC, 2007).  
The delta suffers from a range of factors which increase vulnerability to additional climate 
impacts, including population pressure, tropical cyclones, flooding and the effects of coastal 
erosion.  Every 3-5 years, two-thirds of Bangladesh is inundated by floods, and around every 
3 years a cyclone hits which causes storm surges in excess of 10m (World Bank, 2010a). 
Climate change is expected to lead to sea level rise (SLR) and sea surface temperature (SST) 
increases, increasing the frequency and intensity of tropical cyclones (Khan et al., 2000). 
Salinity ingress and sea encroachment under SLR, compounded by high intensity cyclonic 
activity, could also affect freshwater supplies (Agrawala et al., 2003).  Flooding, salinity 
intrusion and soil erosion also have severe impacts for agricultural lands and rice yields 
which could affect food security (ibid).  1m SLR could inundate 17.5% of the country 
(Salwar and Khan, 2007) with the regions of Patuakhali, Khulna and Barisal most affected.  
Agriculture is the single largest sector of the economy, making up 18.4% of GDP and 
employing 45% of the population (CIA, 2012), with rice as the most important crop.  
Bangladesh is the fourth largest rice-producing country in the world (FAO, 2010c). Hence, 
agricultural development is important for reducing poverty and hunger, and the impacts of 
climate change in coming decades are recognised by the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) 
as a threat to economic development (BCCSAP, 2008).  Climate change will reinforce many 
of the baseline stresses which already impede economic development (Agrawala et al., 2003). 
CIF (2010) indicates that climate impacts include; sea level rise, cyclone and storm surges, 
flooding, drought, riverbank erosion, salinity and extreme events. This chapter takes the 
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various climate change impacts in turn and analyses the existing observable baseline changes, 
as well as projections into the future, before looking at adaptation finance and policy 
responses. 
5.2 Poverty and Food Security in Bangladesh 
Forty percent of the population in Bangladesh lived below the poverty line in 2005, which 
decreased from 48.9% in 2000, demonstrating development is occurring rapidly (World 
Bank, 2011). Poverty also decreased dramatically to 31.5% in 2010 (HIES, 2010).  Yet many 
coastal districts in particular, including Barisal, still suffer from extreme poverty. Barisal has 
one of the highest incidences of poverty with 39.4% of households falling under the poverty 
line according to the incidence of poverty (head count rate) by cost of basic needs method 
(BBS, 2010).  
Literacy in Bangladesh was 56% in 2009, which also increased from 47% in 2001 (World 
Bank, 2011).  Despite recent gains, Bangladesh still suffers from food insecurity. 45% of the 
population suffer from food insecurity (consuming <2122 kcals/person/day) and 23.9% suffer 
from severe food insecurity (consuming <1805 kcals/person/day) (WFP, 2014).  Average 
calorie intake per day in 2010 was 2,318kcal, which increased only slightly from 2,254 in 
1996 (BBS, 2010) and 37% of children under-five were underweight from 2005-2009 (World 
Bank, 2011). Research has cast light on issues about the reliability and validity of such 
household survey and food security data (FAO, 2003).  Yet clearly Bangladesh has made 
many recent gains: despite having less than half India’s per-capita income, Bangladesh has 
overtaken India on many indicators such as life expectancy and child survival (Dreze and 
Sen, 2013). 
Between 1999-2000, it was found 45% of children under five-years suffered from 
malnutrition (Rayhan and Khan, 2006) with the incidence 1.44 times higher in girls than boys 
(Choudhury et al., 2000).   Between 2006-2010, some 41% of children were underweight and 
43% under-fives suffered from stunting (defined as being below minus two standard 
deviations from median height for age) (UNICEF, 2013).  South Asian parents also show 
strong cultural preferences for firstborn sons (Nuwer, 2014) with impacts on malnutrition.  
With regards to nutrition, nearly one-third of women are undernourished (Ahmed et al., 
2012).  
Governance issues remain a challenge in overcoming poverty and food security, with recent 
political turmoil characterised by frequent strikes known as ‘hartals’ as well as conflicts 
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between the main parties over on-going war crimes trials.  Lewis (2012) argues that the 
extensive NGO sector in Bangladesh, including well-known home-grown NGOs such as 
Grameen and BRAC, have become comparable in size and influence to some government 
departments, and some argue NGOs’ power further weakens the ability of the state to serve 
its’ citizens.   
 
Rice is the staple food in Bangladesh, contributing 63% of calorific intake for urban 
consumers and over 71% for the rural population, while food expenditure accounts for nearly 
54% of average total expenditure (60% in rural areas) (WFP, 2014).  Thus food prices are 
linked to poverty and malnutrition, as people spend a large proportion of their income on 
food. Therefore, as well as climate change, people are also vulnerable to changes in food 
prices. Bangladesh is the top of the Nomura Food Vulnerability Index (Nomura, 2010) due to 
the large percentage of income spent on food, amongst other factors.  Rice prices are known 
to be associated with the prevalence of children being underweight, which may have been 
exacerbated by the financial crisis (Thorne-Lyman et al., 2010). Rice is important for the 
most vulnerable. Lower rice prices improve households’ ability to purchase more non-rice 
foods and therefore have nutritional diversity (ibid).  Rising rice prices put an intolerable 
pressure on poor urban and rural households, forcing them to lower consumption of protein-
rich foodstuffs and in 2008, FAO estimated the food crisis had increased the number of 
‘absolute poor’ by 7.5 million people and raised the prevalence of undernourishment by 45% 
(FAO, 2008a).The major cereal crops are rice and wheat, although the main focus is on rice 
production, covering 79.4% of the cultivatable land area (ibid).  There are three main 
varieties of rice; the rainfed ‘Aus’ crop with 10% of the area, rainfed ‘Aman’ crop with 51% 
of the area, and the increasingly important ‘Boro’ variety with 39% of the area (ibid). These 
rice crops are grown at different times of the year, with ‘aman’ rice grown during the rainy 
season between July and November. 
Agriculture grew from 1991-2005, with rice production increasing by 5.9% from 2006-7 to 
2007-8, as well as increased livestock and fisheries production (WFP, 2014).  The 
Bangladeshi economy has seen steady growth overall, with GDP annual growth averaging 
4% in the 1990’s (FAO, 2008a).  The main increase in rice production from 2006/7 to 2007/8 
has been in Boro production whereas Aman rice production fell, with wheat and Aus 
production remaining level (WFP, 2014).    Boro rice is produced during the ‘rabi’ (Winter) 
season from November to March (ibid).  Most areas allow three crops a year with the 
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exception of Sylhet, the western drought-prone areas and coastal areas. Since work for 
agricultural labourers is seasonal, the income and food security status of the poorest groups 
often varies on a seasonal basis as well, and is highly dependent on agricultural production. 
Oilseeds, pulses, fruits and vegetables are all nutritionally important, but there is evidence 
pulse production has declined over recent years.  In 2008, production of pulses reportedly 
declined from 523,000 to 279,000 tonnes in the eleven years to 2005-6 (ibid). Lentils make 
up 40.17% of pulses, with Khesari an additional 38.8% (WFP, 2014).  The main oilseeds are 
rape and mustard (FAO, 2008a).  Oilseed area also declined during this period, though 
production increased. 
Child food insecurity in Bangladesh has been shown to be seasonal, as well as being affected 
by climate-related disasters such as flooding. Research to monitor the effect of the 1998 
floods, above, found that child wasting more than doubled from the surplus season to the lean 
season (IFPRI, 2013). After the floods, the percentage of households that borrowed money to 
cope with a shock increased from just over 10% to more than 55% of households in affected 
districts.  Reducing the harmful effects of seasonal events will be crucial to build resilience 
(ibid). Thus it is found that hunger and agricultural livelihoods are both seasonal in 
Bangladesh. 
5.3 Climate Change Impacts on Bangladesh 
This section analyses each of the projected climate impacts in turn and analyses the observed 
and projected changes in terms of: temperature, precipitation, ocean acidification, glacier 
melt, sea level rise, flooding, intense cyclones and storm surges, and salinity intrusion.  These 
all have direct or indirect impacts upon the agricultural sector and food security, as well as 
for health, development, freshwater, and livelihoods. 
Table 5.1, below, highlights the observed and projected climate change for a range of factors. 
Further details on these climate change impacts can be found in Annexes VIII-X. 
Table 5.1  Impacts of climate change on Bangladesh 
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Impact O bserved Change and Current O bservations Projected Changes Under Climate Change
    Average monsoon-season maximum and minimum 
temperatures are increasing by 0.05°C and 0.03°C/year 
(WB, 2012)
     Temperature rise expands the range of many agricultural 
pests and livestock diseases (Schmidhuber and Tubiello, 2007) 
. Increased drought is possible in the North-east (Ahmed et al, 
2006)
    A SST increase of about 1°C in May and 0.5°C in 
November has been observed during the 14-year period from 
1985-1998 (WB, 2012)
     Most GCM models show increases of 2-3°C by 2080-2099 
compared to 1960-99 (WB, 2012).  Projections includes a  
0.9-2.6ºC rise by the 2060’s and 1.3 -4.1ºC by the 2090’s 
(Karmalkar et al, 2010)
   0.3 ºC rise since 1960 ºC in June-August (0.07ºC/decade) 
and a 0.5ºC rise in the Sept-Nov period (0.12ºC/decade) 
(Karmalkar et al, 2010). Between June-Aug there has been a 
32% increase in average number of hot days (ibid).
   Rising global temperatures impact on SLR, both directly 
through direct ocean warming causing thermal expansion, and 
also indirectly through melting ice sheets.  
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    Recent trends have seen increasingly variable and erratic 
rainfall (WB, 2012). Decadal rain anomalies have been 
above long-term averages since the 1960’s (IPCC, 2007).  
   Most GCM models show increases in monsoon rain (WB, 
2012). Increases in precipitation are most evident in the wet 
seasons (June-Nov), when the 5-day maxima projects 
increases by the 2090’s of 0-62mm in June-Aug and between -
7-49mm in Sept-Nov (Karmalkar et al, 2010).
  Average pH in the Bay of Bengal has fallen by 0.2 units 
from 1994-2012 (to 7.95) (Rashid et al, 2013).  Average Ca 
composition of calcifying organisms in the Bay of Bengal was 
80%, 17% lower than the standard composition of those 
species; the lower pH might have made molluscs vulnerable 
which may be why less were present (ibid).   Vulnerability of 
molluscs may have impacts on the next trophic level (small 
squids) and higher trophic levels like fish and marine 
mammals.  
 Rising SST and ocean acidification from higher CO2 are likely 
to affect coastal ecosystems and marine ecosystem services like 
aquaculture and fisheries (IPCC, 2007) with impacts on food 
security.  Increased atmospheric CO2 leads to decreased ocean 
pH which decreases availability of carbonate ions (CO-3) in the 
water, important for organisms like molluscs for calcification 
(Cooley et al, 2009). Molluscs and corals build hard shells and 
skeletons using carbonate ions and thus exhibit negative 
responses to calcification (Cooley et al, 2012).
  Acidification trends are found in the east Indian Sunderbans 
(close to Bangladesh), equivalent to trends in other oceans and 
estuaries (Chakraborty et al., 2013).  However, in the Bay of 
Bengal, mangroves exert a regulatory role on water pH as 
halophytes absorb CO2 for photosynthesis and shift  the 
equilibrium towards alkalinity (ibid).
 Ocean acidification and increased SST is expected to affect 
survival of coral reefs due to bleaching (IPCC, 2007).  Coral 
reefs can be found around St Martin’s Island (Rajasuriya et al, 
2004), a tourist hotspot, and it  is likely these coral species 
would vanish.
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  The 9 Himalayan glaciers listed in IPCC (2007) are receding 
at  5.1-135.2 metres/year. Himalayan glaciers are the source 
of water for the Ganga and Brahmaputra rivers which supply 
freshwater for Bangladesh (as well as India, Nepal and Bhutan) 
and these glaciers hold the largest body of ice outside the polar 
caps
 The IPCC’s claim the Himalayan glaciers were under threat of 
melting by 2035 was erroneous (Raina, 2010).  Fastest 
degeneration of glaciers was in Jammu & Kashmir whilst the 
lowest was in Sikkim (Raina, 2010).  The Siachen glacier, the 
largest glacier, has shown litt le change; it  is thought larger 
glaciers take longer to respond to temperature (ibid).  It 's 
premature to say glaciers are retreating abnormally; mass 
balance is primarily determined by annual snow precipitation 
(ibid).   
   Mean tide level at Hiron Point (Sunderbans region) has 
shown a trend of 2.5mm/year increase in May and 
8.5mm/yr increase in Nov whilst in Cox Bazar there has 
been a positive trend of 4.3mm/yr in May and 10.9mm/yr 
in Nov (Khan, 2000) .   During the cyclone months of May 
and November, there is an increase in the sea level 
increment.    
    SLR by 2050 would be 32cm, and by 2100 it  would be 88cm 
(Mohal et al., 2006).  11% more land would be permanently 
inundated over the next century (ibid).  However the model 
has limitations as it  is a fixed model that does not include land 
subsidence, erosion, accretion or adaptations (ibid).
   SLR in South Asia (Pakistan and India) is reported to be 
about 1mm/year in long term trends (Ali, 1996).
     1 metre of SLR could inundate 17.5% of the country 
(Salwar and Khan, 2007) although it  could be partially 
compensated by downstream sediment flows (CEGIS, 2010)
   Shum and Kuo (2011), using multiple-mission satellite 
radar altimetry, estimate observed SLR as 1.8-2.2mm/ year 
since 1900. Contributors included glacial isostatic 
adjustment and anthropogenic effects from dams.  
   Tol (2007) estimated 10% of dryland in Bangladesh will be 
lost by 2100, amounting to 5% of GDP (ibid). As with most 
studies, the study stops at 2100 although SLR will extend 
beyond this.   
   Hazipur Well subsides by 2.2cm/year (past 10,000 years) 
while the Hatiya Trough, Faridpur Trough and Sylhet 
Trough subsided at higher rates (Alam, 1996).  From 1959-
82, there was a seaward growth (accretion) at Noakhali, 
perhaps due to increased soil erosion, deforestation or 
changes in estuary circulation (ibid) but accretion may also 
be caused by “channel migration” meaning accretion is 
offset by erosion elsewhere.  Subsidence varies, from 
0.65mm/year at Dhaka to 20mm/year in Sylhet trough and 
over 30mm/year at Hayita Trough (ibid).   1.33 billion 
tons/year of sediment discharge through the rivers are 
needed to balance the subsidence  (ibid).  
   A range of anthropogenic and natural factors influencing 
coastal erosion, as well as climate change, and complexity in 
isolating the climate signal (see Appendix). In 1990, a 
Bangladesh Task Force estimated sea level change would be 
90% due to SLR and just 10% due to subsidence (Ali, 1996).  
However Walling and Fang (2003) argue the construction of 
reservoirs is “probably the most important influence on land-
ocean sediment fluxes”.   
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Impact O bserved Change and Current O bservations Projected Changes Under Climate Change
Bangladesh experiences regular flooding, inundating an 
average of 20.5% of the country annually which can reach 
70% in extreme cases like the 1998 floods (Mirza, 2002). 
 Karim and Mimura (2008) find a 2 ºC SST rise and 0.3m 
SLR would increase the flood risk area by 15.3%.  The high 
risk zone (HRZ) would require an additional 320 shelters to 
protect people during extreme cyclones (ibid).  
The 1998 flood caused an estimated 2-2.8Bn USD of 
damage; including 2.2-3.5m tons of crop damage, costing 
directly 5.5% of agricultural GDP and 1.5% of total GDP 
(with indirect effects of about 10% and 3% respectively) 
(ibid).  
For the Meghna basin (Eastern Bangladesh) the probability 
of a 20-year flood occurring increases tenfold under 6C of 
warming in the HadCM2 scenario (and a 20-year flood causes 
about 1.51m tons of crop damage) (Mirza, 2002).
18.5m people are currently exposed to more than 1m of 
inundation.  Under the baseline scenario, with population 
growth this increases to 28.3 million by 2050 (53% increase) 
while climate change increases this to 35.3m people by 2050 
(World Bank, 2010)
In 1991, the devastating storm in Bangladesh resulted in 
150,000 deaths (Ali, 1999).  In 1970, the cyclone killed 
approximately 300,000 people (IPCC, 2007).  1.4% of 
the world’s total cyclones hit  Bangladesh (Ali, 1996), and  
49% of the world’s total deaths due to cyclones occur in 
Bangladesh (Khan et al, 2000; Ali, 1996).  
 Increased SST is expected to intensify cyclone activity and 
heighten storm surges accompanied by strong winds 
(Dasgupta et al, 2010), especially since development of 
tropical cyclones is dependent on a warm ocean surface of 
over 27C (Khan et al, 2000).
 About 5-6 cyclones form over Bay of Bengal and 
Arabian Sea each year. May, October and November are 
the stormiest months of the year (Khan et al, 2000).
 Ericson et al (2006) found SLR increases the delta 
population exposed to storm surges from 44.9% to 47.3% 
and the area flooded from 47% to 49.8%;  affecting 4.7 
million more people.
  Frequency of intense tropical cyclones has increased, 
with the highest positive trend in November (Khan et al, 
2000). Intensity of cyclones reaching the ‘severe’ cyclone 
stage in November has increased by 20% per 100 years 
(ibid).  Frequency of severe cyclones increased faster than 
weaker cyclones.  
 Increased wind speeds over 10% of the 1991 severe 
cyclone would increase the storm surge level by 1.7 metres 
along the eastern coast of Bangladesh (Mohal et al, 2006)
 Singh et al (2001) found over 1877-1998 there has been 
an increase in cyclones in November and May.  The 
highest increase was in November with a 2X increase 
(ibid). Naidu et al (2011) state there is an increased 
cyclogenesis trend in Nov and May; with an upward trend 
in tropical cyclone power dissipation index (PDI) values 
which is at least partly anthropogenic.  GCMs suggest an 
increase in intensities of tropical cyclones, though there 
may also be a decrease in frequency (ibid).   
 Cyclone impacts will be worsened by potential SLR of 
27cm by 2050 (World Bank, 2010) and 10% intensification 
of wind speed by 2050 (Dasgupta et al, 2011).  By 2050 
there will be a 69% increase in the vulnerable zone with 3m 
inundation and 14% increase in the vulnerable zone with 1m 
inundation (Dasgupta et al, 2010).  8.06 million people in 
coastal Bangladesh are vulnerable to storm surges over 1m 
which will increase by 110% with climate change and 
population growth in absence of adaptation.  The model 
assumed 1% population growth p.a. and 6-8% GDP 
growth/year (ibid).
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Soil salinity generally increases rapidly in winter months 
and reaches maximum values in April (Huq et al, 1999). 
Some salinity intrusion may have resulted from the 
building of the Farakka barrage in 1975 (Mirza, 1998).
 Under the severe climate change scenario, more areas 
would be severely affected by soil salinity and this land would 
become unsuitable for a number of crops (Huq et al, 1999)
F
lo
o
d
in
g
E
x
tr
em
e 
ev
en
ts
; 
cy
cl
o
n
es
 a
n
d
 s
to
rm
 s
u
rg
es
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
101 
 
Uncertainty in climate models 
New et al (2012) explain that over the Indian subcontinent, a major obstacle for deriving 
reliable projections arises from the difficulties climate models have in simulating the summer 
monsoon.  The monsoon in the Ingo-Gangetic plains region is subject to the influence of a 
variety of tropical and extra-tropical phenomena and exhibits substantial variability at sub-
seasonal and interannual time scales (ibid).  New et al (2012) explain the warm phase (El 
Niño) of El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) is frequently associated with a weakening of 
the Indian (South Asian) monsoon with an overall reduction in rainfall, while the cold phase 
(La Niña) is associated with the strengthening of the monsoon. Moreover, the Indian Ocean 
Dipole (IOD) plays an important role as a modulator of the Indian monsoon rainfall, and 
influences the correlation between the monsoon rainfall and ENSO (ibid).  Studies have 
shown coupled atmosphere–ocean GCMs perform better in simulating the monsoon (ibid).  
Annamalai et al (2007:1082) find that out of the 18 GCM models used in the IPCC AR4, only 
six out of these have a reasonably realistic representation of monsoon precipitation 
climatology and only four (GFDL_CM_2.0, GFDL_CM_2.1, MRI, and MPI_ECHAM5) 
exhibit a “realistic representation of the ENSO-monsoon relationship”.  Similarly, Roxy et al 
(2013) show that only the GFDL-CM2.0 and GFDL-CM2.1 models simulate both ENSO and 
ENSO Modoki patterns as important modes in summer months, and only one model, GFDL-
CM2.0, captures both the Modoki and ENSO modes realistically for both summer and winter 
during the last 30 years of the 20C3M. 
However, different models seem to be more accurate when it comes to temperature and 
precipitation.  Analysing data on the mean absolute error of these models, which is a measure 
of agreement between GCM models and observed values, New et al (2012) found that the 
GFDL-CM2.0 and MIROC3_2_MEDRES models had less error when it came to 
precipitation, but that the CSIRO_MK3_5 and MPI_ECHAM5 models had less error for 
temperature.   Thus it is hard to identify which model or models are better than others (ibid).  
New et al (2012) shows that all models project a later onset of the monsoon by several days 
in the 2050s and 2090s.  
5.3.1. Historical climate change and weather trends 
Bangladesh has four prominent seasons; winter (December to February), pre-monsoon 
(March to May), monsoon (June to early October) and post-monsoon (late-October to 
November (Agrawala et al., 2003). Winter is generally cooler and drier. Moreover the 
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southern districts are 5ºC warmer (Agrawala et al., 2003). The monsoon brings heavy 
torrential rainfall and more than 80% of annual precipitation falls during this period (ibid).  
Cyclones and associated storm surges can occur in the pre-monsoon or post-monsoon 
periods. The devastating cyclones originate in the Bay of Bengal from April to May as well 
as September to November (Karmalkar et al., 2010).  
5.3.2. Sea Level Rise (SLR) 
Quantitative data on sea level rise in Bangladesh can be difficult to find, and observations and 
projections vary (see table above). Overall subsidence and coastal erosion can be caused by a 
variety of factors including natural subsidence due to compaction, tectonic subsidence, 
construction of dams and reservoirs, and deforestation of the coastal mangrove forests (see 
Annex VIII). By contrast, some of the factors leading to accretion (seaward growth) include 
soil erosion due to crop farming, and upstream deforestation. This demonstrates it is difficult 
to attribute the changes to climate change or isolate the climate change signal. The literature 
review also suggests that monitoring the construction of dams and protecting mangrove forest 
would offer some protection against SLR in the face of climate change (ibid). 
5.3.3. Flooding and Flood Risk Management in Bangladesh 
The impacts of SLR, along with an expected increase in the height of storm surges due to 
increased sea surface temperature, are both expected to increase the flood risk area in 
Bangladesh (see Annex IX). Karim and Mimura (2008) estimate that an additional 320 
shelters would be needed to protect people during extreme cyclones. The Bangladesh Water 
Development Board is historically responsible for maintenance of water management 
structures like embankments, though there is evidence these have not been well maintained 
(see Annex IX). It is also clear the number of people exposed to flooding in Bangladesh is 
highly dependent on population growth rates. Refer to Annex IX for further details on 
flooding and flood risk management in Bangladesh. 
5.3.4. Extreme Events: Cyclones and Storm Surges 
Bangladesh is already vulnerable to both storm surges and seasonal river floods, both of 
which are projected to become more severe under projected climate scenarios (see table 
above, and Annex X).  SLR combines with storm surges to make people more vulnerable to 
inundation during cyclones, while wind speeds and the frequency of intense cyclones are also 
expected to increase (see Annex X).  However, it is argued there has not been an increase in 
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frequency of all cyclones, though there has been an increase in the frequency of the highest 
storm surges (see Meehl et al., 2007). Refer to Annex X for more detail on this issue.  
5.3.5. Salinity Intrusion 
Another impact of SLR in Bangladesh is the impact on salinity intrusion. Increased flooding 
and seawater intrusion due to SLR will increase the impact of saline and brackish water 
intrusion on food and rice production.   It has already been noted that the subsidence of the 
delta cause drainage and sedimentation problems, along with soil and ground water salinity 
which has economic and ecological impacts (Alam, 1996).  One of the major impacts of 
enhanced soil salinity is upon food grain production (Huq et al., 1999).  Salt accumulates in 
the crop root zone, which interferes with crop growth when the concentration exceeds the 
tolerance limits.   Soil salinity generally increases rapidly in the winter months in Bangladesh 
and reaches maximum values in April (Huq et al., 1999). Under a severe climate change 
scenario, more areas would be severely affected by soil salinity and this land would become 
unsuitable for various crops (ibid).Although irrigation, high-yield varieties and water 
management can enhance crop productivity, the coastal zone has largely not benefitted from 
this due to the lack of quality irrigation water (Mondal et al., 2001).  Some of the salinity 
intrusion may also have resulted from the building of the Farakka barrage in 1975 (Mirza, 
1998). 
5.3.6. Socio-economic Impacts of Climate Change 
The projected impacts of climate change, including those covered above, are likely to have 
impacts on poverty and development, health (including cholera, diarrhoea and malnutrition), 
livelihoods, and migration and human security, amongst other issues (IPCC, 2014).  Due to 
space limitations, these socio-economic impacts of climate change are not explored in detail 
here, but the potential impacts of climate change on migration and health are discussed in 
Annex XI. 
5.4 Agriculture and Food Security in Bangladesh under Climate Change  
5.4.1. Impacts of Climate Change on Food Security 
As we have seen, climate change is projected to have various different impacts on 
Bangladesh including increased sea surface temperatures, increased temperatures, ocean 
acidification, precipitation changes, glacier melt, sea level rise, flooding, extreme weather 
events (cyclones and storm surges) and salinity intrusion.  All of these impacts will affect 
agriculture and food security in various ways. 
104 
 
With regards to the direct impacts of climate change on food security, climate change is 
expected to have a direct impact on crop production.  Faisal and Parveen (2004) found that by 
2050, rice and wheat production in Bangladesh could fall by 8% and 32% respectively, based 
on 4
o
C of warming against the 1990 baseline.   As well as modelling CO2 and temperature 
effects, their model included moisture stress (60%), inundation, and salinity impacts. In 2030, 
the impacts of climate change would be compensated by the CO2 fertilisation effect. The 
study also stated although wheat requires less water, it is not recommended to switch to 
wheat as it is more temperature-sensitive.  However the authors concluded food security in 
Bangladesh is more seriously challenged by population growth, land and water scarcity than 
by climate change (ibid). 
 
Basak et al (2010) projected the effects of climate change to be considerably higher with a 
yield reduction for both the BR3 and BR14 boro varieties of over 20% and 50% by 2050 and 
2070, respectively.  This was due primarily to the negative effect of the increases in daily 
maximum and minimum temperatures which did not compensate for incoming solar radiation 
and CO2.  These rice varieties are not widely used at the time but were modelled because the 
genetic coefficients were available in the DSSAT system (Decision support system for 
agrotechnology transfer).  Lobell et al (2008) used a crop modelling approach to estimate 
climate change impacts in South Asia, finding that rice and maize production would both 
decrease slightly by 2030. They noted that impact projections for some crops are more 
uncertain than for others. This model does not include the fertilisation effect of CO2 upon C3 
crops like rice.  However, rice requires more water than wheat, and this model does not 
include the impact of other factors like salinity and SLR. As described in Chapter 3, C3 crops 
like wheat and rice experience a CO2 fertilisation effect under experimental conditions, but 
C4 crops like maize do not (Schmidhuber and Tubiello, 2007). 
Different crops are differently affected by climatic stimuli, making projected yields complex 
to model.  New et al (2012) points out that wheat and potato grow at the optimum 
temperature of 20-25ºC and 18-20ºC respectively, while rice has a fairly high optimum at 
30ºC (day) and 20ºC (night).  This suggests rice is not as vulnerable to temperature increase 
as other crops.  New et al (2012) explain that for irrigated agriculture, maize, rice and wheat 
are not affected in terms of areas that are suitable for growth except under the warmest 
scenarios of the 2090s. 
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Higher temperatures can also have an impact on soil fertility and erosion, since warmer 
conditions speed up the deposition of organic matter and increase the rate of processes that 
effect soil fertility.  Hence, additional application of fertiliser may be needed to counteract 
these processes (Rosenzweig and Hillel, 1995) to take advantage of any CO2 fertilisation 
effect. Additional chemical usage can in turn affect water quality and pollution.  Agricultural 
production and food security are affected by other factors described above, including sea 
level rise, salinity and extreme events. For example, rice production is vulnerable to severe 
flooding and cyclones. The flooding after Cyclone Sidr damaged 12% of the rice production 
in Sidr-affected districts (FAO, 2008a).  
Most GCM projections estimate a potential decline in Boro production with a median loss of 
3% by the 2030s and 5% by the 2050s (Yu et al., 2010). By contrast, wheat production is 
projected to increase by 3% out to the 2050s (ibid).  The Khulna region is particularly 
affected due to rising sea levels, with a -18% loss projected for Boro by the 2050s and a -10% 
loss for Aus, Aman and wheat (ibid). However economic responses such as price effects are 
not included in the model and could to some extent buffer these effects. 
As well as the direct impacts, climate change is expected to have a range of indirect impacts 
on food security.  As identified in Chapter 3, climate change has impacts on all four 
dimensions of food security (availability, stability, utilization and access) although only the 
first aspect has been explored in simulation studies (Schmidhuber and Tubiello, 2007; 
Ziervogel and Ericksen, 2010).  The direct and indirect impacts of climate change on the four 
dimensions of food security in Bangladesh are summarised in the table below.  The table 
demonstrates there are various different pathways through which climate change can affect 
food security. 
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Table 5.2  Impacts of climate change on the four dimensions of food security in 
Bangladesh 
Dimension/Pillar of 
Food Security
Impacts of climate change in Bangladesh
       Temperature rise, salinity and flooding are expected to cause a decrease in crop 
yields, which is only partially offset by a CO2 fertilisation effect for some crops (Faisal 
and Parveen, 2004; Basak et al, 2010a)
       Increased flooding would decrease the growing area and damage crop production
       Increased frequency or intensity of extreme weather events such as cyclones  
would impact on crop yields and land suitability
       Sea level rise would lead to inundation which reduces the area available to grow 
crops. 1 metre of SLR could inundate 17.5% of the country (Salwar and Khan, 2007) 
although this may be partially compensated by the downstream sediment flows 
       Salinity intrusion has an impact on crop production in various coastal areas of 
Bangladesh (Huq et al, 1999)
       Increase in drought is possible in the North-eastern region of Bangladesh which 
impacts on water availability for agricultural crops (Ahmed et al, 2006)
       Temperature rise expands the range of many agricultural pests and livestock 
diseases (Schmidhuber and Tubiello, 2007)
       Ocean acidification could have an impact on molluscs and shells which may 
impact on other marine organisms important for food security
       Loss of livelihood due to extreme weather events (cyclone or flooding) or 
environmental change can lead to loss of purchasing power (Schmidhuber and 
Tubiello, 2007). Loss of income due to extreme events, or loss of agricultural income, 
leads individuals to switch to less nutritious foods (ibid)
       Increased price of food means individuals switch to foods with lower nutritional 
value or lower dietary diversity (Thorne-Lyman et al, 2010)
       Disease pressure can cause a loss in labor productivity which can increase 
poverty and reduce the ability to buy food (Schmidhuber and Tubiello, 2007)
       Increased temperature alters the conditions for food safety, including increasing 
the range of some diseases and microbes that affect food products (Schmidhuber and 
Tubiello, 2007)
       Daily temperatures increase the risk of food poisoning such as salmonella (IPCC, 
2007)
       Rainfall variability and temperature rise increase incidence of diarrheal diseases in 
Bangladesh (Hashizume et al, 2007).  Disease pressure from vector, food and water-
borne disease, such as diarrheal diseases impact on the ability of individuals to take in 
adequate nutrition.
       Climate change may effect nutritional quality of foods (DaMatta et al 2010)
       Flooding particularly affects sanitation and hygiene in areas where infrastructure 
is lacking (Schmidhuber and Tubiello, 2007)
       Vicious cycles are possible where infectious disease causes hunger which in turn 
makes populations more susceptible to disease (Schmidhuber and Tubiello, 2007)
       Extreme weather events (cyclones, floods, droughts) may become more common 
leading to stability of food supplies
       Extreme weather events may disrupt food supply chains, including transportation 
to markets and communication infrastructure
       Price shocks may be transmitted from other regions of the world particularly if 
trade restrictions are put into place
Stability: Price 
stability, 
vulnerability and 
shocks
Utilisation: 
Metabolism of food 
by individuals, Food 
safety
Access: 
Affordability and 
allocation of food, 
including economic 
and physical access
Availability: Food 
supply through 
production, 
distribution and 
exchange 
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Many factors influence and impact on social vulnerability, and climate change is just one of 
these factors (Wright et al., 2012). The underlying context of social vulnerability includes 
market fluctuations, unstable policy and poor infrastructure (Ribot, 2010). Therefore, 
adaptation to climate change has to be understood in its context and cannot be viewed 
independently. Under the sustainable livelihoods approach (see Annex V), the focus is on the 
holistic context.  
5.4.2. Adaptation Options in the Agricultural Sector 
Yu et al (2010) identifies a series of options for adaptation of agriculture in Bangladesh. For 
example, irrigation has played a major role in helping farmers adapt to soil moisture deficits 
in drought-prone areas. This has resulted in the diversification of agriculture and increased 
cropping intensity.  Embankments have also played a role in reducing flood risk (ibid).  
Agricultural research has been important in Bangladesh and the agricultural research 
institutes that exist include the Bangladesh Agricultural Research Institute (BARI), 
Bangladesh Rice Research Institute (BRRI), Bangladesh Institute of Nuclear Agriculture and 
the Bangladesh Agriculture University. However it is vital these adaptive practices reach the 
communities they are intended to help.   
The Department of Agriculture Extension (DAE), one of the largest government departments, 
plays a vital role in dissemination of new technologies through demonstration plots (Yu et al., 
2010).  Furthermore, the Agricultural Information Service prepares materials on specific 
technologies.  Adopting a new technology or technique brings significant risks for 
communities and thus there needs to be further research and communication to help 
communities choose the right options.  Annex XII (from Yu et al., 2010) shows a number of 
adaptation options in agriculture. These have been tested and demonstrated as options with 
potential for replicability and scalability. However, it will also be vital to test the 
effectiveness and suitability of each of these options in a particular area or context. 
As noted in Chapter 3, adaptation in the agricultural sector often focuses upon agricultural 
productivity and increasing the income of smallholder farmers. This tends to address the 
‘availability’ aspect of food security, but other means to tackle ‘access,’ stability’ and 
‘utilisation’ may also be useful. For instance, increasing market access, improving 
livelihoods, and tackling food access and availability may also be effective, including 
improving infrastructure.   FAO (2006) presents the results of a recent project in drought-
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prone areas in Bangladesh, and presents a whole suite of options for livelihood adaptation, 
drawn from discussions with farmers and experts. These fell under the categories of 
agronomic management, water harvesting, water resource exploitation, water use efficiency, 
crop intensification, alternate enterprises, alternate energy, and post-harvest operations (ibid). 
These practices were evaluated and ranked according to various prioritisation criteria relating 
to drought mitigation potential, suitability and sustainability under future climate conditions, 
relevancy to vulnerable communities, employment opportunities, gender integration and 
social acceptability; before identifying the resources required, potential maladaptation risks 
and non-climatic benefits (ibid).  
A range of high-tech adaptation options exist such as a seed varieties (also known as ‘hard 
technologies’) but there are also a range of low-tech adaptation options including moisture 
conservation through mulching by straw and rice husks, traditional practices such as pond 
excavation, and retention of rainwater in ponds or pits to supplement irrigation (Mazumder, 
2010). Thus adaptation options can be categorised as ‘hard’ as well as ‘soft’ technologies 
(Glatzel et al., 2012).   
Overall, while there are initiatives to tackle to direct impact of climate changes upon crop 
productivity, there may also be a crucial need to tackle the indirect impacts of climate change 
on food security including flooding and cyclones.   In this section we analyse some options 
for tackling the direct and indirect effects of climate change on food security in Bangladesh.  
For a more comprehensive overview of adaptation in agriculture, refer to Clements et al 
(2011).  The intention here is not to give a comprehensive overview of all adaptation options 
but to provide insight into some illustrative examples. 
5.4.2.1. Improved Seed Varieties 
Improved climate-tolerant seed varieties include early maturity, short-duration, salt-tolerant 
and drought-tolerant seed varieties (Mazumder, 2010).  The DAE has played a role in 
promoting paddy varieties that are short-durational such as BR25, BRRI Dhan33 and BRRI 
Dhan39 in order to avoid the effects of drought, although there are no drought-resistant 
varieties (Yu et al., 2010). BRRI has also developed some flood-tolerant varieties of paddy 
rice; BR11, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24, and BRRI Dhan31, 32, 33, and 34 (ibid).  The Boro crop 
plays an important role in offsetting flood losses.  Once improved seeds are developed, 
initiatives are needed to disseminate seeds to farmers.    Widespread lack of awareness of 
new varieties has been found to be a major barrier (Page et al 2009).  In the case of improved 
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wheat varieties (developed by BARI), bottom-up seed production and dissemination systems 
can be highly effective in transferring this technology and developing an enabling 
environment for seed dissemination (ibid). Further details of climate-tolerant rice varieties are 
found in Huq and Rabbani (2011). 
5.4.2.2. Increased Rice Production 
Specific focus on Boro rice has been noted in the literature due to the importance of this rice 
variety. Deb et al (2009:p.9) note that structural changes in rice production in Bangladesh and 
more dependence on Boro has “made rice production a function of input supply, policies and 
prices rather than vagaries of nature”.  This is also because Boro rice is not rainfed but 
irrigated.  It is produced in the dry season, meaning irrigation is a necessary precondition 
(ibid).  It also depends upon other inputs like seed, fertiliser, pesticide, and agricultural credit.  
Future challenges include water scarcity from falling water tables, low soil fertility and high 
costs of agricultural inputs.  Irrigation (below) is one area in which we can clearly see the 
interlinkages between food, energy and water scarcity, also known as the ‘food-energy-water’ 
nexus (Bazilian et al., 2011). 
Coelli et al (2002) finds larger farms are more allocatively and cost-efficient than smaller 
farms in the labour-intensive ‘Aman’ season, but were disadvantaged in the less labour-
intensive season. Therefore, in the Boro season, smaller farms are more efficient. 
Infrastructure affects access to inputs, and thus the efficiency of production.   The data points 
to over-use of labour, reflecting the disguised unemployment problem, and also the over-use 
of fertiliser which means guidelines may need to be revised (ibid). Factors such as age, 
education, experience, soil fertility and extension and training were found not to have a large 
influence on efficiency (ibid).  It is recommended that better use can be made of agricultural 
survey data to increase production. 
5.4.2.3. Irrigation and Water Management 
Irrigation has been proposed as an adaptation option for Bangladesh in the literature, 
including in the FAO study on long-term climate change in drought-prone regions (Ahmed et 
al., 2006).  However, Deb et al (2009) report that more than 70% of total irrigation in 
Bangladesh is dependent on diesel-driven engines. Diesel prices have risen in recent years 
putting pressure on farmers.  The new government reduced the price of diesel by Tk. 2/litre in 
response to oil price rises (ibid). This subsidy is costly to government and may have to 
increase as fuel prices increase. The adoption of ‘alternate wetting and drying’ (AWD) 
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irrigation technology for Boro rice cultivation could save 25% of water for irrigation as well 
as save energy without reducing yields (Deb et al., 2009).  The ‘system of rice 
intensification’ could also be promoted to reduce costs and increase yield (ibid).  
 
29% of the total irrigated area in Bangladesh is irrigated by electricity, which is cheaper than 
diesel irrigation.  Deb et al (2009) find that the production cost of High-Yielding Variety 
(HYV) Boro paddy is Tk.12.16/ kg for diesel production and Tk.10.85/kg for electricity-
operated production, largely because diesel irrigation costs Tk.5000 per acre compared to 
Tk.2000 per acre for electricity-driven irrigation (Deb et al., 2009).  Therefore it could be 
argued that policies to promote a switch to electricity-driven irrigation would enhance 
resilience for farmers, helping them adapt to climate change and rising energy costs, as well 
as increasing income.  The Government in Bangladesh subsidised electricity for irrigation by 
Tk.75 crore in 2007-8 (Deb et al., 2009).  In order to provide enough electricity for irrigation, 
the government enforced closing shops and malls by 8pm (ibid).  However, these policies 
may have other detrimental effects and other measures to improve irrigation methods may 
have been more appropriate.   In two regions (Jhalakathi and Patuakhali) there are reportedly 
no electricity-operated engines. 
IFPRI argues irrigation has made a massive contribution to increasing food security in 
Bangladesh over past decades (Hossain, 2009).  This is because increased rice production is 
primarily due to the increase in Boro production over these years.  The areas under modern 
irrigation are primarily in the North-West (Deb et al 2009) which is also the ‘bread basket’ of 
Bangladesh due to its rice production.  Altogether, this has been primarily due to the STW 
(Shallow Tube Well) development. STW’s became available in the 1980’s due to the 
liberalisation of agricultural inputs, as importation of cheap irrigation equipment from other 
countries became possible (ibid).  The reform was completed in 1988-89 with the removal of 
a ban on the importation of small engines and elimination of import duties and other 
restrictions.   Nearly 70% of farmers in Bangladesh use STWs; on equivalent to two-thirds of 
the total irrigated area (Hossain, 2009).  Rahman and Parvin (2009) put this figure at 62%.   
Boro rice production is highly correlated with the irrigated areas.  A water market emerged 
after privatisation wherein marginal farmers could access irrigation, as tubewell owners 
(usually larger landholders) sold their water to the adjoining plots. Privatisation also reduced 
the price of the tubewells and increased access to fertilisers (Hossain, 2009).  Irrigation has 
thus been a key factor in increasing agricultural GDP and alleviating rural poverty (Rahman 
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and Parvin, 2009). However, environmental concerns have emerged, including issues such as 
long-term soil fertility pressures, heavy pesticides use impacting on fish habitats, and possible 
overexploitation of groundwater (Hossain, 2009). Harvesting rainwater and efficiency 
improvements are thus required. Another related concern is the contamination of groundwater 
with arsenic (ibid).   
Thus despite the gains from irrigation for rice yields and water availability for agriculture, 
there are potential negative effects, including over-abstraction of groundwater resources 
which a contributor to sea level rise (Pokhrel et al., 2012).  Irrigation might be seen as a 
‘double-edged sword’ which may increase climate change vulnerability whilst appearing to 
reduce it. Ahamed et al (2006) argues energy is extremely important for food security in 
Bangladesh, due to the need for energy for irrigation. The interaction between energy and 
food security exemplifies the interactions between adaptation and mitigation of climate 
change.  There has also been found to be a gap between demand and supply for energy in 
many places, leading to energy shortages (ibid).   
Despite the benefits, increased rice profits for farmers do not always lead to improvements 
for the poor.  Hussain (2004:12) argues the distributional aspect of irrigation projects has 
been insufficiently considered, and the number of landless people has increased, with 
marginal, small and landless farmers enjoying the “trickle-down effect only”. The real wage 
of agricultural labour has also stagnated (ibid) and although irrigation increases agricultural 
production, this may not necessarily translate into reductions in rural poverty due to other 
factors such as the “land distribution pattern, land tenurial arrangement” and “demand for 
agricultural products” (Hussain, 2004:3). Although rice prices were strongly co-integrated 
with agricultural wages until the 1970’s, it is no longer a significant determinant of 
agricultural wages in Bangladesh (Rashid, 2002). Therefore productivity gains may not 
always ‘trickle’ down to the poorest and most vulnerable labourers (ibid).  Analysis of survey 
data from CCAFS confirms this because agricultural wage labourers, who are often landless, 
still suffer from food insecurity (see Chapter 9).  There may be other measures needed, 
therefore, to target the most vulnerable members of society.  In fact, whilst we cannot 
extrapolate from other countries, lessons might be drawn from the work of Thomas Piketty 
on income inequality, because income inequality might well be growing (Ibrahim, 2014). 
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5.4.2.4. Agricultural Research and Extension Services 
Extension services have been found to be vital for dissemination of agricultural inputs, seeds 
and information. Coelli et al (2003) argue that ‘Green Revolution’ technology adoption and 
research expenditure had an impact on increased technical progress in Bangladesh from 
1960-1992. However extension expenditure was actually found to retard technical progress 
and reduce total factor productivity (TFP) growth, as it competed with research for a fixed 
budget (ibid). TFP was found to be declining, particularly as modern rice varieties spread to 
less suitable land in regions which were “historically suitable for traditional varieties” but 
“these have been gradually displaced by modern varieties” (ibid:328) combined with the 
effect of soil exhaustion from nutrient depletion.  This indicates that high-yield varieties may 
be counterproductive when applied in unsuitable locations.  Interestingly, education arguably 
had a negative effect on crop output since “higher education provides more opportunities for 
moving away from agriculture” and because the educational system is not oriented to 
agriculture (ibid:331).  BRRI is now paying more attention to climate-resilient varieties for 
saline locations (Huq and Rabbani, 2011)   
5.4.2.5. Enhancing Awareness of Adaptation 
Whichever adaptation options are promoted by policy-makers, these have to be accompanied 
by a programme of communication to increase awareness for adoption.  BBC Media Action 
conducted interviews with 3,578 households in Bangladesh and found there was high 
awareness of climate change and changes to livelihoods. Some 77% of people felt that 
climate change was happening and 36% of people interviewed had made changes to their 
livelihoods, the highest proportion of all countries in the study (Al Mamun et al., 2013).  In 
terms of barriers and enablers for action, 86% felt lack of government support was a barrier 
to responding, and 77% said they did not have enough resources to respond, while 57% and 
56% cited lack of information and knowledge respectively (ibid).   
The study sub-divided respondents into five different categories; those who were surviving, 
struggling, adapting, willing and unaffected (Al Mamun et al., 2013). 43% of farmers and 
fishermen were found to be ‘struggling’ (wanting to take action, but finding it very difficult) 
as opposed to 31% of the population overall (ibid).  Amongst farmers and fishermen, 91% 
used television to receive climate-related information, and 85% used mobile phones, while 
82% regarded agricultural extension workers as a highly trusted source of information (ibid).  
People from Barisal division were found to be disproportionately struggling; 57% were 
classified as ‘struggling’ compared to 31% of the population overall (ibid), but media 
113 
 
penetration was comparatively low in this division. Examples of communication channels 
through which people were receiving climate-related information include the agricultural 
programme ‘Hridoye Mati O Manush’ (People of the Land) on Channel i, with discussions 
about climatic impacts on crops and agriculture, and ‘Green Hour’ on Radio Today, covering 
environmental issues (ibid).  BBC are now using the study to develop targeted TV and radio 
programmes to increase resilience - an example of how communication tools can be used to 
promote adaptation options. 
5.4.2.6. Polder Construction 
As noted previously, construction of embankments (polders) have been proposed as a 
structural adaptation to control flooding in the coastal zone. According to Chowdhury et al 
(2010) polder construction has a positive impact on agriculture, because higher rice yields 
can be achieved as there is a lower risk of salt water intrusion during monsoon-season ‘aman’ 
rice production.  Overall the ‘aman’ rice yield was more than double inside the polder 
compared to the control area, and the mean family income was also double in the area 
protected by the polder (ibid).  However, net returns from shrimp cultivation were slightly 
lower in the polder-protected area, and the wage rate for landless households (who derive 
their livelihood from labouring) was slightly lower in the polder-protected area (ibid).  This 
may have been due to an excess of labour because more households were landless in the 
polder area.  Using a conservative assumption that the main benefit of the polder was on 
‘aman’ rice production, Chowdhury et al (2010) calculate the benefit-cost ratio of the polder 
is 3.75 and the internal rate of return was estimated at 38% at prevailing market prices.  
However it was noted the benefit mainly accrued to the land-owning households than the 
landless, leading to potential increases in inequality (ibid). 
5.4.2.7. Cyclone Preparedness 
As noted in previous sections, climate-related disasters like cyclones pose a threat to food 
security both directly (damaging crops and agricultural livelihood assets) as well as indirectly 
(damaging health and infrastructure).  Thus, policies to prevent death or injury from cyclones 
can play a role in preventing the worst impacts.  IPCC (2014) highlights that Bangladesh has 
a world-renowned cyclone preparedness programme (CPP) and early warning system that has 
reduced mortality from cyclones when compared to neighbouring Myanmar.  Refer to Annex 
XIII for the case study of the CPP. 
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5.5 Climate Finance and Policy Responses in Bangladesh 
5.5.1. Costs of Climate Change  
The direct annual cost to the national economy in Bangladesh of natural disasters averaged 
over 10 years (damage and loss in production) is already estimated at between 0.5% and 1% 
of GDP (UNDP, 2009; World Bank, 2010a). With Bangladesh’s GDP amounting to $100Bn 
in 2010 (World Bank, 2011) such costs already amount to $500m-$1Bn per year and are 
expected to increase dramatically due to climate change, with increased cyclones, flooding 
and drought. This statistic does not include the significant loss of life that occurred.  World 
Bank modelling found climate change is expected to increase damages and losses from an 
average 10-year return period cyclone in 2050 by $4,560m, nearly doubling the loss and 
damages compared to the no-climate change scenario (see Dasgupta et al., 2010). This does 
not include the costs of other changes such as inland flooding, salinity intrusion and loss of 
crop productivity.  Impacts like flooding, erosion, cyclone, sea level rise and salinity 
intrusion are all expected to have a severe impact on poverty and economic growth (UNDP, 
2009). Specific events are very costly, for example the 1998 monsoon flood resulted in 
damage and loss of over $2bn (4.8% of GDP) whilst Cyclone Sidr in 2007 caused loss and 
damage of $1.7Bn (2.6% of GDP) (World Bank, 2010a). 
Karim (2011) used the Annual Development Programme (ADP) to estimate the costs of 
adaptation in agriculture by considering the costs of adaptation measures in the sector.  
Agricultural adaptation investment includes $13m through the Pilot Programme for Climate 
Resilience (PPCR).  Adaptation costing is estimated at $69.67Bn for major investment in 
agriculture, with the majority for infrastructure development (30% of total) followed by 
market development, (17%), irrigation and water management (15%) (ibid).   
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The EACC study by the World Bank (2010a:p.37) costed the additional damages and losses 
due to climate change in 2050 as follows: 
 
 Figure 5.1  Additional loss and damage due to climate change in Bangladesh in 2050. 
Amongst the direct impacts of climate change on agriculture, Boro rice production falls by 
8% by the 2080’s, however this assumes farmers have limitless access to irrigation (World 
Bank, 2010a). Boro production shows the largest losses (Yu et al., 2010) due to temperature, 
rainfall and flooding impacts. Modelling also found production in Patuakhali and Khulna is 
particularly vulnerable. Agricultural climate impacts was found to cost Bangladesh $129Bn 
over a 45-year period (2005-2050), or $2.9Bn losses each year (an average annual reduction 
of 1.6% GDP) (World Bank, 2010a). This could rise to $5.1Bn/year in a pessimistic high-
emission scenario (ibid). The study argued agricultural adaptation ought to focus on the 
North-West and Southern coastal regions. 
5.5.2. Climate Finance in Bangladesh 
Climate finance can be seen as coming through various channels, including non-Annex I 
domestic budgets, Annex-I countries domestic budgets, and the private sector (Persson, 
2011).  Refer to Chapter 7 for a detailed overview on climate finance.  
Persson (2011:9) argues since there is no agreed methodology or metric for determining 
vulnerability to climate changes, there is a “risk of highly skewed per capita funding both 
between and within countries”.  If we were only to consider the principal of ‘national 
sovereignty’ and consider adaptation finance as ‘pure restitution’ (ibid) there would be no 
need to consider the beneficiaries, effectiveness or efficiency of climate change finance. In 
reality, however, it is crucial climate finance reaches the intended recipients who are most 
vulnerable in order to build trust for provision of further finance support.  Thus, distributional 
and equity concerns are legitimate concerns. 
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Since the first NAPA in Bangladesh in 2005 there have been many policy and institutional 
changes undertaken by the government. There has been an expansion of climate finance in 
recent years by the GoB, and donors including the EU and UK.   The first NAPA identified 
15 priority actions including capacity building, awareness raising and projects with a special 
focus on agriculture and water (UNFCCC, 2005).  The first priority issue was afforestation in 
coastal areas under a $23m project entitled ‘Reduction of climate change hazards through 
Coastal afforestation with community participation’ (ibid).  The updated NAPA in 2009 
identified a further 45 adaptation measures with 18 immediate and medium-term measures. In 
2008, the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan was launched (BCCSAP) 
and was updated in 2009.  However this is not a fully “costed and sequenced delivery 
framework” (Hedger, 2011:7).  The BCCSAP is intended to be integrated into the National 
Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction but the OECD (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development) reports it has yet to be fully integrated due to capacity 
constraints (OECD, 2010a).  In 2009 the GoB announced its own $300m Trust Fund funded 
by the national budget to implement the plan.  $300m would be distributed over a 3-year 
period with $100m designated in 2010, 2011 and 2012.  Moreover, in 2010 the Bangladesh 
Climate Change Resilience Fund (BCCRF) was created as a Multi-Donor Trust Fund towards 
which bilateral donors contributed $188m.  Therefore there are two national funds in 
Bangladesh which are both intended to contribute to the BCCSAP.   
The funds currently available do not meet the needs of the assessment made of the $2.7Bn at 
risk from climate change in the Annual Development Plan, which has an overall budget of 
$4.7Bn (Hedger, 2011).  The OECD estimated crudely in 2003 that as much of 50% of 
development assistance goes to areas potentially affected by climate change. 
Under the BCCSAP, there are six key pillars outlined below:- 
1. Food security, social protection and health 
2. Comprehensive disaster management 
3. Infrastructure 
4. Research and knowledge management 
5. Mitigation and low carbon development 
6. Capacity building and institutional strengthening 
 
Climate change has therefore become a key strategic and political issue for the GoB.  The 
Action Plan recognizes the risks climate change poses for national development, as well as 
the importance of climate-resilient development to reduce vulnerability. The BCCSAP also 
states that cost-effective priority programmes will begin implementation in the next 5 years, 
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with “special attention on the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable” (BCCSAP, 2008:29). 
Since funding to tackle climate change is currently limited compared to projected impacts, it 
is important to ensure this funding reaches the most vulnerable communities. 
There have been various different channels of climate finance to Bangladesh. Under Fast 
Start Finance (FSF), Bangladesh received funds from GTZ (Germany development agency) 
as part of the €2.7m allocated to ‘Fast Start Finance of Adaptation to Climate change in 
Asia’. Moreover, Bangladesh has received €9.7m from Sweden in FSF.  According to 
Nakhooda et al (2013), Bangladesh has been the top recipient of ‘fast start finance’ for 
adaptation globally, amounting to $266m. 
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Table 5.3  Current funding streams for climate finance to Bangladesh  
Funding Channel for Climate 
Finance
Details
$100m funded by GoB (Hedger, 2011)
$100m p.a. with 66% for projects in BCCSAP and 34% for 
emergency relief (TI, 2011)
Climate Change Unit (CCU) under the Ministry of Environment and 
Forests (MoEF) oversee and monitor (ibid)
43 government projects and 32 NGO projects approved (UNFCCC, 
2011)
A Multi-Donor Trust Fund to support implementation of 
Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP)
$110m with $87m from DFID (UK), and also Denmark, Sweden and 
EU (Hedger, 2011)
Development partners pledged $113.5m and technical assistance 
will be provided by World Bank (UNFCCC, 2011)
$87m of 125m committed by Mar 2012. 90% will go through BCCRF 
Trust and 10% through PKSF (TI, 2011)
The World Bank serves as Trustee for the interim period (2010-2014)
$110m branded by UK as ‘fast start’ (Hedger, 2011)
CIF documentation shows $50m in grant funding and $60m in loans 
(CIF, 2010).
Further $515m co-financing available from MDB (loans) made up of 
300m in credit from IDA (International Development Association) 
for coastal embankments and 215m in loans from the ADF (Asian 
Development Fund) of the ADB for water resources
Total $575m loan element and $50m grant (8.7% grant)
Supported by UNDP.
$70m with some activities on climate change (Hedger, 2011)
Bangladesh Climate Change Trust 
Fund (BCCTF)
Bangladesh Climate Change 
Resilience Fund (BCCRF)
Bangladesh Strategic Programme for 
Climate Resilience (BSPCR) under 
the World Bank’s Pilot Programme 
for Climate Resilience (PPCR), one of 
the Climate Investment Funds (CIF)
Comprehensive Disaster 
Management Programme (CDMP)
 
The proliferation of funding mechanisms does run counter to the principles of harmonisation 
and alignment in the Paris Declaration.  Monitoring is a challenge because there are weak 
records and no coherence on modalities for data collection (Hedger, 2011). There is a clear 
need for more coordination between channels of finance and between partners.  Therefore, 
experts have urged for the creation of a ‘clearing house’ for climate finance in Bangladesh. It 
is also very challenging to differentiate climate and development spending to determine what 
is “new and additional” (Hedger, 2011:9).  For the requirements of MRV (Monitoring, 
Reporting and Verification) it will be necessary to distinguish what is development aid (that 
may be mainstreamed to take account of climate change) and what is climate finance.  
Donors have mentioned the need to develop institutional capacity for fiduciary management 
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before climate finance is channelled directly through the government (Interviews; Hedger, 
2011). 
The Two Climate Funds 
Table 5.4  The main characteristics of the two funds: 
Bangladesh Climate Change Trust 
Fund (BCCTF) – The Government Fund
Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund 
(BCCRF) – The Donor Fund
$125m up to 2015
As of Dec 2014, $188m USD pledged
Source From national budget From bilateral donors
Management and 
Ownership
Climate Change Unit  (CCU) within the 
Ministry for Environment and Forestry 
(MoEF)
World Bank is the ‘interim trustee and takes a 1% 
fee + up to 8% in technical assistance.
Based on 7 selection criteria:
-Implementation by line agencies
-Projects greater than $15m
-Eligible Activities meet CCSAP objectives
-Basis of approval; approved project grant 
request, World Bank project appraisal, and 
signed grant agreement between GOB and WB
-Readiness for implementation in the next 3 years
-Results Monitoring based on agreed results 
indicators
-Priority given to proposals using 'existing 
project units of development-type operations to 
administer the grant' (BCCRF, 2012; BCCRF, 
2012a) 
Projects approved: 30% allocated to 
mitigation projects and a further 30% to 
infrastructure projects.
1 project is underway to build cyclone shelters – 
See Box Below
As of Dec 2014, 2900 crore Taka (29Bn 
Tk) has been allocated (around $372m), 
for 282 projects (63 implemented by 
NGOs and 219 by government). Of the 
219 government projects, 31 were 
completed. 
13 approved projects, around 145.9m USD 
allocated (as of Dec 2014)
Coordination and 
Harmonisation
A single body at the Ministry of 
Environment is designed to coordinate.
World Bank is the interim trustee responsible for 
fiduciary management and disbursement. MoEF 
is the nodal agency, and members of the 
governing board are the same as for BCCTF to 
enable harmonisation (BCCRF, 2012)
Monitoring of 
Results
Results framework is not available Results framework is not available
Status of 
Implementation
Funding Available
$300m over three years, with $100m 
between 2011-12; 
Criteria for 
Funding 
Allocation
Not yet publicly available
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In the Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Review (CPEIR) the need for 
coordination emerged prominently as did the lack of intra-government coordination 
mechanisms (CPEIR, 2012). The study argued coordination of climate adaptation could be 
classified into policy and planning coordination (headed by the Planning Commission in 
coordination with MOEF); financial planning and performance coordination (this role lies 
with the Finance Division, implemented by MTBF); and technical coordination (lying with 
the MOEF) (see figure below).  In addition, horizontal coordination between national, 
regional and local government appeared limited, illustrated by the lack of reference to climate 
change in the MBF (Ministry Budget Framework) of local government (ibid). Human 
resource and institutional capacity issues were also highlighted (see Annex XIV).  
 
Figure 5.2  Coordination function of each body (represented by ovals) and the mutual 
interfaces between all three coordination functions (represented by rectangles). 
Developed using from information from CPEIR, 2012. 
Overall, it was found the GoB spends around 6-7% of the annual combined (development and 
non-development) budget on climate sensitive activities, amounting to around $1Bn, or 
around 1.1% of GDP (CPEIR, 2012). This was around 77% from domestic resources and 
23% from foreign sources (ibid). There has been a shift towards loan-based resources from 
donors, away from grants, and loan funding increased from 58% to 82% of foreign resources 
between the 2009-10 and 2011-12 programmes (ibid). 
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It was recognised during the CPEIR that, for sound operational reasons “climate change 
budgets and expenditure are integrated with existing historical activity and institutions and 
cannot readily be separated from this” (CPEIR, 2012:111).  At the time of the study, there 
was no functional recognition of climate change in the Government accounting system.  It is 
also notable that the international standard for budget classification, GFSM 2001, does not 
identify climate-related expenditure either (ibid).  However, following the study, the GoB 
introduced a climate budget code with indicators in the 2013 budget, so it can track spending 
on a more continuous basis across all sectors (UNPEI, 2013). Furthermore, the Ministry of 
Finance is now spearheading the introduction of a ‘Climate Change Fiscal Framework’ to 
allow the government to track demand and supply for funds associated with climate change, 
as well as sources of funds available from domestic and external sources (ibid).  
5.5.3. Adaptation finance for food security in Bangladesh 
This section provides an overview of the flows of finance that could make a contribution to 
adaptation in Bangladesh, with a focus on food security and agricultural resilience.  As shown 
below, on-farm investment in agricultural capital by smallholders is estimated to make up the 
vast majority of investment in agriculture, demonstrating the importance of micro-finance 
and providing an enabling environment for farmers to invest at local-level.  However, 
government investment plays a key role in local infrastructure, markets, institutions and 
enabling environments. For further details on financing agricultural adaptation, refer to 
Chapter 7.  This literature review was used to inform the results and analysis section. 
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Figure 5.3  Average annual investment in agriculture in Bangladesh (Data from Lowder 
et al., 2012) 
 
Data are the average for 2005-2007 or for the most recent years available prior to that 
(Source: Lowder et al., 2012). There may be some overlap between data on ODA on the 
one hand and government investment in agriculture or agricultural R&D (ibid).  
The figure above does not specifically include multilateral or national adaptation finance. As 
noted above, in 2009 GoB announced the $300m BCCTF for climate change, and in 2010 the 
BCCRF was created with funds from multilateral donors.  A certain percentage of these funds 
would go towards agricultural adaptation. This does not significantly change the overall 
picture in the figure above, especially since most multi-lateral donors count their adaptation 
finance as part of their official development assistance. 
5.5.3.1. Public finance for agricultural adaptation 
The two main climate funds in Bangladesh (described above) are likely to overlap and 
interact in providing food security under climate change. In particular, both funds aim to 
coordinate together to achieve the objectives of the BCCSAP, which as described above, 
prioritises food security, social protection and health (BCCSAP, 2008).  However it is not yet 
clear how the funds will coordinate other than within the CCU of the Ministry of 
Environment.  Conversations with experts in Bangladesh highlighted that the Resilience 
(donor) fund projects are usually intended to be larger in size and scale that the national fund 
projects. This is partially because the World Bank eligibility requirements mean that larger 
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projects are favoured.  Under the PPCR, there has been criticism of the emphasis on loans for 
adaptation as well as the bias toward heavy infrastructure (see box below). 
By early 2014, 11 projects had been approved under the Trust Fund (BCCTF) to tackle 
agriculture and food security, out of 62 total projects approved.  Under the Resilience Fund 
(BCCRF), three of the 13 approved projects were targeting agriculture and food security (see 
also BCCRF, 2014).  The first approved project under the agriculture sector allocated $22.8m 
for a programme jointly operated by the FAO and the DAE entitled ‘Agricultural Adaptation 
in Climatic Risk Prone Areas of Bangladesh’. 
Box 5.1: Loans and debt under the PPCR 
The World Bank’s Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience (PPCR), under the CIF (Climate 
Investment Funds) has been criticised by civil society groups for the loan element which may 
increase debt levels in Bangladesh. Under the PPCR’s SPCR (Strategic Programme on Climate 
Resilience), Investment Project 2, entitled ‘Coastal Embankments Improvement and 
Afforestation’ include building embankments and water management structures, and planting 
mangroves greenbelts of coastal forests. Project costs are $330m made up of a $30m PPCR 
grant and $300m in IDA credit (so there is a 91% loan component) (CIF, 2010). 
For example, Bangladesh’s external debt in 2010 was 24.96Bn USD which is 26% of GNI 
(Gross National Income). In 2010, interest payments on this debt were 199m USD. Bangladesh 
pays back $1.50 for each of the $1 it receives in aid (Shamsuddoha and Chowdhury, 2007). In its 
favour, the CIFs are arguably “comparatively transparent and well documented” (Hedger, 2011). 
However, contentious issues remain around loans for adaptation, and “heavy bias to hard 
infrastructure” (ibid).   
 
5.5.3.2. Policies relating to agricultural adaptation 
Since the issues of climate change and food security cut across various sectors, there are a 
range of national policies, plans and programmes in Bangladesh that could be affected by 
climate change (Haque and Haque, 2009; Karim, 2011; Mallick et al., 2012).  Exploring 
these policies and plans enables further analysis on efforts to direct adaptation finance 
effectively.  A review of these policies and programmes related to agricultural adaptation is 
featured in Annex XV. 
5.5.3.3. Prioritisation of adaptation finance 
At international-level, the vulnerability of Bangladesh suggests that it should receive funding. 
As explained in Chapter 3, vulnerability is a function of both the sensitivity to the risk, and 
exposure.  As shown in Chapter 7, vulnerability indices have also been developed that 
incorporate indicators for exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity, but these vulnerability 
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indices are not presently being used to guide allocation of finance, for a number of reasons. 
However, it is clear these tools could potentially be used on an international and sub-national 
level to determine the allocation of adaptation finance and to lead to more targeted adaptation 
finance. It is also possible that at times those same factors that contribute to vulnerability, 
such as weak governance systems, may also lead finance to be misused, misdirected or not 
used efficiently.  This assertion will be analysed further in the semi-structured interviews. 
As we see above, under the BCCRF project selection was based on seven selection criteria 
relating to projects, but not on any regional or district-based vulnerability criteria. Similarly, 
at international-level the GCF has not yet established firm criteria for prioritisation of funding 
(see Chapter 7). Hence, it is possible that political influence or corruption at national levels 
could impact on climate finance prioritisation or project selection. The BCCRF selection 
criteria listed in Table 5.4 included the monitoring of results, and ‘readiness’ criteria but not 
any indicators estimating the social, environmental or economic impacts.  These issues are 
further explored in the semi-structured interviews (see Chapter 9). 
Benefits of using vulnerability indices include potentially more targeted, equitable and 
effective use of resources, but drawbacks include the resources and data required for using 
such indices. At present, there seems to be a gap between the development of indicators at 
international-level, particularly in the academic or scientific context, and their uptake and use 
by the policy-makers in this area.  This assertion will be further tested in the analysis. 
This was also evident from semi-structured experts interviews in which government officials 
highlighted the political influence on funds.  It emerged that that vulnerability indices and 
tools were not being widely used in Bangladesh, possibly due to the constraints on time and 
resources for policy-makers (see Chapter 9).   
In Nepal, 80% of funding is earmarked for village or municipal-level project implementation 
(Oxfam, 2011) but there is no such political commitment in Bangladesh.  In Bangladesh, 
local government authorities do not currently have access to the BCCRF funds (see 
Christensen et al., 2012).  The Local Government (Union Parishad) Act 2009 intended to 
bring in reforms for good governance, decentralisation and transparency, which may have 
implications for the participation of local government in adaptation planning but has not been 
fully implemented yet.  The engagement of local government is a further issue to be explored 
at local-level. 
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5.5.3.4. Private Sector Engagement, Trade and Agricultural Adaptation 
Public adaptation finance, the key focus of this case study, is available due to the 
international context and commitments made under the UNFCCC. However, it is recognised 
that mobilisation of private finance will be a key objective in order to enhance action on 
adaptation and mitigation, which is the rationale behind the GCF’s Private Sector Facility. 
Technological development including research (for instance, on improved crop varieties) can 
be done by both private and public actors (Glatzel et al., 2012).  Private sector engagement in 
adaptation in Bangladesh has been limited to date. In one study, 99% of corporate 
stakeholders perceived climate change to be either an irrelevance or at best “an extension of 
their Corporate Social Responsibility” (IFC, 2010:7).  This resulted from short-term thinking 
in businesses (ibid). However various stakeholders expressed interest potential public-private 
partnerships in areas such as development of flood-tolerant or saline-tolerant crop varieties 
and vulnerability mapping (ibid).   
Whilst FDI is recognised as important for the economy, and could enhance agricultural 
investment, a major barrier to FDI results from the slow legal system in which the 
enforceability of contracts is uncertain (DoS, 2013). Refer to Chapter 7 for related discussion 
of foreign direct investment (FDI).  
The ability of trade and marketable products to enhance capacity to adapt to climate change is 
contingent on trade policies, including both subsidies and tariffs.  Hence this will be explored 
in greater detail in the results. In chapter 9 of the IPCC-AR5 report, trade is recognised as 
having an impact on climate change adaptation, including “deepening agricultural markets 
and improving the predictability and the reliability of the world trading system through trade 
reform” (IPCC, 2014, Section 9.3.3.3.4). In fact, technology transfer can be seen as 
encompassing trade, in general, as most transfers of technology will occur as a part of 
international or regional trade.  Subsidies and tariffs can both be seen as trade policies which 
can constrain or enable adaptation (Glatzel et al., 2012).  Refer to Annex XVI for examples 
of adaptation-relevant tariffs and subsidies in Bangladesh. 
5.6. Summary 
This chapter highlighted the main impacts of climate change in Bangladesh with a focus on 
food security, before providing an overview of the main finance and policy responses that 
have taken place to date. The information in this chapter informs and provides background to 
the national-level (Bangladesh) and local-level (Kalapara) case studies which are detailed in 
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forthcoming results chapters 8 and 9.  Overall, the literature review found climate change is 
projected to lead to temperature rise, precipitation changes, ocean acidification, glacier melt, 
sea level rise, flooding, cyclones and salinity intrusion in Bangladesh, amongst other effects. 
However, uncertainty remains in the projected impacts, particularly with regards to the 
impacts of climate change on the monsoon.  Furthermore, impacts such as sea level rise 
cannot always be attributed to climate change as these environmental changes are affected by 
a range of other geophysical and socio-economic causes, and recognising this can lead us to 
identify some innovative solutions to reduce the impacts. 
In analysing the impacts of climate change on food security, it was noted climate change is 
likely to have both direct and indirect impacts on agriculture and food security in Bangladesh, 
with impacts for food availability (e.g. crop productivity impacts) but also on accessibility 
(e.g. loss of livelihood,) utilisation (e.g. nutritional impacts), and stability of food (e.g. price 
shocks).  Thus climate change can impact on all four aspects of food security.  
In reviewing the main finance and policy responses in Bangladesh, it was found that existing 
climate finance channels include a range of different mechanisms, which are not coordinated 
together, although the intention is for all the mechanisms to contribute to the BCCSAP.  It 
will be interesting to find out how the funds and priorities at national-level are experienced at 
local-level. There are ongoing efforts to mainstream climate change into development but the 
range of existing policies relating to agricultural adaptation in Bangladesh do not all take 
climate change into consideration as yet. 
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6.  International Trade Regulation and Diplomacy for Food Security 
under Climate Change  
6.1. Introduction 
In this section, the opportunities and risks created by international agricultural trade under 
climate change are analysed, barriers and enablers to climate resilience are explored, before 
looking at issues related to the international negotiations on climate change. Finally, certain 
parallels are drawn between the international architecture on climate change under the 
UNFCCC and agricultural trade under the WTO.  The international scale is the jurisdiction of 
analysis in this chapter. The chapter provides background to inform the international-level 
analysis (Chapter 10). 
International agricultural trade creates both risks and opportunities under climate change. 
While globalisation and inter-connected trade have led to benefits including innovation and 
income growth, Goldin and Mariathasan (2014) argue it creates systemic risks. Climate-
related disasters like floods can cascade over national borders and affect global supply chains 
(ibid).  For instance, the 2011-12 floods in Thailand affected the long-distance supply chains 
of many technology and semi-conductor companies. Climate change has a ‘multiplier effect’ 
on supply chain risk, particularly in agriculture (Glenhill et al., 2013). That is, global supply 
chains are already susceptible to disruption from systemic risks, especially where a 
commodity is sourced from a small number of suppliers (e.g. agricultural commodities like 
rice which can grow only in certain places), and climate change adds an additional element to 
this existing supply risk.  Many goods that are needed for adapting to climate change are 
traded internationally, whilst international trade regulation can impact on the vulnerability of 
smallholder farmers. 
6.2. Trade, environmental protection and food security 
The IAASTD report (International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and 
Technology for Development) found that expansion of commercial-industrial agriculture has 
put a strain on many small-scale farmers in developing countries and moreover, that focus on 
exports has left many small-scale producers vulnerable to volatile market conditions and 
international competition from subsidized producers in the Global North (IAASTD, 2009). 
Globalisation has therefore been described as a double-edged sword that can be a force for 
progress as well as a source of harm (Goldin and Mariathasan, 2014).  In this chapter we 
explore the impacts of international trade on the vulnerability of farmers, considering the 
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history of the international trade negotiations, and consider the case of the impact of EU 
agricultural subsidies. 
International agricultural trade policies such as perverse subsidies (e.g. agricultural or fossil 
fuel subsidies) may have an impact upon adaptive capacities. Rigid agricultural policies 
including “subsidies for certain crops in certain areas” can “constrain change and reduce the 
flexibility of land-use changes” (Kurukulasuriya & Rosenthal, 2003:p43, in Glatzel et al., 
2012). Thus it is suggested such distortions should be removed in the WTO’s Doha 
Development Round.  Arguably, the potential impact of import tariffs and agricultural 
subsidies upon adaptive capacity requires further research and recognition (ibid).  Structures 
and regulations within the international trading system can be a determinant of vulnerability. 
For example, O’Brien et al (2004:303) argues farmers in India are simultaneously vulnerable 
to impacts of climate change, as well as globalisation, a situation they describe as “exposure 
to multiple stressors”. Globalisation and marketization of the rural economy can create 
opportunities, as well as risks for smallholder farmers, like vulnerability to agricultural input 
prices. 
Furthermore, trade regulation is also relevant in the case of IPRs. Patents on seed varieties 
can potentially act as a barrier to uptake of new drought-resistant seed varieties (Glatzel et al 
2012), especially where the seeds are sterile to ensure IPRs over seeds are upheld.  
‘Terminator seeds’ could be seen as a negative example of intellectual monopoly, but biotech 
companies argue that the gene-use restriction technology (GURT) was initially introduced to 
prevent spread of transgenic genes into the environment for biosafety reasons, as well for 
protection of IPRs (Black et al., 2006).  The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) under the WTO compels all WTO member countries to 
implement and enforce IPRs on plant varieties.  Farmers associations and civil society 
expressed concern that this places breeders’ rights above farmers’ rights, and undermines 
farmers’ rights to use and save seed (GRAIN, 2003).  For further details, please refer to the 
co-authored chapter, Glatzel et al (2012), which provides background to these issues (see 
Annex I for published works). 
6.3. Barriers and Enablers to Climate Resilience and Food Security 
Although international trade is threatened by climate change, recent literature highlights the 
role that trade can play in adaptation to climate change, for example, importing food might 
enable countries to adjust to climate-induced productivity shocks and mitigate welfare losses 
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(see Chapter 9; IPCC, 2014).  Moreover, many of the technologies and tools that help with 
adaptation to climate change are tradable goods, known as ‘market goods’ (see Boldt et al., 
2012). 
Under the UNFCCC, countries have been conducting ‘Technology Needs Assessments’ 
(TNA) to identify priority technologies for adaptation and mitigation. Agriculture was the 
most commonly prioritised sector (UNFCCC, 2013).  Adaptation technologies in agriculture 
included irrigation, HYVs, crop diversification and early warning systems (UNFCCC, 2006).  
New crop varieties (such as short-maturing or flood-tolerant varieties) were regularly 
highlighted (UNFCCC, 2013).  In almost all countries there were a range of barriers to 
technological development and transfer: including an insufficient regulatory/legal framework, 
or inadequate financial resources (ibid). Another barrier might be the lack of R&D 
investment in developing-country agriculture (IAASTD 2009).   
The barriers may well differ depending upon the scale of analysis, or the scale at which a 
particular technology is introduced, for instance, market goods like crop varieties may meet 
with different barriers to public goods.   Thus, policies might need to be tailored to specific 
local needs (Boldt et al., 2012), but other barriers will be cross-cutting, like WTO rules 
(Abbott, 2010).  Since governments can only act on national barriers, there is a need for 
international collaboration, for instance on WTO regulations. This relates to the next section 
on subsidies. 
As discussed in chapter 3, it is important to recognise the limits to adaptation.  For example, 
bio-physical limits, such as the thermal limits for heat tolerance in plants. Some might be 
defined as ‘mutable’ while others may be ‘absolute’ limits (Kolikow et al., 2012).  However, 
Moser and Ekstrom (2010) argue barriers are different from limits as they can be overcome.   
Jones (2010) divides barriers to adaptation into categories of social barriers (e.g. cognitive 
and institutional), and human and informational barriers (comprising of knowledge, 
technological and economic).  Social barriers to include psychological barriers, and these 
could be personal to an individual, for example, if a farmer will not adopt a strategy if they 
perceive the cost exceeds the benefit (Kolikow et al., 2012).  The possible options for 
adaptation can change over time with innovation, for example, so these barriers can be 
dynamic.   
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The ‘enabling environment’ is important. This enabling environment can be divided into 
national, macroeconomic conditions human, organisational and institutional capacity; 
research and technological capacity; and social and cultural aspects (Boldt et al., 2012). Each 
of these elements has policies associated with them and there are also different and 
interacting levels (e.g. regional/local), at which different actors work (UNFCCC, 2003). 
However, this discussion has been far more developed for mitigation than for adaptation 
(ibid). In fact it can be argued the whole focus on ‘technology’ is more suited to mitigation.  
Yet, some of the low-climate innovation literature can be usefully applied, for instance Grubb 
(2004) argues there is often a ‘valley of death’ between technology demonstration and 
commercialisation.    
6.3.1. Identifying Barriers and Enablers  
In identifying barriers, Boldt et al (2012) subdivide adaptation technologies into categories of 
‘market goods’ (like consumer/capital goods) and ‘non-market goods’ (publicly-provided 
goods and other non-market goods).  Many adaptations fall under the categories of consumer 
or public goods (UNFCCC, 2013). Seed varieties can be considered a tradeable consumer 
good, while a sea wall would be a public good. Where technologies are traded in a market it 
is necessary to identify market or trade barriers. Many ‘soft’ technologies, like farming 
techniques, do not easily fall into this categorisation as they are not traded but are learnt and 
adopted.  Indigenous knowledge for adaptation (see Chapter 4) also does not easily fall into 
this categorisation.  In fact, the prioritisation of technologies for adaptation under the 
UNFCCC’s TNA process could inadvertently favour ‘hard’ rather than ‘soft’ technologies 
(Christiansen et al., 2011).  Thus, the suitability of this framework for exploring barriers to 
adaptation is uncertain. 
While technology is important, its actual effectiveness depends on the ‘enabling 
environment’ – including legal, economic, institutional and socio-cultural contexts 
(Christiansen et al., 2011) (see previous section). In the TNA process, many countries 
identified barriers and enablers using tools like ‘market mapping’, problem trees or logical 
problem analysis (Boldt et al., 2012).  A root-cause analysis was also used to identify which 
barriers are only symptoms of problems, and which are real problems.  
Life cycle analysis (LCA) might also be a useful tool for analysing resilience of food 
products or systems, as it evaluates environmental effects of a product, process, or activity 
throughout its life-cycle or lifetime. For example, Heller and Keoleian (2003), in analysing 
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the US food system, propose a set of indicators addressing economic, social and 
environmental aspects sustainability, including diversity of seed purchasing, number of 
community organisations, or rates of malnutrition. In future, adaptation standards might 
enable companies or organisations to assess the climate resilience of food products across 
their life-cycle.  A related concept is that of the ‘value chain,’ popularised by Porter (1985), 
referring to the activities within and around a company that create a product or service.   Most 
LCA studies have so far been developed for developed-country contexts and used to evaluate 
environmental sustainability rather than food security. Potential ‘resilience’ indicators in the 
context of Bangladesh, for example, might include the percentage of farmers using saline-
tolerant rice varieties, or the nutritional value of food at the consumption phase. However, in 
the context of a developing-country, such data is extremely difficult to find and would require 
multiple studies.  In a developing-country context, analysing the various elements of food 
security (e.g. availability, utilisation and stability) might be more relevant. These approaches 
(LCA or value-chain analysis) are noted here for reasons of completeness but might be more 
applicable to adaptation for companies with globalised supply chain risks, rather than 
smallholder farmers. Identifying barriers to adaptation remains an important consideration in 
the analysis. 
6.3.2. Perverse Subsidies as Barriers to Climate and Food Security 
Whilst subsidies can play a role in addressing market failures or advancing public policy 
objectives, they can also contribute to over-exploitation of resources, curb trade opportunities 
and distort competitiveness (ICTSD, 2012).  Trade regulation or subsidies can both be 
categorised as global or cross-cutting barriers to food security under climate change. In this 
section we review the extent and impact of perverse subsidies on climate change and food 
insecurity, with particular attention to agricultural subsidies and fossil fuel subsidies.  Finally 
opportunities for reforming these subsidies are reviewed.  
Under Article 3 of the WTO’s ‘Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures’ (SCM 
Agreement), subsidies are prohibited if they are contingent “upon export performance” (Art. 
3.1(a)) or “upon the use of domestic over imported goods” (Art. 3.1(b)) (WTO, 1994). 
Subsidies are also actionable if they are deemed to be “specific to an enterprise or industry or 
group of enterprises or industries (referred to in this Agreement as "certain enterprises") 
within the jurisdiction of the granting authority” under Article 2 of the SCM Agreement. 
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According to Myers and Kent (2001), subsidies are ‘economically perverse’ when they do the 
following things: (1) maintain production processes that would otherwise not occur; (2) 
reduce costs so far that natural resources are overexploited or wasted; (3) deter efforts at 
sustainable exploitation, (4) while benefiting one economic area, harm others so that the net 
impact is negative.  Subsidies are ‘environmentally perverse’ when they; for example, foster 
activities that result in environmental harm; or encourage inefficient, if not profligate, use of 
fossil fuels (ibid). 
Resource subsidies on energy, agriculture, water and fisheries amount to $1.1 trillion 
globally, of which over 70% went to energy and agriculture (Dobbs et al 2011). Moreover, 
according to data from the OECD, agricultural subsidies rose by 4.2% per annum from 1995 
to 2010 (ibid).  The estimates refer only to direct cash payments to producers and do not 
include a range of other indirect support mechanisms including tax measures (ibid).   
Global fossil fuel subsidies amounted to $544Bn in 2012 according to IEA (2013).  This 
increased from $52Bn in 2011, and had been pushed up due to higher fossil fuel prices and 
increased consumption (ibid). Meanwhile, agricultural subsidies in OECD countries 
(producer support estimate) amounted to $258.6Bn in 2012, representing 19% of farm 
receipts in the OECD, up from 18% in 2011 (OECD, 2013).  By contrast, under the 
UNFCCC, countries committed to mobilising $100Bn by 2020 for climate adaptation and 
mitigation.  
Certain types of agricultural subsidies remain legal under the WTO’s Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures because Art.3 of the agreement states that subsidies 
are prohibited “except as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture” (WTO, 1994).  
Moreover, while a WTO member would be able to request withdrawal of subsidies if they 
cause “adverse effects” in terms of “injury” or “serious prejudice to the interests of another 
Member” under Article 5 of the SCM Agreement, Art.5 states; “this Article does not apply to 
subsidies maintained on agricultural products” (WTO, 1994). Therefore, the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture has precedence over the SCM Agreement, and the agricultural 
sector has a particular status providing it exemptions from the SCM Agreement.   
Agricultural subsidies have a range of effects including shaping decisions on production and 
consumption, altering land use, and determining the viability of livelihoods around the world, 
thus their impact on sustainable development and climate change has been a subject of 
intense debate (ICTSD, 2012). Subsidies create winners and losers, making it difficult to 
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reform subsidies (ibid).  For example, EU agricultural subsidies benefit rich landowners and 
agribusinesses in the EU, but the losers are poor developing-country farmers (Joseph, 2011). 
Please see the next section for further details of the environmental and development impacts 
of the EU’s agricultural subsidies under the CAP and attempts to reform it. Specific duties in 
agriculture make it difficult to calculate average tariffs as they “obscure true levels of 
protection, and penalize developing countries that supply cheaper products” (Aksoy, 2005:6). 
Fossil fuel subsidies are a drain on government budgets and promote consumption of fossil 
fuels, contributing to climate change. At least eight countries (Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, the United Arab Emirates, and Uzbekistan) commit 5% or more 
of their GDP to energy subsidies (Dobbs et al 2011). In Iran, energy subsidies in 2008 totaled 
$101Bn or one-third of the annual central budget (IEA, 2013). These fossil fuel subsidies also 
generate dependency and drive over-use of agricultural fuels. Fossil fuel subsidies are 
relevant to this thesis because industrial or mechanised agriculture consumes fossil fuels, and 
also because agricultural fuel subsidies can undermine resilience. For example in India, 
energy subsidies for irrigation have contributed to unsustainable groundwater abstraction 
(Mukherji et al., 2012). 
 
Figure 6.1   Global fossil fuel subsidies. Source: IEA, 2013 
Moreover these subsidies are socially regressive. Only 8% of the $409Bn spent on fossil fuel 
subsidies in 2010 went to the poorest 20% of the population (IEA, 2011).  However, removal 
of subsidies is politically challenging (Dobbs et al., 2011). Measures may be needed to 
reduce negative impacts of reform on poor communities. In Indonesia, unconditional cash 
transfers were used to compensate low-income households for fuel subsidy cuts (Beaton et 
al., 2010). 
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Under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies, such fossil fuel subsidies are considered 
“actionable” (giving cause for legal action) if they were found to be “specific to an enterprise 
or industry or group of enterprises or industries” (Art.2;WTO, 1994). Arguably many fossil 
fuel subsidies could be considered “specific” since they relate specifically to the fossil fuel 
industry. A WTO member can also refer the matter to the Dispute Settlement Body to request 
withdrawal if they cause “adverse effects to the interests of other Members” (Art.5; WTO, 
1994). ‘Dual pricing systems’ are often used by energy-rich countries to set a lower price for 
domestic consumption of fossil fuels than the price charged for imported fuel, and would be 
either prohibited or actionable under these definitions (Selivakova, 2007; Meyer, 2013) 
especially since these subsidies are contingent “upon the use of domestic over imported 
goods” (Art. 3.1(b)) (WTO, 1994).  However, clever drafting by legislators has meant most 
dual pricing systems have avoided these conditions, for instance, avoiding specificity by 
applying the schemes “to all industries and enterprises throughout the economy” (Meyer, 
2013:2).  Furthermore, measures to combat the negative environment impacts of fossil fuel 
subsidies by subsidising renewable energy, have also come up against WTO challenges (for 
instance, wind subsidies in China) because policy-makers have not been careful to ensure 
WTO-compatibility (ibid). 
The scale and extent of perverse subsidies demands increased political attention to reform 
them.   Effective pricing of resources is the single biggest consistent driver of accelerated 
resource productivity (Dobbs et al 2011).  The effectiveness of finance committed to the 
Green Climate Fund (GCF) to mobilise action on climate change could be enhanced by 
policy measures to remove perverse subsidies. Where there are political challenges to 
removal of fossil fuel subsidies in developing countries, one mechanism to overcome such 
challenges would be using climate finance to cushion the impact on vulnerable communities, 
for example, subsidising alternative (or renewable) energy in communities affected by a 
removal of fuel subsidies. Such compensatory mechanisms might, however, suffer from 
challenges under the WTO if they are not drafted correctly. 
6.3.3. The Case of the WTO and EU Agricultural Subsidies 
The EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is one of the EU’s most important policy areas, 
making up over 40% of the total EU budget with 50Bn EUR in subsidies in 2011 (EC, 2014).  
However, as detailed below, the CAP may conflict with international commitments to 
promote free trade under the WTO, and climate change commitments. Whilst a percentage of 
Pillar II subsidies are intended to go towards environmental or social objectives (equivalent 
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to the ‘Green Box’ measures under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture), subsidies also go 
toward meat and dairy production, contributing to GHG emissions. For instance, EU beef 
producers receive export subsidies and direct payments. It can also be argued that the 
capacity of developing-country farmers to adapt to climate change through development is 
hindered by a lack of fair market access for their products. The CAP may contribute to a 
situation where local production in rural communities of developing countries is hampered by 
competition with subsidised EU exports (FAO, 2005). 
The existing round of WTO negotiations, known as the Doha Development Road, was 
supposed to be completed with an agreement on substantial reductions in trade-distorting 
support to agriculture. However there has been little progress in reducing EU subsidies 
(Cunha and Swinbank, 2012). It can be argued completion of the WTO’s Doha Development 
Round would contribute positively to adaptive capacity in developing countries.  Agricultural 
trade liberalisation acts as an important vehicle for economic adaptation to climate change, 
whereby increased price transmission via global trade results in increased global welfare 
(Randhir and Hertel, 2000). For example, sugar trade liberalisation would shift production to 
efficient, low-cost producers in the tropical zone, saving global resources and increasing 
incomes (Borrell and Hubbard, 2008). Subsidies exacerbate the effects of climate change by 
encouraging production from the highly subsidised EU agricultural sector (Randhir and 
Hertel, 2000) because this disadvantages developing-country producers that are also highly 
vulnerable to climate impacts. 
Agricultural trade policies were brought into the global trade negotiations for the first time in 
the 1994 Uruguay Round. Before then, the import barriers in agriculture were coupled with 
widespread use of subsidies linked to production (Aksoy, 2005). The URAA imposed an 
obligation of tariff reduction by 36% for developed countries, and 24% for developing 
countries. However, under Article 6, direct payments are exempted from reduction 
commitments if they are in the “green box” – all subsidies in this box are permissible, which 
included “payments under environmental programmes”. The EU could even increase its 
support beyond the reduction commitments since the “green box” subsidies were excluded 
from the calculation of a member’s total level of domestic support  under Article 6 (5)(b). 
Environmental objectives could thus potentially be used as a cover for protectionism. 
The 2003 CAP reform featured a ‘de-coupling’ of agricultural production from subsidy 
payments (Cunha and Swinbank, 2012). Subsidies were now paid regardless of whether the 
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farmer produces or not. Thus a ‘single payment system’ (SPS) was implemented whereby 
subsidies were allocated according to other indicators like land size rather than production. 
These payments were generally considered as falling in the ‘Green Box’ as they were deemed 
to have little or no distorting effects on trade, meaning they were exempt from reduction 
commitments. Some countries, like France, still maintained coupled direct payments in some 
sectors, for instance for livestock (SAC, 2008).  The CAP Health Check of 2008 also 
abolished milk production quotas, but Member States were permitted to maintain ‘coupled 
support’ for suckler cow, goat and sheep permia (EC, 2009c). 
The new post-2013 CAP reform does include some environmental provisions (see EC, 
2012b). 30% of the direct payments will go towards farmers who have turned towards 
environmentally-friendly practices and improved use of natural resources, including crop 
diversification, maintenance of permanent pasture, and preservation of environmental 
reservoirs and landscapes. Yet crop diversification is already widespread, since most arable 
farmers already grow three or more crops (Westhoek et al., 2012).  Loopholes may enable 
farmers to rent marginal land nearby which could render the whole measure ineffective (ibid). 
The post-2013 CAP reform fails to address any of the serious issues of livestock production, 
including animal welfare, antibiotic use or the indirect effects on deforestation for animal 
feed (ibid).  Predictably, lobby groups and farmers unions, e.g. COPA-COGECA made an 
effort to weaken the reforms (Euractiv, 2013).  Overall, CAP proposals have not seized the 
opportunity to change the environmentally-damaging livestock sector by reducing the 
subsidies going towards intensive livestock farming.  Thus, experts have concluded the 
proposed greening measures will hardly be effective in stimulating biodiversity and reducing 
GHG emissions (Westhoek et al., 2012). Thus there has not been much progress in trying to 
get the CAP to align with the EU’s global development or climate change commitments. 
6.4. International Diplomacy on Climate Change and Sustainable Agriculture 
The international architecture on climate change (and climate change finance) is drawn up at 
the UNFCCC under a process of negotiation between member states (Parties to the 
Convention).  Thus, processes of negotiation and diplomacy between states are at the root of 
the international regulation and treaties to tackle climate change under the UNFCCC, as well 
as those determining agricultural trade under the WTO.    
Parties negotiating at the UNFCCC use a range of tactics in the negotiations ranging from 
‘hard’ tactics (conflictive or aggressive) to ‘soft’ tactics (cooperative or friendly tactics) 
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(Bailer, 2012).  Other classifications of negotiations strategies include cooperative versus 
non-cooperative strategies (ibid).  However, it is recognised the structures at the UNFCCC 
negotiations are inequitable as poorer countries cannot afford to send large delegations and 
their level of expertise usually remains below that of wealthier countries (UNFairplay, 2011; 
Schroeder et al., 2012).  Many negotiations go on in parallel with one another, and go on late 
into the night on the last days, putting smaller delegations at a further disadvantage (ibid).  
The UNFCCC negotiations under the SBI, focusing on implementation, tend to be relatively 
more contentious, whilst those under the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological 
Advice (SBSTA), with its function for learning and developing the evidence-base, tend to be 
less contentious. 
Whilst transparency and access to information might go some way towards helping under-
resourced delegations to engage in dynamic and fast-paced UNFCCC negotiations, a delegate 
from Austria commented “if everything was transparent you would never make progress” 
[sic] (UNFairplay, 2011:27).  Some delegates prefer a level of discretion to enable them to 
speak openly with each other.  Meetings on sensitive issues, including climate finance, are 
often ‘closed’ meetings meaning the public and international media have restricted access. 
Lack of transparency is likely to restrict the participation of stakeholder groups such as civil 
society and the media, who might be supporting the interests of climate-vulnerable countries, 
as well as limiting the access to media information about the negotiations. The actual impact 
of the lack of transparency in UNFCCC negotiations will be explored and discussed further in 
this thesis through semi-structured interviews and participant observation at the UNFCCC 
(see Chapter 10). 
Consensus-based decision-making arguably stifles progress. The decision rule in international 
politics is typically unanimity (consensus) meaning the consent of all states is required. 
Unanimity is the prevailing rule at the UNFCCC. This generally means the ‘law of the least 
ambitious program’ applies (Hovi and Sprinz, 2006) so the final decision can only be as 
ambitious as that of the least ambitious party.  Any Party can hold a veto, so the climate 
negotiations effectively march at the “pace of the slowest”, and countries opposed to change 
can accumulate burdensome “side-payments” (Ward et al., 2001:438). One example of this 
could be observed at the UNFCCC negotiations in Bonn in 2013, where Russia was observed 
using a tactical vote to stop the negotiations for two weeks, in the words of Tuvalu “crashing 
the car to prove the seatbelts don’t work”. Thus, it is argued a stronger reliance on qualified 
majority voting would speed up the decision-making process, and weighted voting 
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mechanisms can ensure decisions take all major interests into account (Biermann et al., 
2012).  
This architecture is broadly similar to that for other important international issues like those 
relating to agriculture under the WTO’s Doha Development Round, which also involves a 
process of international negotiation between states. At the WTO, small low-income countries 
are also at a disadvantage. It has been found that small low-income countries face barriers to 
participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism (Abbott, 2007).  This may limit the 
extent to which smaller of low-income countries can participate in enhancing their interests 
through recourse to international trade law. 
Major issues are at stake for agriculture in developing countries with subsidies being 
discussed at the WTO, and climate finance discussed at the UNFCCC.  The cross-cutting 
issues at stake include the use of policy mechanisms like food reserves, which may help 
countries ensure food security for poor consumers in the face of climate shocks.  The UN’s 
Special Rapporteur underlined that food reserves are “a crucial tool” for ensuring food 
security, yet there are concerns about WTO rules restricting the use of food reserves (UNSR, 
2013). 
Furthermore, at the WTO ‘divide and rule’ tactics may be at play, with countries divided into 
different interest groups like LDCs and Non-LDC’s, as well as the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific group of countries (see Aksoy, 2005).  Under the WTO, preferential trade schemes 
offer special preferences to LDCs, but these create a complex mosaic of tariffs, quotas and 
import restrictions (Hasha, 2004), acting as a disincentive for LDCs to agree to a more 
comprehensive agreement for fear of losing special preferences.  Preferential access is only 
granted for a specific range of products, constraining the ability of developing countries to 
diversify exports (Brenton and Ikezuki, 2005) and move into high-value exports.  Similar 
divisions occur within the UNFCCC with different interest groups of countries as well as 
multiple strands of negotiation. Overall, as described above, there is some evidence the 
international trade talks mirror the climate talks in terms of weighting of outcomes in favour 
of the most powerful states, limiting the extent to which negotiation outcomes can be reached 
that benefit the most vulnerable countries. 
6.5. Summary 
In this chapter, we provide an overview of important issues relating to international 
agricultural trade and climate change. While globalisation of international trade has benefits 
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for food security under climate change, there are certain risks. For example, agricultural 
subsidies persist in developed countries and this may limit the capacity for smallholder 
farmers in developing countries to adapt, by hindering fair market access for their products.  
Subsidies can be viewed as a global or cross-cutting barrier to food security under climate 
change and reforming such subsidies, while challenging, is recommended. 
The barriers and enablers to adaptation technologies were explored in the context of TNA’s. 
However, it was observed the categorisation of ‘technologies’ under this approach might be 
biased toward market-based adaptation at the expense of insights into non-market adaptation 
practices or locally-generated knowledge.   
Finally, the chapter explores the international architecture for decision-making on climate 
change at the UNFCCC, drawing certain parallels with the WTO. Both the structures and 
interests at play in these international negotiations guide the decisions that are made and the 
extent to which outcomes can be reached to address the impacts of climate change. Due to the 
importance of these structures it was decided that the UNFCCC negotiations would be taken 
as a case study to observe the negotiations on adaptation finance. 
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7. Climate Finance for Food Security: A Framework for Analysis  
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides an analysis of climate change finance, focusing particularly on public 
adaptation finance for food security under climate change.  Various issues and challenges 
relating to adaptation finance are explored and, as described in Chapter 2, these issues form 
the basis for many of the questions with experts and stakeholders in the semi-structured 
interviews. Criteria to determine between adaptation options as well as evaluate their 
effectiveness are reviewed. This chapter aims to develop an indicator-based framework for 
analysing the effectiveness of climate finance. 
Annex I Parties committed to providing ‘new and additional resources’ for developing 
countries under Article 4 of the UNFCCC Convention. However the UNFCCC Convention is 
not specific about the resources for adaptation being new and additional under Article 4.4, as 
most of the original convention is directed towards mitigation.  Subsequently in Article 1(e) 
of the Bali Action Plan, parties committed to “provision of financial resources and investment 
to support action on mitigation and adaptation and technology cooperation” including 
“adequate, predictable and sustainable financial resources and financial and technical 
support” (UNFCCC, 2007).  Following this, in Article 8 of the Copenhagen Accord, 
developed countries committed to “a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion dollars a 
year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries” (UNFCCC, 2009). At COP-16 in 
Cancun, Mexico in 2010, Parties agreed to establish the Green Climate Fund (GCF) to 
distribute this climate finance.  Paragraph 98 of the Cancun Agreements reiterates that 
“developed country Parties commit, in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and 
transparency on implementation, to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year by 
2020 to address the needs of developing countries” (UNFCCC, 2010).  If countries fulfil 
these commitments, there will be a tenfold increase in climate finance flowing to developing 
countries by 2020, compared to the current climate finance flows of about $10Bn per annum 
(Carty, 2010). Aid commitments in 2010 were around $128Bn (OECD, 2010).  Article IV (A) 
of the Cancun Agreements takes notes of the promise for $30Bn in new and additional 
financial resources for the period 2010-12 with a “balanced allocation between adaptation 
and mitigation” whilst “funding for adaptation will be prioritised for the most vulnerable 
developing countries” (UNFCCC, 2010) in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 95.  This is known as 
‘Fast Start Finance’. At COP-17 Durban in 2011, Parties to the Convention approved the 
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governing instrument for the Green Climate Fund (UNFCCC, 2011b) and under the Annex, 
Article II F (26), the World Bank was recognised as the interim trust of the GCF, subject to a 
review three years after operationalisation of the Fund.  In decision 4/CP.19 at the Warsaw 
conference in 2013, the additional guidance to the GCF (Section B, Article 13) called for 
“ambitious and timely contributions by developed countries to enable an effective 
operationalization” (UNFCCC, 2013d).  However, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, 
speaking at the Ministerial Meeting at Warsaw, described the GCF as an “empty shell”. 
In Doha (COP-15), in decision 1/CP.18 (paragraph 68), countries were encouraged to provide 
resources at least to the average annual level of the fast-start finance period for 2013-15, and 
under paragraph 67 were invited to submit information on approaches for mobilising scaled-
up climate finance to $100Bn per year (UNFCCC, 2012a).   However, with financial 
constraints due to the global economic downturn, there are increasing concerns for adaptation 
finance to be scaled-up and to be as effective as possible, since climate change is already 
threatening to erode global development gains (WDR, 2010).  There is a risk that 
governments and communities are becoming trapped in a vicious cycle, where climate 
change disrupts economic and social development, meaning countries have even less 
financial capacity to tackle climate change (see diagram below). 
There is also a danger that instead of getting on with the urgent tasks of adaptation, 
governments are getting embroiled over debates about governance, monitoring and 
additionality (Fankhauser and Burton, 2011). However, ensuring the effectiveness of climate 
change finance is crucial because “nothing is likely to undermine progress on adaptation in 
the developing countries more than evidence, or even suspicion, that the funds are being  
diverted or used wastefully, and are not reaching those most in need of assistance” (ibid:p.5).  
A major challenge is that lack of transparency and unclear guidance on what constitutes 
climate finance have made reporting and tracking climate finance difficult (Nakhooda et al., 
2012). 
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Figure 7.1  Potential vicious cycle of economic damage under climate change at global 
or local scales 
 
In 2010, the High-Level Advisory Group established by the UN Secretary General found that 
raising the $100Bn per year by 2020 was “challenging but feasible” (AGF, 2010:5).  The 
Advisory Group assessed the different sources against the set of 8 criteria set out in its terms 
of reference which were: revenue, efficiency, equity, incidence, practicality, reliability, 
additionality and acceptability (ibid).  Private flows were included, as well as leveraged loans 
from the multilateral development banks.  However, there is no widely accepted methodology 
for calculating the ‘net benefit’ of gross private flows to developing countries.  Direct 
budgetary contributions were expected to play a role, dependent on national circumstances, 
whilst innovative sources such as a ‘financial transactions tax’ were considered.  It has been 
recognised that grants and highly concessional loans will be particularly important for 
adaptation and that emphasis must be placed on spending funds wisely (ibid) including 
prioritisation based on cost effectiveness. 
Under the UNFCCC, three funds were created at the climate conference in Bonn in 2001, the 
Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and the 
Adaptation Fund.  The Adaptation Fund is funded uniquely from a share of the proceeds from 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) amounting to 2% of Certified Emission 
Reductions (CERs) issued, but can also receive contributions from countries as part of 
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official commitments under the Convention.  In addition the EU’s Global Climate Change 
Alliance (GCCA) is one of the largest funders of adaptation activities (Schalatek et al., 2012). 
In parallel to the climate finance architecture under the UNFCCC, the multilateral 
development banks established a series of funds to distribute ‘Fast Start Finance’ 
commitments.  The graph below shows the pledges and disbursement of funding as of July 
2014. The PPCR (Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience) was established as a programme 
of the Strategic Climate Fund which is one of two funds within the CIF (Climate Investment 
Funds) framework.  Operational in 2008, the World Bank serves as the Trustee and 
Administrating Unit for the PPCR, a role which has been controversial due to opposition by 
civil society bodies to the use of ‘loans’ for adaptation (EquityBD, 2011).  The PPCR 
contains a ‘sunset clause’ under Article 57 which establishes the closure of funds once a new 
financial architecture becomes effective under the UNFCCC (CIF, 2008). The article states; 
“the SCF will take necessary steps to conclude its operations once a new financial 
architecture is effective”. However, the subsequent Article 58 states the SCF may continue 
“if the outcome of the UNFCCC negotiations so indicates” (ibid). This is there to leave open 
the possibility of the continuation of the SCF if determined by the COP. 
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Figure 7.2  Climate Finance Pledges and Deposits, as of July 2014. Source: Author’s 
Own, Data from: www.climatefundsupdate.org 
 
The Development Co-operation Directorate (DAC) of the OECD has gathered statistical data 
on climate-related aid and in 2011, released the data using the ‘adaptation markers’ which 
shows that mitigation-related aid was estimated at $17.6Bn in 2010, whilst adaptation-related 
aid was at $9.3Bn (OECD, 2011).  The fourth high-level forum on Aid Effectiveness was 
held in November 2011 in Busan, which re-iterated the importance of effectiveness for 
climate change finance under Article 34, calling for “coherence, transparency and 
predictability” in climate finance (OECD, 2011a). Adaptation finance has been marginalised 
historically by comparison to mitigation finance, although it has been seen as the priority for 
developing countries. The same can be said of adaptation as a whole (see Schipper, 2006). 
Columbian representative Cavelier pointed out in the Bonn UNFCCC meeting in 2012: “if 
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countries did not adapt today, they could not mitigate in the future” (Williams, 
2012:vol.7411).  In analysis of the ‘fast state finance’ commitments between 2010-12 it was 
reported by Derek Gibbs that in the earlier period, before 2012, adaptation made up only 10% 
of finance whereas in the latter period it reached 22% of total flows (Williams, 2012). 
Therefore there was no major readjustment in favour of adaptation, although some parties 
such as UK and Australia did achieve a balance in their funding allocation. Developing 
parties have also criticised the failure to use the direct access modalities of the Adaptation 
Fund (ibid).  In more recent analysis by ODI, it was found that $5.2Bn of the $30.5Bn in FSF 
went to adaptation (around 17% of the total) (Nakhooda et al., 2013). 
At COP-16 in Cancun (Sixteenth session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC) in 
2010, countries promised that the financial flows for climate change would reach a target of 
$100 billion per year. However, the 2010 World Development Report estimates that the 
overall cost of adaptation and mitigation in poor countries would reach $170-275Bn per year 
by 2030 (WDR, 2010).   UNFCCC (2007a) estimated that global annual investment and 
financial flows of $200-210Bn would be needed in 2030 for mitigation alone.  While 
countries agreed under 4.3 of the UNFCCC Convention to cover the ‘agreed full incremental 
costs’ of mitigation, there has been no agreement on what these costs are (Haites, 2011). 
Estimates of incremental costs are likely to be much lower than the levels of incremental 
investment, but are more difficult to calculate (Olbrisch et al., 2011). Haites (2011:965) 
argues that estimating the costs of adaptation are more challenging because there is “no 
operational definition that can be used to specify adaptation measures” so this is usually done 
using sectoral estimates. Estimates are almost always limited to the costs of ‘hard’ 
infrastructure measures rather than ‘soft’ measures such as capacity building (Smith et al., 
2011) and the costs of operating and maintenance are also rarely included. It is challenging to 
estimate costs to natural ecosystems (see Parry et al., 2009).  Furthermore, we may question 
whether increased resilience is a cost or a benefit, whether to count residual damages as a 
cost (which has not usually been attempted), and whether benefits in one sector offset 
damages to another (Haites, 2011). The sensitivity of the adaptation costs to the choice of 
development baseline has not yet been explored (Smith et al., 2011).  Worryingly, the global 
estimates of the costs of adaptation assume a level of warming of 2
o
C, for example the World 
Bank estimate under the EACC estimated costs of $70-100Bn per year by 2050 (Narain et al., 
2011). In the case of Bangladesh, agricultural GDP is projected to be 3.1% lower each year 
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(US$36Bn in lost value-added) and total GDP US$129Bn lower due to climate change over 
the 45-year period 2005-2050 (World Bank, 2010b). 
Whilst the Paris Declaration Principles on Aid Effectiveness have been invoked (see 7.3.5), 
Stern (2008) argued that an effective adaptation response to climate change must consider 
both efficiency and equity. Bird and Brown (2010) highlight the principles of timeliness, 
appropriateness, national ownership and focus on the most vulnerable.   UNFCCC (2011a) 
argues equity is a key principle for adaptation, since climate change disproportionately 
affects vulnerable populations, most of whom are poor. Therefore, the distributional impacts 
of adaptation options and effective targeting are particularly important. Furthermore, 
although some broad principles have been developed for what climate finance can be 
expected to achieve, it has been noted there has not been sufficient attention to principles 
governing finance disbursement itself (Bird and Glennie, 2011).   Other challenges include 
the concept of ‘readiness’ which has meant that so far, finance has often gone towards 
middle-income countries that are consider “more ready to absorb” (Bird and Glennie, 2011:2) 
as well as having increased emissions. In terms of the first Paris Declaration principle of 
ownership by developing countries, the Adaptation Fund’s modalities for direct access have 
generated significant interest as an innovative element that seeks to ensure this (Brown et al., 
2010). 
Researchers have previously tried to define ‘successful adaptation’ to climate change, and 
using an Delphi panel of experts, defined this as “any adjustment that reduces the risks 
associated with climate change, or vulnerability to climate change impacts, to a 
predetermined level, without compromising economic, social or environmental 
sustainability” (de Franca Doria et al., 2009:p.815). This research will contribute towards this 
debate.   
Bird and Glennie (2011:1) argue insufficient attention has been paid to country-level delivery 
mechanisms to ensure climate actions are “effective, efficient and equitable”.   Furthermore 
there has been little clarity about which type of investments will need to be made. Since 
climate finance will be different from development aid in various ways, there may a need for 
additional principles going beyond the Paris Declaration.  For instance, a need for 
additionality beyond Official Development Assistance (ODA), which will be challenging 
since the existing commitment of 0.7% of GNI has not been met by many countries.  Due to 
financial and budgetary pressures in the current economic climate, developed countries at the 
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UNFCCC have been pushing for the consideration and prioritisation of ‘private flows’ within 
climate finance as this is a key economic interest.  Furthermore, oversight by OECD-DAC 
may not be preferable because the OECD has been seen by developing countries as a small 
club of elite countries who further their own interests (Bird and Glennie, 2011).  Moreover, it 
is not clear whether focusing on ‘aid effectiveness’ principles, whilst it may have improved 
transparency, has actually led to improved effectiveness in reality.  
Overall, finance for adaptation needs to be effective in targeting the most vulnerable and 
needs to be as efficient as possible. Since the funding is limited in comparison to projected 
impacts of climate change, it is all the more important to ensure it is as effective as possible 
in implementation and delivery.  Therefore it is necessary to investigate principles by which 
this finance can be made effective, including ‘ex ante’ frameworks by which finance can be 
directed towards priority programmes or projects, and ‘ex post’ frameworks for results-
monitoring and evaluation.  This study will attempt to analyse both ‘ex ante’ methods of 
assessing adaptation options and prioritising the direction of finance, including vulnerability 
indices, and ‘ex post’ methods for monitoring and evaluating plans and projects after they 
have been financed.  In the long-term it may also be necessary to ensure the ‘mainstreaming’ 
of climate change into the wide range of related government departments, national 
institutions and policies, which may include finance mainstreaming.  
7.2. Finance for agricultural adaptation 
This section aims to identify the flows of finance and investment that could make a 
contribution to climate adaptation, specifically for agricultural resilience and food security in 
developing countries. Particular attention is given to effectiveness in benefiting the most 
climate-vulnerable.  As shown in chapter 6, the enabling environment is important in shaping 
the context in which adaptation can occur and there are a range of stakeholders and bodies 
that could be involved in promoting adaptation and resilience for agricultural finance, trade 
and investment.   
Agricultural investment is a highly effective poverty reduction strategy. However, investment 
and growth in agriculture has been slow over the past decade (FAO, 2009). Schmidhuber et al 
(2009) estimate at least $83Bn of additional net investment is needed in agriculture year-on-
year until 2050 to meet targets for poverty and food insecurity reduction, without factoring in 
climate change. 
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Parry and Boyle (2012) explore the different financing options for food security under 
climate change, and differentiate different types of public finance; (1) international 
development assistance, (2) microfinance institutions, (3) national governments. Climate 
finance specifically includes UNFCCC financing, climate finance outside the UNFCCC; and 
carbon markets. In terms of agriculture-related climate finance, Murphy (2011) argues that 
there is a need for ‘triple dividend’ funding tackling adaptive capacity, mitigation and food 
security altogether.   This section also considers additional issues relating to finance for 
agricultural adaptation, including on-farm investment in agriculture (including microfinance), 
agricultural R&D investment, agricultural FDI and inclusive business models. 
7.2.1. International development assistance  
In real terms, Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the agricultural sector has declined 
between 1980-2005 (Parry and Boyle 2012). This trend is particularly stark when we view 
the trend of agriculture as a percentage share of ODA which has fell from 17% in 1980 to as 
low as 3.8% in 2006 (FAO, 2009; see figure below). Presently this percentage stands at 
around 5% as there was a slight increase due to the food crisis (ibid).  Little of this finance 
within ODA is linked to climate change, and the limited extent to which the agricultural ODA 
is linked to climate change partially reflects the concerns climate finance should be new and 
additional (Parry and Boyle, 2012).  Hence there is a suggestion that mainstreaming of 
climate change into agriculture is inhibited by the requirement for additionality.  However, 
this may reflect a missed opportunity to encourage ‘climate-smart’ practices through 
initiatives such as the G8 leaders 2009 L’Aquila Food Security Initiative (ibid). 
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Figure 7.3  Annual ODA commitments: overall trends and share allocated to 
agriculture. Source: FAO, 2009 
7.2.2. Climate finance and the UNFCCC 
Within the UNFCCC system, the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) has supported 
implementation of NAPAs (National Adaptation Programmes of Action) of which many 
projects (the largest share) relate to food security (Parry and Boyle, 2012). REDD+ (the 
United Nations Program on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) 
and NAMA (Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions) plans both have relevance for 
agriculture and food security as well. Other UNFCCC channels include the SCCF and 
Adaptation Fund. Yet these funds have been dwarfed by the climate finance channelled 
outside the UNFCCC, including into multilateral development bank funds such as the PPCR 
and CTF (see Figure 7.2). Outside of the UNFCCC funds, the priorities have arguably largely 
been set by the developed countries and so these focus on mitigation primarily (refer to the 
introduction section above).  At the UNFCCC it was discussed whether the Green Climate 
Fund ought to have an ‘integrated’ adaptation-mitigation window which could include 
agricultural activities (ibid). However, after recent GCF negotiations it appears the GCF will 
have separate adaptation and mitigation windows, with “enhanced agricultural and rural 
adaptation” as one of the sectoral results under the ‘adaptation logic model’ (GCF, 2014a:11). 
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7.2.3. National governments  
Public spending has also fallen to around 7% on agriculture in developing countries (FAO, 
2009; Hallam, 2011).  It is as low as 4% in some agriculture-based economies, including 
some Sub-Saharan African countries (WDR, 2008).  Since some developing countries receive 
ODA directly and report this in their spending on agriculture or agricultural R&D spending,  
Lowder et al (2012) notes there is likely to be double counting between ODA  and 
government spending on agriculture or agricultural R&D. 
Agricultural extension services could be pivotal in building adaptive capacity due to their role 
in reaching local farmers with information and tools for agriculture, and these systems may 
also benefit from reform and modernisation (Parry and Boyle, 2012). Furthermore, reforms in 
terms of land tenure could be beneficial. There are also opportunities for smallholder groups 
or cooperatives to deliver grants (ibid). Yet, it is argued the absorptive capacity of some 
governments is inhibited by weak governance systems or corruption (Parry and Boyle, 2012). 
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7.2.4. On-farm investment in agricultural capital, including microfinance 
 
Figure 7.4  Average annual investment in agriculture in selected low and middle income 
countries by source (Source: Lowder et al., 2012).  Note: Number of countries covered is 
shown in parenthesis. 
 
Figure 7.5  Additional annual investment expenditure in developing world needed to 
counteract the effects of climate change on nutrition (Billion/year in 2000 USD) (Source: 
Nelson et al., 2010). Note: Results are based on yield changes that do not include the 
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CO2 fertilisation effect. 127 countries are included in the IMPACT model of the 
developing world.  
Public investment in agriculture, as noted in the previous section, has faltered in recent years.   
In fact, as shown below, farmers themselves are by far the largest investors in agriculture in 
low and middle-income countries, dwarfing other forms of agricultural investment (Lowder 
et al., 2012).  On-farm investment by farmers is more than three times as large as all other 
sources of investment combined, and exceeds government investment by more than 4 to 1 
(ibid).   Moreover this is a conservative estimate. Much of the investment in agriculture is 
also intangible, for example, when farmers spend time and resources forming producer 
associations, a form of social capital that reduces risk and enhances productivity (ibid).   
Arguably, particular attention needs to be made to on-farm investment by smallholders, 
including helping women, and creating an enabling environment. In Lowder et al (2012) the 
on-farm investment category includes estimates of on-farm agricultural capital stock 
calculated in the FAO statistical database, including physical assets such as machinery and 
equipment, plantation crops, livestock and structures for keeping livestock.  The category 
could therefore also be considered to be underlying physical capital making up one of the 
assets in the local adaptive capacity framework (see Jones et al., 2010 and Chapter 4). 
On-farm investment is contingent on access to rural finance. According to FAO, rural 
finance encompasses the range of financial services offered and used in rural areas by people 
of all income levels (FAO, 2013). This rural finance includes agricultural finance, dedicated 
to financing agricultural related activities like input supply, production, distribution, 
wholesale, processing, marketing (ibid). In addition, there is agricultural ‘value chain 
finance’ (taking account of inter-linked processes from farm to consumer and using them to 
increase efficiency and lower lending risk) (ibid). Finally, microfinance offers smaller loans 
and savings services to poor farmers, while accepting a variety of assets as collateral on the 
loan (ibid).  Many countries have seen a microfinance boom in recent years, including the 
well-known example of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh.  In Africa, innovative technologies are 
enabling expansion of microfinance, for example, ‘M-PESA’ in Kenya, which has enabled 
payments by mobile phone.  Emerging ICT technologies provide new opportunities for rural 
finance and banking by reducing costs and alleviating asymmetries in information 
(Kloeppinger-Todd and Sharma, 2010). Furthermore, index-based insurance has been piloted 
in some areas as a way of managing climate risk in agriculture, although it is inhibited by 
lack of high-quality weather data (ibid). 
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The majority of microfinance institutions (MFIs) source their finance from multilateral 
development agencies. This intends to fill a gap, since commercial bank lending to the 
agricultural sector is small (FAO, 2009).  However there may be a disproportionate focus on 
high-value cash crops for export (Parry and Boyle, 2012) and also concerns about transaction 
costs of microfinance, which excludes the poorest smallholders.  Moreover, critics express 
concern that in places like Bangladesh, microfinance can have negative impacts, leading to 
debt and placing an additional work burden on women without empowering them (Karim, 
2011a). Despite these objections, in countries like Bangladesh with MFI’s, rural areas have 
outpaced rural areas in neighbouring countries (like India) against various development 
indicators, and this success can be partially attributed to microfinance (Dreze and Sen, 2013). 
However, it is clear microfinance is not a panacea for poverty reduction or similarly, adaptive 
capacity in the face of climate risk. In the words of Mohammed Yunus, microfinance works 
best as a poverty reduction tool when it is “combined with other innovative programmes” 
(Chowdhury, 2009:2). Furthermore, a proliferation of small micro-enterprises will not by 
itself reduce poverty and build up adaptive capacity. There is a need for other supply-side 
(infrastructure, skills) and demand-side (macroeconomic) factors to make those micro-
enterprises more productive (ibid). 
7.2.5. Private Finance: Challenges and Opportunities  
Agriculture accounts for less than 10% of commercial bank lending in developing countries 
(FAO, 2009). Thus, as shown above, the majority of private investment in agriculture comes 
from informal national sources like friends and family (Havermann & Muccione 2011, in 
Parry and Boyle, 2012).  However agricultural FDI plays an increasingly important role, as 
described in the box below. Yet, there are limitations to the extent which the private sector 
can be mobilised to engage in adaptation in vulnerable countries. Investment opportunities 
for FDI are lower in low-income countries as a result of worsening business conditions and 
increased informality of the economy (CAN, 2013).  This may therefore leave the most 
vulnerable countries marginalised, where needs are greatest.   
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Mechanisms to mobilise the private sector can use public funds to incentivise private-sector 
investments. An example is the IFC (International Finance Corporation) loan engaging 
private-sector seed companies in development of stress-tolerant varieties as part of the PPCR 
in Bangladesh (IFC, 2014).   Another example is the ‘Katalyst’ project, a DFID-funded 
project in Bangladesh that worked with Banglalink (a mobile company) to launch an 
agricultural helpline (see www.katalyst.com.bd). Direct instruments include grants (including 
subsidies), debt (loans, credit lines), equity (public or private, shares), quasi-equity (debt-
based or equity-based loans), de-risking instruments (loan guarantees, insurance) (CAN, 
2013).   Governments can also use indirect tools, like enacting legislation affecting private 
companies, or creating a bond market (CAN, 2013; Moriel and Bordier, 2012). Indirect 
instruments include market mechanisms (e.g. an ‘adaptation credit mechanism’), bonds, 
Box: Agricultural Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
Investment in agriculture makes up only a tiny percentage of total flows of foreign direct 
investment to developing countries. FAO (2013) estimated that the average annual inward FDI 
flows over 2007-2008 were USD $922.4Billion but the FDI into agriculture (including hunting, 
forestry and fisheries) represented only 0.4% of this. However, trends in FDI were also found 
to be difficult to monitor and track due to missing data, and the private investments by 
institutional investors (mutual funds, banks, pension funds and hedge funds) were not included 
in these estimates (ibid).  
FDI (foreign direct investment) in agriculture in developing countries has also been increasing, 
with growing economies such as China and India playing a growing role, as well as a spike due 
to the 2008 food crisis and growing demand for biofuels (Parry and Boyle, 2012).   However, 
there are concerns over recent large-scale land acquisitions, known as ‘land-grabs’ which are 
of little benefit to the local food-insecure population (ibid). Criticisms have also arisen where 
the FDI promotes mechanised practices that generate fewer employment opportunities or 
depletes water resources and biodiversity.  There are important implications for food security 
if the food produced is destined for export. Often, the legal framework favours the investor 
rather than the host country (Hallam, 2009). There is therefore an urgent need to monitor 
impacts of international investments and to catalogue best practices in law and policy, in order 
to minimise risks and maximise benefits (ibid).  Regulatory approaches towards product 
labelling, certification schemes and focus upon the sustainability of commercial supply chains 
could help alleviate some of these concerns.    While an International “code of conduct” to 
promote responsible investment has been suggested as a solution (Hallam, 2009) critics have 
argued that such a code of conduct would not lead to pro-poor outcomes because the objective 
of such land transfers is not to protect the interests of the poor (Borras and Franco, 2010).
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internalisation of adaptation costs by companies, or technological development and transfer 
(ibid).   
 
Challenges for mobilising companies to internalise risks in their agricultural value chain 
include the fact that many companies have been found to be aware of climate risks, but due to 
the uncertainty and long-term nature of climate change, few companies implement actions to 
tackle these risks (CAN, 2013). Private investment requires an ‘enabling environment’ 
including legislation and institutions.  Also, some adaptation projects are “non-bankable” in 
that they do not generate a cash return or it is too small (ibid:13). This may be applicable for 
many vulnerable smallholder farmers, already struggling regularly from issues such as 
drought or floods. Most agricultural investments have focused on cash crops and industrial 
production (ibid).  Another challenge for private sector engagement is that there is no 
established methodology for the estimation of leverage ratios for private adaptation finance 
(Pereira, 2013). In addition, public actors engaged in the same project often claim to have 
leveraged one anothers’ money, leading to double counting (ibid).  Existing safeguards are 
largely insufficient since Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and other DFIs 
(Development Finance Institutions), like IFC, continue to support fossil-fuel based energy 
projects, and often fail to ensure ethical practices are kept to, for instance, preventing use of 
tax havens which could undermine developing countries’ revenues (CAN, 2013). 
7.2.6. Agricultural R&D investment 
There is likely to be a significant deficit in investment in private Research and Development 
(R&D) for technologies related to adaptation to climate change.  The IAASTD found that 
only 6% of global agricultural R&D investments were spent in the 80 low-income countries 
with a combined population of 600m people (IAASTD, 2009 in Glatzel et al., 2012). Lack of 
investment in private R&D for climate change can occur because the commercial payoffs are 
uncertain and long-term (Grubb, 2004).  Levels of uncertainty about the precise geographical 
impacts of climate change can make estimating returns extremely difficult (Newell & Wilson, 
2005).   
Research suggests that investment in agricultural R&D pays off. For example, in Bangladesh, 
it has been estimated that TFP has grown by slightly more than 1% per annum from 1975-6 
to 1997-8 (Pardey et al., 2006). Estimates by Ahmed and Karin (2006) in Pardey et al (2006) 
show that the TFP increase of 1% annually equates to 170,000 metric tons of rice, valued at 
$42.5 million (1.913Bn Tk), while the public expenditure on rice research averaged only 
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118.9m Tk during 1990-7, suggesting a benefit:cost ratio of around 16:1 which is an 
extremely high rate of return.   
As part of their review for the Foresight Report, Piesse and Thirtle (2010) found that the 
public sector share of R&D expenditures in agriculture has fallen and that there has been a 
rapid concentration in the private sector, where six multinationals now dominate.  These 
companies are now accumulating intellectual property to an extent that public and 
international institutions are disadvantaged (ibid).  It is argued the functions of the 
multinational corporations are largely incompatible with those of poverty reduction (Piesse 
and Thirtle, 2010).  Participation of private entities in agricultural R&D is also hindered by 
the lack of IPR in developing countries (Pardey et al., 2006).  Realistically, Pardey et al 
(2006) argue one should not expect private funding to displace public funding in developing 
countries, and that public involvement will be required if biotechnology products are to be 
developed for subsistence farmers.  
Whether the source of R&D funding is public or private is important because “governments 
may be more inclined to make technology available to a wider group of enterprises than 
private-sector individuals” (Abbott, 2009:22).  Privately-funded R&D outcomes will be 
subject to the IP rights retained by the company or companies involved (Wright and Pereira, 
2012).  Yet, publicly funded R&D outcomes do not always become available publicly as 
there are various other barriers to commercialisation (ibid).  Results stemming from public 
R&D are not necessarily publicly available, as the IP rights may be publicly-owned and 
therefore retained by the public entity so the technology is still not commercialised. Overall, a 
key challenge in policy relating to patenting is ensuring that publicly-funded research yields 
the maximum possible societal benefit. For example, patenting on seed varieties could 
potentially act as a barrier to uptake of new drought-resistant seed varieties, like sterile GM 
varieties that undermine farmers’ abilities to save seeds. Publicly-funded R&D in resilient 
seed varieties can overcome these types of problems as the resilient seeds can be made 
available to all.  For further details on this issue, refer to Glatzel et al., 2012. 
Recommendations for adaptation finance are discussed in the conclusions section. 
7.2.7. Inclusive business models 
In their survey of inclusive business models that provide opportunities for smallholders, 
Vermeulen and Cotula (2010) find that there are a range of business models that provide an 
alternative to large-scale land acquisitions. These include contract farming, management 
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contracts, tenant farming and sharecropping, joint ventures, farmer-owned business and 
upstream/downstream business links.  The study found no single model emerges as the best 
possible option for smallholders - this is very much context-specific and contingent on tenure, 
policy, culture, history and biophysical considerations (ibid). In fact “the devil is often in the 
detail” – with the detail often being more important than the abstract model (Vermeulen and 
Cotula, 2010:6). For example, while joint ventures can be a vehicle for greater local control, 
at times this can be nominal in practice (ibid). 
7.3. Issues and Challenges for Adaptation Finance 
This section seeks to explore various issues and challenges for adaptation finance, building 
upon the literature review, and then informed by stakeholder interviews (see Chapters 8-10). 
The issues explored below are non-exhaustive and are limited to a select number of the total 
number of possible issues. Subsequently, an indicative framework of criteria for analysis is 
developed. 
7.3.1. Additionality 
As described above, the Cancun Agreements (Art. 95) take notes of the promise for $30Bn 
USD in “new and additional” financial resources for the period 2010-12. This is understood 
as being new and additional to existing aid commitments such as official development 
assistance (Bird and Brown, 2010) in alignment with the polluter pays principle.  However, in 
terms of agreeing on set ‘additionality’ criteria, according to Smith et al., (2011) there has 
been no agreement on assessing whether finance is ‘new and additional’, and depending on 
the baseline choices, between all and almost none of the amount pledged as Fast Start 
Finance was new and additional.  Of Fast Start Finance (2010-12) it was reported that around 
80% ($24Bn of $30Bn) was sourced from ODA commitments (Nakhooda et al., 2013).  In 
that sense the fast-start period may just represent a re-branding of existing ODA 
commitments as climate finance. Furthermore, only one of the top five contributor countries 
(Norway) had met the Monterray commitments to deliver 0.7% of GNI as ODA both before 
and during the fast start finance period, demonstrating that there is already a development 
deficit (ibid). 
Additionality is challenging because in addition to the additionality in volume, there are some 
calls for climate finance to be additional in terms of practice, which may not be practical 
since there is already a ‘development’ deficit and much of the underlying vulnerability to 
climate change is due to the development deficit.  That pre-existing vulnerability is why there 
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is arguably a continuum from activities that target underlying vulnerability or development, 
to activities that target additional climate impacts (McGray et al., 2007).  In fact, three-fifths 
of the projects in the NAPAs fitted into the category of ‘vulnerability reduction’ meaning that 
these investments are basically for development, but can also reduce vulnerability to climate 
change (Smith et al., 2011). It may be more appropriate for climate finance to target 
underlying vulnerability and urgent development needs which is why at the ground level, 
adaptation activities may often look like conventional development activities.   The 
‘adaptation deficit’ (also known as the development deficit), in terms of the degree to which 
societies are not adequately adapted to the current climate, has not been included in all 
estimates of adaptation finance needs, an exception being for the 2009 study by Parry et al 
(Smith et al., 2011).  Hence these studies did not estimate the cost of reducing present 
vulnerability.  
According to Werksman et al (1996:248) additionality “describes the origins of the financial 
resources needed to solve global environmental problems,” while incrementality “determines 
the total size of those resources” but these concepts interlock since the greater the 
‘incremental’ costs of climate change, the more ‘additional’ resources are required. The 
concept has different definitions for developing and developed countries, depending on their 
interests. For developing countries, the concept drew from concern that contributions to GEF 
should not diminish funds available for development (ibid). For developed countries and 
donors, they have supported definitions that “place their practices in the best light” 
(Werksman et al., 1996) including definitions that mean they could count their contributions 
as ‘additional’.  GEF has adopted rules that mean that the ‘additional’ costs of responding to 
climate change are identified with comparison to a counterfactual (Nakhooda, 2013a) and 
only those additional costs have been financed.  GEF will only fund the ‘incremental’ costs of 
activities that generate ‘global environmental benefits’ (Verheyen, 2005). Unsurprisingly, this 
has proved difficult and controversial to apply to practice, especially in light of the well-
recognised links between development and climate change (Nakhooda, 2013a).  Developing 
countries have expressed concern that developed countries have disallowed projects which 
are domestically beneficial from being eligible for funding (Werksman et al., 1996).  
Arguably, adaptation activities are more likely to have close links with development benefits 
than mitigation activities, and thus they are even more difficult to finance under this 
approach. Overall, this problem could be resolved by more flexible criteria under the GEF.  
Alternatively, the problem could be resolved by providing climate finance to mainstream 
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adaptation and mitigation into development (as is currently happening) whilst also scaling up 
ODA commitments to meet the 0.7% of GNI target in order to ensure the ‘adaptation deficit’ 
is addressed.  
7.3.2. Adequacy 
A key issue relating to adaptation finance is the adequacy of finance provided. This issue has 
been highlighted by the Parties under the UNFCCC, for instance under Decision 8/C.19 it is 
one of the criteria to be used to assess the effectiveness of the financial mechanism, under the 
fifth review of the financial mechanism (UNFCCC, 2013d).  As described above, there have 
been various different estimates of the costs of adaptation to climate change. Some of these 
estimates and their various methodologies are shown below: 
Table 7.1  Global adaptation cost estimates. 
Source
Cost of adaptation in 
US$ billion p.a.
Comments/Methodology
World 
Bank 
(2006)
9 – 41 (8-34 in 2009) Cost of climate-proofing FDI, GDI and ODA flows
Stern 
(2006)
4 – 37 (3-31 in 2009) Update, with slight modification of World Bank (2006)
Oxfam 
(2007)
50 (40-41Bn in 2009)
Based on World Bank, plus extrapolation of costs from 
scaling up NGO projects and immediate needs in 
NAPAs 
$86 – 109Bn
($70-89Bn in 2015)
  UNFCCC 
(2007)
   $49 – 171Bn by 2030 (of 
which $28-67Bn in developing 
countries)
$28-67 Billion of this would be in developing countries.  
Only 5 sectors were included: infrastructure, agriculture 
(including forests and fisheries), water, health and 
coastal zones. Parry et al (2009) argued this may be 
underestimated by a factor of 2 or 3 since it does not 
include estimates for important sectors (mining and 
manufacturing, energy, retail, financial sectors and 
tourism).
  World 
Bank 
(2009)
   $75 – 100Bn (between 2010-
2050)
Higher estimates under the wetter NCAR scenario than 
the drier CSIRO scenario. Assumes a 2 degree warmer 
world.
UNDP 
(2007)
World Bank plus costing of ‘climate-proofing’ poverty 
reduction strategies and better disaster response
Sources: ECA, 2009 and various given above 
In terms of the adequacy of climate adaptation finance, estimates of the costs of adaptation to 
climate change are uncertain at present. The World Bank’s Economics of Adaptation to 
Climate Change (EACC) Study estimated the costs of the impacts of climate change to be 
around $75-100Bn/year between 2010-2050, assuming 2
o
C of warming (World Bank, 
2010b). The UNFCCC placed the costs of adaptation to climate change at between $49Bn to 
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$171Bn per annum by 2030, of which $28-67Bn would be in developing countries 
(UNFCCC, 2007a).  Parry et al (2009) argued that these figures may be underestimated by a 
factor of 2 to 3, since it does not include estimates for various important sectors such as 
mining and manufacturing, energy, the retail and financial sectors and tourism.  Furthermore, 
these estimates assume that warming is kept at 2
o
C degrees, a level which is not guaranteed. 
In fact, current post-Copenhagen pledges see the world headed to 3.7
o
C of warming (Hare, 
2013). 
 
Figure 7.6  Adaptation-related finance, using the OECD-DAC Rio Marker for 
Adaptation (Source: OECD, 2014) 
 
The data from the OECD (above) shows that adaptation-related finance has increased slightly 
between 2010 and 2012, but the proportion of finance with adaptation as the principal 
objective has fallen.  Overall, the data provided showed that an average of 42% of adaptation  
ODA also targets mitigation, 31% targets biodiversity, and 20% targets desertification 
objectives (OECD, 2014).  For both adaptation and mitigation, it was found that the total 
climate-related aid per year between 2010-2012 reached USD 21.5Bn, with 58% targeting 
mitigation only, 25% targeting adaptation only, and 18% of the total targeting both together 
(ibid). It was estimated that 69% of bilateral adaptation-related aid was through grants. Note 
that these figures are slightly different from the ODI estimates. 
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Research of the climate finance landscape in 2013 has actually found that global climate 
finance for developing countries has plateaued at around $182Bn in 2013, which has not 
increased from 2012 (Buchner et al., 2013). The amounts falls well short of the amount 
required for estimated investment needs for a further successive year, making the keeping 
below 2
o
C of global warming even more challenging (ibid). Of this amount, only $11Bn is 
estimated to have been delivered by grants, the rest is instruments such as risk management, 
debt, and equity (Buchner et al., 2013). 
7.3.3. Efficiency and Mobilising Private Action 
Efficiency has been another key outcome that has been highlighted as crucial for climate 
finance. Efficiency, along with effectiveness, were both highlighted in the governing 
instrument of the Green Climate Fund (UNFCCC, 2011b).  This has normally been 
associated with cost-efficiency, including achieving the least (or lower) economy cost, and 
also having low transaction costs which means more of the finance gets to activities on the 
ground (UNEP, 2011).  Cost-efficiency is usually measured through use of various economic 
metrics; for instance return on investment (ROI) or benefit-cost ratio (BCR). Arguably the 
efficiency of climate finance is also linked to timeliness, which means dealing with the urgent 
and immediate needs in an efficient way, and also to flexibility. UNEP (2011:24) argues that 
bilateral finance institutions (BFIs) have “easier and faster modalities for disbursement, and 
higher flexibility to decide and close on innovative financing solutions”.  The use of blending 
instruments, or concessional and non-concessional loans, enables donor to claim to have 
leveraged higher amounts of climate finance without the same implications for their own 
budgets. Research has shown that some countries’ reports count the leveraged finance 
towards climate finance contributions (Nakhooda et al., 2013).  However, as we see in this 
section, there can be equity implications. 
According to the ‘polluter pays’ principle the finance ought to come from the emitting 
countries and therefore should be distributed as grants from public finance from developed-
country donors.  Arguably, and with limited resources available, there has been a push for 
climate finance to place a greater emphasis on “private flows and innovative public sources 
of finance” (Bird and Glennie, 2011:2). With the recession, many governments have 
tightened their budgets and limited public spending.  The focus on the private sector has been 
emphasised in the UNFCCC convention text.  Paragraph 99 of the Cancun Agreements states 
that funds provided to developing countries “may come from a wide variety of sources, 
public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources” (UNFCCC, 
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2010).  The governing instrument of the GCF states under paragraph 3 the GCF will “play a 
key role in channelling new, additional, adequate and predictable financial resources to 
developing countries “ and will “catalyse climate finance, both public and private” 
(UNFCCC, 2011b).  The GCF agreed to establish a ‘Private Sector Facility’ under decision 
B.04/08 to address barriers to private sector investment in adaptation and mitigation 
activities, such as market failures, insufficient capacity and lack of awareness (GCF, 
2013:48).  The GCF Board also established a Private Sector Advisory Group. 
However, developing countries and civil society organisations mistrust the emphasis on the 
private sector as it is seen as a way of avoiding international obligations under the ‘polluter 
pays’ principle.    Hence, the issue of the balance between public and private finance is linked 
to the principle of equity.  Multilateral programmes such as the PPCR administered by the 
World Bank have been criticised by civil society organisations for providing loans for climate 
adaptation (Chowdhury, 2011), and there may be a trade-off between equity and efficiency in 
certain cases where the balance is determined by power. For example, there might be pressure 
on donors to prioritise cost-efficiency over equitable distribution.  The track record of the 
private sector shows that private finance is difficult to deploy responsibly in low-income 
countries and marginalised communities (Pereira, 2013).  Arguably, adaptation in particular 
offers few commercially profitable opportunities for private financiers (Pereira, 2013).  Thus 
there can be a conflict between the objectives of equity and value-for-money, because those 
who need the money most are more difficult to invest in, whilst those who are making 
money, are not usually those who need it. 
Yet private finance is clearly important to consider for adaptation since the private sector 
accounts for approximately 85% of all investments worldwide (CAN, 2013).  In addition, up 
to 90% of the population in developing countries depends on income from the private sector, 
and the private sector represents close to 75% of global climate finance flows (CAN, 2013).    
In Bangladesh, for example, SMEs make up 90% of all industrial enterprises (Alam and 
Ullah, 2006).  Clearly, engagement of the private sector needs to be done in the right way to 
build trust, maximise benefits, and to ensure that funds are not misappropriated by rent-
seeking activities. It is particularly vital to engage the private sector in mitigation, since 
investments in fossil fuels continue the emissions of greenhouse gases.  Institutional investors 
and pension funds are heavily invested in fossil fuel energy resources.   Research by the LSE 
Grantham Institute shows between 60-80% of coal, oil and gas reserves of publicly listed 
companies are ‘unburnable’ if the world is to have a chance of not exceeding global warming 
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of 2°C (Carbon Tracker, 2013).  It is therefore vital for such funds to address climate risk by 
divesting from fossil fuels and adopt a ‘carbon budget’ approach to climate risk and capital 
allocation (ibid). The study called on financial regulators and ratings agencies to incorporate 
systematic assessment of climate risk into their methodologies (ibid). 
There is evidence many adaptation options are cost-effective. Some actions are also ‘no 
regret’ actions in that they are suitable under a range of scenarios (including no climate 
impacts). Results using the Economics of Climate Adaptation (ECA) methodology show that 
in general, between 40-65% of the projected increase in losses due to climate change can be 
averted cost-effectively which demonstrates strongly the importance of adaptation finance 
(WEF, 2014).  The ECA approach uses a threefold methodology which involved scenario 
planning (developing a base, moderate and high scenario for climate change); assumptions to 
forecast economic and population growth; and assessment of adaptation measures using cost-
benefit analysis (ECA, 2009:p.123).  In the case of drought risk in Maharashtra, India, a large 
proportion (around 50%) of the adaptation measures had lifetime economic benefits greater 
than costs showing they can be cost-effectively averted (ECA, 2009:p.84).  Another 30% of 
the losses could be avoided through insurance (risk transfer), but the remaining 20% would 
be a residual loss (ibid).  This demonstrates the potential of low-cost and ‘no regrets’ 
adaptation options like irrigation or drainage construction.   However, just because a project 
is cost-effective with a high BCR, this does not mean it would have occurred without public 
investment, since there may be other risks or costs which prevent private investment such as 
transaction costs or  non-excludability of ‘free riders’. 
Some adaptation funds, such as the GEF, have a ‘leverage ratio’ stipulating that applicants 
must generate an appropriate ratio of ‘co-finance’. For example, during phase 2 and 3 of GEF 
(GEF-2 and GEF-3), the average co-financing ratio of approved GEF projects was more 
than1:4, while it increased to over 1:6.4 in GEF-4 and over 1:7.8 in GEF-5 (GEF, 2013).  
However, as the GEF itself confirmed in 2002, “some countries have less opportunity than 
others to raise co-financing, because their economic development, absorptive capacity, and 
familiarity with GEF and global environmental issues makes this difficult. For this reason, it 
is important to retain low co-financing targets for foundational efforts that build capacity and 
for small activities” (GEF, 2002:7).  Some countries may be disadvantaged by high leverage 
ratios, such as least developed countries (LDCs) with less developed financial sectors. Yet it 
has been noted ‘co-finance ’or pooled finance is not the same as leveraging, because other 
bodies or organisations might just as well have claimed to have leveraged the GEF money 
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(Griffiths, 2012) .  This results in the problem of ‘double counting’ of climate finance.  Often, 
two MDBs each claim to have leveraged each other’s money (Brown et al., 2011).  GEF also 
use ‘leveraging’ describe funding mobilised later through replication (Brown et al., 2011) (an 
example of scalability), but this would not be considered in a ‘leverage ratio’ because it is 
mobilised after the fact.  Commentators have pointed out that high leverage ratio actually 
implies lower financial additionality, because it implies that the project is more likely to have 
occurred anyway without public sector involvement (Griffiths, 2012).   
Data available from GEF suggests it may be more difficult to ‘leverage’ (co-finance) private 
finance for adaptation than for mitigation.  The overall co-financing ratio from GEF projects 
on mitigation between 1991 and 2013 was 6.7 according to data reported at the COP 
(UNFCCC, 2013d).  In mitigation, sustainable transport and urban projects in the reporting 
period had a particularly high co-financing ratio 22.8 (ibid), perhaps reflecting ease of access 
to co-finance in this area.  By contrast, NAPA projects for adaptation under the LDCF had a 
co-financing ratio of 4.5, while the co-financing ratio under the SCCF for adaptation was 7.4 
(ibid), which might also reflect the difficulty of getting co-financing for NAPAs. However, 
the relatively high co-financing levels for mitigation might also reflect the overall availability 
of mitigation finance compared to adaptation, so it may be difficult to draw firm conclusions 
from these leveraging ratios.  Moreover, it may be more difficult for some countries to get co-
financing than for others, as the co-financing ratio under GEF was lower for Africa (1:6) than 
for Asia (1:92) (UNFCCC, 2013d) . Since vulnerable LDCs in Africa find it more difficult to 
attract private investment, this might be another reason why the co-financing ratio was lower 
for these countries.  Overall, at the global scale it does seem that private finance is used more 
commonly for mitigation than adaptation. Buchner et al (2013) estimated that all of the 
adaptation flows captured using their ‘landscape of climate finance’ methodology were 
publicly-funded. However, the same report also states there is little agreement on what 
qualifies as adaptation finance or what qualifies as an adaptation intervention. 
The GEF Council views co-financing as an indicator of a project’s sustainability, country 
ownership and mainstreaming of GEF activities in those partners institutions, as well as being 
an indicator of the GEF’s ‘multiplier’ effect in generating additional resources (GEF, 2009). 
At the local scale one could argue that if direct beneficiaries are willing to contribute to a 
project, in-kind or through labour, it is an indicator the project is truly beneficial and the 
activity will be maintained into the future.  However, analysis by GEF of the links between 
the levels of co-financing and outcomes and sustainability ratings was inconclusive (GEF, 
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2005). There may also be a level of co-financing beyond which “the risk of the GEF’s losing 
leverage increases the chance of compromising the achievement” (ibid:17).  Moreover, in 
poor areas with an adaptation deficit it could be envisaged that local people (or private actors) 
would not often have capacity or incentive to co-finance an adaptation project. By contrast to 
the GEF, the Adaptation Fund does not require co-financing and will fund the “full cost” of 
adaptation with grant funding (Adaptation Fund, 2012). Overall, adaptation planners must 
ensure such efforts to mobilise private contributions do not place an additional burden on the 
most vulnerable, for instance through increasing debt (see 7.2.4). 
7.3.4. Equity  
It can also be argued that insufficient attention has been paid to the principle of ‘equity’, 
which would dictate that resources should be made available to the most vulnerable (Bird and 
Brown, 2010).  This can be considered as equity in disbursement of climate finance. The 
balance between public and private sector finance for adaptation can also be considered to be 
another equity issue, discussed further above.  This can be considered to be an issue of equity 
in mobilisation. For example, civil society groups have expressed concern regarding the 
provision of loans for adaptation (EquityBD, 2011) arguing that this violates the polluter pays 
principle.  
Another element of the ‘polluter pays’ principle is that the finance would be mobilised from 
those countries with historical responsibility for climate change. The graph below shows 
there is no relationship between the fast start provided per capita and CO2 emissions per 
capita. However, the division within the UNFCCC of Annex-I and non-Annex-I Parties’ 
(mainly developing countries) was supposed to draw a division between those with less 
responsibility for climate change (the latter group) and those with more responsibility. 
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Figure 7.7  CO2 emissions/capita in 2010 against total fast start finance 
contribution/capita (Source: Data from World Bank, 2011 and 
Climatefundsupdate.org)  
 
In the Durban COP-17 decision on establishment of the GCF, the guiding principles of the 
governing instrument were agreed in Article I of the Annex and stated that the fund will 
“operate in a transparent and accountable manner guided by efficiency and effectiveness” 
(UNFCCC, 2011b) but within the governing instrument of the Green Climate Fund, ‘equity’ 
or equitable distribution was not mentioned. Under the operational modalities (Annex V.E) it 
states that the allocation of resources for adaptation should take into account “the urgent and 
immediate needs of developing countries that are particularly vulnerable” (ibid) but it does 
not state that the resources ought to target the most vulnerable.  This is despite the fact equity 
was a founding principle in the original UNFCCC Convention.  The UNFCCC Convention 
(Art.1) called on countries to “protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future 
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but 
differentiated responsibilities” (UNFCCC, 1992).   UNFCCC (2011a) explains that equity is a 
key principle for adaptation because, as pointed out by the IPCC, climate change 
disproportionately affects vulnerable populations, many of whom are poor.  Therefore, it is 
particularly important to consider the distributional aspect of adaptation finance. 
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In terms of justice and equity, Paavola (2005) argues that climate justice includes both 
procedural and distributive aspects. In relation to climate adaptation finance, procedural 
justice would involve the inclusion of a range of stakeholders in the decision-making process, 
including vulnerable groups who are most affected by climate change.  At the international 
scale, we can consider this as relating to the inclusion of LDCs in decision-making relating to 
finance, for instance through direct access modalities. At national or local scales this will 
include the participation of affected communities.    Arguably, Nepal offers and innovative 
model as the ‘LAPA’ model seeks to ensure that 80% of climate funds will reach the local-
level, but procedural and implementation modalities have not yet been fully established.  Bird 
et al (2013) argue that one way to ensure climate finance reflects local priorities is through 
increasing the role of local government.  
The issue of equity and procedural justice is linked to legitimacy of climate finance. Bird et al 
(2013) link the issue of stakeholder engagement in climate finance governance to legitimacy, 
because legitimacy refers to the procedural processes of decision-making as well as related 
governance arrangements (Biermann and Gupta, 2011).  However, in reality, Bird et al 
(2013) concede that those directly affected by climate change at local levels often lack a 
powerful voice with which to influence climate-related policy-makers in government. Yet we 
can also consider that this lack of representation and marginalisation may also be driver of 
climate change vulnerability, for example, because policies do not consider the needs of these 
groups. Thus it is suggested that it is prudent for adaptation projects to adopt best practices 
with regards to stakeholder engagement and participatory processes, drawing on CBA 
projects. 
7.3.5. Monitoring effectiveness 
Anderson (2011) argues that monitoring and evaluating (M&E) for adaptation activities 
needs to be based on the needs of the climate-vulnerable poor, and thus cannot be based only 
on quantifiable impacts. This is especially true where adaptation gains will be achieved by 
behavioural and institutional changes, such as improving governance, which cannot easily be 
assessed by impact evaluations (ibid).  Furthermore, it is problematic if time and financial 
resources are consumed by working out ‘adaptation is additional to development’ rather than 
pragmatically using developmental indicators as proxies (ibid). In the PPCR and Adaptation 
Fund results frameworks, there is evidence of developmental outcomes linked to the tracking 
of ‘adaptive capacity’.  Monitoring results of adaptation becomes increasingly difficult under 
168 
 
the shifting baseline of climate change (Brooks et al., 2011) because the context is changing 
and there is uncertainty.    
Box: Aid Effectiveness Principles
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness enshrines five principles which are also useful for the 
evaluation of adaptation finance (OECD, 2005):
(1) Ownership by developing countries
(2) Alignment using local systems
(3) Harmonisation to avoid duplication
(4) Results and measuring of results: 
(5) Mutual accountability for results
Experts have suggested that climate finance may have to move beyond these principles in order to be 
effective and incorporate other principles. For example, McGray and Spearman (2011) argue that the 
principle on measuring of results must include moving beyond outputs to meaningful outcomes and lasting 
impact. Bird and Brown (2010) highlight the principles of timeliness, appropriateness, national ownership 
and focus on the most vulnerable.   Stern (2008) argued that an effective adaptation response to climate 
change must consider both efficiency and equity.  It has been argued that oversight of adaptation finance 
by OECD-DAC, the body which oversees the Paris Declaration, may not be preferable because the 
Development Assistance Committee of OECD has been seen by developing countries as a small club of 
elite countries who further their own interests (Bird and Glennie, 2011).  Moreover, it is not clear 
whether the focus on ‘aid effectiveness’ principles, whilst they may have improved transparency, has 
actually led to improved effectiveness in reality.  The UNFCCC (2011b) has argued that equity is a key 
principle for adaptation, since climate change disproportionately affects vulnerable populations, most of 
whom are poor, therefore the distributional impacts of adaptation options are particularly important.
 
In terms of effectiveness, UNEP (2011) highlights the importance of ‘scale’ in terms of the 
amount of outcomes, and amount of finance provided, as well as in terms of the results (e.g. 
emissions reduction or vulnerability reduction). This links to the issue of adequacy in the 
above section.  Timeliness, flexibility, scalability, replicability and localisation were other 
outcomes highlighted by UNEP (2011). 
Bird et al (2013) also highlight the importance of public expenditure management.  Improved 
public expenditure, procurement and financial accountability systems have been promoted by 
the World Bank and others through the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability 
framework. Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Reviews (CPEIR) have been 
undertaken in various countries as a result of this need. Yet Bird et al (2013) argues there is a 
current absence of systems to track and monitor climate-related expenditure. Please refer to 
Chapter 5 for the case of the CPEIR in Bangladesh.  
7.3.6. Conditionality and National Ownership 
Existing aid flows have been characterised by conditionality, however the different nature of 
climate change and the language of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ in Article 3 of 
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UNFCCC and ‘historical responsibility’ highlights the need for collaboration and softening of 
conditionality.  It is not clear how far climate finance will offer a new paradigm in aid 
relations or how far it will be characterised by existing power relations.  Bird and Glennie 
(2011) also point out that the principle of ‘equitable representation’ has been promoted in the 
context of climate finance, which departs from conventional donor-recipient aid relationships.  
This principle links to the concept of ‘ownership by developing countries’ under the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, as conditionality can be seen as the opposite of country 
ownership.   
The Adaptation Fund is often given as an example of a fund with a ‘direct access’ modality, 
which means there is transfer of financial resources directly to eligible countries rather than 
through a third party.  The logic behind this approach is to increase the level of country 
ownership, oversight, and involvement, and to create stronger accountability (Brown et al., 
2010). National Implementing Entities (NIEs) and multilateral implementing entities (MIEs) 
must meet certain fiduciary standards for accreditation with the Adaptation Fund, including 
financial integrity, institutional capacity, and transparency.  However accreditation of NIEs 
has taken time, meeting several barriers. There are some concerns the advantages of ‘direct 
access’ are only available to those with established institutions (Bugler and Rivard, 2012). 
Since there is a cap in resource allocation per country, there has been a tension between 
accrediting an NIE and the ‘first mover advantage’ of working through existing MIEs (like 
UNDP) (Brown et al., 2010).   
Moreover, in applying for funds from the Adaptation Fund, proponents also have a certain 
amount of flexibility (Nay et al., 2014).  Proposals must demonstrate they are “cost-effective” 
and “justified on the full-cost of adaptation reasoning” (Adaptation Fund, 2012:49), with 
cost-effectiveness assessed based on a provision of a description of alternative options to the 
proposed measures.  Quantitative assessments are only provided where feasible and useful 
and a review of the technical reviews of proposals shows assessment against these criteria is 
nearly always undertaken on a qualitative basis (Nay et al., 2014). This allows proponents the 
flexibility of using the tools best suited to particular local circumstances (ibid). 
Under Paragraph 47 of the GCF Governing Instrument, the GCF Board will consider 
“additional modalities that further enhance direct access, including through funding entities 
with a view to enhancing country ownership of projects and programmes”.  Hence in addition 
to ‘ordinary direct access’ using accredited institutions such as the NIE’s, the idea of 
‘enhanced direct access’ has been  proposed under which National Funding Entities such as 
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national climate funds could directly access funds (Muller, 2013).  In this regard, the BCCRF 
in Bangladesh is proposed as a concrete example of a national funding entity (Muller, 2013). 
However, most ‘fast start finance’ commitments were not provided directly to governments. 
Nakhooda et al (2013) found that only around 35% of FSF targeted governments in 
developing countries. FSF was in most cases channelled through intermediaries, such as the 
World Bank’s Climate Investment Funds (CIFs), MDBs, and through bilateral cooperation 
and development agencies. Around 69% of FSF was channelled bilaterally (ibid). 
7.3.7. Long time-scales and dynamic maladaptation 
Over longer time scales, the problem of dynamic maladaptation has also emerged. This 
means that in the long-term, some adaptation efforts might protect the population for a short 
while, but then leave them more exposed in future.   Hallegatte et al (2011) argue that the 
combination of uncertainty about climate change and the long lifespan of assets lead to the 
risk of maladaptation.  For instance, embankments or barriers that protect from rising sea 
levels may give populations a false sense of security, or actually increase the development on 
a particular area of land.  Constructing flood barriers can encourage investment in further 
development and building on areas that were once wetland, meaning those houses are 
particularly vulnerable to flooding.  A possible example of this has been found in Khulna 
City, Bangladesh were land prices in newly protected areas have gone up due to the emerging 
demand to build on them (Haque, Pers. Comm., 2013).  Similarly, insurance can lead people 
to feel more secure so that they take more risks, an issue known as ‘moral hazard’. Examples 
of maladaptation can be found in the IPCC-AR5 report (IPCC, 2014).  Moreover, in many 
places society is also maladapted to today’s climate risks as there is an ‘adaptation deficit’ 
(Hallegatte et al., 2011). Maladaptation can be avoided by choosing a flexible option that can 
be iteratively adjusted or by prioritising ‘no regrets’ actions (ibid). Barnett and O’Neill 
(2010) propose five criteria for maladaptation, arguing it can be avoided by ensuring 
adaptation actions do not increase emissions, burden the most vulnerable, have high 
opportunity costs, reduce incentives to adapt, or lead to path dependency. The problem of 
maladaptation also underscores the need for long term post-project monitoring. 
7.3.8. Sustainability and balance between adaptation and mitigation 
IPCC (2007) includes a detailed discussion of the trade-offs and synergies between 
adaptation and mitigation, with a recognition that some adaptation options may result in an 
increase in emissions, while others result in a decrease.  One example would be the 
171 
 
construction of concrete sea walls, as opposed to conservation of mangrove forest in order to 
protect a coastal area from storm surges.  Brooks et al (2011) argue that adaptation should not 
substantially increase GHG emissions. However, others have argued that the most vulnerable 
communities should not be required to take on emission-reduction responsibilities since 
finance for adaptation is already a scarce resource.  
Yet issues could arise in ‘adaptation’ of the energy sector, for instance, if fossil fuel 
companies were to call for support to adapt to climate change, a scenario which would clearly 
contradict mitigation aims.  Exclusive focus on ‘adaptation’ could lead to a situation where 
climate change goes beyond climatic ‘tipping points’, and thus greater adaptation resources 
are required in future.  Emerging evidence of the limits to adaptation and the ‘loss and 
damage’ agenda demonstrate the need for a focus on mitigation as well as adaptation. There 
are various opportunities where adaptation and mitigation overlap, as evidenced by the 
finance currently going towards meeting both objectives (OECD, 2014).   
Many commentators highlight the need for further guidance on this. Thus there is a need for 
guidance to ensure adaptation resources are not appropriated for actions that directly 
contradict mitigation goals. Equally, there is a need for guidance to ensure the most 
vulnerable communities are not tasked with onerous mitigation responsibilities when 
adaptation finance is a scarce resource.  A distinction here could be placed on which 
stakeholders are adapting, and whether these are high-emitting stakeholders or low-emitting 
vulnerable communities, in which case the carbon impact of adaptation is likely to be 
negligible in any case.   
7.3.9. Mainstreaming: Integrating disaster risk reduction, development and 
adaptation 
It has been noted that there are differences as well as similarities and synergies between 
Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) management and finance, and adaptation finance, and there 
has been calls towards integrating these for smarter policies and responses. Integrating 
priorities could lead to greater efficiency in the use of resources, including finance for 
adaptation and sustainable development. In the realm of DRR it has been noted that this 
agenda has been shifting from a focus on emergency response towards capacity-building and 
prevention which does synthesise with building resilience and adaptive capacity.  This is 
emphasised by the Hyogo Framework for Action - a ten-year plan which was agreed in 
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Hyogo, Japan in 2005 with the aim of building the resilience of nations and communities to 
disasters (UNISDR, 2012). 
In Vietnam, for example, lack of coordination between adaptation, disaster risk reduction and 
development in Vietnam has been found to demonstrate a real case of mal-adaptation and 
wasted resources (Ridolfi, 2011).  Examples can be found from the lack of integration 
between development and climate change in other countries if, for example, development 
structures could be built which will not be resilience to long-term climate change. Barriers to 
integration are evident in the ‘silo-like’ mentality of the institutional structures within 
organisations like the FAO which had limited collaboration between them (ibid). 
Furthermore, project funding is separated out which is a barrier to integration; and it is thus 
recommended that adaptation and DRR should be viewed in the context of a continuum to 
integrate funding at the local level in future (ibid). 
There have therefore been calls for ‘mainstreaming’ the integration of development, DRR 
and adaptation.  Klein et al (2007a) suggest that portfolio screening can be one way of 
ensuring that development projects consider the impacts of climate change on planned and 
ongoing development projects. However, other commentators including Carruthers, 
negotiator for the Cook Islands, argued that ‘maladaptation’ conditionality for adaptation 
finance it could be another way of countries avoiding their responsibilities to provide finance 
(Carruthers, 2010).  It is important that excessive criteria do not act as a barrier for countries 
in accessing finance for urgent adaptation needs. Furthermore, it is also possible that 
mainstreaming priorities together could also be a bureaucratic or administrative burden where 
the costs in terms of lost resources might actually be costlier than the savings. 
7.4. Assessing Adaptation Options at National and International Levels 
Assessing and deciding between various adaptation options is important, particularly because 
not all adaptation options will be possible due to constraints such as insufficient local 
resources, capacities, and authority (IPCC, 2014). In addition, financial resource constraints 
mean that not all options can be implemented, thus requiring a process of prioritisation of 
adaptation options. However, it is important to note that rather than focusing on adaptation 
options addressing specific climate impacts, more attention is increasingly being paid to 
mainstreaming climate change into wider government policy and private sector activities 
(IPCC, 2014) including promoting adaptive management. 
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UNFCCC (2011a) has suggested various broad criteria to determine adaptation options 
including efficiency, effectiveness and equity, as well as urgency, flexibility, robustness, 
practicality, legitimacy and synergy with other strategic objectives. In addition to these 
criteria, IPCC (2014) suggests various other considerations when selecting adaptation 
options. These included the following considerations: 
- Stakeholder participation, engagement and support 
- Consistency with social norms and traditions 
- Sustainability (environmental and institutional sustainability) 
- Designed for an appropriate scope and timeframe 
- Livelihood to avoid maladaptive traps 
- Resources available (including information, finance, leadership, management capacity) 
- Need for transformative changes considered. 
Identification and assessment of adaptation options is crucial for effective targeting of 
resources and finance.  Various methodologies are proposed by UNFCCC (2011a) to assess 
and evaluate adaptation options including cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, 
and multi-criteria analysis. It is suggested from the literature review above, that incorporating 
analysis of both the tangible and intangible elements of adaptive capacity will be essential. In 
this regard, multi-criteria analysis (MCA) or participatory cost-benefit analysis may offer 
useful approach for assessing and evaluating adaptation options.  MCA may be particularly 
valuable due to the inclusion of social and environment criteria that may not be suited to the 
monetary approach.  Incorporating tangible and intangible elements of adaptive capacity 
might be essential to evaluate adaptation options.  
However it is recognised that after analysis, as with cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness 
analysis, decisions are often taken based on pragmatism and strategic issues to which policy-
makers must also give weight (Dodgson, 2009). Final decisions are usually political and 
techniques cannot try to incorporate every element such as equity or political impact. 
Although MCA is potentially a valuable tool for identifying adaptation options for financing, 
in practice decisions seem to be taken on the basis of the context and other factors (ibid).  It is 
valuable as priorities can be put into categories of urgent and less urgent, but ultimately there 
are trade-offs to be made. 
Steps of the MCA include; (1) setting objectives, (2) setting criteria and sub-criteria (3) 
assessing criteria and (4) setting value scores (Dodgson, 2009).  Two further steps in multi-
criteria decision analysis (MCDA) include: (5) Setting weighting; assigning weights relative 
to performance; (6) Combining weights and scores (Keeney and Winterfeldt, 1988).   Keeney 
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and von Winterfeldt (1988) recommend including a wide range of stakeholders and key 
interest groups. Gathering and processing data consumes resources, which is something to 
bear in mind when using detailed MCA (Dodgson, 2009) and can justify a simpler approach. 
If it can be reasonably assumed that criteria are preferentially independent of each other, and 
uncertainty is not built in, then the simple linear additive evaluation is applicable which 
involves multiplying the value score by the weight of the criteria, then adding these scores 
together (ibid). 
A key feature of MCA is that there is subjectivity in the establishment of objectives and 
criteria, estimating relative importance weights and, “to some extent, in judging the 
contribution of each option to each performance criterion” (Dodgson, 2009:20). Although 
this can be of concern, it may also be more practical than data-intensive cost-benefit analysis. 
One drawback is that there is no way of showing the action adds more value than it detracts 
(ibid). Positive aspects are that the MCA offers a level of transparency and that it can be also 
a means of communication. 
Indicators have been proposed to assess climate finance at national-level as well as project-
level, with many of these indicators being process-orientated rather than results orientated. 
However, many of the MDG (millennium development goals) have direct relevance to 
adaptive capacity and could therefore be used as proxies (Levina, 2007). Some of the MDGs 
also have direct relevance for adaptation, particularly MDG 9 on sustainability development 
and MDG 10 on water resources (ibid). Similarly the post-2015 Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) on the issues of food security and water will have relevance for adaptation. 
In assessing adaptation projects, the international funds each have their own criteria for 
eligibility of project applications. As described by Nay et al (2014) the Adaptation Funds’ 
project review criteria are largely qualitative in nature and are assessed qualitatively. For 
example, qualitative project review criteria for the Adaptation Fund include a requirement to 
demonstrate “economic, social and environmental benefits, with particular reference to the 
most vulnerable communities, including gender”, consistency with national sustainable 
development strategies (mainstreaming) and a “learning and knowledge management 
component” (Adaptation Fund, 2012:31).  MCA is commonly used to assess projects for 
adaptation, including for the NAPAs (see Nay et al., 2014).  
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7.5. Vulnerability Indices and Climate Finance 
It has been suggested that ‘vulnerability indices’ could be used for ex-ante prioritisation of 
the adaptation finance going towards countries and towards communities.  There are a range 
of national-level vulnerability indices that have been used which also use a range of different 
indicators (Weadapt, 2012).  The two main approaches towards vulnerability which are 
outlined in the literature are ‘outcome vulnerability’ which is based on the positivist, natural 
sciences approach and uses the risk-hazard methodology based on risk assessment 
techniques, and ‘contextual vulnerability’ which uses a more normative approach 
incorporating social vulnerability, based on political economy and determined by 
socioeconomic factors (Fussel, 2010). Furthermore, outcome studies tend to focus on 
technological adaptation whilst ‘contextual’ studies tend to focus on sustainable 
development. It is therefore recognised that the development of aggregated vulnerability 
indices are not objective, but requires substantive normative choices, and their design is as 
much a “political as a scientific task” (Fussel, 2010:7). 
For example, Maplecroft’s Climate Change Vulnerability Index (CCVI) used a set of 42 
factors including exposure to climate-related natural disasters and sea-level rise; human 
sensitivity, in terms of population patterns, development, natural resources, agricultural 
dependency and conflicts, as well as indicators of adaptive capacity (Maplecroft, 2013).  
Oxford University’s Climate Vulnerability Index for the water sector (Sullivan, 2008) is 
based on a set of indicators under the sub-components of ‘geospatial’ variables (e.g. extent of 
land at risk of sea level rise), ‘resource’ variables (e.g. water storage capacity), ‘access’ 
variables (e.g. access to clean water), ‘capacity’ variables (e.g. under-five mortality rate), 
‘use’ variables (e.g. water consumption) and ‘environmental’ variables (e.g. species loss).  
Social vulnerability indicators include the UNDP’s Human Development Index which is 
considered by Fussel (2010) to accurately measure social vulnerability to climate change and 
outperforms other indices in this regard, as it includes life expectancy, education and gross 
national income per capita.  Levina (2007) from the OECD follows on from this approach 
and suggests possible indicators to monitor progress on adaptation by measuring adaptive 
capacity at national-level, such as; proportion of the population with income below $1/day 
(PPP), net enrolment ratio in primary education, literacy rate of 15-24 year-olds, proportion 
of households with access to secure tenure, or access to micro-crediting.  This list of indices 
suggests the choice of indicators for measuring vulnerability to climate change is somewhat 
subjective, and there are in a vast array of potential indicators that could be used. 
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Further indices of vulnerability which have been used include the Climate and Regional 
Economics of Development’s vulnerability index (VI-CRED) at SEI which used just a few 
relevant indicators; including share of GDP from climate-sensitive industries, coastal share of 
the population, and freshwater availability based on publicly-available data (Weadapt, 2012).  
The GAIN index has also been used which assesses vulnerability to climate change as well as 
other non-climatic challenges for water, food, health and infrastructure (ibid), whereas 
DARA’s Climate Vulnerability Monitor (CVM) looks at two points in time, 2010 and 2030.  
There are other vulnerability indices focused upon environmental vulnerability of ecosystems 
and biodiversity, such as the UNEP’s Environmental Vulnerability Index (EVI) and 
NatureServe’s Climate Change Vulnerability Index but for the purposes of this study this 
analysis has focused on social vulnerability. 
Barr et al (2010) offer an attempt to use a resource allocation framework for the allocation of 
adaptation investments, based on three indicators: physical impact, adaptive capacity, and 
implementation capacity. Since exposure and sensitivity were difficult to disentangle, the 
framework uses their combined effect, physical impact, as the first pillar, whilst the first and 
second pillar together (physical impact and adaptive capacity) intend to determine 
vulnerability (ibid). The third pillar, “implementation capacity” introduces “adaptation 
effectiveness” as an explicit concern, e.g. using corruption indices (ibid:851). However, the 
framework does suggest a trade-off between considerations of fairness and equity (favouring 
the most vulnerable) and adaptation effectiveness which is linked to governance.  The 
framework recognises the normative basis of the indicator system, concluding that there are 
infinite ways in which the raw data on climate impacts, adaptive capacity and implementation 
capacity can be combined, scaled, normalised and added up (Barr et al., 2010). 
Fussel (2010) argues that all the vulnerability indices used so far have different limitations. 
For instance, they are being developed in the context of coping with short-term climate 
variability and extremes rather than long-term climate change. Moreover, they may rely on 
observed data rather than using projections from climate impact models (ibid). Many 
vulnerability indices also express strong sensitivity to the selection of specific proxy variables 
(ibid). According to IPCC (2014), one of the most comprehensive attempts to validate 
vulnerability metrics was in Brooks et al (2005) in which it was found that 11 key indicators 
showed correlation with mortality for climate-related disasters. This used an inductive 
approach, based on observed data. However, this does not validate these indicators against 
vulnerability to slow-onset climate impacts like salinity.  It would be difficult to develop 
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vulnerability indicators for long-term impacts of climate change precisely because some 
impacts have not yet occurred. 
A single vulnerability index has not been agreed at the UN level and would be likely to be 
difficult to agree upon internationally for many of the reasons listed above, especially since 
countries might have a particular interest in pushing for the use of one particular index if 
there was an intention for this to guide allocation of adaptation funding.  However it has been 
suggested that an agreement on national funding allocations will be needed at some point, 
since national governments and programmes may be more effective and better able to address 
the temporal equity of adaptation measures than international bodies (Haites, 2011). 
Eriksen and Kelly (2007) also found that the vulnerability indices used for adaptation policy 
assessment have varied greatly in the indicators and measures used, as well as the 
identification of the most vulnerable countries.  The categories of indicators fell largely into 
the categories of social, environmental, economic and institutional indicators. They found 
that it would be necessary to expand our knowledge of the causes of vulnerability in order to 
develop effective indicators (ibid). Klein and Mohner (2011:15) agree that there has not been 
a single objective scientific ranking developed for vulnerability, and so the PPCR and 
Adaptation Fund used a variety of different vulnerability criteria that have been “politically 
as well as scientifically ambiguous”, which remains a challenge for the Green Climate Fund. 
Therefore this PhD research aims to expand on such knowledge in order to understand how 
such finance can be effective, particularly in meeting the challenge of food security under 
climate change. 
In their assessment of fast start finance, Nakhooda et al (2013) found that the per capita 
allocation of adaptation finance was only weakly correlated with vulnerability according to 
the DARA or GAIN vulnerability indices (see figure below). 
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Figure 7.8  Top ten recipients of adaptation fast start finance per capita, against their 
GAIN/DARA vulnerability score. Source: Nakhooda et al., 2013. 
This suggests that vulnerability indices are not currently being used to direct the flows of 
adaptation finance, and this hypothesis applies at both the international or sub-national level. 
However, the study did find that most top recipients of adaptation finance under fast start 
finance (FSF) tended to be small island developing states (SIDS) or least developed countries 
(LDCs) (Nakhooda et al., 2013).   LDCs and SIDS received approximately $2Bn out of the 
$5.2Bn in adaptation FSF, or around 39% (ibid) but 31% of recipients could not be identified. 
The largest recipients of adaptation FSF per capita were the SIDS (ibid). 
During the research in Bangladesh it was found that vulnerability indices were not being used 
by the international donors to guide allocation of adaptation finance at national-scale and in 
fact the process of adaptation finance allocation has at times been guided by political 
considerations. In fact there have not been any criteria used to guide prioritisation of funding 
in the national funds except for a few eligibility criteria (see Chapter 5), which demonstrates 
the need for such research.   
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7.6. Monitoring and Evaluation of Adaptation Finance 
Evaluation of adaptation has become an increasingly important issue to ensure effectiveness 
and monitor progress, which has been mentioned in the international negotiations. Brooks et 
al (2011) argue that the criteria that are likely to be most important in evaluation of 
adaptation include feasibility, efficacy and effectiveness, efficiency, acceptability and 
legitimacy, equity and sustainability (see Annex XVII). Development and disaster risk 
reduction indicators are likely to be used, but additional criteria may also be used. However, 
it is recognised that the framework proposed is a first step towards solving the ‘wicked 
problem’ of what constitutes good adaptation (ibid). The implications of the selected criteria 
are discussed in Annex XVII. 
The need to measure, monitor and evaluation adaptation has led to a search for adaptation 
metrics. Adaptation has no single common reference metric in the way that tonnes of 
greenhouse gases are for mitigation (IPCC, 2014). Institutions, communities and individuals 
value things differently and many of those values cannot be captured in a comparable way 
within metrics (ibid). Furthermore there are various different uses for adaptation metrics; 
firstly measuring vulnerability; secondly measuring and tracking the progress of 
implementing adaptive actions; and thirdly measuring the effectiveness of adaptation (ibid). 
Experts have argued adaptation metrics should be policy-relevant, scalable, transferable, 
context-specific, and comparable (IGES, 2008).  There was recognition of the mixture 
between qualitative and quantitative measures (ibid) and it was argued these may be specific 
to a certain sector such as the agricultural or water sector.  Developing metrics for adaptation 
is challenging due to the often locally-specific nature.  However there is a need for these to be 
implemented into planning processes at all levels (IGES, 2008). 
Some authors have highlighted the importance of linking the local to the global, and 
aggregating the measures used at local-level to make meaningful measures of performance at 
national or local-level. In this case, ‘upstream’ assessment of capacity of institutions is 
combined with ‘downstream’ assessment of impacts of interventions, and keeping 
‘development on track (Brooks et al., 2011).  
This is highlighted in the diagram below (adapted from Brooks et al., 2011): 
180 
 
  
Figure 7.9  Schematic to show the evaluation framework shown in Brooks et al (2011)  
At international-level, there are calls for an international framework for MRV (monitoring, 
reporting and verification). Transparency and accurate reporting will be important in this 
regard, as is the principle of ‘new and additional’ finance that is additional to official ODA.   
Transparency is arguably essential to ascertain who benefits from public climate financing, 
how scarce public resources are being used, and the extent to which available finance meets 
demonstrated needs (Watson et al., 2012). Thus independent initiatives have been developed 
to track climate finance, including the Climate Funds Update.  
The Bali Action Plan iterated that the funds must be monitored, reportable and verifiable, and 
at Copenhagen, parties called for the finance to be “rigorous, robust and transparent” (Tirpak 
et al., 2010:19).  In Durban, the Parties did not adopt a common reporting framework, 
meaning reporting guidelines are likely to be limited in their “transparency, completeness, 
consistency, and accuracy” (ibid:18).   Moncel et al (2009) argue that climate finance also 
brings up the issues of responsibility and accountability, including the issues of equitable 
distribution and ensuring that allocation is demand-driven.  Therefore the issues of equity and 
accountability are also raised. 
Under the UNFCCC, the ‘review of the financial mechanism’ has taken place since COP-4 
when the Conference of Parties decided to review the financial mechanism of the Convention 
every four years in accordance with Article 11.4 of the Convention.  The initial criteria 
developed under the decision 3/CP.4 were that the financial mechanism would be reviewed 
against the six criteria of (a) transparency; (b) adequacy, predictability and timely 
disbursement of funds (c); responsiveness and efficiency of the GEF project cycle; (d) 
amount of resources provided; (e) amount of finance leveraged; (f) sustainability of funded 
projects (UNFCCC, 1998).  The review of the financial mechanism happened in 1998, 2002, 
2006 and 2010.  The criteria for assessing the effectiveness of the financial mechanism has 
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just recently changed.  In November 2013, at the Warsaw COP, in addition to the criteria 
listed above, Parties agreed to include the following four criteria under Annex C ; (b) the 
level of stakeholder involvement; (c) the extent to which the financial mechanism is 
contributing to gender-sensitive approaches; (h) the extent to which the resources provided 
are contributing to achieving the objectives of the Convention; and finally; (j) the extent to 
which the financial mechanism is contributing to country ownership of programmes and 
projects (Decision 8/CP.19, UNFCCC, 2013d).   Refer to the international-level case study in 
Chapter 10 for in-depth analysis of negotiations used to decide upon these criteria.   The 
addition of these criteria was enabled by the COP decision at COP-18 in Doha in 2012, which 
put the Standing Committee on Finance in the driving seat and enabled it to change the 
criteria which are used to assess the financial mechanism.    
7.7. Development of an Indicative Framework to Assess Effectiveness of Climate 
Finance 
As described during the methodology, the literature review on climate finance in this chapter 
is used to inform an indicative framework of principles to consider in assessing the 
effectiveness of climate finance, as well as identifying various other important issues relating 
to adaptation finance for further exploration in semi-structured interviews. Development of 
this framework was an iterative process informed by both the academic literature and semi-
structured interviews. 
Various principles on climate finance effectiveness were available from the literature, and 
many of these incorporate the principles from the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
from OECD (2005), as well as additional relevant principles from Bird and Brown (2010), 
amongst others.  The original list of principles and components for an indicative framework 
to assess the effectiveness of climate adaptation finance included the following set of 
principles and components, many of which are discussed further in sections above: 
(1) Ownership by developing countries (OECD, 2005; Bird and Brown, 2010) and direct 
access 
(2) Alignment using local systems / Mainstreaming (OECD, 2005)  
(3) Harmonisation to avoid duplication (OECD, 2005) and coordination 
(4) Measuring of results; and mutual accountability for results (OECD, 2005; McGray and 
Spearman, 2011) 
(5) Equity (Stern, 2008; Bird and Brown, 2010); including targeting vulnerable 
communities (UNFCCC, 2011a; Brooks et al., 2011) 
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(6) Efficiency and cost-effectiveness (UNFCCC, 2011a; Brooks et al., 2011) 
(7) Effectiveness, e.g. in reducing vulnerability (Brooks et al., 2011; IPCC, 2014) 
(8) Urgency and timeliness of disbursement (UNFCCC, 2011a; Bird and Brown, 2010) 
(9) Additionality to ODA and polluter pays (Bird & Brown, 2010; Bird & Glennie, 2011) 
(10) Adequacy, precautionary and predictability (Bird and Brown, 2010; Schalatek and Bird, 
2013)  
(11) Transparency and inclusive governance (Bird and Brown, 2010) with stakeholder 
participation, engagement and support (IPCC, 2014) 
(12) Flexibility and robustness under uncertain projections (UNFCCC, 2011a) 
(13) Synergy/coherence with mitigation (UNFCCC, 2011a) 
(14) Legitimacy/acceptability/appropriateness (UNFCCC, 2011a; Brooks et al., 2011; 
Schalatek & Bird, 2013) including consistency with social norms and traditions (IPCC, 
2014) 
(15) Practicality and feasibility (UNFCCC, 2011a; Brooks et al., 2011) 
(16) Sustainability - environmental, technical and institutional (Brooks et al., 2011; IPCC, 
2014) 
(17) Gender equity (Schalatek and Bird, 2013) 
(18) ‘Do no harm’ (Schalatek and Bird, 2013)/Avoiding maladaptation (IPCC, 2014) 
(19) Need for transformative changes considered (IPCC, 2014) including scaling up and 
creating an enabling environment (Nakhooda, 2013) 
Thus, the literature review was used to derive an extensive list of principles from which 
duplicate principles can be removed or combined where applicable, although some overlap 
and linkages exist between different principles. For instance, accountability may require 
transparency, so that civil society organisations can act as ‘spotlights’ on activities taking 
place (OECD, 2008a).  Trade-offs may also exist between different principles, for instance, 
between efficiency and equity, as discussed previously. There is also a tension between the 
efficiency benefits of bringing in innovative sources of finance through private sector 
engagement, and the equity concerns about this in terms of reducing the ‘additionality’ of the 
finance. 
This indicative set of principles can also be sub-divided into the categories of ‘ex ante’ 
(prioritisation) principles, governance principles, and ‘ex post’ (monitoring) principles, as 
follows:- 
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Table 7.2  Categories of Principles 
Category Principles
Efficiency and cost-effectiveness (UNFCCC, 2011b; Brooks et al, 2011)
Equity in targeting the most vulnerable (UNFCCC, 2011b; Brooks et al, 2011)
Urgency and timeliness (UNFCCC, 2011b)
Flexibility and robustness under uncertain projections (UNFCCC, 2011b)
Legitimacy/acceptability/appropriateness (UNFCCC, 2011b; Brooks et al, 2011; Schalatek 
and Bird, 2013)
Synergy/coherence between mitigation/adaptation (UNFCCC, 2011b)
Gender equity (Schalatek and Bird, 2013)
Practicality and feasibility (UNFCCC, 2011; Brooks et al, 2011)
Avoiding maladaptation (IPCC, 2014)
Need for transformative changes considered (IPCC, 2014) including considering scaling up, 
enabling environments (Nakhooda, 2013)
Ownership by developing countries and subsidiarity (OECD, 2005; Schalatek & Bird, 2013)
Alignment using local systems / Mainstreaming (OECD, 2005) 
Additionality to existing aid commitments (Bird and Brown, 2010)
Harmonisation to avoid duplication (OECD, 2005) and coordination
Adequacy, precautionary, and predictability (Bird & Brown, 2010; Schalatek & Bird, 2013)
Transparency, accountability, inclusive governance and stakeholder participation (Bird & 
Brown, 2010; Schalatek & Bird, 2013; IPCC, 2014)
Results and measuring of results (OECD, 2005) including effectiveness in reducing 
vulnerability and increasing adaptive capacity (Brooks et al 2011; IPCC, 2014)
Mutual accountability for results (OECD, 2005) 
Sustainability - environmental, technical and institutional (Brooks et al, 2011)
‘Ex ante’ 
(prioritisation) 
principles
Governance 
principles
‘Ex post’ 
(monitoring/ 
evaluation) 
principles  
However, it is also recognised there are various other possible sub-categorisations of these 
principles, and some ‘ex post’ monitoring principles may include some of the prioritisation 
principles, although these have been combined in the table above to reduce duplication.  For 
instance, monitoring the effectiveness in reducing vulnerability should also be considered as 
a prioritisation principle. Whilst results would of course not be available at the prioritisation 
stage, applicants to an adaptation fund should be able to demonstrate the expected impact in 
terms of results for reducing vulnerability and increasing adaptive capacity. Bird and Brown 
(2010) sub-divided their principles into categorisations of: mobilisation, administration and 
disbursement.  Similarly, Nakhooda (2013) divides her set of principles into ‘instrument’ 
principles (relating to governance) and ‘outcome’ principles (relating to impacts).  With 
regards to national-level analysis, mobilisation principles may not need to be considered at 
the national level (e.g. the polluter pays principle and respective capability) since the 
mobilisation of a certain amount is already assumed to be available.  Other possible 
principles could include social, environmental and economic sustainability; however it is 
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considered that these principles are subsumed under various categories and can be considered 
as covered under the general ‘sustainability’ principle.  
Implementation of these Principles 
Analysis of these principles has shown that at times the principles cited in the literature seem 
to defy relevance in terms of what they mean, as they could have various different definitions 
and interpretations. These principles might not be capable of being implemented or 
operationalised as a set of descriptive terms.  To overcome this problem, a set of examples of 
objective tests for implementation of these principles were derived, drawing on the research, 
relevant literature and industry best practices. Refer to Annex XVIII for the table. This table 
was used to identify whether certain principles are duplicated, and whether some were just 
descriptive terms without potential for practical implementation.  Through this process, it was 
decided legitimacy and mutual accountability for results could be subsumed under the 
category of inclusive governance (which included transparency, accountability, legitimacy 
and stakeholder participation).  As described in Chapter 10, the criteria were refined after 
sharing the indicative framework and examples for operationalising it with selected experts. 
It is recognised that the identification of these criteria is a subjective process, and as with 
adaptation metrics, there is no single common metric.  Schalatek and Bird (2013) argue that 
while the precise meaning of these principles remains a matter of interpretation, principles 
can serve as normative guidance for a coherent framework by which the effectiveness of 
climate finance can be assessed.  A propositional statement for each of these criteria is given 
below.  
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Table 7.3  Propositional Statement for each of the Criteria in the Framework 
Criterion Propositional Statement
Equity
Adaptation finance should target and benefit the most climate-vulnerable areas 
and stakeholders, without marginalising disadvantaged groups. 
Efficiency and cost-
effectiveness
Adaptation finance should deliver value-for-money. 
Effectiveness in reducing 
vulnerability;  results and 
monitoring results
Adaptation finance should lead to verifiable results and outcomes in terms of 
reducing vulnerability and building adaptive capacity compared to the baseline 
situation.
Urgency and timeliness Disbursement should occur in a timely manner to meet urgent needs.
Flexibility and robustness Results should be robust under a range of climate scenarios.
Synergy/coherence between 
mitigation/ adaptation
Synergies with mitigation and low-carbon development should be built where 
possible and conflicts must be avoided.
Gender equity
Adaptation finance should benefit both genders and incorporate gender equity 
in planning, governance and implementation.
Practicality and feasibility Interventions must be technically and practically feasible.
Avoiding maladaptation
Every effort must be made to ensure interventions do not inadvertently 
increase vulnerability of other systems, sectors or social groups.
Ownership and subsidiarity
Direct access modalities are used to enhance national or sub-national 
ownership over projects or programmes, and governance is devolved to the 
lowest possible level without compromising results.
Alignment/ mainstreaming
Adaptation finance must be based on countries’ adaptation strategies and 
planning, consistent with national/local government strategies; and channelled 
through a country’s own institutions and systems, where these provide 
assurance that aid will be used for agreed purposes.
Additionality Adaptation finance must be additional to existing development finance.
 Harmonisation
 Harmonisation and coordination with other initiatives is ensured to increase 
complementarity and reduce transaction costs.
Adequacy, precautionary, 
predictability 
Adaptation finance must be predictable in the long-term, implemented 
according to the precautionary principle, and sufficient to meet the additional 
costs of climate change.
Inclusive governance 
(Transparency, 
accountability, legitimacy 
and stakeholder 
participation)
Adaptation finance must be governed in a way that is completely open, 
ensuring representation of and accountability to climate-vulnerable 
stakeholders.
Sustainability
Adaptation finance must be environmentally, socially and economically 
sustainable to ensure long-term results.
Need for transformation 
considered (scale, enabling 
environments)
Scaling-up of interventions and outcomes must be considered at the outset to 
deliver wider long-term impact.
 
As described above, the framework was developed iteratively and adjusted according to new 
literature and information that became available during the course of the thesis.  These 
principles and components were used to inform the semi-structured interviews with key 
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informants.  An effort will therefore be made to assess climate adaptation finance against 
these criteria, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters.  Similarly, the utility of the 
indicative framework was validated or disconfirmed through semi-structured interviews with 
key informants. 
7.8. Summary 
This chapter outlines the global financial architecture with regards to climate finance, with a 
particular focus on adaptation to climate change in agriculture.  Various different financial 
flows relating to food security were reviewed, including international development 
assistance, finance under the UNFCCC, and domestic public spending. The literature review 
discussed a number of important issues and challenges relating to adaptation finance, 
including additionality, adequacy, equity, effectiveness, efficiency, conditionality, 
maladaptation and sustainability.  This responds to the research question which asked what 
issues should be taken into consideration in evaluating the effectiveness of adaptation finance 
(see Section 2.2).  It was evident that there can be contradictions and trade-offs between 
different objectives, for instance between efficiency and equity. The discussion of challenges 
and issues are used to inform the key informant interviews during the field research, as well 
as informing the development of an indicative framework for assessing climate finance 
effectiveness.   
The chapter provides an outline of various frameworks for ex-ante prioritisation of adaptation 
options.  The criteria selected to decide between adaptation options using multi-criteria 
analysis (MCA) are usually selected on a subjective basis, and qualitative criteria are 
valuable.  ‘Vulnerability indices’ can potentially be used to determine which regions or 
sectors are vulnerable to climate change but no evidence was found that such indices are 
being used to direct flows of adaptation finance at international or national-level (see 5.5.3.3).  
Various metrics for measuring, monitoring and evaluation were reviewed with a view to 
identifying common elements. The ‘Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness’ (OECD, 2005) 
provides a useful basis to analyse climate finance, but it is recognised by Bird and Glennie 
(2011) and others that there may be a need for additional principles.  In particular, providing 
effective climate finance will require attention to governance and delivery mechanisms. 
Finally, the chapter outlines an indicative framework for assessing climate finance 
effectiveness, including some proposed ‘ex ante’ prioritisation principles, governance 
principles and ‘ex post’ monitoring and evaluation principles. 
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8. Local-Level Analysis and Findings: Kalapara  
8.1 Introduction 
The following three chapters explain the results and discussions drawn from the three levels 
of case studies, at local-level (in Patuakhali, coastal Bangladesh), national-level (in the case 
of Bangladesh) and international-level.  The previous literature review informed 
identification of key issues and principles for further exploration in interviews with expert 
key informants (Chapter 7). Forthcoming sections 9.6 and 10.6 explore cross-scale linkages, 
whilst the progress against the framework of analysis at all scales is then summarised in 10.7. 
This chapter discusses the findings from the local-level case study.    Kalapara Upazila, 
Patuakhali District, is a coastal area of Bangladesh that was severely affected by Cyclone 
Sidr in 2007 as well as Cyclone Aila in 2009 (see 4.7). The international NGO ActionAid 
Bangladesh had been implementing a community-based adaptation project in Poshurbunia 
village since 2008. Under this project, a group of women from poor households formed 
People’s Research Teams or ‘GGD’ and a rights-based approach was utilised to provide these 
groups with information and resources to identify and address their own priority adaptation 
needs, including accessing local government resources.   Ongoing projects in the area 
included the ECRRP programme to upgrade the cyclone shelters and embankments. 
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Box 8.1: Scoping Visit to Naogaon                                                                                                                      
During a scoping visit to Naogaon, Bangladesh in February 2012, focus group discussions 
(FGDs) took place in 2 villages in this North-Western drought-prone farming district. Fresh 
water availability was crucial for local livelihoods, since people were dependent on farming, 
and access to water was closely linked to land rights. Climate vulnerability appeared entwined 
with structural inequalities.   The village was isolated by both religion (Hinduism) and language 
(Paha) from surrounding communities.  The recent CBA project implemented by ActionAid 
seemed to have enhanced community participation. Villagers explained they had established 
committees like a ‘sanitation committee’ and ‘lighting committee’ to address different issues, 
and also learnt how to access local government UP (Union Parishad) resources and support. 
The villagers described the benefits of the CBA project; including improved health and 
sanitation, livelihood opportunities, food security, women’s security, and awareness on “how to 
conduct with these agencies”, particularly getting support from the agricultural department, 
which they felt excelled all other departments. Previously, drought forced the local people to 
cook, wash and irrigate from the same pond, leading to disease and water disputes. Water has 
been voted on by the community as the leading problem. ‘Khas land’ (government-owned 
land) and ponds were supposed to be accessible to the poor by law, but had been sold by local 
officials to rich business-people (“grabbed”). Legal disputes over land appeared to be a key 
driver of vulnerability.  Local officials confirmed income from ‘water bodies’ and ‘haat’ 
(market stalls) were their main revenue sources. Under the 2009 Act, it had also recently been 
made compulsory by law to elect female ‘ward members’.  In an Upazila-level meeting (the 
second rung of local government), the Chairman described female members of local 
government as “something ornamental until now”.  The scoping visit raised several interesting 
issues relating to climate adaptation, gender and governance, but was limited by the fact the 
FGD transcriptions were not entirely verbatim as the NGO was relied upon for translation. 
 
After a scoping visit to Bangladesh (see Box 8.1), the village of Poshurbunia, Lalua Union, 
Kalapara Upazila was selected as the local-level case study for analysis, in a coastal region 
that is vulnerable in terms of sea level rise, salinity, extreme weather events (cyclone and 
storm surges), flooding and food insecurity (see Methodology and Chapter 4).  An earlier 
survey identified 116 households in the village (Actionaid, 2009), but a local government 
official updated this to 133 households in 2013.  This might have risen due to in-migration 
from adjacent villages due to river erosion and cyclones. 
The local-level household questionnaire included questions on the perceptions of different 
climate-related hazards (cyclones, salinity, flooding and river erosion) as well as how people 
were coping and adapting, including a comparison of the perceived benefits of different 
adaptation options and strategies. In addition, respondents were asked about their relationship 
with local government, their group membership (a proxy for social capital) and livelihood 
assets, informed by the sustainable livelihoods approach, as described previously. Finally 
respondents were also asked how they are affected by changes in food and fuel prices. Due to 
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resource limitations, the questionnaire was completed with 32 households randomly sampled 
from the village (24% of the total number of households). Semi-structured interviews were 
also conducted with key informants from local government (including the agricultural 
extension officer, LGED and forestry officer) as well as local civil society organisations. 
Random sampling was used to identify households whilst snowball sampling was used to 
identify expert key informants.  
Where ‘climate-related hazards’ are discussed (cyclones, salinity, flooding) it was not 
assumed these local hazards were caused primarily by anthropogenic climate change, but 
these risks were experienced locally, and there is evidence they may increase under climate 
change (IPCC, 2014). For further details, refer to Section 5.3. Thus, climate change may be a 
contributory factor, but estimating to what extent the risks are attributed to climate change 
was beyond the scope of this study. 
Key themes emerging from the local-level interviews and questionnaire included the 
interconnectedness of different climate risks and the difficulties of prioritising solutions, 
gender issues, loss of land and tenure insecurity, issues relating to local government and the 
relative benefits of the various adaptation strategies and options in the vicinity. 
8.2. Emerging Issues 
8.2.1. Increasing disasters and vulnerability 
Most household respondents felt climate-related disasters had been increasing, and that 
cyclones were increasing in frequency and intensity. One retired man (aged 52) said that 
“after 1970 there’s no cyclone in this area but after 1990’s, cyclone attacks very suddenly, 
almost every year now” [sic]. Only two respondents (out of 32) argued that cyclones had 
been decreasing, with one fisherman (age 35) saying that cyclones had decreased in number 
but increased in power.  Only one respondent mentioned climate change specifically, a 
farmer who argued that in the past there were 6 distinguishable seasons, but now there were 
“only two seasons, winter and summer”.  This description of changing seasons was 
triangulated in FGDs, and also emerged from another local study identified in the literature 
(Andreasen, 2011).    
Several respondents argued salinity was less severe than in the past due to the embankment 
(dam) built in front of the sluice gate, which had preserved fresh water and allowed winter 
crops to be grown.  One respondent (a male farmer) said levels of salinity were “not 
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decreasing, but all the same due to the embankment”.  This implies the salinity would have 
been much worse without the embankment.  Most people felt there had been an improvement 
in the salinity problem since the dam was built to preserve fresh water. This intervention 
could be attributed to the NGO project in the area which constructed the dam in collaboration 
with local government.  
8.2.2. Seasonal nature of work and food security 
Many respondents referred to the seasonal nature of work and to their food security status, 
which were interrelated. When respondents were asked if there are any months of the year in 
which they do not have sufficient food for the family, one female day labourer (age around 
40) explained she has no work between September and October. A fisherman also explained 
that fishing work is seasonal and that he does not earn any money for six months of the year, 
so faces difficulties getting food during that time. A seasonal calendar was drawn in 
collaboration with the women’s group under the recent NGO project (Annex XIX). 
 
Figure 8.1  Percentage of respondents facing food insecurity across months of the year  
Many respondents (63%) stated they faced food insecurity issues during the month of 
September.  One respondent described this as the “disaster period” and another respondent 
reported; “sometimes we have to starve”.  As shown in the seasonal calendar (Annex XIX) 
this is also the period of the year in which flooding is expected. Those who described 
themselves as day labourers or agricultural labourers were the most food insecure livelihood 
group, as was found during the analysis of the CCAFS dataset (Chapter 9). 
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Figure 8.2  Percentage of day labourers facing food insecurity across months of the year  
 
Figure 8.3  Percentage of those in different livelihood groups facing food insecurity 
across months of the year (as a percentage of those in each livelihood category) 
However, there was some overlap between the different livelihood groups, and these are not 
distinct categories. For instance, one respondent who identified themselves as a fisherman 
explained later in the interview they also grow crops. Meanwhile, one retired person (who 
was previously in the army) later explained they were now farming. 
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8.2.3. Helplessness in the face of disaster 
A key issue emerging from the household survey was the feeling of helplessness in the face 
of disasters. When asked about the coping strategies or adaptation strategies adopted to deal 
with climate-related hazards, several respondents responded with a question.  When asked 
about possible strategies to cope with river erosion, one female respondent replied: “What 
can we do, we just want to live here and wish land not be eroded by river erosion - where will 
we go if it goes underwater by river erosion?” One female respondent asked: “if erosion 
washes this area away, where will we go?” Being able to physically move away from the 
hazard was an issue, with one respondent arguing “if there is a cyclone we can rush to any 
place, but cannot do anything with salinity”.   
Poverty seemed to exacerbate feelings of helplessness and vulnerability. When asked about 
adaptation strategies to address salinity, one respondent asked “how can we do it, we’ve not 
enough money?”  On the issue of river erosion, another respondent asked, “What can I do? 
We are very poor - the poor people cannot do anything”. 
On the topic of cyclones, one female respondent (a day labourer) asked:  
“What can I do? We get alarm in the evening but storm may come in midnight - so what will I 
save, myself, my things in the house, or my children and daughters? 
Reliance on external support was a key theme in many of the interviews.  One respondent 
said “the embankment will save us but personally we can do nothing to cope”.  Several 
respondents referred to the responsibility of government when they were asked about their 
coping strategies, with one male day labourer saying; “together we get local people together 
and say to the UP chairman he should repair the embankment”.  One fisherman, when asked 
about possible adaptation strategies to cope with river erosion, said “it is the responsibility of 
government”. Some respondents felt they did not have the right skills to respond.  One male 
respondent said they were “not a skilled person” so did not have enough skill to protect 
against the cyclone.  However some respondents did suggest various adaptation options and 
strategies, discussed further below. 
8.2.4. Loss and damage from cyclones 
When respondents were asked about the impacts of cyclones Sidr and Aila, many households 
listed losses and damage to their housing, income, crops, livestock, trees, fishes from the 
ponds, and boats.  As described in the literature review, loss and damage results from the 
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residual impacts of climatic hazards resulting from limits to adaptation.  Although it is not 
assumed Cyclone Sidr (2007) was caused by anthropogenic climate change, it is explored as 
an illustrative example of a severe cyclone, since the intensity of tropical cyclones is likely to 
increase under climate change (IPCC SREX, 2012). As expected, these hazards have a 
particular impact on the poorest and most vulnerable households. One male labourer 
described how the cyclone and storm surge washed away the base of his house, as it was 
made of earth. Most households described devastating losses. One respondent said that during 
Sidr “water came inside the embankment, and we have nothing – we lose everything, also the 
house was destroyed”.  One female respondent said “if there is a flood it washes away 
everything – during Sidr we lost goats, ducks, chickens… also our house”. One female 
respondent (age 50) described the impacts of cyclone Sidr as such: 
“We have so many problems because there is nothing in that time for food. All the crops in 
the field go underwater… for 2 months the land remains in the same situation… the pond is 
inundated so the fish go away…. the tube well is lower than the water level so is inundated by 
the flood water - leading to diarrhoea, skin diseases, scabies, rotten water, and flies come”. 
In terms of economic losses, household respondents were asked to calculate, if possible, some 
of the economic losses suffered during Cyclone Sidr.  In total, 26 households responded to 
this question, estimating their losses largely in terms of the costs of housing reconstruction 
and the value of livestock. The losses described added up to a total of 4263000Tk (£32,792 
GBP), or an average of 163962Tk (£1,261 GBP) per household.  These losses are devastating 
when we consider that it was found from the survey the annual household income in the 
village was 78258Tk (£602 GBP) per year.  
Where respondents indicated the economic losses as a range, the median figure was used.  
This can be considered a conservative estimate since some losses were not calculable. One 
respondent argued it is difficult to put a value on the burden. It is possible that there were 
some exaggerations, but overall it was felt that households did not have an incentive to 
exaggerate. 
Regular cyclones seemed to be causing a repeated cycle of disaster and loss. One female 
respondent described how just as they had started to recover from Cyclone Sidr (2007), 
Cyclone Aila came (2009).  Several respondents reported that although they had to rebuild 
their house, they could not afford to rebuild it the same as before. One male fisherman (age 
45) explained that he lost his boat and nets in Cyclone Sidr and had to take out a loan by 
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selling land, but still struggles from debt after this loss. Limits to adaptation seemed to result 
from the fact that the cyclone shelter only protected people’s lives from the cyclone, not their 
homes or crops. 
8.2.5. Interconnectedness of climatic hazards 
The household survey confirmed most of the climate-related hazards experienced at local-
level were interrelated. The cyclone and storm surge brought flooding, which in turn led to 
salinity intrusion and river erosion. Yet salinity and river erosion were also experienced on a 
daily basis. Therefore it was difficult for households to rank the hazards (cyclones, salinity 
and river erosion) or say which hazard was the greatest risk. One male respondent said “it is 
difficult to put them in order as all have quite a similar effect on us” and so it is “difficult for 
us to make a rank".  Another respondent said that all the climate hazards cause much harm: 
“if we have flood we cannot grow food, and if cyclone we cannot live, it destroys lives and 
property”. Other respondents did feel they were affected by one hazard in particular. One 
farmer said, “as I’m a farmer, salinity affects me the most”. Overall, 28% said river erosion 
was the greatest risk, 25% said salinity and 18% said cyclones (see figure below).  
 
Figure 8.4  Which environmental hazard was the greatest risk? 
The local official from Lalua Union Parishad also felt river erosion was the worst climate-
related problem facing the area. Meanwhile, an LGED official suggested that cyclones are 
not a daily occurrence, as they occur only each few years, while the extreme poor face 
continuous hazards in their daily lives that must be prioritised. Similar difficulties in ranking 
environmental hazards in the area were experienced by other researchers (Stott, 2014). 
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Figure 8.5  Linkages between climate hazards and impacts identified at local-scale 
(drawn from literature review and local household survey) 
From the diagram above, it is clear there are feedback loops in the system, for example, the 
broken embankment and sluice gate lead to salinity intrusion, and the saline water in turn 
weakens the embankment further making it more vulnerable.  Furthermore, the local LGED 
official explained saline soils mean the land is more susceptible to river erosion.  Climate 
impacts can impact on food security through direct pathways, such as increasing temperatures 
affecting crops, but also indirect pathways such as increased water contamination leading to 
ill-health, which in turn can impact on food security.  As in the literature, climate-related 
hazards include both rapid-onset impacts (such as cyclones) as well as slow-onset impacts 
like temperature change, sea level rise and riverbank erosion.  Since local agricultural 
produce is consumed directly as well as sold, crop production losses can lead to a direct loss 
of food availability as well as a loss of income which reduces the households’ ability to 
purchase food. 
It emerged from local interviews that people could lose their land from river erosion, but 
productive land was also lost to salinity intrusion, meaning crops could not grow.  Although 
increasing salinity was a slow-onset hazard, local households reported experiencing particular 
problems after cyclones and floods.  One respondent said “if the embankment is damaged or 
breaks again all land will be filled with salinity and nothing can be grown on this land”.  
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Meanwhile, cyclones cause direct health hazards, even loss of life, but they can also lead to 
flooding and lack of freshwater, which can then lead to slow-onset health problems.  There 
was evidence of climate-related ‘poverty traps’, for example losing livelihood assets like 
livestock during a cyclone means a household loses income, in turn making it more difficult 
to recover these lost assets.  “Health poverty traps” (Krishna, 2010:86) can also exist whereby 
illness (caused by dirty water or poor nutrition, for example) make it difficult to work, in turn 
making it more difficult to access food or resources in order to stay healthy. 
The complex interrelationships between different hazards meant it was difficult to rank these 
interrelated climatic risks. In addition, it also makes it difficult for respondents to prioritise 
between different adaptation strategies and options as detailed further below. One respondent 
argued we “need all three” [adaptation options] and could not say which adaptation strategy 
should be prioritised out of the embankment, the sluice gate or the cyclone shelter. 
8.2.6. Land issues and loss of land 
Several respondents said they had lost land due to climate-related hazards.  Fourteen 
respondents (43.8%) reported that their family had lost land due to river erosion, while five 
respondents (15.6%) had reportedly lost land due to salinity.  One male respondent (a 
fisherman) said that his family “had 300 decimals before but apart from 60 all were eroded by 
river erosion”1, adding that this occurred over a period of twenty years and it was still 
eroding. 
Loss of land due to river erosion appeared to be a long-term process affecting several 
generations.  Another respondent, also a fisherman, said that about 1.75 kani of land (more 
than 1 acre) of his fathers’ land had eroded, and that if the river had not eroded the land he 
would have inherited some portion of it. Another fisherman also reported that his forefathers 
had lost around 20-25 kani (around 30 acres) of land due to river erosion. All of the 
fishermen in the household questionnaire had reportedly lost land to river erosion, indicating 
there may be a link between loss of land and the need to go into fishing.  
The subdivision of land due to increases in population emerged as another potential issue, 
which also emerged in the literature. One fisherman reported that his grandfather and 
forefathers had owned 80 kanis land this area, but from that only 20 kanis was left which 
“belongs to 16 families now - all these families are relatives of them”. 
                                                 
1
 In this area of Bangladesh, 100 decimals of land = 1 acre, and 1 decimal = 0.01 acre. 1 bigha = 33 decimal. 1 
kani = 120 decimals, and 1 kani = 1.2 acre (Source: Banglapedia.org). 
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Insecurity of land tenure was a problem for several families who did not own any land 
themselves. Some respondents were living on “khas” land (government-owned land) and 
others said they were leasing land in order to grow crops.  It had also emerged from the 
literature review of World Bank documents that a few landless families living on the 
embankment would have to be resettled due to the construction of the embankment. 
Access to land is a determinant of whether a household can engage in farming. It emerged 
from the household survey that farmers had an average of 123 decimals (including leased 
land), fishermen had only 88 decimals on average, and day labourers had very little land on 
average (only 0.2 acre).  In fact, 89% of the day labourers were landless. Although the sample 
size is too small to draw firm conclusions, it appeared that access to land was associated with 
income, since farmers were the highest-earning income group, followed by fishermen and 
then day labourers. These results reiterated the results from the CCAFS dataset at national-
level, which found that day labourers were often food insecure and landless. This has 
implications for the projected sea level rise under climate change in this area, which is likely 
to lead more households into landlessness and poverty.  
8.2.7. Gender issues 
Social issues relating to the disadvantaged position of women were mentioned several times 
during the local-level household interviews.  It is clear women faced a range of risks in their 
daily lives. Polygamy was relatively common, with two female respondents (out of thirteen) 
mentioning that their husband had another wife.  Forced marriage appeared to have been 
occurring, as one poor lady living in a small hut beside on the roadside explained her husband 
was mad and lived elsewhere, because her father “gave her to a mad person for marriage”. 
Another female respondent, who estimated her age at around 50-60, explained she had been 
married at the age of 12 years.  In one conversation, a lady explained how she had been taken 
to Dubai in the hope of working, but soon realised she had been trafficked.  Fortunately, with 
the help of an NGO, she explained she had managed to make her way back to the village and 
to her children.  Thus, local women face insecurity in their daily lives. 
Gender issues also emerged strongly from the focus group discussions (FGDs) and semi-
structured interviews, as well as during informal discussions with local people.  During one 
FGD with a women’s group, the group explained that in this village, girls usually marry at 
11-12 years old and leave school.  Although the legal age for marriage is 18 for girls, people 
commonly forge birth certificates in order to arrange marriages earlier.  By contrast, the legal 
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marriage age for boys is 21. This is an example of how legislation and local customs, as well 
as non-enforcement of legislation, put women at a disadvantage in Bangladesh. 
The disadvantaged position of women in society was linked to vulnerability to climate-related 
hazards. In one FGD with a women’s’ groups, the women explained they feel insecure in 
cyclone shelters during disasters, as women and girls facing teasing or violence in the shelter. 
They described how there was no separate bathroom for women in the cyclone shelter, and no 
privacy for women and girls. 
However, it was felt that recent project interventions by the NGO in the village had enabled 
women to improve their position in society and gain recognition.  In one interview, a female 
member of the GGD (women’s group) argued that “now they are saying in this area, they 
women are working, they’re doing the right things… by them we can be benefitted”.  In 
another focus group, various women explained that since the CBA project had started, they 
felt more comfortable discussing their problems with local government officials and no 
longer felt they had to wear a hood (headscarf) when talking to outsiders. The interview with 
the Lalua UP official confirmed these findings, affirming that women participated and 
“presented smartly” [sic] in local ward shova meetings, whereas in the past they did not have 
such skills. 
8.2.8. Local governance 
People in this village in Kalapara seemed to be relatively politically engaged, with several 
respondents recounting that they had visited the local Union Parishad (UP) office. When 
asked if she had any contact with local government, one of the members of the GGD 
(women’s group) said she had spoken to local government several times and “we attended a 
procession raising our demands… they only said there'll be a port this area but God knows 
when it’s built”. This was a reference to Government plans to build a third seaport at nearby 
Kuakata, Patuakhali, aimed at promoting the economy. 
As found in the literature review, there were suggestions the local government sometimes 
handed over the responsibility for local services to NGOs. The extensive NGO sector in 
Bangladesh has brought fears about the creation of a “parallel state”, and some have argued 
that the parallel efforts of NGOs simply reflect and further contribute to the weakness of the 
state’s ability to serve its citizens (Lewis, 2012:109).  During the household survey, one 
respondent explained; “during disasters the local government often give the relief effort over 
certain areas to NGOs”.   
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The CBA intervention in this area deliberately attempted to overcome such problems by 
strengthening the governance capacity of local government in order to strengthen local 
adaptive capacity. This included supporting the UP to construct dams to preserve non-saline 
water (see below). One interview respondent also described how the project worked with 
local government on participatory budget planning, including assisting the UP to explore 
options to sustainably increase its’ own income. Transparency was increased, as the local UP 
government were supported in producing periodical budget reports at local government level 
(available in Bengali).  
However, corruption was raised by several respondents. One respondent claimed the UP had 
misused money from the dam, as they had been allocated 50000Tk for the dams, but they 
spent only 20000Tk. Another respondent claimed that the local government had misused 
money given to them by the NGO, claiming the NGO had given local government 11 lakh 
taka for the sweet [fresh] water preservation scheme but “the UP didn’t sanction the road”.  
These respondents gave different figures, so it is unclear whether these details were correct.  
Bribery also seemed to be rife. One respondent stated; “whenever we get anything from the 
UP we have to pay some bribes”, while another respondent argued that “during a disaster, 
member chairmen [sic] comes to our locality and they only think of their own interest… We 
have to give bribe to get anything.”  This suggests that corruption in local government 
hampers disaster relief and recovery efforts. 
At national-level, it was discovered in interviews with Transparency International 
Bangladesh (TIB) there was controversy surrounding the building of embankments, and in 
one specific project, 30,000 trees were ordered to be cut down to construct the cross-dam 
under the BCCTF (funded by GoB).  It was later ascertained from documents that this 
occurred in Kalapara, as the approved cross-dam would connect Patuakhali and Bhola, and 
would be 5km long with 3.44 under Char Mynka and Char Montaz of Patuakhali District.  
Kalapara Water Development Board reportedly requested the local Forest Department to 
allow them to cut 30,000 trees in the protected forest (TIB, 2012).  Moreover, there had been 
no Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) done on the project, which was approved under 
the BCCTF.  The area adjoins the Char Kukri Mukri Wildlife Sanctuary.  Local communities 
and experts were reportedly not consulted, and following concerns from the forest 
department, the BCCTF authority stopped project funding disbursement (TIB, 2012).  The 
incident reveals concerns about the accountability of the BCCTF (government fund) in 
approving such a project. 
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Similar to the national-level interviews, there were suggestions that allocation of climate 
adaptation finance was affected by political influence.   In one FGD, participants argued that 
they face discrimination from powerful elites and this affects the allocation of UP budget 
resources.  In fact, members of the focus group claimed that last year a cyclone shelter was 
sanctioned for this village but a politician had used their political influence to move it to his 
own area. 
However, it was suggested that the intervention by the NGO had empowered local people to 
demand more from their local government officials, while also giving local officials an 
incentive to listen to local demands.  One respondent suggested they now gave “more 
importance to us” than before.  One respondent argued that the weaknesses of local 
government could be overcome by working together:  
“If someone goes to UP or any other office they misuse these services and we don’t get 
anything but in this project we got some benefit as we’re working together.” 
Hence, the sustainability of efforts to improve local governance will be reliant on continued 
participation of local people as well as the improved understanding of their rights in relation 
to local government. 
Furthermore, in interviews with local government, it emerged the UP (lowest rung of local 
government) did have a good grasp of local priorities. The UP official said river erosion was 
the greatest climatic risk facing this area. This aligned with the opinion of the majority 
(almost 40%) in the household survey. Furthermore, the official confirmed there can be 
tension between fisherman and farmers over water management, but stated they prioritise the 
conservation of fresh water “as more people will get benefit from the dam… we give priority 
for the dam and agriculture”.  Once again, this aligns with the household-level survey, which 
found most households were engaged in agriculture and would benefit from keeping out 
saline water. 
8.2.9. Institutions, group membership and social capital 
Various members of the community identified themselves as part of informal or formal 
groups, for example, the women’s GGD group which had been established in the recent CBA 
project.   Group membership was important as a form of social organisation determining the 
allocation of resources locally, including the management of water resources. 53% of 
household survey respondents confirmed they were part of a formal or informal group, 
including the GGD, a political party, farmers and fishermen’ groups, micro-credit groups, the 
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Red Crescent, and NGO-linked groups.  Groups, such as the CPP volunteers, were linked 
vertically with local government institutions which were then linked with national-level 
departments and this provided a conduit for information and resource flows. Furthermore, 
group membership also provided a forum for horizontally linkages with other formal or 
informal groups at the same scale, for instance, farmers groups’ at the Union level took part 
in negotiations with the UP over issues which concerned them, like the availability of fresh 
water. 
However, while the ‘bard rocca’ committee (sluice gate committee) emerged as important for 
sluice gate management, many respondents did not disclose which groups they were part of. 
While one fisherman revealed he was a part of Lalua Union fishermen’s’ group, it was felt 
some respondents were not fully disclosing their group connections. This could be due to 
bias, perhaps linked to suspicions by respondents that the research would be used by the 
NGO, thus leading them to a resource-maximisation strategy in which they did not wish to 
disclose their connections. This limitation of the study meant that it was difficult to further 
explore the impacts of group membership on adaptive capacity. 
8.2.10. Rising fuel and food prices 
The household survey also asked respondents about the impact of rising food, fuel and 
fertiliser prices on their livelihood.  Three-quarters of respondents said that rising food prices 
had a major impact on their lives and had a much worse impact than rising fertiliser or fuel 
prices.  One day labourer argued “if the price increases we cannot eat… we have to starve”.  
Another day labourer argued that food prices posed the greatest problem for her, as she had 
three children. Another respondent argued that feeding his family costs 5000tk per month but 
he earned only around 4000tk per month. However, one male farmer argued he had no 
problem with increased food prices, but needed to get a fair price for his paddy, arguing that 
if he could sell his rice for a fair price, he could buy anything.  This corroborates the findings 
from the literature review that food prices affect people in different ways, and some rural 
farmers benefit from rising prices if this is passed onto them in terms of higher income. 
A few farmers felt that fertiliser prices had a negative effect on them. One farmer, aged 25-30 
argued fertiliser was the main risk for him as he could not earn money if he could not grow 
crops. However, others, including one day labourer, said fertiliser had no effect on them 
because they had no land to grow crops. 
202 
 
In terms of fuel prices, several respondents explained that they were reliant on kerosene 
lamps to light their homes. Another explained they had to lend a trailer to move the produce 
to restock their small shop (tea stall) in the village, while another explained they struggled 
with the price of transport.   One female farmer explained: 
“We have solar so we have little impact from fuel price increase… those who use shallow 
machine for irrigation and fly boat, they have a great impact.” 
Several respondents explained that since they were using solar energy in their homes they 
were not affected by fuel prices. Solar penetration was high in this village, with 50% of 
households reporting they had access to solar energy.  Interestingly, when asked whether they 
had access to electricity, a few answered “no, I have only solar”, while some answered “yes, I 
have solar”, perhaps indicating some households did not see solar as having electricity.  Out 
of the 16 respondents with solar, only three said they had any problem with fuel prices (two 
of whom mentioned rising transport costs), and the remaining respondents with solar said 
they were not affected by fuel costs.  One respondent explained that they had to use at least 4 
litres of kerosene per month, and this cost 72 taka per litre.  One male respondent argued: 
“I have no solar energy so have to use kerosine and cannot buy it, so have a problem with 
high prices.” 
Overall, solar energy seemed to relieve households from the burden of kerosine costs.  
However, transportation was also restricted in the area by transport fuel costs. It cost 20Tk 
one-way to cross the nearby river using a motorised boat to reach the local town, a substantial 
sum in a place where many agricultural labourers earned only 120Tk ($1.50) per day.   
8.3. Adaptation Options and Strategies 
Various different adaptation options and strategies were discussed and emerged from the 
household-level interviews, FGDs and key informant interviews at local-level, including; 
strengthening embankments, constructing cyclones shelters, preserving freshwater, saline-
tolerant rice varieties, the early warning system, planting trees, and developing alternative 
livelihood activities.  These adaptation options and strategies are discussed further in the 
sections below. Furthermore, embankment and cyclone shelters are both prioritised at 
national-level as adaptation options (see Chapter 5 and Section 9.4). 
Household-survey respondents were asked open-ended questions about their suggestions for 
adaptation options or strategies. The frequency of these options is shown below. 
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Figure 8.6  Frequency of suggested adaptation options. ‘Tube well’ refers to installation 
of freshwater wells. ‘Throwing stones’ refers to manually strengthening the riverbanks 
with stones. 
 
Figure 8.7  Ranking of prioritised adaptation options 
It must be noted that ‘embankment’ and ‘road’ were used synonymously, but have been 
differentiated only where this was clear from the context. Furthermore, as noted above, 
several household respondents did not feel able to place the adaptation options or strategies in 
rank order, stating that all of them were badly needed. 
8.3.1. Fresh Water Preservation and Sluice Gate 
One adaptation strategy introduced by the CBA project in this area was the construction of a 
dam in front of the broken sluice gate to retain fresh water (known as ‘mita pani’ or sweet 
water), enabling farmers to grow crops during the winter (‘rabi’) months. During the survey 
many respondents reported great benefits from this adaptation intervention, citing economic, 
food security and environmental benefits.  
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Respondents argued the preservation of freshwater during these months provided a source of 
fresh (non-saline) drinking water for livestock, water for fodder, for growth of fruit trees, 
water for bathing, washing clothes and cooking, and a source of water for irrigation for 
growing ‘rabi’ winter crops include watermelon, kashari dal (pulse), sweet potato, potato, 
chillies, maize and boro rice.  Respondents also cited health benefits, claiming the 
intervention meant they were less affected by waterborne skin diseases.  Other respondents 
stated there were health benefits for cattle and livestock, because “cows get diarrhoea from 
drinking the saline water”. Furthermore, day labourers explained that they had more work 
due to the increase in fresh water available for agriculture, with one day labourer noting: “We 
can work up to 6 months which we were not able to do in the past”. 
Box 8.2: Participatory cost-benefit analysis of the freshwater preservation scheme 
Benefits: The household survey included questions on the perceived benefits and costs of the dam to 
preserve freshwater in front of the broken sluice gate and keep out salinity. Respondents highlighted a 
range of benefits including economic, social and environmental benefits, including having non-saline 
water for livestock, crops, cooking and bathing.  According to data available from the local NGO, an 
estimated 1,265 farmers benefited from the additional freshwater supply during the ‘rabi’ winter 
season in Lalua Union. Data from the marketplace it was found these farmers had produced 
watermelon, pumpkin, sweet potato and boro rice over an area of 4500 hectares.  According to 
Razeev (2012) each farmer grows around boro paddy on 102dm and earns gross income of 213Tk/dm, 
so the total earning in Lalua is estimated at 21,726Tk/farmer or a total of 27,483,390Tk in Lalua 
Union, on around 129,030dm of land (522 hectares).  
Costs:  In 2011, the cost of 8 dams (Lalua Union) was 249,750Tk (approx. £1900) according to data 
from the UP and NGO.  The data showed 3 additional dams were constructed the following year and 
the UP contributed to the expense which totalled 272,152Tk in 2012 (approx. £2000).  Figures from 
2012 only have been used as the project is a one-year project, requiring reconstruction each year.  As 
described below, some fishermen also described a loss in income from the dam, because they were 
unable to use the sluice gate for fishing. Since there were 11 sluice gates, and assuming 3 fishermen 
were affected per gate, the income losses are estimated at 3,993,000Tk/year.  These costs for the 
fishermen may not continue in future years, as they may change their livelihood. 
Stakeholder Group Benefits Costs 
Farmers 27,483,390Tk - 
Fishermen - 3,993,000Tk 
UP/NGO - 249,750Tk 
Totals: 27,483,390Tk 4,265,152Tk 
Overall the benefit-cost ratio of the freshwater scheme for 2012 was estimated at 6.44. 
Sensitivity Analysis:  A sensitivity analysis found the results are robust under different assumptions. 
The farmers’ average income from boro rice production would have to be just 33Tk/dm for the BCR 
to be reduced to 1 (see figure below). Furthermore, the fishermen who benefitted from the sluice gate 
gave their income before the dam as a range (500-700Tk/day for the whole year) and their income 
after the dam as a range (200-300Tk for 7 months).  The highest possible losses for the fishermen 
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were calculated, using the highest end of this range for income per day before the dam, and the lowest 
end of this value for the income after the dam, and the BCR was still above 1 (3.71).  Moreover, the 
results are robust against different values for the cost of the sluice gates. The cost of the sluice gates 
would have to be 23,491,439Tk in order for the BCR to equal 1, which is almost ten times the actual 
cost of the sluice gates in 2012, as reported in UP documents. 
 
The average area of land being used to grow boro rice by each farmer (102dm) from Razeev (2012) 
was also triangulated against the average area of land owned per farmers in the household survey, 
which was found to be 123dm.  Furthermore, the average additional earning per year from boro rice 
per farmer was estimated at 21,726Tk/farmer, which is also realistic figure when we consider that the 
average annual earning of farmers in the household survey was estimated at around 76,000Tk per 
annum.  Farmers are therefore estimated to be earning around a third of their total income from the 
boro rice production during the ‘rabi’ winter season. 
The results can be considered a conservative estimate as this does not income the additional income 
from other types of crops such as watermelon, pumpkin, sweet potato, as well as pulses and wheat, 
which were described by farmers.  These additional benefits could not be calculated due to resource 
and time constraints. Furthermore, the health benefits, and other reported benefits such as increased 
freshwater for washing clothes and for giving to livestock were not included. The benefits for day 
labourers who gained additional work in farming are also not included. The difficulty of quantifying 
the additional social and environmental benefits of this adaptation option was recognised by several 
respondents. One NGO representative argued you cannot put a value on most of the benefits, 
presumably referring to the health and social benefits, such as freshwater for washing clothes.  
Several respondents mentioned the dam in front of the broken sluice gate could not 
completely keep out the saline water, and farming was still a risky business. One respondent 
explained his watermelons were washed away by salinity last year.   While several farmers 
listed the benefits from growing different types of crops, it appeared drought and salinity 
were still causing problems because “drought left salinity on the ground”. Another 
respondent explained:  
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“If there is heat it withers away water and salinity stays on the ground and if that happens 
cannot grow crops this year”. 
The dam benefitted the farmers more than the fishermen (Razeev, 2012). As one NGO 
respondent explained, in some areas, fishermen previously used to control the sluice gate to 
the detriment of the general population. Thus, in some places “muscle men” would use the 
gate for catching fish.  The representative from the Bangladesh Water Development Board 
(BWDB) agreed sometimes local “elite people” would control the gate for fishing, which 
affected local farmers.  The local government official agreed there was “a little tension” 
between farmers and fishermen, but claimed there were no serious clashes. 
One NGO representative reported there had been initial tensions when the CBA project 
began.  In the first year of the CBA project (2007) the GGD group had “got threats from 
people they would cut the dam”.  Eventually the tensions appeared to have been alleviated by 
the third year, through cooperation with the UP, and because local people demanded the UP 
should control the sluice gate with a dam. Yet according to the NGO, the sluice gate was still 
controlled by a “sluice gate management committee” which included “muscle men”.  The 
sluice gate committee was reportedly well-connected politically, and according to NGO 
representatives, this was one reason why the dam had been built in front of the sluice gate 
instead of pressing for the gate to be repaired. After communication with government leaders 
at the start of the project, according to one NGO representative: “The MP in that area said do 
what you like in our area, but you cannot think of touching that committee” [sluice gate 
committee]. 
One fisherman interviewed during the household survey explained he used to be the person 
responsible for managing the sluice gate, and when there was no dam, the fish could go inside 
and he was able to fish there. He explained that previously he had earned 500-700tk/day for 
fishing all year round but “now I can’t do that because of the dam”. He explained his income 
was reduced to 200-300tk per day for 7 months per year. However, the fishermen seemed 
reconciled to this and accepted the fact that the dam in front of the sluice gate benefitted more 
people, saying: “it benefits the common people… if everyone is well I am well”.   
207 
 
  
Figure 8.8  Earthen dam constructed in front of the broken sluice gate (left) and broken 
sluice gate (right) 
The dam was needed because the sluice gate was broken.  Respondents confirmed that the 
earth dam would have to be “cut” each year to allow freshwater to enter, and then rebuilt the 
next year, leading to the conclusion that repairing the broken sluice gate could be a more 
viable and sustainable long-term solution as it would not require annual expense. However, 
an NGO representative explained the sluice gates were under the jurisdiction of the BWDB 
so local government did not have permission to repair the gates: 
“Only WDB have permission to repair or rebuild and the UP [Union Parishad] don’t have 
permission and that’s why the UP cannot repair the sluice gates” 
One civil society respondent reported that out of 10 sluice gates, none of them are completely 
working, and “there is no rubber seal to prevent the flow of water”. Key informants explained 
that the sluice gates were in such a poor state that they could not be easily repaired, but would 
need to be replaced entirely. 
 
It emerged that local people and local government had repeatedly requested the BWDB to 
replace or repair the sluice gates, but this had not happened yet.  As a result, interviews 
confirmed that the UP supported by the NGO were spending 3-5 lakh taka each year (over 
£3,000 per annum) on building earth dams in front of the broken sluice gates. In Poshurbunia 
village, the sluice gate dam in 2011 cost 53521tk (approx. 500GBP).  When asked about 
repairs of sluice gates in the vicinity, the BWDB official argued this was “routine work for 
us” and they were “doing work regularly”.  The BWDB official confirmed there was “no 
formal arrangement” for communication with the UP as they receive information directly 
from the local people.  The lack of institutional coordination between the UP and BWDB 
might threaten the sustainability of the initiative. It was unclear whether the UP would have 
sufficient resources to continue to provide their own funds for the scheme if NGO support 
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ceased in the future.  Moreover, repairing the sluice gates may also be hindered by the 
political control of ‘elites’ in the sluice gate committees, as indicated above.   
 
The poor state of repair of water control structures in the area has historical roots. Several 
respondents described how in the 1970s, each of the gates had a ‘khalasi’ (gateman) who 
would control the water flow (see figure below).  The local government UP official stated 
that the gates were built in 1963 and since then, BWDB have “done nothing for sluice gates” 
and have “no fund to manage the sluice gates” so the community have to manage the sluice 
gates themselves.  This confirms the literature review findings that many of the water 
management structures in coastal Bangladesh, constructed during 1960-80’s, have not been 
effectively maintained.  
 
Figure 8.9  Derelict building in a nearby village which previously housed a ‘khalasi’ 
(gateman) 
In the literature, Ostrom (1999) suggests local self-governed systems are often more effective 
in developing rules to fit a local resource, whereas top-down design processes are more 
limited.  Ostrom (1999:495) argues that “state control has usually proven to be less effective 
and efficient than control by those directly affected”.  In this case study, similar findings are 
evident as the poor management of the water resource appears to have its roots in the 
centrally-established “position” rules which gave priority to the elites in the sluice gate 
committee.   It is likely that a more poly-centric governance system, where local users were 
able to take back control of the sluice gate and establish their own “authority rules” would 
enable the sluice gate to be managed to the benefit of a greater number of community 
members.  Drawing on Ostrom (1999) the sluice gate would still require monitoring in order 
to ensure fishermen did not open the sluice gate by stealth in order to benefit at the expense 
of the farmers. 
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8.3.2. Strengthening Embankments 
The interviews with key informants and the household survey both confirmed that the 
embankment frequently had to be repaired as it was regularly damaged by river erosion and 
storm surges. One NGO respondent argued there was “huge pressure” on the BWDB to 
continually repair the embankment.  The embankment in the village under study (polder 
number 47/5) was currently being repaired under the ECRRP project funded by World Bank, 
and co-financed by the BCCRF using multilateral funds.  However, one NGO respondent 
suggested there could be some corruption, in that “they have in interest in not making 
embankment strong so they keep having to repair it”.  
In terms of the cost, the literature review of documents showed the cost of the rehabilitation 
of polder 47/5 over 2012-13 was $5,400,000 (World Bank, 2014). Documentation showed 
this included construction 0.8km of embankment, 0.4km of slope and bank protection, 4km 
of embankment to be re-sectioned, 3km extra slope protection and 1 sluice gate (ibid). 
The interview with the NGO confirmed that participatory monitoring was being undertaken 
by the local community ‘bard rocca’ committees, in areas in which they existed, and this 
information was verified on the ground.  The respondent added; “monitoring should be 
keeping out the influential people otherwise they may try to influence it”. This comment 
shows there was a perception that political interests could influence the quality of adaptation 
works in the area. The BWDB official claimed there were three tiers of monitoring for the 
embankment works, which at a minimum included the World Bank monitoring team, the 
BWDB’s own team, and government officials from the Ministry of Water.  In terms of 
participatory monitoring, the BWDB claimed this had started, but was “not 100% yet”. 
  
Figure 8.10  Ongoing construction work on the embankment (Polder 47/5) 
In terms of the sustainability and flexibility of the embankment under projected climate 
change, the BWDB official argued that future sea level rise projections were being taken into 
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account in planning, assuming a 1 metre increase along all the crests of the embankment to 
cover the next 50-100 year period. These projections were considered under the World 
Bank’s CEIP (Coastal Embankment Improvement Project).  However, the engineer 
confirmed that from time to time, the next generation would have to arrange an additional 
increase in height.  Moreover, the engineer argued the community “will not cope if it happens 
in a sudden time” [sic].    
During the household survey, several household respondents suggested “throwing stones by 
the bank” as an adaptation option to protect against erosion of the embankment.  Several 
respondents reported they had repaired the embankments themselves at times, including 
raising the banks of the ponds.  In addition, the BWDB engineer suggested afforestation of 
the embankments as an effective adaptation strategy (see below). 
8.3.3. Road Construction 
Several household respondents argued the poor state of the local roads was an impediment to 
dealing with environmental risks, including their ability to reach safety during a severe 
cyclone. The roads were primarily brick-built and in a poor condition.  The word for 
‘embankment’ was used synonymously with ‘road’ since the roads were raised up and also 
functioned as an embankment to prevent movement of floodwater. During cyclones 
households explained they would put their livestock and belongings onto the road to raise 
them up above the flooded fields on either side.  Roads were also necessary to get to the 
cyclone shelter. Thus several households explained that replacing the brick-built path with a 
stronger road was an important adaptation priority. One female respondent said : 
“We face a long distance to get to shelter… if roads are in good condition then we can more 
easily get there and help us protect with crops and everything will be saved”. [sic] 
8.3.4. Cyclone Shelter 
Many household survey respondents expressed the need for a cyclone shelter and the 
difficulties of getting to nearby cyclone shelters during a cyclone. Less than half of the 
respondents (44%) reported taking shelter in a cyclone shelter in the last cyclone. Many 
households (31%) reported taking shelter in Banati Bazar cyclone shelter, while others went 
to the shelter in Charipara or Utter Lalua.  
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The figure below shows the participatory map of the location of the nearest cyclone shelters 
which was drawn up in collaboration with local fishermen.  Studies have shown unless a 
cyclone shelter is within 1.5 km of a house, it may be too distant (Rahman and Islam , 2011). 
 
Figure 8.11  Participatory map of the location of the nearest cyclone shelters (sketched 
by local fishermen) 
Several household respondents said there was not enough space in existing cyclone shelters. 
One lady from a poor family described how she had tried to go to Banati Bazar cyclone 
shelter during cyclone Aila and was in a corridor with a very small space where she got wet 
in the rain.  Another respondent related this to the village population size, adding that the 
nearby shelter is not sufficient.  In the interview with the UP official, it emerged that the 
population of the Lalua Union (in which Poshurbunia village is located) is 16,704 people or 
4,477 households, and there are only 8 functional cyclone shelters. Since the normal capacity 
of the cyclone shelter is 500 people, this meant only 4,000 people in Lalua Union had access 
to a cyclone shelter (less than a quarter of the population). The official said more than 500 
people were usually forced to squeeze into the shelters during a cyclone.  Women reported 
having a lack of privacy and security in the cramped conditions in the cyclone shelter.  
The UP official said there used to be 11 shelters, but 3 were destroyed by river erosion, 
demonstrating that this structural adaptation option (cyclone shelter construction) to address 
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cyclones is also vulnerable to a different climate-related hazard (river erosion). This further 
confirms the complexity of adapting to multiple hazards. 
Some respondents said they did not go to a cyclone shelter because they stayed behind to 
look after livestock or household belongings. One respondent reported that sometimes when 
they leave the house during the cyclone, valuables go missing or are stolen. One male 
respondent described how his wife and children went to the cyclone shelter, but he stayed 
behind to look after the house. One female farmer reported sometimes people stay behind to 
take care of their animals, and argued it would be beneficial if both animals and humans 
could take shelter.   It emerged these concerns were being addressed in the new design for 
cyclone shelters. The LGED official described how the new design included a “killah” 
platform for keeping cattle, while another design included three storeys, with space for 
livestock on the second floor. The designs were also discussed in the national-level 
interviews with the World Bank. 
In addition to the distance from the shelter, travelling to a cyclone shelter on the road was 
also extremely risky.  One male respondent (an agricultural labourer) described how some 
women died going to take shelter and had to “hang in the trees”.  One respondent argued 
elderly people and pregnant women face particular difficulties getting to the cyclone shelter.  
Another respondent said; “we started moving to cyclone shelter but trees fell down on the 
road so we come back”.  As noted in the previous section, roads were important to enable 
cyclone shelter access but were in a poor condition. This issue was raised in national-level 
interviews with the World Bank, where the respondent explained that poor roads were a 
barrier construction of cyclone shelters (in terms of transporting materials), as well as a 
barrier for those who needed to access the shelters. 
  
Figure 8.12: Cyclone shelter construction (left) in Lalua Union showing adjacent 
platform ‘killah’ for livestock. Multi-purpose shelter-cum-school (right) in use as a 
school 
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In terms of sustainability and on-going maintenance of cyclone shelters, it emerged from the 
interview with the LGED engineer that maintenance had been considered through 
construction of multipurpose shelters which double as primary schools.  The engineer 
explained; “it is in multipurpose use as a primary school and so with the government system 
it is maintained by the education department”.  The engineer explained this also overcame 
access problems and ensured the shelter was rapidly available when needed, by constrast, if it 
was closed for a long time it “may not be possible to open the gate when needed” or the lock 
may not be in good condition. 
It appeared that a few households did not need to take shelter in the cyclone shelter, as they 
sheltered in a strong two-storey building nearby with family or friends. However, most 
houses in the village were made from earth, straw and wood which were vulnerable to 
cyclones. Therefore, one alternative to cyclone shelters would be to build stronger housing.  
The LGED official also raised this point, praising the nearby NGO pilot project which had 
built “single person” brick-built housing in Chapli Bazar, Patuakhali. Construction of these 
houses was limited by household income. 
When exploring the lack of a cyclone shelter in the village, one respondent said; “we do not 
give land that’s why there is no cyclone shelter in our locality”. The LGED engineer 
confirmed land scarcity is an important barrier to construction of cyclone shelters and 
“sometimes there is great need or demand but not enough space to build it”, while sometimes 
there is enough space but the community are not able to give up the land. This appeared to be 
a social barrier to cyclone-shelter construction. 
One elderly male respondent (age 60) recognised there was an intergenerational dimension to 
cyclone shelter construction, stating: “We are in the last stages of our life but it will benefit 
the next generation if we can build the cyclone shelter”. 
Finally, when asked about the allocation of cyclone shelters, a UP official argued there are 
six villages in the area that badly need a cyclone shelter.  Whilst the village of Poshurbunia 
clearly needed a shelter too, the official argued there were other villages in even greater need.  
The UP official also mentioned there was no scope for funds for repairing cyclone shelters 
unless these were sanctioned by central government. Interviews at national-level with the 
World Bank had established that each shelter costs 300,000USD.  Thus, there were economic 
barriers and limits to adaptation (see Jones, 2010), such as limited government resources to 
construct enough shelters, and insufficient household income to construct stronger homes. 
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Social barriers were also evident, including the security of women, and unwillingness of local 
people to give up land to shelter construction. 
8.3.5. Early Warning System (EWS) 
In the chapter on Bangladesh, it was noted that Bangladesh’s Cyclone Preparedness 
Programme (CPP) is well-known and internationally respected as it has dramatically reduced 
the number of lives lost during cyclones, by ensuring an early warning is disseminated 
through a network of volunteers. Around 75% of respondents in the household survey said 
they heard the alarm before Sidr. However some respondents said they did not hear the alarm 
because it was too far away. One respondent said the Red Crescent volunteers have to cover 
about 3km to raise the alarm and the sound level of the microphone is not loud enough, so 
they can hardly hear it. 
One household survey respondent was a member of the Red Crescent volunteer team who 
was responsible for disseminating the alarm.  He was interviewed in further detail, and 
explained that his unit had 15 people to cover 3 villages.  The activities of the volunteers 
included raising the alarm, rescuing people, cutting trees that fall on the road, and helping 
people during disaster.  The volunteer also explained that 4 people out of 15 are in the ward 
committee (local government ward representatives) suggesting an overlap between local 
government engagement and disaster volunteer work.  He described the EWS process, 
explaining that the alarm comes from the thana (sub-district) HQ office through radio and 
mouthpiece, which informs the unit commander for a ward, who calls each of the 3 villages 
in that ward.  These volunteers then use microphone, siren and whistle to raise the alarm. The 
volunteer explained that some volunteers are responsible for post-disaster response including 
first aid. 
It seemed to be easier for households to hear the early warning if the cyclone came during the 
day.  Several respondents explained that cyclone Sidr struck very suddenly during the night 
so some people did not hear the alarm.  Overall, the EWS seemed to be working effectively, 
enabling villagers to prepare by placing belongings inside their homes, moving livestock onto 
the embankment, and if the alert reached a high level, moving to the cyclone shelter. The UP 
official pointed out it was important for NGOs and other organisations to increase awareness 
about the different cyclone alert levels, especially in schools. 
The EWS can be credited with reducing the number of lives lost in cyclones. According to 
the local NGO, there were 4 deaths in Lalua Union (with a population of 16,704) during 
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cyclone Sidr (2007) and none in cyclone Aila (2009). However, the early warning system 
does not prevent people from losing their homes and belongings. In the survey, 85% of 
respondents reported their house was damaged or destroyed in Sidr. 
The EWS is reliant on meteorological services, but it was revealed from the interview with 
the local meteorological officer at Khepupara that there are only five meteorological stations 
in Bangladesh using satellite. The station at Khepupara was one of only 5 radar stations under 
the BMD (WMO, 2007). The information was triangulated by literature which showed 
satellite images are only received through five satellites in Bangladesh (3 US-based, 1 China-
based and 1 Japan-based) (MOF, 2014). The officer also revealed that they did not store any 
weather data locally at Khepupara, it was stored only in Dhaka due to a “lack of manpower” 
and other logistical reasons.  
8.3.6. Saline-Tolerant Rice Varieties 
Growing saline-tolerant rice varieties was discussed as an adaptation option to deal with 
salinity. In the FGDs, different rice varieties were discussed and participants listed various 
BRRI varieties 47, 28, and 29 (known as BRRI dhan28, BRRI dhan29, BRRI dhan47). 
Variety BRRI-58 was also being used and farmers reported this variety could tolerate 
remaining underwater for 15 days. Farmers explained they had learnt about these varieties 
from NGOs and found out where to get them. Before this, they had not used them. They 
explained they collected them from the Agricultural Extension Office in Kalapara (around 40 
minutes by motorcycle and boat). Farmers also explained they got the seed for free, and could 
preserve the seeds after cultivation so that anyone with land could cultivate it. From FGDs it 
was clear farmers with land could benefit more from saline-tolerant rice varieties, but day 
labourers would also benefit from additional work. 
The FGDs corroborated evidence from the literature review that there was not enough 
awareness about climate-tolerant varieties, as villagers had only been aware of them recently.   
Moreover, local extension services were lacking in capacity because the extension officer 
was quite distant. The interview with the local Agricultural Extension officer confirmed they 
had only just started awareness-raising activities, but had received a great response so far.  
The officer also confirmed the demand for seeds was often higher than availability. Small and 
marginal farmers were both eligible for free seeds (it was clarified that those with 50-249 
decimals of land were classed as ‘small farmers’ and those with 5-49 were ‘marginal’ 
farmers). In order to identify ‘farmers’ a list was drawn up in the UP office by the field block 
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supervisor and agricultural officer, and then approved by the union committee.  The 
extension officer also explained that there were some risks, so new varieties were mainly 
provided to “advanced farmers” who were ready to take the risk. 
However, while the selling price of the climate-tolerant rice was the same, the agricultural 
extension officer confirmed that they had no way of controlling the price farmers’ would get 
for their produce from middlemen: 
“Our department is not responsible for controlling the price of crops so farmers come to us 
and ask why they’re not getting a fair price… we have no answer as we’ve no authority to 
control the price.” 
8.3.7. Livelihood Support/Diversification 
In the FGD with day labourers (who were identified as a particularly vulnerable group) it 
emerged they had many different ideas for future adaptation options and strategies. These 
mainly related to livelihood support activities and development of small businesses, including 
“goats for business”, “fishing business”, “grocery shop”, and “tailoring”.  The day labourers 
also said they did not want money or “products”, because if they got sick, this would have to 
be sold so they should “use it for business instead”.  Many of these respondents therefore 
seemed aware about issues relating to the sustainability of NGO interventions.  
In the same FGD, in which participants were invited to identify their key problems in the area 
(social, environmental and economic problems) many participants stated that a key problem 
was “no work” (see image below).  FGD participants also discussed the seasonal nature of 
work, which often led them to get into debt for half of the year (see 8.2.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.13  Image from FGD where 
participants identified and discussed lack of 
work as one of the most serious problems  
In particular, the group concluded; “women need training for handicrafts” as well as “goods 
and support to sell them in market”.  These livelihood activities had not been discussed in 
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detail in the household survey.  Since many of these day labourers did not own land, it is 
possible they would benefit more from alternative livelihood activities, as their lack of access 
to land prevented them from taking part in farming. 
8.3.8. Mangrove Planting 
Eco-system based activities were not a prominent part of the NGO activities in the area as 
these focused on community-based adaptation (CBA).  In the literature review (chapter 4) it 
was recognised there is a distinction between ecosystem based adaptation (EbA) and CBA in 
the literature.  
However, the local government engineer from the BWDB strongly recommended 
reforestation to protect the embankment.  The BWDB engineer was responsible for the 
embankment construction project in the area and had noticed the forested areas of the 
embankment were subject to less erosion: 
“I’ve seen where it is afforested, the damage is less but where not, it is seriously affected” 
 
Figure 8.14  Image showing the embankment covers an exposed area, while the forested 
area acts a natural buffer that reduces river erosion of the forested area 
The BWDB officer also argued tree-planting would be the “least cost” option compared to 
construction of embankments that are currently prioritised under the CEIP.  He had noticed 
during his work that wave action is higher where there are no trees, and trees also had other 
benefits such as fruit production, and use for firewood when mature. He did not mention 
synergies with mitigation although this was another benefit. However, he argued 
implementation of such projects had been in “slow motion” and that plans had to be led by 
the MoEF. As present, he observed there was insufficient afforestation. However, he felt they 
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should not afforest all the land because they had to consider the demand for agricultural land 
for food production, thus he thought afforestation should be undertaken mainly on and 
outside the embankments. 
Although trees act as a protective buffer, it was noted by some respondents that trees were 
also vulnerable. The official from the local meteorological office at Khepupara (Kalapara) 
said around 30% of the trees in the Sunderbans were destroyed in Sidr and they take 30 years 
to grow back.  This aligned somewhat with reports that around 25% of the Sunderbans forest 
was destroyed by Cyclone Sidr, but there were also reports that the forest recovered more 
quickly from the cyclone than expected (Dailystar, 2007).  The Forestry Officer also argued 
many mango trees in the Kuakata area had been destroyed by river erosion. 
The key informant interview with the local Forestry Officer revealed that in 2009-2010 there 
had been a project under the Forestry Department to plant trees on the slope of the 
embankment, but there were no current projects. The officer explained there are various 
mangrove species tolerant to salinity and tidal waves including ‘kaora’ (Sonneratia apetala), 
‘gol pata’ or ‘nipa palm’ (Nypa fruticans), ‘sundri’ (Heritiera fomes), amongst others. One 
project was on-going to protect the trees beside the LGED roads for “poverty alleviation 
through social forestry”. There were also plans to implement a future project in collaboration 
with the agricultural office on multi-purpose trees and social forestry.  There was no climate-
related forestry project under implementation in this area, as far as the officer was aware. 
In the FGD with women, it was also argued that trees protected the embankment from river 
erosion. However, the group mentioned that trees also get washed away by river erosion, so 
in some areas it is not possible to reforest. Yet the women discussed how there were some 
tree varieties with the capacity to exist in saline water like “kaora”, and trees with deeper 
roots.   Interestingly, when describing their involvement in the embankment, the participants 
mentioned they had been involved in “putting down branches of trees to protect the 
embankment”. However, the women did not seem to be aware that this activity might only 
have a short-term effect while contributing to deforestation.  
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Figure 8.15: Deforested trees on the roadside in Lalua Union (March 2013) 
8.3.9. Comparison of adaptation strategies  
One important structural measure introduced under the CBA project was the construction of 
dams in front of the broken sluice gates to preserve fresh water.  A preliminary cost benefit 
analysis of the intervention revealed the benefit-cost ratio to be 6.44 (see Box 8.2), 
demonstrating that each dollar invested generated 6.44 dollars of benefits for the community.  
However this is a conservative estimate, as intangible non-monetary benefits, such as 
improved health, were not included in the analysis. However, the dam had negative effects on 
a small minority of fishermen, resulting in social tensions. These tensions appear to have 
been gradually resolved through collective negotiation and one local fisherman seemed 
reconciled to the dams.   
However the tensions indicate that although ultimately repairing the sluice gate could be a 
more cost-effective long-term solution, it would be politically difficult.  Several respondents 
reported that elites had control over the sluice gate committee for their own interests. The 
problem appeared to be exacerbated by a lack of communication between the local 
government and BWDB (who are responsible for maintenance of water structures). 
Embankment maintenance was a key priority for the community who felt their lives were in 
danger if the embankment was broken, as this could increase the impact of storm surges and 
salinity (see Table 8.1). People also felt road improvement was vital for transport, including 
movement to safety during a cyclone.  On the topic of cyclone shelters, many respondents felt 
they were too distant and experienced difficulties getting to the overcrowded shelters during 
cyclones. Others stayed behind to protect livestock and belongings. However, while 
respondents in this village felt they badly needed a shelter, the UP official said there were 
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other villages in greater need. Land could also be a barrier to shelter construction. One 
alternative noted by the local LGED official would be to construct individual cyclone-
resistant houses. 
Table 8.1  Comparison of relative benefits and costs (and limitations) of adaptation 
strategies  
Adaptation
Hazard 
addressed
Benefits (social , economic 
and environmental)
Costs (if known)/ limitations and 
constraints
Freshwater 
preservation 
(dams)
Salinity, food 
insecurity 
Food security, freshwater for 
livestock, cooking and 
bathing, increased income in 
winter months. Water for 
irrigation benefited an 
estimated 1265 farmers in 
Lalua Union (4500 ha)
Poshurbunia sluice gate dam in 2011 cost 
53521tk (approx. 500GBP). Cost of 8 dams 
(Lalua Union) in 2011 cost 249,750tk 
(approx. 2000GBP). Drawbacks are that 
dams will require rebuilding each year.
Embankments
Salinity, river 
erosion and 
cyclone
Protection from erosion, 
flooding/storm surges and 
salinity
Rehabilitation of polder 47/5 was 5.4m USD 
(ECRRP)
Roads
Cyclone 
(access to 
cyclone 
shelter), food 
insecurity
Accessibility during 
cyclone, transport links for 
education/work, access to 
markets
Not known
Cyclone 
shelter
Cyclone
Saves lives, multipurpose 
shelters function as schools
300,000USD (World Bank, pers comm, 2014)
Early warning 
system
Cyclone
Saves lives and enables 
protection of 
belongings/livestock
Not known, already exists with Red 
Crescent community volunteer network
Saline-tolerant 
rice varieties
Salinity, food 
insecurity
Food security, improved 
income for farmers and farm 
workers
Low cost, seeds already available from 
DAE, requires awareness-raising
Livelihood 
support
Food 
insecurity, 
poverty
Improved income for day 
labourers, poverty 
reduction, reduces 
dependence on 
environmental resources
Not known
Mangrove/ tree 
planting
River erosion,  
cyclone, 
salinity, food 
insecurity
Protection from erosion of 
embankments, cyclones, 
increased income from 
provision of fruit/firewood 
Low cost compared to concrete 
embankments according to BWDB 
engineer. Need for community awareness to 
protect trees.
 
The EWS under the CPP seemed to be effective with 75% of household respondents 
reporting they heard the alarm during Sidr. However the warning did not prevent 85% of 
household respondents from losing their homes during severe cyclones. 
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Extension services and saline-tolerant rice varieties also provided a vital lifeline for 
struggling farmers, but local farmers had only been aware of these relatively recently. This 
demonstrated the need for increased awareness, extension services and supplies of seeds for 
farmers. 
Day labourers emphasised the need for alternative livelihood options and they had many 
ideas including selling handicrafts and tailoring. These ideas could be facilitated with NGO 
support, inputs or training. It was also observed that tourism is expanding in nearby Kuakata 
so there may be a market for locally-made handicrafts. In nearby Kuakata, anecdotal 
evidence was obtained that most of the handicrafts on sale to tourists were being imported 
from India. 
Eco-system based adaptation did not seem to have been prioritised in the local area. In the 
interview with the BWDB, the official felt strongly that planting trees on embankments 
would prevent river erosion. The local forestry official confirmed there were currently no 
projects in the area on this issue.  This could be a low-cost intervention with additional 
benefits such as providing fruits and other ecosystem services like firewood to the 
community. Community engagement would be needed to increase awareness about 
sustainable forestry management in order for the scheme to be sustainable in the long term. 
8.4. Progress against Indicative Framework 
An attempt has been made to retrospectively evaluate local adaptation progress (including the 
CBA project and government projects) against the indicative framework for effective finance 
(Chapter 7).  This goes some way towards answering the research question on the progress 
made in effectively financing adaptation. The findings discussed in this section are 
summarised in the table in Section 10.7.  
Consistent with the framework in 7.7, the local CBA project implemented by ActionAid 
seemed to have been successful in addressing equity by targeting the most vulnerable groups 
(women and landless households) and providing them with knowledge and training. The 
CBA project targeted the poorest more than the BCCRF project. The cost-effectiveness of the 
project was also demonstrated through particulatory cost-benefit analysis, although the social 
benefits of the intervention could not be quantified.  However, whilst the CBA project 
appeared effective in reducing vulnerability, the long-term sustainability of the sluice-gate 
dam is not assured, since re-building the dam requires ongoing annual expenditure. Thus, 
there was balanced progress on the sustainability of the initiative.  
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The ongoing local infrastructural projects (cyclone shelter and embankment construction) 
appeared to align with stakeholders’ stated urgent needs in relation to adaptation and were 
being implemented in a timely way. However, these particular needs might only have been 
articulated due to the visibility of these projects.  Due to uncertainties regarding future 
climate change, it was not clear to what extent the infrastructure would be robust under 
different scenarios and therefore neither clear to what extent maladaptation could be avoided 
nor whether interventions would be adequate.  It was not clear to what extent practicality or 
feasibility were taken into consideration.  
Synergies between mitigation and adaptation did not appear to be recognised in either the 
CBA project or governmental projects.  However, the household survey revealed that low-
income households benefited from solar energy. Local stakeholder interviews also revealed 
tree-planting was considered to be potential adaptation option, but that this has not been 
adequately recognised by government decision-makers. Overall there was little progress in 
coherence between adaptation and mitigation. 
Gender equity had been taken into account in the local CBA project as there were dedicated 
women’s groups (GGD), and women were now becoming involved in local politics and 
disaster relief work. Respondents noted they had previously been marginalised in decision-
making.    
In terms of scaling-up, the local government appeared to have adopted the dam-construction 
(freshwater preservation) scheme in other areas of Lalua Union, but long-term monitoring 
would be required to demonstrate long-term results.  Thus there was balanced progress on 
this issue. In terms of ownership, the bottom-up approach undertaken by the NGO appeared 
to have been instrumental in providing a sense of empowerment to climate-vulnerable 
stakeholders, particularly in relation to their engagement with local government. There was 
nascent evidence of mainstreaming of adaptation into local government planning, though 
clearly these results cannot be generalised to other areas.  There did appear to be a level of 
coordination within local government (for example, in allocation of cyclone shelters) but it is 
not clear to what extent this was objective or transparent. Due to the similarity between 
adaptation and development, the issue of additionality was not relevant at local-level. 
Altogether, the NGO-initiated CBA project appeared to be implemented transparently and 
had resulted in documentation of the local government spending in various budget reports. 
However, the top-down World Bank projects (cyclone shelter and embankment construction) 
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were more difficult to explore at local-level.  There was evidence local-level stakeholders had 
been involved in their own ‘community monitoring’ of the embankment construction but this 
may not occur elsewhere.  Thus there was balanced progress regarding transparency and 
stakeholder engagement (see 10.7).  Local communities’ enthusiasm in this regard may 
indicate the World Bank and LGED could fruitfully improve such projects through improved 
stakeholder engagement. 
8.5. Conclusions 
Interestingly, many households felt cyclones were increasing and becoming more severe. 
However, it is also possible this perception may have been influenced by the NGO project in 
the area, in which some villagers discussed climate change in GGD groups. Overall, most 
households felt their food security was linked to the seasonal nature of work in the area, 
which was of course linked to the seasonal hazards (like flooding) which pose risks for 
agricultural production. 
Whilst some households were keen to discuss the adaptation options and coping strategies 
they used, many households felt they were largely helpless in the face of the risks of disasters 
like cyclones and salinity intrusion.  After Cyclone Sidr (2007) it was noted that the loss and 
damage to homes and livelihoods had been immense. In fact, from the household survey it 
was calculated that the average losses per household were twice the average household 
annual income.  This demonstrates it is extremely difficult for people to recover from this 
type of severe disaster without external support and relief. 
Households found it difficult to prioritise or rank the climatic hazards in this area, as they 
were all seen as serious.  Furthermore, it emerged from the interviews and household survey 
that these hazards are interrelated, for example, cyclones lead to flooding and salinity 
intrusion, which also exacerbates the on-going river erosion and damages embankments 
leading to further salinity intrusion. The complex web of climatic hazards therefore has a 
multifaceted impact on local livelihoods. Feedbacks in the system also provided evidence of 
climate-related “poverty traps”. 
Land tenure security was an additional issue emerging from the study. This appeared to be 
exacerbated by river erosion; a slow-onset process which meant that families sometimes lost 
their land over generations. Access to land is a prerequisite for farming, and a determinant of 
wealth.  Thus, long-term sea level rise under climate change will have severe economic and 
social implications unless households can access land elsewhere.  However, this issue could 
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not be addressed by local-scale projects but would require addressing by national-level 
policymakers.  The study highlights the need to address not only availability of food but also 
access. 
In terms of the research question on the progress in effectively financing adaptation, there 
appeared to have been progress in addressing gender. The vulnerability of women emerged 
strongly from the interviews, including security risks in disaster, and day-to-day risks. Yet, it 
was reported by women in the village that they had more say in local politics and felt more 
empowered since the CBA project had begun. This suggests gender issues remain a problem 
in other areas where the CBA intervention had not taken place and tackling gender issues 
would also require interventions at national-scale. 
Local government capacity appears to have been strengthened in the CBA project through 
participatory budget planning efforts, which were enabled by empowering local people to 
understand their rights in relation to local government. Although there were allegations of 
corruption and bribery in local government, which it was felt affected allocation of resources 
for adaptation, several household respondents felt governance had improved. Government 
accountability appears to be a two-way process (Rahman, 2007) requiring active public 
participation at local levels to demand improved services.  
The household survey also found many people are affected by rising prices of food, fuel and 
fertiliser. Food prices were a particular serious issue for the landless, but one farmer 
recognised they may benefit from higher food prices. Access to solar (owned by 50% of 
respondents) seemed to partially offset the impact of rising kerosine prices on households. 
Finally, the local study aimed to explore the relative benefits of different adaptation options 
and strategies, with particular focus on embankments, cyclone shelter and water preservation 
as these activities were currently being implemented as adaptation projects in the vicinity. A 
range of other adaptation options were suggested by household respondents including 
building housing, throwing stones on the embankment, fertiliser and agricultural inputs, tube 
wells, road construction and livelihood support. Embankment and cyclone shelter 
construction were widely applauded as adaptation needs by households, and these are the 
projects being carried out by the World Bank under the ECRRP. 
Limitations arising from the local-level study were that a translator had to be used for all 
interviews, except with a few local officials who spoke English.  There were various 
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confusions arising from translation in several cases, for instance, since the word for 
‘embankment’ (‘rasta’ in Bengali) was the same as that for ‘road’ in Bengali. These obstacles 
were largely overcome through careful facilitation of FGDs, seeking further clarification of 
various points, and by using a trained and experienced interpreter. 
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9. National-Level Analysis and Findings: Bangladesh 
9.1. Introduction 
As described in the methodology chapter, semi-structured interviews were undertaken in 
Bangladesh at national-level, as well as quantitative analysis of household-level survey data.   
Semi-structured interviews with 24 key stakeholders and experts took place, primarily in 
Dhaka, Bangladesh (February-March 2012, and March-April 2013) although some interviews 
took place via telephone where required.  Chapter 5 provides an extensive and systematic 
literature of the national-level issues of climate change adaptation, food security and 
adaptation finance in the case of Bangladesh.  As explained in Chapter 2, the indicative 
framework for effective adaptation finance (Chapter 7) was used to inform the analysis in this 
section. Sections 9.6 and 10.6 explore cross-scale linkages, and progress at all scales is finally 
summarised in 10.7. 
Interview data has been used track progress against the framework for analysis (Chapter 7), 
to determine to what extent the evidence points towards satisfaction of those principles. 
Although much discussion focuses on the BCCTF and BCCRF funds, that is not 
determinative of the evaluation of progress as these are just discussed as they were the two 
dominant funds. 
In summary, expert stakeholders in Bangladesh expressed concerns about the initial lack of 
transparency in the new multi-donor climate fund, as well as the lack of institutional capacity 
for disbursement of funds. Overall, it is hypothesised that channelling climate change finance 
in an appropriate and effective manner will be an institutional and governance challenge, as 
well as a logistical challenge.  
9.2. National-Level Household Survey on Food Security and Adaptive Capacity   
In addition to qualitative research, statistical data analysis was undertaken using the 
household survey data obtained from CGIAR (Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research).  The survey data from Bangladesh was collected as part of the 
Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS) research programme, a global ten-
year highly collaborative research programme led by the CGIAR and the Earth System 
Science Partnership (ESSP) (see: www.ccafs.cgiar.org).  Analysis of the data highlighted the 
value of different ‘assets’ under the sustainable livelihoods approach, indicating this approach 
offers a useful conceptual framework for understanding local adaptive capacity (Jones et al., 
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2010; DFID, 1999). The rich dataset provided relatively scarce empirical evidence and 
insights into relationships between household food security and agricultural livelihood 
changes in rural households of coastal Bangladesh.  An overview of the results is given in 
this section. For further details, refer to Wright et al (2012) from which this section is 
adapted.   
The CCAFS baseline survey was carried out across diverse rural sites in 12 countries. In 
Bangladesh, the surveyed sites are located in the coastal zone, where salinity intrusion is 
prominent and crops are frequently lost due to floods or tidal surges. The survey was 
designed with the intent of developing simple, comparable cross-site household-level 
indicators, for which changes can be evaluated, of food security, household assets, 
agricultural production diversity, agricultural sales diversity, changes to farming practices 
(adaptation or innovation), mitigation and gender indicators (Kristjanson et al., 2011). In 
Bangladesh, a random sample was taken of 20 households in each village, and seven villages 
within each seven sites meaning 980 households were surveyed in total.   
Empirical evidence from the household-level survey of smallholder agricultural and fishing 
households was used to examine the relationship between assets, livelihood strategies, food 
security and changes to farming practice being made by households as they cope with various 
demographic, economic, and environmental changes. In summary, it was found that the least 
food secure households are making few, if any, changes in their agricultural practices, have 
relatively few assets, and are producing and selling fewer types of agricultural products than 
more food-secure households. The analysis found a strong association between a proxy 
measure of household adaptability - the total number of changes made in agricultural 
practices over the past ten years - and one for the degree of agricultural diversification of 
households in terms of the number of different products produced, suggesting agricultural 
diversification is a key strategy helping households to deal with climate and other changes.    
The survey confirmed there are many highly food insecure households across coastal 
Bangladesh since 15% of households reported they struggled to feed their families for six or 
more months per year, and a further 41% face between one and five “food deficit months” in 
a typical year.  In looking at household food security levels in relation to the number of assets 
a household owns (taken from a list of basic household assets, such as mobile phones or 
radios), the analysis found highly food-insecure households generally had few of these 
household assets. The Chi-square statistical test confirmed a strong association between the 
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number of assets owned by the household and the level of hunger reported (chi² = 140.5 
(n=980), d.f.=4, p<0.001).  
 
Figure 9.1  Relationship between Asset Indicator and Food Security 
Rice was by far the most critical crop with 64% of households saying it was their most 
important. Coconut, bananas, garlic, papaya, lentils and betel nut were frequently mentioned 
as the ‘second most’ important crop. There was a strong statistically significant association 
between diversification in agricultural production and the level of food security (chi² = 76.4, 
d.f.=4, p<0.001).  More diversified households had fewer food deficit months in a year; the 
converse was true for less diversified households. This may have been because wealthier 
households were able to diversify which also enhanced their income. Refer to Annex XX for 
the full table of results. 
These results give support to the use of the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF) as a 
conceptual framework (see Annex V and Chapter 4).  Knutsson and Ostwald (2006) argue it 
has previously primarily been used in a theoretical sense rather than a practical one where 
these relationships are tested empirically. The remaining relationships in the dataset were 
thus examined in light of the SLF. In the SLF, the vulnerability context has a direct impact on 
people’s assets and livelihood options so climate change could be conceptualized as one 
aspect of the vulnerability context. 
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There was also a strong association between the market orientation of households and levels 
of food security reported (chi² = 48.96, d.f.=4, p<0.001).  Households selling a greater range 
of products reported fewer food deficit months in a year; and the converse was true for 
households selling fewer products.   Out of the 151 households surveyed that reported having 
more than 6 months hunger per year, 74% sold only 1 or 2 agricultural products.  Being 
dependent only a few crops could have increased susceptability to climate shocks. 
Land can be conceptualised as a form of ‘natural capital’ under the SLF, and there was also a 
strong and significant negative relationship between the amount of land owned and food 
security (chi² = 164, d.f.=6, p<0.001). None of the landless households reported having 
sufficient food for their families all year. This may suggest policies such as land reform could 
be effective to help landless households. Agricultural day labourers (who were often landless) 
were found to be likelier to suffer from food insecurity.  Agricultural labouring might 
therefore be seen as a coping strategy for those without any or much land, but does not appear 
to be successful in terms of ensuring food security. 
On gender, it was found that women play an important role in agricultural production, 
particularly producing vegetables, processing food produced on their farms, collecting fuel-
wood, producing livestock products, and raising small livestock.   For large livestock (such as 
cattle and buffalo, found in 44% of surveyed households), one-half of households reported 
men do most of the work. Fishing was primarily a male activity in coastal Bangladesh; 40% 
of households were producing fish and 88% said men did most of the work.   
The survey data also explored changes households had made in their agricultural practices 
over the last ten years (including those related to crop varieties, crop types, soil, water, and 
land management practices, and livestock types and management), and the reasons for those 
changes. This aimed to explore agricultural adaptation and adaptability (or innovation). 78% 
of households had introduced a new variety of crop, mainly Aman Rice and HYV Boro rice. 
A majority of households had started purchasing more inputs, such as pesticides herbicides, 
and mineral or chemical fertiliser, with inputs commonly being applied to the rice varieties.  
Interestingly, market-related reasons (like prices or yields) were more frequently given as the 
reasons for agricultural crop changes than weather or climate-related reasons. Better yields 
and better prices were cited by over one-half of households; higher salinity was mentioned by 
one-quarter, and emergence of new pests and diseases was cited by 21%. It may be primarily 
market forces affecting food security and livelihood strategies of households, rather than 
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climate changes. Yet virtually all households reported facing a climate-related crisis (such as 
cyclones, see Chapter 8) in the past five years with only 36% of them reportedly receiving 
assistance. 
Overall, the analysis provides empirical evidence of enhanced food security being linked to 
more natural capital (land) and physical capital (assets) in particular.  Human capital 
(education) was also found to be closely associated with adaptability (below) with a strong 
positive association between adaptability and the highest education level achieved by a 
household member (chi² = 96.7, d.f.=6, p<0.001).  
 
Figure 9.2  Relationship between Household Education and Adaptation  
Although the analysis was not a causal one, the statistically significant association between 
adaptability and food security supports the view that poor households with high levels of food 
insecurity are forced to be more conservative in their livelihood strategies to avoid risk 
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2012).  Such households are not in a position to adopt new agricultural 
strategies in response to climate or market-related changes, and may become stuck in a 
‘poverty trap’. It is also likely the causality goes both ways; those that are not changing their 
agricultural practices are increasingly likely to remain food insecure. This supports the 
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crucial role of public intervention and finance in facilitating adaptation for such vulnerable 
households. Clearly, poor households with few assets that are already suffering from food 
insecurity will be the most vulnerable to extreme events and average temperature increases. 
Differences between households in terms of assets, livelihood opportunities and adaptive 
capacity demonstrate why equity is such an important consideration in research and 
development efforts focusing on adaptation (Smit and Pilifosova, 2001).   
The data suggest more immediate market and productivity drivers (higher prices, improved 
market opportunities) are dominant in shaping Bangladeshi households’ agricultural 
adaptation strategies. This implies programmes and investments coming from new ‘climate 
change’ funds will be most effective if they do not falsely assume rural households’ 
behaviour is influenced by climate change alone. Such vulnerability factors may require 
further research in order to explore appropriate adaptive strategies. For instance, there may be 
need for policies to reduce market risks for smallholder agriculturalists.   
Overall, the analysis supports the use of the SLF as a conceptual approach for understanding 
household food security and agricultural adaptation.  This may inform strategies and policies 
for increasing food security and adaptive capacity of households in the face of climate 
change. Although SLF has been shown to be useful, it is also limited in so far as it leaves out 
the role of power, including political power and women’s empowerment, and cannot 
incorporate historical dimensions or dynamic changes (Adato and Meinzen-Dick, 2002).  
However the analysis suggests the SLF may form a useful basis for future work on 
developing metrics and indicators for measuring adaptation and adaptive capacity. It also 
lends to support to the LAC framework (Jones et al., 2010) as a way of conceptualising 
adaptive capacity (see Section 4.1). 
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9.3. National-Level Semi-Structured Interviews with Key Informants  
As described in the methodology, semi-structured interviews were undertaken with a range of 
national-level key informants in Bangladesh (24 interviews in total). Institutional 
mechanisms and channels for publicly-provided climate change finance are explored with the 
aim of exploring key issues surrounding adaptation finance and identifying recommendations 
for the kind of frameworks, institutions and policies to facilitate effective adaptation finance.  
As explained in 2.2, sub-questions included finding out what issues should be taken into 
consideration in assessing the effectiveness of international climate finance, and what 
frameworks can facilitate effective finance for food security under climate change. The 
principles and issues identified in the literature review were used as a theoretical framework 
to inform open-ended semi-structured interviews. Respondents requested their responses 
should remain confidential.   Progress against the set of framework principles (Chapter 7) 
was evaluated qualitatively using the available evidence and is finally summarised in 10.7.   
As described in Chapter 2, an inductive approach was used to identify key emerging themes, 
discussed in Section 9.4. 
9.3.1. Equity and Allocation Criteria 
Several respondents reported that political influence in project selection was a problem for 
the BCCTF (government fund), but not the BCCRF (donor fund).  One civil society 
organisation suggested that political influence was evident in Trust Fund since projects were 
approved in the home districts of the Environment Minister and the Prime Minister although 
these were not priority vulnerable areas.  A donor argued there has been “too many projects 
in Chittagong where the Minister comes from” leading to speculation and allegations of 
political influence. The government official cited several examples, including finance going 
to “Chittagong – the home of the Environment Minister”, and to the home of the Prime 
Minister (Gopalganj), but argued the coastal area should have been prioritised. The 
anonymous government official added this was a “serious problem” and the BCCTF “will be 
controversial whether it is really reaching the climate victims” as they were “receiving letters 
from people asking for projects” including from the “speaker” and these were “not priority 
but had to approve it because they were powerful to the system” [sic].  Another example of 
political influence was given from Khulna, where one respondent argued that “the major of 
Khulna City Corporation had some interest in building a water treatment plant in this area 
because on this place he had some land” [sic]… “the mayor is supreme authority and he 
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decided”.  Overall, the allegations by civil society of political influence suggested 
prioritisation of projects was not based on vulnerability, with implications for effectiveness 
and equity. 
The World Bank respondent also confirmed that project selection was based on the projects 
that came forward (a demand-driven approach), meaning that prioritisation was “based on 
projects available” rather than being based on vulnerability, but they were considering doing 
‘a priori’ prioritisation or issuing calls for proposals on specific issues.  Overall, it seemed 
specific vulnerability criteria were not being used to target the most vulnerable. 
Government highlighted the advantages of having flexible allocation criteria. A government 
official argued that “if the topic is urgent, the criteria is not a problem” [sic]. The respondent 
argued the BCCRF format is complex while the BCCTF has “an easy format... it is easy to 
apply and the form is simple”.  When asked why the BCCRF is only for larger projects, the 
official stated the stipulation came from development partners as they were “more happy in 
terms of transparency, etc” and because “development partners are more interested in 
donating to BCCRF”. Thus, both development partners and government prompted the focus 
on larger projects; the former because they were deemed easier to monitor, the latter possibly 
because it was felt that would garner larger funds. 
Similar to the BCCRF, seven practical project selection criteria were reportedly being used to 
select projects for funding under the PKSF-managed community component (CCCP). 
According to PKSF, the criteria used were: (1) A registered NGO (2) 5 years experience at 
community level (3) 3 years established presence working on that issue in that area (4) 
Spending of at least 10mTk every year for the past 3 years (5) Project in line with the 
BCCSAP (6) Implementation capacity (7) Location in the 49 selected Upazilas (flood-prone, 
drought-prone or saline-prone). The World Bank respondent said they had to ensure the NGO 
applying under the CCCP was financially solvent, had sufficient staff to manage the project, 
and also had consulted with the community.  
It was initially discovered the BCCRF project selection criteria were that projects had to be 
above $15m in size and “close to implementation”.  One respondent made available 
additional documentation containing seven project selection criteria (see Chapter 5.5).   The 
eligible project size under the BCCTF (government fund) is up to $3m, while the BCCRF 
would initially only fund projects of over $15m.  It was therefore noted by the author there is 
a gap between project sizes of $3-15m which are not eligible for either national climate fund.  
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However, in a later interview with a multilateral organisation, it emerged the minimum 
project size was “not set in stone” and potentially could be changed in future.  A government 
official stated the BCCRF project selection criteria were controversial and “every member 
has their own opinion of the criteria”.  When asked who developed the criteria, the official 
argued the “World Bank developed the criteria, but don’t blame the World Bank, this is the 
system they have”.  However, the official also argued that “government overruled the 
criteria” suggesting the government ultimately had the final decision on project selection.  
Vulnerability indices and tools were not being used to guide funding allocation in 
Bangladesh, possibly due to the constraints on time and resources for policy-makers, so it 
was not clear to what extent objective criteria guided funding allocation.  Furthermore, there 
were concerns about the effect of structural flood defence works on the poorest landless 
communities, some of whom may be forced to move (see 9.4).  Overall, there was mixed 
progress regarding equity because whilst project selection criteria under the BCCRF and 
CCCP included a focus on hazard-prone areas, there was also no specific requirement to 
target climate-vulnerable sub-groups (e.g. children or women). 
9.3.2. Cost-efficiency 
In terms of the overhead costs of World Bank management, some respondents were critical. 
One (from media representative) argued that the overhead was “supposed to be 2% only but 
on the document they already got 4-5% and going to 6%”. This was also raised by another 
NGO stakeholder who argued there is a “hidden cost” and “they may increase this up to 10% 
- nobody knows” hence linking the management costs to the lack of transparency.  
However, the donor official argued that the World Bank “definitely” provides value-for-
money as they only have the “5% overhead” which is “maybe why they are not doing the soft 
policy stuff” as they charged the “bare minimum level”.  This suggests cost-efficiency was an 
important concern for donors. This comment suggests pressure for cost-efficiency had led to 
the focus on structural adaptation because there was an assumption that such projects 
provided better value-for-money, although this assumption was questioned by other studies 
(Haque, 2013).  The World Bank appears to have mobilised co-finance, although this has also 
led to concerns regarding additionality (see section on additionality below).  Overall the 
evidence on cost-effectiveness is balanced, and it appears insufficient information was 
available to make a comprehensive analysis on progress on cost-efficiency at this stage. 
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9.3.3. Monitoring Results/Effectiveness 
Project results indicators were not yet available and one donor official stated in 2012 “for a 
solid 22 months I have been asking for a project-ised results matrix... no-one holds the vision, 
it is partly the donors fault”.  They also stated there was no annual workplan. When asked 
about the reasons for this, this respondent said this was due to capacity issues as the MoEF 
has not got the “staffing, time or space” or the “pressure to have results on-the-ground”.  
However, another respondent from the same organisation stated there was “for each project, a 
clear results framework”.  Hence there was contradictory information.  Furthermore, while 
the donor official implied the World Bank were preparing the results framework, another 
respondent from the ADB argued in 2012 that “DFID is preparing” the results framework and 
they hoped there would be a results framework “by this year”.  Interviews with the World 
Bank in April 2013 triangulated the information that a monitoring and results framework was 
not available yet and there had been delays as it was “slightly lagging behind” but it was 
argued this should be “finalised by mid-June [2013]”.   The World Bank stated the 
communication strategy was in draft and would be available after the results framework, and 
the strategic workplan would also be available after the results framework. 
One media representative argued capacity for monitoring results was limited, stating: 
“They try to say they have monitoring but they have two guys – and no visible process, 
manpower or infrastructure.  They should build the monitoring process on universities and 
build a knowledge bank to work on these issues. They should give money to universities – 
connect universities, government agencies, local government and community people… it 
would make the whole process transparent. Instead the 'research' part of the BCCRF will be 
a consultancy business – they will rent it to these people and ‘cut and paste’.” 
The lack of manpower for monitoring within government was triangulated by another NGO 
expert who argued there were only “3-4 people” monitoring the distribution of $300m in the 
Climate Change Unit (CCU).  According to the same respondent, monitoring was not the full-
time job of these staff and they needed someone with an “exclusive monitoring purpose” 
[sic]. However, at ground-level, provision for monitoring programmes and projects appeared 
to be in place.  One World Bank official described how the construction of cyclone shelters 
was monitored by various stakeholders: including the LGED, World Bank, Project 
Coordination Monitoring Unit (PCMU), as well as the School Management Committee who 
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were also “given authority to monitor” and would report any problems to the contractor or 
LGED.   
The CCCP appeared to have considered robust monitoring processes. According to PKSF this 
would be done by various bodies: NGOs, the PKSF management unit, a central unit of PKSF 
and the World Bank. They stated “each project will be visited physically by the project staff 
of PKSF”. However, it was noted PKSF did not have experience managing NGO projects or 
experience in adaptation, but did have pre-existing monitoring processes (including an online 
system) used for their micro-finance activities.  Evidence regarding progress on effectiveness 
was balanced, with more evidence of capacity for monitoring effectiveness under the CCCP 
than under BCCRF. 
9.3.4. Urgency and Timeliness 
One senior government official expressed frustration at the bureaucratic processes of the 
World Bank which they argued created delays in disbursement.  The official argued 
“government have speeded the processes for urgent and immediate needs and requested the 
World Bank to do so”, adding that “the World Bank needs to evaluate its own systems to 
address immediate need”.  As an example, the official argued that “you don’t need to develop 
a guidance manual before building a [cyclone] shelter”.   These concerns were repeated by a 
respondent from a multilateral organisation, who argued the World Bank’s “bureaucratic 
system for approval of projects is a major challenge” in terms of causing delays in 
implementation.  These concerns reveal there seems to be a tension or trade-off between due 
diligence (robustness and oversight) and rapid implementation, as was hypothesised in the 
literature review. The same trade-off was noted by a donor respondent who argued that the 
World Bank is “very robust but takes time”. 
Moreover, the same respondent argued the frequent transfer of civil service staff was 
“hampering the project implementation works and quality of project works” because it “takes 
time for training them” [sic].  The links to the discussion on the capacity of the Ministry staff 
(9.3.9). In terms of overcoming these challenges, the respondent noted there are “12 climate 
change cells in relevant ministries and CCU unit in MoEF… it would be better to transfer 
between those”. Overall, it was suggested by various respondents that civil service reform 
could improve implementation capacity and timely disbursement. 
Cyclone shelters were identified as an urgent and immediate need, suggesting this is why the 
ECRRP project was prioritised. The government official described how they had streamlined 
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the approval process for rapid implementation by bypassing the Planning Commission. 
However, the donor respondent argued this was a “bone of contention” and the new system 
had yet to be tried. In summary, there was some progress in attending to urgent adaptation 
needs in a timely manner. 
9.3.5. Flexibility and Robustness 
Arguably, construction of cyclone shelters under the BCCRF can be considered a ‘no regrets’ 
adaptation as they were needed even without the projected impacts of climate change.   
However it is unclear to what extent these shelters could withstand the most extreme SLR 
scenarios (see section 9.4.2 below). One NGO expert argued they “didn’t think” the 
adaptation options had been “rigorously tested against different climate scenarios”. 
Moreover, some respondents expressed concerns that embankments can make communities’ 
more vulnerable in the event of extreme storm surges as they provide a false sense of 
security.  
When asked which climate models they were currently using for planning, the LGED official 
was not specific on this point but said the scenarios were “20 years ahead” assuming 200mm 
of extra sea level rise. Thus, presumably the infrastructure would have to be adapted later.  
Overall, there was balanced evidence about the extent to which flexibility and robustness 
were considered in adaptation finance in Bangladesh. 
9.3.6. Adaptation/mitigation coherence 
A donor official commented that governments’ position was that 80% should go to 
adaptation, and they agreed, because Bangladesh is a “victim of climate change”.  Several 
respondents felt adaptation was more important for Bangladesh.  It emerged there were some 
projects tackling both adaptation and mitigation together, including a coastal afforestation 
project, and a solar irrigation project awaiting approval from the Governing Council.  
Moreover, it was noted that the government allocated significant sums to mitigation under the 
BCCTF.  Under CCCP, PKSF reported they were only accepting adaptation projects, but they 
would accept projects with mitigation co-benefits.  Overall, there was some evidence that 
synergies between adaptation and mitigation had been considered. 
In terms of trade-offs between adaptation and mitigation, a respondent from a multilateral 
agency reported that in Bangladesh they were not talking about mitigation but instead about 
“green growth” as there was a need for alternatives to fossil-fuel generation.    However, an 
example of a cross-border contradiction between adaptation and mitigation emerged, as one 
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interviewee highlighted that construction of hydroelectricity dams in India had a negative 
impact on adaptive capacity in Bangladesh. 
9.3.7. Gender equity 
Gender and the specific vulnerability of women were raised several times in the national-
level key informant interviews. For example, under the government’s “food-for-work” 
programme launched by the WFP, women were targeted as key beneficiaries of the project 
for the extreme poor.  
One NGO respondent explained: 
“Women farmers have important lack of rights in the food chain. The government only counts 
‘farmers’ as those who are doing the planting but this is only one small part of the whole 
food chain. Women are excluded from the same subsidies and agricultural extension services 
because they often look after the seeds, for example or do harvesting.  They do not have the 
same rights. You need the right seeds to get the best crop. Equal rights for women farmers 
would promote adaptive capacity.” 
In other interviews, there was only a passing reference to the vulnerability of women. For 
example, one government engineer stated that in his project “women were handled properly”. 
One NGO expert argued that the Bangladeshi government has mainstreamed and considered 
gender in government but “I am not sure about climate change specifically”.  Overall, there 
was little evidence that gender had been considered. 
9.3.8. Practicality and feasibility 
Under the BCCRF, management by the World Bank meant there were rigorous standards 
regarding the technical and financial capacity of applicants to handle finance and implement 
programmes. Similar standards were in place under the CCCP. However, under the BCCTF 
there was a concern by one NGO that a ‘floating garden’ programme had been approved 
without sufficient research to evaluate long-term sustainability or feasibility.  Thus, progress 
against this issue can be classed as balanced with some measurable progress. 
9.3.9. Capacity issues 
The issue of monitoring results links to the topic of government and management capacity. 
There were suggestions from various donor respondents that the Ministry of Environment and 
Forests (MoEF) lacked capacity and staff.   Another donor representative in 2012 explained 
the bank account for the BCCRF has not yet been set up.  A donor respondent argued that 
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“readiness criteria” should not mean that a particular project would never get funding, but it 
may need capacity-building first. They also felt the MoEF was “thin on the ground with 
people” and had a “problem with retaining good staff” and suggested this may be a problem 
requiring civil service reform, not just an issue for climate change. This issue was raised in 
another interview with a multilateral organisation, who stated there was a “loss of 
institutional memory of technical staff” due to frequent staff transfers. The donor interviewee 
argued the World Bank was building the capacity of government and would then hand over 
responsibility.  This information was triangulated in an interview with ADB. 
The capacity of the World Bank was also highlighted by some respondents.   On reflection, 
World Bank staff also seemed overburdened and lacking in staff capacity. It was noted by 
one interviewee from the World Bank that staff working on the BCCRF were mostly “not full 
time”.   
Government capacity was linked to the issue of national ownership and direct access to 
funding. In particular, one donor argued they “can’t give direct because [Bangladesh] scores 
badly in fiduciary management”.  Hence, this appears to confirm the suggestion from the 
literature than corruption issues were linked to the resistance of donors to direct access 
mechanisms, and explains again why the World Bank was given an interim role in the 
BCCRF. 
Capacity issues at the MoEF were also raised in interviews with the World Bank, including 
the difficulty of getting enough people or the right people, and “also they are not typically a 
spending Ministry – they are a regulatory one – so due diligence is quite new”. On the issue 
of building up the government’s own capacity, the work by GIZ on this was mentioned, and 
the World Bank stated they were “on track to handover to government” perhaps by 2017. 
Capacity issues were also raised in an interview with a government official, who said they 
“need people with capacity on fiduciary management in the secretariat… from existing 
systems it is difficult to find people who know about fiduciary management of World Bank 
and to train them”.  The government respondent admitted the MoEF “is very overburdened… 
with forests and pollution” and suggested the need for a dedicated independent Commission 
or Ministry of Climate Change. However, the respondent added “we have the right people but 
they are not being used for the right cause – capacity is not real problem”.  
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Capacity of the government staff was raised as an issue by a media respondent, who said: 
“CCU is a technical body to manage the climate finance – but they don’t have any technical 
person – all are bureaucrats” [sic].  The media representative also criticised politicians and 
other climate experts for exercising a kind of climate ‘tourism’, saying: “climate change 
experts – travel to all the countries – it is part of tourism – all climate experts are like that”.  
This comment implied that by undertaking extensive international travel, this was both 
hypocritical and counter-productive (in terms of emissions from travel) but also self-serving. 
This concern was reiterated by another respondent from a multilateral organisation, who 
argued that the MoEF had a limited number of staff who were often “busy for foreign 
conferences”. 
The capacity of the PKSF to manage the CCCP was also put in doubt by several respondents. 
One media representative argued the PKSF gave the community grant to “some NGOs that 
don’t have capacity for this kind of project”.  This assertion was contradicted by a 
government official who said “the PKSF has the best fiduciary management in the country”. 
9.3.10. Maladaptation risks  
One World Bank respondent argued uncertainty and selection of ‘no regrets’ options was not 
an issue, because “people can see the needs” whether that was for cyclone shelters, saline-
tolerant varieties or drainage.  The donor respondent also argued the BCCRF was focusing on 
“no regrets” options first like cyclone shelters. However when the issue of ‘no regrets’ 
measures was raised with another World Bank respondent, they did not understand the 
question. 
A potential ‘maladaptive’ social impact of the embankment construction emerged during the 
research, in terms of resettlement of affected communities. Analysis of documents showed 
some people would be resettled during construction of embankments. A chance informal 
anonymous conversation with an informant from Netherlands (working for a Dutch 
construction firm) validated these concerns. The informant stated they had been working as a 
“de facto anthropologist” and were “responsible for resettlement” under an ADB project. On 
the issue of resettlement of affected persons, they provided the following insight: 
“Those who are directly affected by the embankment get compensation – i.e. those behind the 
embankment.  But the landless here (in front of the embankment) do not get any 
compensation as the ADB won’t pay”. 
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Therefore there was the potential for negative social impacts on vulnerable landless 
households in some places, with implications for equity. Furthermore, it emerged this 
informant, a recent engineering graduate, had no previous experience in work of this type. 
‘Floating gardens’ emerged as a case study for possible maladaptation (see IPCC, 2014).  It 
was promoted by government under their Trust Fund (BCCTF) as a technology to overcome 
land constraints and cope with flooding. However, an NGO respondent explained the main 
material for building floating gardens, water hyacinth, was dependent on the timing of 
rainfall. They explained “nobody has done research on floating gardens under climate 
variability… it is not a good option for everyone where there is waterlogging, because it will 
not survive wave action”.  Furthermore, water hyacinth absorbs heavy metals and cannot 
survive in salinity above 7 parts per thousands (ppt).  Although the NGO respondent had 
advocated for a research component under the BCCTF, he argued it was difficult to advocate 
for this because “I’m from a different sector” and the project had already started, so “they 
might not be able to go out of that structure”.  Institutional momentum or ‘path dependency’ 
(see Hovi et al., 2003) may therefore pose a risk for maladaptation.  Overall, there was little 
evidence maladaptation had been considered. 
9.3.11. Transformation/Scaling-up 
There was little information about whether the climate funds required applicants to consider 
scaling-up beyond the scope of the project or programme itself.  One government respondent 
argued upscaling was their “main priority” but they did not have a “master plan”. One donor 
respondent argued it was too soon to look at scaling-up as they had not received all 
applications (under the CCCP).  One NGO respondent argued it is crucial to do an evaluation 
before scaling-up a particular technology, but the BCCTF had not fully recognised this. 
In terms of private sector engagement, the issue of loans provoked controversy. The media 
respondent argued; “loan is another crime” [sic]… “from Copenhagen Accord, it was said the 
finance should be new and additional”. They argued politicians took the loans to “show for 
political achievements… to show in election to demonstrate development”.  Therefore, they 
implied decision-makers were thinking short-term rather than considering the long-term 
implications of debt for Bangladesh. They also argued; “climate change is going to be a loan 
business because the balance of payments of Bangladesh is very good”. 
The issue of loans appeared to be connected to both the adequacy of finance, as well as 
concerns regarding additionality (see 9.3.14).   World Bank staff admitted the issue of loans 
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was problematic because of the “belief we didn’t cause it [climate change] so shouldn’t have 
to pay for it” – but they pointed to the reality that Bangladesh would not get all the grants 
they need.  The loans were reported to have 0.7% interest with 40 years return, and a 10-year 
grace period.   One NGO representative felt that loans are not suitable for adaptation because 
they may not generate an income. Under the recent Local Government Support Programme, 
for example, the NGO interviewee noted local governments had been taking a World Bank 
loan and distributing it as a grant.  A donor official also argued the Bangladeshi government 
had lobbied for the loans (i.e. under PPCR) since they were concessional loans.  Thus whilst 
loans appeared to have had a role in scaling-up adaptation finance, their use was tinged with 
controversy relating to equity (see additionality section below). In summary, there was little 
evidence scaling-up had been taken into consideration. 
9.3.12. Ownership and Subsidiarity 
It was argued by some respondents that the World Bank’s role undermined national 
ownership of climate finance to some extent.  One NGO expert argued while the World Bank 
claims they are only a trustee of the BCCRF, in fact they have a larger role “in the name of 
technical assistance”. Similarly, this respondent argued there were internal plans to extend the 
role of the World Bank until 2018, “driven by the donor side”. The respondent implied 
government could not afford to challenge the World Bank.  Moreover, they stated that there 
were “allegations that people in government pushed for the World Bank [role] for their own 
interests”. 
One high-level government representative openly criticised the World Bank for being the 
most “highly bureaucratic organisation on earth”. The respondent stated that within 
government, the Ministry of Planning was now being bypassed, with new modalities for a 
quick approval process within 3 months. The official said the World Bank should not be 
blamed because “this is the system they have” and they were having to find or train people 
with “capacity on fiduciary management in the secretariat” [in government].  The 
government official confirmed the prior finding that management of the BCCRF will be 
transferred from the World Bank to government after institutional capacity has been 
development.   
A report by the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) argued whilst “the World 
Bank needs to be held more closely to account for its performance” it was preferable to 
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directing flows to Government itself. The report stated; “no UK finance is given directly to 
the Government of Bangladesh. We think this caution is appropriate” (ICAI, 2011:18).  
One government official argued the World Bank was preferable to other organisations. In 
particular, the GEF was “even more bureaucratic than the World Bank” and “doesn’t have an 
independent office in other countries”.  Furthermore it was argued the World Bank also has 
“more technical capacity” than ADB. 
In relation to ownership by local government, a multilateral donor reiterated the importance 
of local government as they are “handling vulnerable people” and it is important to build their 
capacity through “seminars, workshops, training– on-going work”. Another interview with 
the CDMP revealed that there are now efforts to downscale climate impact scenarios to sub-
district or union level and translate these into local languages. 
It appears local government engineers had a pivotal role in terms of targeting of 
infrastructural interventions. For instance, in one interview it emerged the main point of 
contact with local government under the Coastal Climate Resilient Infrastructure Project was 
with the LGED engineer at Upazila-level who was responsible for project allocation: 
“Information given by Upazila engineer – he knows vulnerable places of the area – based on 
the vulnerability he submits the knowledge to us and he sends consultant and then we get the 
number of sub-projects where we do adaptation works.” 
In the shelters programme under the ECRRP it was also clear the sustainability of the shelters 
was enhanced by the fact they had a multi-purpose function as schools (8.3), as well as 
through collaboration with local government and communities. According to the World 
Bank, maintenance of the cyclone shelters would be managed by School Management 
Committees.  
By analysing project documents, it was observed that few local government projects were 
implemented under either climate fund. However, when asked about the role of local 
government, one government official argued local government can apply to either fund, as 
there is no bar to local government, and there are already a few local government projects “in 
Chittagong, etc…”  This comment was contradicted by a donor official, who argued the 
BCCRF has “not much window” [sic] for local government but there are more opportunities 
under the CDMP.  This assertion was again contradicted by a different donor official who 
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argued the CDMP project was “using NGOs to do it” and questioned the capacity of local 
government.   
The same issue of weak capacity of local government and NGOs taking the place of local 
government functions had emerged during the literature review, and the local-scale analysis.  
One respondent linked the issue of local government capacity to long-term project 
sustainability, saying: “Local government bodies don’t have legal right to generate income at 
local-level – income goes straight back to the Treasury so there is little incentive to do the 
job properly. The way government is structured in Bangladesh makes things difficult”. 
Thus, at both national and sub-national levels, ownership and devolution of powers to local 
levels was undermined by concerns regarding capacity. Overall, there appeared to have been 
little progress in implementing principles relating to ownership. 
9.3.13. Mainstreaming and Alignment 
Efforts to mainstream adaptation into existing development programmes and projects were 
evident from the interviews with various respondents.  However, it was not clear to what 
extent projects and programmes were integrating new climate risks or using climate change 
to fulfil pre-existing development needs (known as the ‘development deficit’ in the 
literature).  For instance, in the Enhancing Resilience project, implemented by the WFP in 
collaboration with the Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) existing 
vulnerability to disaster risk was the focus, with a food-for-work programme for poor 
women. However, another government engineer argued addressing climate change was “not 
the job of the LGED”. 
One respondent noted there had been efforts to mainstream climate change cells in each 
Ministry under the CDMP Phase-I, but that once the project finished these have not all been 
sustained. Hence the sustainability of climate mainstreaming efforts was questioned. 
According to one government official, there were cost and awareness barriers to 
mainstreaming climate change into government planning. Under the LGED, it was reported 
the “cost goes up so many times they’re reluctant to incorporate climate change into the 
design”. Cost-efficiency appeared to be a crucial concern. Another barrier to mainstreaming 
was reportedly the availability of experts, as well as knowledge barriers and uncertainty. In 
the words of one government official: 
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“You’ll be drowned under the ocean but stuck for a particular detail if not enough 
knowledge” [sic] “…All knowledge is hypothetical knowledge and not tested. Sea level will 
rise 200mm but may or may not increase. People are reluctant to invest money to protect 
those adaptive works if it’s not sure if it’s required or not required.”  
Hence, uncertainty was recognised as a barrier to mainstreaming climate change into 
government planning. Refer also to 9.4.2. Overall the evidence was balanced, with nascent 
evidence of mainstreaming climate change in some government projects.  
9.3.14. Additionality and loans for adaptation 
In terms of additionality to existing development projects (see 7.3.1), a media stakeholder 
argued the adaptation funds were “old wine in new bottles”.  It was argued by this respondent 
that projects like the coastal embankment (polder) and cyclone shelter project (the ECRRP) 
had been merged with climate finance, so they had “repackaged the money”.  This concern 
was also cited by one donor official, who argued the World Bank were “topping up” their 
already approved projects, but this led to additionality questions because “to what extent is it 
just topping up what it is doing already”. However, the decision to channel climate change 
finance to a pre-existing project was defended by a World Bank official who argued; 
“supervision and monitoring were already in place” so it was “prudent to expedite it further”.  
This suggests the project was given support based on issues of practicality. Furthermore there 
were synergies with other World Bank programmes, as teachers in the multi-purpose 
cyclone-shelters-cum-schools were “provided by another World-Bank funded project”. 
On the issue of additionality to development, it was noted it is often difficult in practice to 
differentiate adaptation from development activities. The respondent from PKSF argued that 
it is “sometimes difficult to separate development and adaptation” but the project selected the 
“most vulnerable areas – so it should be adaptation”. It appeared ministries were viewing the 
climate funds as a source of finance for their pre-existing development projects. One donor 
official noted: 
 “Ministries that haven’t got projects approved from development fund are now lobbying for 
funding from the climate fund. Instead they should be funding the climate deficit from the 
climate fund.” 
It appeared the lack of transparency made it difficult to track additionality. One civil society 
expert in this field suggested the problem was that disaggregated amounts were not shown.  
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On the balance between loans and grants, one government official revealed that under the 
PPCR project for cyclone shelters and embankment-building, out of the $150m, only $19.8m 
was as a grant and the rest was from a soft (concessional) loan. In other words, 86.8% was a 
loan. It terms of additionality of finance flows, several countries, including the UK, counted 
their Fast Start Finance as part of their ODA commitment.  There was little evidence that 
additionality to either development finance or development programmes had been 
considered. 
9.3.15. Harmonisation/Coordination  
An NGO representative criticised the lack of coordination between the BCCTF and BCCRF; 
saying “the left hand does not know what the right hand is doing”. In the interview with a 
donor it emerged the intention was for the government fund (BCCTF) to do smaller projects 
and the Donor Fund (BCCRF) to cover larger infrastructure projects, mainly because the 
World Bank is managing it and they find it easier to do larger infrastructure projects. This 
was verified in an interview with the World Bank, in which the respondent stated their 
processes were “quite intensive” so it was only worth getting involved if the projects are of a 
substantial size.  This also suggests that any bias towards structural projects (see 9.4.1) was 
linked to the role of the World Bank.   
A donor respondent argued they were hoping the World Bank would facilitate dialogue on 
coordination, but they have not done that. According to one donor, the capacity within the 
Ministry of Environment (MoEF) is low as it is a “junior ministry” and there is an “ad hoc” 
approach with “no formal coordination” with the PPCR. Hence, lack of coordination links to 
the issue of capacity.  Delays were also linked to the lack of coordination.  One donor 
expressed frustration that it took two years to get a list of projects on the government website, 
and staffing and implementation questions have yet to be answered. Refer to Figure 9.3 for a 
diagrammatical representation of these links.  
One government official argued there was an indirect means of coordination between the 
BCCTF and BCCRF because there was a lot of similarity in the members of the committee 
and “6 members are the same”.  It therefore appeared the coordination between the two funds 
was indirect rather than explicit.  Although both funds aim to implement the BCCSAP, one 
donor noted that there is no forum to discuss implementation of the plan, and this may be a 
“missing link”. As well as coordination between the two funds, it appeared there was little 
coordination between these two funds and the PPCR.  One donor respondent stated the 
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coordination was ‘ad hoc’ and “as and when it comes up” for example, under the “PPCR we 
said are doing embankments – so BCCRF didn’t do that”. 
Coordination between donors emerged as another challenge. One multilateral organisation 
argued coordination is a “bit tricky” but that there was a Local Consultative Group on 
environment and climate change, chaired by DFID, to map and coordinate who is doing what. 
This was the only time the group was mentioned.  In addition, coordination between 
ministries emerged as another challenge.  Another interviewee from the UNDP noted that 
coordination in terms of multi-ministerial implementation was hampered by the “territorial” 
and “silo” mentality in ministries and sectors.  
However, the CDMP and the CPP offer positive examples of coordination between 
stakeholders. Interviewees described the main challenge as “coordination of the response” 
between the various stakeholder groups (NGOs, civil society, and community people).  A 
World Bank official also argued the cyclone shelter construction project (ECRRP) was 
effectively coordinated at ground-level by a PCMU under which all agencies responsible for 
implementation were involved. 
Overall, there was little evidence from the interviews that coordination with other initiatives 
was ensured. However, respondents were hopeful of future improvement. One representative 
from a UK-based think-tank felt the Planning Commission had recently got more involved in 
coordination “they have been more active on that… they’ve taken the lead more 
energetically”. 
9.3.16. Adequacy and predictability  
One prominent NGO respondent complained that donors often do not provide the money they 
have pledged.  This issue of the gap between pledges and disbursement relates to both 
international and national climate finance.  However, one donor official suggested the gap 
between pledges and disbursement was also a question of absorptive capacity, arguing 
Bangladesh has previously been given grants that it has not spent.  One expert from a UK-
based think-tank argued the adequacy of finance was linked to corruption concerns, claiming 
there was a “question of how much money donors will hand over with the corruption”, and 
there was a “political crisis there – there is lots of problems”.  In the Bangladesh Chapter 
(5.5) the data from World Bank had estimated the current losses from climate change as up to 
$1Bn per year while the BCCRF has received $188m from multilateral donors. Furthermore, 
248 
 
this may not be additional to existing development finance (see 9.3). Overall, there is limited 
evidence that current climate finance flows are adequate. 
9.3.17. Transparency and stakeholder engagement  
In the BCCRF, the World Bank respondent confirmed there are civil society representatives 
on the Governing Council, which meets once a year. A World Bank respondent argued there 
is a “lot of community involvement” under the NGO window (CCCP) but relatively less at 
government-level. It also emerged that there was no formal forum where they would meet 
civil society regularly. 
Some stakeholders suggested World Bank modalities were non-transparent. One NGO argued 
there were “hidden costs” of World Bank management. However, the World Bank respondent 
felt transparency was part of the reason the World Bank was selected to manage the BCCRF, 
with one respondent saying “that’s our job, for transparency and fiduciary management”.  
This raises the question of to whom transparency is available. 
One NGO respondent was also concerned there are no clear criteria for prioritisation of 
climate finance in Bangladesh, and the three thematic areas of infrastructure, water and 
rehabilitation were all “highly vulnerable to corruption”.  The same respondent linked lack of 
transparency to the lack of specific prioritisation criteria or monitoring processes under the 
government’s trust fund. The CCU was described by various stakeholders as under-staffed 
and lacking capacity for ground-level monitoring.  The government official argued 
transparency was not a problem for the BCCRF, but it was for the BCCTF due to “political 
influence” (as discussed in section 9.3.1). 
Two respondents stated they had used the Right to Information Act (2009) to request 
information from Government on climate finance. These respondents both independently 
stated that the World Bank is not legally obliged to disclose information under Bangladesh’s 
Right to Information Act 2009, but they do have their own disclosure policy.  A media 
stakeholder argued both the World Bank and Government were non-transparent and “they 
play with us” when asked to provide documents, saying “go to the Ministry, go to PKSF, go 
to the CCU”.  Hence, both sides blamed each other for non-disclosure of documentation.   
This was corroborated by another stakeholder, who said the World Bank was “claiming that 
without government consent they cannot release documents” but that there “might be a 
sensitive part of government that is not allowing the World Bank to release the information”.  
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There was no consensus amongst stakeholders about which organisation was responsible for 
non-disclosure of documents. 
One respondent working for a WFP project discussed the issue of corruption. In his view 
“officials are corrupt but not as corrupt as NGOs”, at which point, he signalled out the 
window to the offices of BRAC.  He argued his project had been assessed by WFP and 
leakage had been found to be “only 4%... even the cash-for-work programme you won’t find 
corruption more than 4%”.  Direct transfers were used to ensure money goes straight to 
beneficiary accounts. He described how in one rural road project, a junior employee had been 
caught taking money, but it was detected, and now “70% of the money has been recovered”. 
In his project, he stated there had been no corruption reported.  Each beneficiary has a 
“national ID” card and cash grants for beneficiaries were directed to the “bank or the postal 
cash card… so we hope there’s no leakage”. This respondent openly discussed the transfer 
mechanism in depth, provided documents, and did not avoid any questions.  Overall, the 
evidence on transparency appears to be balanced, with some progress on transparency. 
While it emerged from one interview that Transparency International had been drafting a 
report about climate finance in Bangladesh, one NGO expressed concerns that the report is an 
“excuse to claim Bangladesh is corrupt as a tactic so that they retain control.”  Therefore, 
there were concerns that placing emphasis on lack of transparency could undermine national 
ownership.  Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) expressed concerns about the 
government’s own climate fund (BCCTF), with less attention on the multi-donor fund. The 
government recently announced cuts to the BCCTF (see Trust, 2014) with critics citing this 
criticism as a contributory factor in this decision. Thus, criticism from TIB might have 
inadvertently led to reduced funding. 
The media representative argued “both local and global is not transparent”.  This comment 
engages with an understanding of the multi-scalar global to local nature of climate adaptation 
finance flows (see Chapter 7). 
9.3.18. Sustainability  
Some adaptation funds and programmes in Bangladesh appeared to have considered long-
term sustainability.  In the CDMP and the early-warning system (CPP), sustainability of these 
programmes was integral, with ongoing training of volunteers to distribute the early warning 
signal.  However, challenges for sustainability were highlighted during interviews, for 
example, many women left home when they marry, which led to renewed need to train 
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volunteers in an on-going process. Further challenges related to the practical problems of 
updating the early warning system and changing the signals (including with mobile phone 
technology), which required communication and awareness-raising about the changes to 
ensure lives continued to be saved.  
According to one NGO stakeholder, finance under the BCCTF was being allocated on “first 
come first served” basis, not on a geographical or need basis, and “without proper EIA” 
(Environmental Impact Assessment).  This respondent argued there was “politicisation of the 
project selection process”. The respondent gave an example of one cross-dam project under 
the BCCTF (government fund) which included plans to cut down 40,000 trees without proper 
consultation.   
Under the CCCP, each project intended to have a local government focal point. However, the 
PKSF respondent noted that since beneficiaries were not required to contribute financially, 
projects may be “difficult to sustain”. The respondent stated they were still considering 
“sustainability framework” guidelines, such as establishing a “community bank account” 
with community people.  Sustainability, long-term impact and community involvement were 
recognised as key challenges. However, while requiring in-kind contributions from 
communities could enhance project sustainability, such initiatives could come under criticism 
for placing a burden on communities. Thus, strengthening sustainability through leveraging 
community investment must be balanced with equitability. 
Furthermore, since some of the initiatives under the BCCRF (embankments and cyclones 
shelters) were costly public goods, it would be difficult to justify mobilisation of private 
contributions. Thus, sustainability and maintenance of those initiatives are dependent on 
ongoing multilateral public finance. Overall, the interview data indicated that sustainability 
remained integral to adaptation financing in Bangladesh and the evidence points to 
measurable progress against this issue within the indicative framework (see 10.7). 
9.3.19. Barriers and challenges 
Under the ECRRP, the World Bank respondent argued the main challenges for cyclone 
shelter construction were practical barriers; the remoteness of vulnerable areas, problems 
transporting construction materials like stone aggregates, and the need to upgrade roads. The 
World Bank also highlighted the challenge of getting good contractors. 
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One political barrier highlighted was that the Bangladesh Meteorological Department (BMD) 
and Bangladesh Space Research and Remote Sensing Organisation (SPARSSO), responsible 
for monitoring agro-climatic conditions, come under the Ministry of Defence. Thus the 
World Bank could not fund meteorological services as there were rules against funding the 
Ministry of Defence. The BMD would only be able to apply for funds if it partnered with 
another department like the Ministry of Agriculture.  
An additional political barrier mentioned by several respondents was the political context, 
with regular ‘hartals’ (strikes) occuring every few days.  Respondents from multilateral 
development agencies reflected that it did not always affect their work, but it did affect travel 
and work with Government. 
9.4. Emerging Issues  
9.4.1. Structural Bias 
A media respondent argued there was overt focus on construction-based projects because “the 
whole motive of development is construction-based – we need construction, but not the 
whole of development is based on construction”.  This comment suggests other types of 
development (and adaptation) project were needed.  They argued; “the main development 
process doesn’t acknowledge the people side… community-based adaptation is trying to do 
that”.  In fact, one NGO respondent strongly opposed embankment construction, saying, “in 
my opinion all the embankments should be knocked down to be honest”. 
However, the government official argued most people prefer ‘hard’ or structural adaptation, 
stating; “most development partners want software or policy-level changes e.g. Action 
Plans…” but “for people, they need hardware or infrastructure”.  They argued; “there is 
enough policy…if you want to do something, do it on the ground”. 
Some respondents suggested there was focus on structural ‘hard’ adaptation technologies 
because the implementing organisations have more experience in that realm.  One academic  
argued that ADB was focusing on structural adaptation “because of corruption and 
transparency”… and they “have a natural bias to structural bias” [sic]… “because they’re 
engineers they think they can solve it with that one” [sic].  
Moreover, the ‘structural’ bias was linked to the issue of maladaptation. One academic 
argued that there is “more uncertainty for engineering approaches” and cited a recently-
completed study on land market responses, which found that after structural flood defences 
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were built; “the land value changes – so the poor people get pushed out”.  They added this 
occurred because most low-income settlers do not own their land. The respondent suggested; 
a “more holistic approach would avoid that sort of thing happening... be aware of all the 
impacts”… “a managerial approach would be less costly but would be more effort”.  This 
directly contrasts with one donor respondents’ view that the World Bank provides greater 
value-for-money by leaving out “soft policy” changes.   
The academic respondent also argued structural flood defence works “will benefit the poorest 
from employment and other issues but some have to move out from major locations and 
marginal areas”.  This contradicts the view of the engineer responsible for the project, who 
argued “poor areas will completely benefit”. 
9.4.2. Uncertainty 
One government official argued “climate change is a big term but knowledge is very limited 
about that and everything is based on predictions, but whether it’ll really happen is not sure”. 
For instance, the official noted climate models were predicting 75-79cm of SLR by end of the 
century.  They also stated that a storm during high tide might be 60cm higher, causing an 
even higher death toll.  However, another colleague argued they were working on the basis of 
200mm (20cm) of additional sea level rise. The official said “sea level will rise 200mm… but 
may or may not increase”  As noted previously, uncertainty seemed to be a barrier to 
robustness and mainstreaming climate change into planning, and a barrier to funding 
additional investment. 
9.4.3. Cross-border and international water management  
One donor respondent argued India’s barrages were responsible for some of the issues 
relating to water scarcity and flooding, so in this sense there was a “lack of clarity of what 
climate change means”.  They argued “90% of water flows across the border”.  Another civil 
society respondent also commented that “upstream the dams being built are affecting 
Bangladesh negatively”. This confirms the literature review finding that many of the impacts 
classed as ‘climate change’ impacts were exacerbated by cross-border water management 
issues. Improved collaboration under regional initiatives such as the South Asia Water 
Initiative (SAWI) is suggested as a possible solution. 
9.4.4. Microinsurance 
The interview with the Institute of Microfinance (IoM) revealed they are piloting and 
designing micro-insurance products, incorporating research on household shocks (crop, 
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livestock shocks and mortality) as well as manmade and natural disasters. Most microfinance 
companies have credit insurance, but these are geared to protecting the insurer only. The IoM 
are trying to design micro-insurance for the urban and rural poor, and cited good examples 
including health insurance in a Dhaka hospital as well as livestock insurance (with 
inoculation) in partnership with PKSF. However, these mechanisms target extreme events 
rather than slow-onset climate changes. 
9.4.5. Land rights 
Land rights emerged as a key issue from various interviews as a barrier to adaptation. One 
respondent argued this was an “enormous nightmare” and there was a “backlog of cases in 
the legal system”.  The issue was exacerbated by river erosion, since land disappears in the 
delta.  The elite capture of common property resources – like “community ponds” and “khas” 
land were cited by one respondent as on-going challenges with a long history that hinder 
adaptation to climate change. It was suggested these types of political economy issues were 
important, but under-studied.  Land rights had also emerged as an issue during the analysis of 
national-level survey data (9.2) as well as in the local-scale analysis (Chapter 8). 
9.5. Conclusions 
In terms of the indicative framework for effective finance (Chapter 7), many of these 
identified issues appeared to be relevant and linked closely to the issues emerging from the 
national-level informant interviews. Ownership, coordination timeliness, additionality, 
mainstreaming and transparency were explored further during the interviews, while 
uncertainty, cross-border issues and land rights emerged during the interviews.  Refer to 10.7 
for a summary. It is also notable that many of the outcomes, for instance on adequacy or 
ownership, were not determined by Bangladesh itself but by donors. 
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Figure 9.3  Linkages between various issues identified in key informant interviews 
The diagram above shows linkages between various issues identified during key informant 
interviews, and in particular, demonstrates that various perceived issues were linked by key 
informants to the role of the World Bank, which in turn was driven by perceived low capacity 
in government. This diagram resonates with the need for effective climate finance to take into 
account the various criteria considered in the framework for analysis (Chapter 7). Policy 
recommendations could include civil service reform to ensure the government can retain 
quality staff. 
In terms of the research question on the progress on effectively financing adaptation, the 
interviews confirmed gaps between the multi-donor BCCRF fund (for large projects) and the 
government’s national BCCTF fund (for smaller projects).   There was evidence allocation 
decisions were guided by political influence, rather than using objective vulnerability metrics. 
Furthermore, monitoring and oversight were difficult due to capacity constraints in 
government, donor agencies and the World Bank (including staff and budgetary limitations). 
Since the interviews took place, recent developments included an announcement from 
Government that funding to the BCCTF will be cut, partially due to criticism by 
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Transparency International (see Trust, 2014). However if the BCCTF is weakened there are 
implications for capacity-building and national ownership of climate finance, especially 
given that the GCF may have used the BCCTF as a conduit.  This might demonstrate that an 
emphasis by NGOs on critiquing early government-led adaptation efforts could undermine 
national ownership in the long-term. 
The national-level survey data highlighted land rights as a major concern for the most 
vulnerable; an issue reiterated in the interviews as well. In the household dataset, it was found 
that landless agricultural labourers are a particularly vulnerable group, and that agricultural 
diversification has a positive strategy for enhancing adaptive capacity. The data also showed 
women have a vital role in agriculture. However, issues of land rights and women’s rights in 
agriculture did not appear to have been adequately considered within national adaptation 
planning.  Social safety net programmes like existing WFP-supported ‘food-for-work’ 
programmes may offer potential to increase adaptive capacity in Bangladesh.  
9.6. Multi-Scalar Analysis: Local-National Linkages 
This section analyses the various linkages between the local-scale (Chapter 8) and national-
scale analysis (Chapter 9).  Local government institutions, and informal groups such as the 
network of CPP volunteers, were vertically linked with national-level departments as 
illustrated in the diagram below, providing a conduit for climate-related information and 
resources flows, including the EWS and climate-tolerant seed varieties. 
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Figure 9.4  Illustration of the various institutions and groups at local government and 
community-level including the linkages with national-level departments.  
The CCP spans the country and has been highly effective. The network of trained volunteers 
were linked vertically with the UP and Upazila disaster teams (see Figure 9.4), which were 
then linked to national networks which distributed the cyclone warning. However, 
meteorological services are a prerequisite and the local station at Khepupara appeared to be 
extremely under-resourced which indicates improving these services at national-level could 
have benefits for local adaptation. 
Development of saline-tolerant rice varieties at national-level, particularly those developed 
by BRRI, appeared to be having a great impact at local-scale. However, awareness of these 
rice varieties did not appear to be widespread, as villagers confirmed they had not been aware 
of climate-tolerant varieties until the NGO intervention. Hence, strengthening extension 
services, along with provision of inputs, could enable these new varieties to reach more 
farmers, including use of the media in awareness-raising. However the extension officer at 
the local scale explained that rice price fluctuations still posed a risk for farmers, 
demonstrating the need to further examine agricultural trade and food security policies. 
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Analysis of the role of the World Bank linked the local-level to the national-level, as the 
World Bank was responsible for upgrading the polder (embankment) in the local village. It 
was confirmed that poor local residents gained employment in embankment construction 
work, and local people were monitoring construction in a participatory way. While there were 
criticisms about transparency and monitoring at national-level, at the local-scale there 
appeared to be active stakeholder involvement.  However, this may not be true in other areas. 
The Bangladesh case study clearly demonstrates an urgent need for additional climate 
finance. Evidence from both national and local-level verified urgent and immediate needs 
relating to food insecurity problems and inadequate cyclone protection.  In the local-level 
analysis, the area had been severely affected by Cyclone Sidr and Aila, and local people felt 
embankments were urgently needed. At national-level, one government respondent had 
pushed for the ECRRP project to be prioritised and this decision seemed to be justified by the 
local-level analysis. Whilst there was a debate in the literature about the effectiveness of 
embankments, at local-level this discussion was not taking place and most households felt the 
embankments were essential for their livelihoods. This may also be because once an 
embankment has been built, its continued protection and reparation are paramount to ensure 
residents behind the embankment are protected.  
Interestingly, priorities at local-level (cyclone shelters and embankments) aligned well with 
what had been prioritised for adaptation at national-scale.  However the case study research 
was conducted with a small sample size in one village so the results are not generalizable to 
other areas.   ‘Hard’ adaptation options were regularly mentioned at local-scale, suggesting 
local stakeholders’ prioritised structural (tangible) adaptation. This was a counterintuitive 
finding, since national-level NGO respondents criticised a possible bias towards ‘hard’ 
technologies and structural adaptation.   
Cyclone shelters, which were also being constructed under the ECRRP, formed another 
linkage between local and national-scale. The World Bank respondent at national-level said 
remoteness and inadequate rural infrastructure posed challenges for cyclone shelter 
construction. This evidence was triangulated at local-level. The national-scale World Bank 
official highlighted the importance of access roads for cyclone shelters, and of new designs 
for ‘killah’ platforms to protect livestock, and these issues were also raised by people at local-
scale.  However, it was not clear how the allocation and positioning of new cyclone shelters 
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was being managed. At local-level there were also suggestions of political influence in 
allocation of adaptation resources like cyclone shelters. 
Whilst national-scale finance has been targeting particular climate hazards and directed to 
‘flood-prone’, ‘drought-prone’ or ‘salinity prone’ regions, at local-scale these different 
climatic hazards are inter-connected and adaptation needs are closely linked to the 
development deficit. Market-related stresses like rising fuel and food prices also placed 
additional stresses on vulnerable people.  
Agricultural labourers, many of whom owned no land, were identified as a vulnerable group 
at both local-level and in analysis of the CCAFS data.  Insecure land tenure was raised as an 
important vulnerability issue at both local and national-level.  Land rights were also raised in 
the context of structural adaptation projects.  In addition, the particular vulnerability of 
women as well as their contribution to agriculture were emphasised in the national-level 
household data analysis, as well as in the local analysis.  However, these issues do not appear 
to be adequately reflected in national-level adaptation strategies or the BCCRF and BCCTF 
adaptation funds.  The study suggest land and gender issues need greater recognition at 
national (or international) scales, for instance through specific interventions targeted to 
women and landless households. 
Several female day labourers suggested additional livelihood activities that could improve 
their opportunities to work, including selling handicrafts. Livelihood diversification had also 
been recognised as an adaptation strategy in section 9.2.  Local employment opportunities 
were affected by policies at regional and national-level. For instance, as incomes increase in 
Bangladesh with economic development, Kuakata might develop into a hub for tourism, 
which could improve opportunities for selling handicrafts in the marketplace. NGOs might be 
able to support such initiatives. 
The important role of local government in adaptation was underlined at both national and 
local scales, but did not appear to have been adequately reflected in the BCCRF/BCCTF 
funds.  At both levels, the LGED engineer was identified as having an important role. 
Furthermore, working alongside and strengthening local government was highlighted as 
critical for project sustainability at national and local-level. In fact, the local-scale CBA 
project deliberately tried to strengthen the capacity of local government to increase its’ 
adaptive capacity. However, local government officials complained the national government 
is often not receptive to their problems and does not provide sufficient support. 
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Furthermore, afforestation of embankments was suggested at local-level but has not so far 
been taken up in national-level programmes. The BCCRF has introduced a programme 
entitled ‘Climate Resilient Participatory Afforestation and Reforestation Project’ focused on 
“degraded forestland, marginal, fallow and newly accreted land” according to project 
documents, but the project does not specifically target embankments. It is suggested that a 
large-scale programme for afforestation of embankments could have a range of win-win 
benefits. Overall, ecosystem based-adaptation had been insufficiently prioritised at national-
scale. 
 
260 
 
10. International-Level Analysis and Findings 
10.1. Introduction 
At international-level, climate finance was analysed through semi-structured interviews with 
expert key informants, and participant observation of climate finance negotiations at various 
UNFCCC meetings.  The methodology (Chapter 2) gave an overview of the methods used for 
consultation with key stakeholders. The issues and principles discussed with expert key 
informants at international-level were similar to those discussed in national-level interviews, 
enabling linkages to be drawn between different levels of analysis.  As detailed in Chapter 2, 
semi-structured interviews were undertaken with a range of expert key informants at 
international-level (18 interviews in total), selected from a range of stakeholder groups 
including international organisations (UN), relevant civil society organisations, and the 
media, ensuring representativeness of both donor and developing-country government 
officials, and major adaptation funds. 
As with the national-level analysis (Chapter 9) the major focus was on public adaptation 
finance so private-sector stakeholders were not engaged.  The international-level analysis was 
necessarily less comprehensive at this scale of observation.  Principles identified in the 
literature review were used as a theoretical framework to inform open-ended semi-structured 
interviews. Hence, the sub-headings within this chapter are similar to those in the national-
level analysis. The chapter provides a broad overview of issues at the international-scale but 
there was insufficient information within the scope of this study to compare different 
international funds in detail. Interview data has been used track progress against the 
indicative list of principles for effective climate finance (Chapter 7), to determine to what 
extent the evidence points towards satisfaction of those principles. The summary of progress 
at all three levels of analysis is then discussed in Section 10.7.   
10.2. International Level Participant Observation 
As explained in the methodology chapter, UNFCCC negotiations were attended by me as an 
observer delegate. In particular, the finance discussions were observed at the nineteenth 
session of the Conference of the Parties (COP-19) in Warsaw, Poland in November 2013. 
Specifically, discussions of the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) were related to 
effectiveness of finance, so are taken here as a case study. The SCF was a body established as 
part of the Cancun Agreement at COP-16 in 2010. Under paragraph 112 of decision 1/CP.16, 
the SCF was established under the COP to: 
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“assist the Conference of the Parties in exercising its functions… in terms of improving 
coherence and coordination in the delivery of climate change financing, rationalization of the 
financial mechanism, mobilization of financial resources and measurement, reporting and 
verification of support  provided to developing country Parties.”  (UNFCCC, 2010) 
At COP-17 in 2011, Parties further defined the roles, functions, composition and modalities 
of the SCF. Under paragraph 121(d) of decision 1/CP.17 it was decided the activities of the 
SCF would include: “making recommendations on how to improve the coherence, 
effectiveness and efficiency of the operating entities of the financial mechanism”. Under 
paragraph 121(f) the SCF would prepare “a biennial assessment, overview of climate finance 
flows” (Decision 1/CP.17, UNFCCC, 2012).  Hence the activities of the SCF are deemed 
highly relevant to the purposes of this PhD research, and were observed at COP-19. 
At the Warsaw conference (COP-19), discussions were observed on the ‘updated guidelines 
for the 5
th
 review of the financial review of the financial mechanism’ (see Annex XXI).  
These guidelines were outlined in the Report of the SCF to the COP (see UNFCCC, 2013c), 
and these updated guidelines had to be agreed by the COP in Warsaw. Final guidelines can be 
found in document FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1 (Decision 8/CP.19, UNFCCC, 2013b). The 
annotated text is found in Annex XXI. 
In the SCF meeting on ‘updated guidelines for the 5th review of the financial mechanism’ it 
was observed that initially the EU asked for clarification on the objective of updating the 
guidelines. The negotiator from Philippines, representing the G77 group of countries, 
explained there was a “progressive procedure” to follow on this.  The dividing lines between 
developing and developed countries were evident from the start. For example, on the 
objectives of the review of the financial mechanism, Egypt (part of the G77 group) said 
clause A (iv) was important, which referred to; “its effectiveness in providing new and 
additional [and, as appropriate, adequate and predictable] resources to developing country 
Parties under Article 4.3 of the Convention”.  However, the EU delegate responded stating 
they wanted to remove this clause. In the final guidelines, the clause had been shortened and 
weakened to refer to “its effectiveness in providing resources to developing country Parties 
under Article 4, paragraph 3, of the Convention”, a compromise solution without reference to 
adequacy or predictability. This short interaction demonstrates the importance of new and 
additional, adequate and predictable climate finance for developing countries, but 
respectively, the attempts by donor countries to limit their financial obligations. 
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The EU delegate also pushed for deletion of text referring to “direct access” (v) and deletion 
of clauses (vi) and (vii) relating to the “coherence and complementarity between the different 
operating entities of the financial mechanism in order to contribute to a global paradigm shift 
toward a low-GHG emission and climate-resilient development pathway” as well as 
“principles and practice for the allocation of funds”.  The EU wished to delete these clauses 
as they said “we also don’t know what the GCF would have yet”.  This appears to be a 
common negotiating tactic at the UNFCCC - to delay negotiation on a particular issue by 
claiming that it will prejudge the outcome of similar parallel negotiation. In the final text, 
clause (v) referred to the “effectiveness of access modalities” for developing countries, while 
clause (vi) referred to “consistency and complementarity” with other “investment and 
financial flows”. It did not, however, refer to a global paradigm shift. 
The EU also wished to delete a clause relating to “examining the role of the financial 
mechanism in identifying pathways for scaling-up the level of resources”. However, the 
delegate from the Philippines, representing G77, made it clear that this clause was important 
to them and said “we need this point”.  Again, the EU position appears to indicate that 
developed-country donors wished to limit their own financial responsibilities under the 
UNFCCC. In the end, this clause remained in the final text. 
A subtle trade-off was evident in these negotiations between financial commitments (by 
developed countries) and environmental commitments (by developing countries). For 
example, when the EU said they wanted to delete the clause relating to a “paradigm shift 
toward a low-GHG emission and climate-resilient development pathway” (quoted above) 
then delegates from Philippines and Egypt responded that they agreed with this. Philippines 
said this could be deleted unless it included “in the context of sustainable development”. 
Thus, the developing countries seemed to be effectively calling the bluff of the developed 
countries, and ultimately, made the developed-country negotiator realise it was in their 
interests to keep this clause (or a related clause) in.  The developing countries’ may be calling 
for additional finance by arguing that without this they cannot shift to a low-carbon pathway. 
The negotiations at times seem to become a bargaining game, in which deliberate 
disagreement can be used as a bargaining chip, or correspondingly, acquiescence to an 
opponent’s demands will make the proposer cautious about the original demands they 
proposed. 
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With regards to section (B) of the guidelines on “sources of information,” the Philippines said 
it was important to include the clause on “information provided by Parties on their 
experiences regarding the financial mechanism support provided and received in accordance 
with COP decisions” (italicised for emphasis) (B2(a)).  For developing countries it is 
important climate finance actually reaches the intended beneficiary country.  This concern 
likely comes from the awareness of the gap between pledges and disbursement.  However, 
the EU, by contrast, wanted to delete the words “support provided and received”.  Perhaps the 
interests of the EU and other developed-country donors are more centred on presenting 
externally (for instance to their electorate) that they have made climate finance pledges, but it 
is less in their interests to ensure the finance is actually distributed to intended beneficiary 
countries. Another possible interpretation is that the words were felt to be superfluous. The 
clause was kept in the final text. 
Secondly, the EU wished to delete text relating to the use of “expert inputs through 
independent reviews and assessments for the preparation and conduct of the periodic review 
of the financial mechanism” (B.2c).  Egypt wished to keep this text. However, the reference 
to expert inputs was deleted from the final text.  The motives of the EU were unclear at this 
stage but we might infer the EU was not keen on including expert inputs in the review of 
climate finance.  In the reference to the ‘GEF Evaluation Office’ the EU was keen to insert 
the word “independent” so that the final wording referred to the “GEF Independent 
Evaluation Office”.  Perhaps the EU was keen to emphasise the GEF Evaluation Office was 
independent so that its recommendations would not be considered official guidance.  
Alternatively they may have felt it was important to emphasise its objectivity. 
Next, the US made a suggestion to delete the reference to the ‘Adaptation Fund’, arguing it is 
not under the financial mechanism so there is no need to review it.  The US wanted to 
“clarify legally if it is under the financial mechanism”.  The literature review found 
developed-country Parties have not been keen to use the direct access modality of the 
Adaptation Fund (Williams, 2012) while developing countries have viewed it as key to 
effective delivery of resources (see Muller, 2013) (see Chapter 7).   The removal of the 
Adaptation Fund from the review was strongly resisted by developing countries. The 
Philippines responded that the “financial mechanism is the Protocol” and “under Article 7 of 
the Convention, 7.2 it says we need to review any related instruments including the Kyoto 
Protocol”. They also pointed out the SCF had already agreed the Adaptation Fund would be 
included. The clause was kept in. 
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With regards to section (C) on the criteria against which the effectiveness of the financial 
mechanism will be assessed (see Annex XXI), the Philippines highlighted transparency in 
particular, and argued; “transparency of decision-making is very important… the Adaptation 
Fund is the highest transparency”.  Transparency appeared to be important for developing 
countries in terms of ensuring the legitimacy of climate finance. Philippines indicated they 
want to keep the words “provided and received” in C3(e) which referred to the “amount of 
[resources provided] [and received]” and wished to remove the mention of investment 
programmes. Again, this reflected a concern that pledged finance is not being disbursed, and 
the brackets indicate these terms were already under discussion. The Philippines delegate also 
stated they were “not comfortable” with criteria (g) to (l) (see Annex XXI) because they felt 
projects were already being monitored and they were unsure if it was necessary to assess the 
impacts. The clauses referred to issues such as the sustainability of results, paradigm shifts, 
innovative projects, and enabling environments. This appeared to reflect concerns by 
developing-country Parties that there is too much onus on developing countries to prove there 
are results from climate finance, rather than an obligation on developed countries to provide 
sufficient finance. In the final text (UNFCCC, 2013b), the words “resources provided [and 
received]” were cut so the clause in Section C only referred to the resources “provided”.  
Transparency can be considered from the perspective of donors as well as receivers. 
The EU responded with an attempt to remove the words “accessibility” and “equitability”. In 
response to the Philippines’ concerns regarding clause (e), the EU suggested putting brackets 
around the whole of clause (the clause referred to the “amount of resources provided” as a 
criteria against which the effectiveness of the financial mechanism is assessed).  This may 
demonstrates the use of hard bargaining tactics by the EU, as they noticed this clause was 
important to developing countries’ and the proposal to delete it could be used as a bargaining 
chip.  The EU stressed the importance of clause (g) on the “sustainability of [the results and 
impacts achieved]” and then added an extra clause on results and impacts. The EU delegate 
pointed out; “the whole thing is a means to an end; we need to have impact as well… we need 
to verify what we are spending money on otherwise there won’t be money coming forward”.  
Again, this may demonstrate use of hard bargaining by presenting a ‘take it or leave it’ 
scenario, by saying there would be no finance provided unless the impacts could be verified.  
In the final text, the clause on sustainability was kept in, but instead of “sustainability of 
results” it referred to “sustainability of funded programmes,” a compromise solution that 
might ultimately benefit developing countries as it could imply programmes will be long-
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term. The other clauses, on “a global paradigm shift”, “innovative projects” and “enabling 
environments” were taken out in the final text, which instead refers to “results and impacts 
achieved” and the “extent to which the resources provided are contributing to achieving the 
objectives of the Convention”.  As for section (A), Parties seemed to fall back on referring to 
the Convention when they could not agree on exact wording.  
The EU was backed up by New Zealand who agreed “equitability” should be deleted.  In the 
final text, equitability had been deleted, but accessibility remained.  It is not clear why the EU 
wished to delete the reference to equitability (C(3)c) but it could have been because they felt 
it was not easily defined, or that ‘equity’ might put a greater burden upon donors.  Finally, the 
delegate from New Zealand made an interesting point about transparency, saying “it can be 
quite useful not to have stakeholders involved in the process of who gets the money; if they 
have applied… sometimes it is quite useful not to have transparency”.  In this intervention, 
they indicated there could be a potential trade-off between transparency and an independent 
decision-making process. 
At this point, concerns were raised about the decision-making process in this discussion, with 
Philippines (of the G77) raising the concern there was “only one from the LDCs” in this 
discussion so it was “difficult for us” because there were other simultaneous meetings going 
on.  The Philippines delegate urged the secretariat “please don’t do parallel meetings”.  
However, the US argued there was a need for parallel meetings because “we’re up against the 
clock” while the EU argued “the only option is parallel groups or we will work through the 
night”.  This demonstrates procedural tensions within the UNFCCC negotiations, as 
developing countries often suggest the process is more difficult for them in terms of capacity 
(UNFairplay, 2011).  Setting time limitations could also have been a deliberate negotiation 
tactic.  Simultaneous parallel meetings at COP-19 included those on long-term finance. 
Pressure for parallel meetings could be an example of use of ‘divide and rule’ tactics by 
developed-country Parties (like EU and US) to split the G77 and weaken the position of their 
political opponents in developing countries.  Alternatively, it could have been a time-saving 
measure. Procedural inequity was linked to the issue of the UNFCCC budget, as the Bahamas 
added; “the issue of the budget has dropped off the radar but affects participation in this 
meeting”.  Finally, the Philippines argued “we are willing to work until late but we cannot 
have parallel groups”. Thus, this particular discussion ended with on-going tensions over 
procedural inequity between developing and developed countries. 
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10.2.1. Summary 
Overall, at the UNFCCC negotiations, tensions were continually observed between the 
interests of developing and developed countries over climate finance.  In negotiations on the 
fifth review of the financial mechanism, it seemed developed countries (like EU and US) 
wished to avoid criticism over the adequacy and predictability of resources provided, 
although these terms did remain in the criteria (section C).  EU tried to delete the reference to 
“direct access” – a modality that has been supported by developing countries and pioneered 
by the Adaptation Fund. For reasons that are not well understood, the EU also tried to remove 
clauses on equitability and expert inputs. In general, developing countries were pushing for 
additional climate finance whilst donors were trying to limit their obligations. 
Drawing on the negotiation typologies from Bailer (2012), both ‘hard’ (conflictive or 
aggressive) as well as ‘soft’ (cooperative) negotiations strategies were observed. In the 
‘informal’ smaller meetings on finance, however, ‘hard’ bargaining strategies were primarily 
used, suggesting the relative absence of media or NGO observers led to more aggressive 
negotiation strategies. 
Although this was only a brief snapshot into the UNFCCC negotiations, the case study shows 
the climate finance negotiations are replete with use of bargaining tactics. The negotiations 
seem to be categorised more by (conflictive) strategies rather than soft (cooperative) 
strategies (see Bailer, 2012). For example the EU’s threat that there would not be “any money 
coming forward” unless sustainability of results were verified. Ultimately, this may 
demonstrate the importance of these negotiations for many countries. Disagreement was not 
necessarily conflictive, but is a part of the process. However, use of hard bargaining might be 
seen as a barrier to reaching an optimal solution since countries’ are not working together 
towards a shared vision of the global good (preventing dangerous climate change) but are 
instead focused on their own interests. One example of this was the removal of the clause on 
a “global paradigm shift toward a low-GHG emission and climate-resilient development 
pathway”, which neither developed nor developing countries wanted to keep in the final text. 
It appears ‘real politik’ was at play. The realism of these finance negotiations was, in general, 
invisible from the pressure of media attention since they occurred outside the main plenary. 
These meetings went on alongside various other parallel meetings. Interestingly, the EU also 
wished to delete the clause referring to information on support “provided and received”.  This 
might have been because the terms were redundant. However, it might have been because 
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while developed countries have an obligation to pledge finance, they might not have an 
interest in ensuring finance is disbursed. In addition, while developing-country 
representatives stated transparency was important, they did not wish for there to be excessive 
emphasis on whether the finance had achieved results. This reflects a concern that placing the 
onus on developing-countries to demonstrate ‘results’ could go against the ‘polluter pays’ 
principle under the Convention. Making climate finance provision contingent on 
demonstrated results, rather than an obligation, would go against developing countries’ 
interests.   
Finally, procedural tensions and inequity affect the negotiations, leading developing-country 
Parties to claim the negotiations outcomes are tarnished by the multiple parallel meetings, 
which limit the capacity of developing-country delegations.  Procedural issues can also be 
used by Parties’ to stall for time (see Chapter 6).  In conclusion, it was difficult for Parties to 
develop effective criteria to evaluate the effectiveness of finance under the UNFCCC in these 
tense and conflictive negotiations. The overt focus on national interests could be contributing 
to a ‘tragedy of the commons’. Perhaps a more collaborative environment needs to be 
engendered for negotiating in the global interest, and one way forward would be to enhance 
procedural equity at the UNFCCC. 
10.3. International Level Semi-Structured Interviews with Key Informants 
As explained previously, international-level semi-structured interviews were undertaken 
based on the principles and issues identified in the literature review. The data has been used 
track progress against the framework for effective climate finance (Chapter 7).  All key 
informants requested to remain anonymous. Hence, interviewees are identified only 
according to stakeholder group (and/or broad geographical location, where necessary). 
10.3.1. Equity and Allocation Criteria 
One UN representative argued; “if disbursed, it [climate finance] doesn’t reach the target 
group because of leakages”. However, one African NGO representative argued funding was 
reaching the vulnerable, but only reached a handful of communities “while millions of 
farmers are suffering from it” so there was “still a gap” due to inadequacy of resources. 
In terms of CBA, one donor representative argued it could be “resource-intensive because 
capacity-building is needed in some cases”. Therefore, this donor representative argued “easy 
wins for UN organisations might not lie in CBA, even though it might generate huge 
returns”. This highlights a potential tension between equity and efficiency. 
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The respondent from IFAD explained that their projects under the Adaptation for Smallholder 
Agriculture Programme (ASAP) are based on the needs of the recipient government and are 
defined by them, with the requirement that it “needs to focus on smallholder farmers, in rural 
areas, of developing countries”. ‘Climate risk analysis’ is undertaken to identify risk hotspots, 
and then linked with poverty analysis.  Their projects tried to identify how many people in a 
particular poverty bracket could be reached with a particular investment. However they 
argued there is not always a “perfect match” between the poorest groups and those affected 
by climate risks because “sometimes the poor people the project is targeting is a different 
group than the people hit by climate risks… the poor have different capitals” [sic].  They also 
identified an incomplete overlap between those who have access to the value chain and those 
affected by climate risks. 
The interview with one Nepalese government official explored Nepal’s LAPA, under which 
Nepal made a commitment to channel 80% of funds to local-level.  Nepal is unique in 
implementing this form of commitment. It was revealed Nepal intends the LAPA to be 
gender-sensitive and inclusive.  However, challenges were revealed in strengthening local 
capacity and fiduciary standards. For instance, the Nepalese government representative 
argued “until people are capable of handling resources there might be a service provider”; 
namely, NGOs or private sector stakeholders who will implement LAPAs. 
The Adaptation Fund respondent linked the principle of finance reaching the most vulnerable 
to direct access (see section on direct access), as well as to review criteria.  They argued 
going through government was more likely to meet people’s needs than going through the 
World Bank or UNDP.  In addition, the respondent described two equity-relevant review 
criteria under the Adaptation Fund. Firstly, each project includes thorough consultation with 
communities; and secondly, donors must demonstrate how initiatives bring benefits to the 
most vulnerable. The respondent emphasised that they did not tell applicants how to achieve 
that, as these are “high-level principles rather than prescriptive top-down criteria”.  However, 
the research revealed the demand-driven (direct access) approach led to challenges related to 
accessibility and capacity (see 10.3.11). 
In the PPCR, one donor respondent argued the prioritisation criteria were “deliberately 
national and context-specific… especially because adaptation is context-specific”. They 
proposed various generic prioritisation criteria including “targeting the most vulnerable; 
gender-sensitive; stakeholder process”.  However they also stated there were “no criteria for 
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community engagement” although there was for stakeholder engagement, “which in reality is 
varied”. 
Under the GCF, it emerged from one NGO interview that from a “high-level” perspective 
there was a proportion of funding set aside for the particularly vulnerable countries including 
the LDCs, SIDS, and African States.  But in channelling from national to local-level, they 
argued “they haven’t got to that yet”.  In terms of the GCF’s initial result management 
framework, it was decided under paragraph 27 of GCF/B.07/04 there will be results-based 
allocation and “the level of expected results of the activity will be one of the key criteria for 
allocating resources”. However, one NGO respondent argued on adaptation, the GCF: “did 
not really incorporate experts” on the results framework, and: “The Adaptation Committee 
under UNFCCC were not even allowed to contribute to this and they sent a letter to GCF 
saying they wanted to contribute to those result areas. GCF is not looking so much to 
external organisations that could feed in.” Overall progress on equity appeared balanced, 
with some progress under the Adaptation Fund though it is too early to evaluate progress 
under the GCF. 
10.3.2. Cost-efficiency and Private Action 
As examined in Chapter 7.3, adaptation funds like the GEF leverage co-finance, including 
private sector finance, as a means to enhance value-for-money. However, several 
interviewees expressed concerns about this. One Pacific-Island NGO respondent argued 
adaptation is less suitable for loans that mitigation, because “adaptation is not a commercial 
venture,” whereas mitigation is. However, they argued “the loan does force more concrete 
outcomes”.  One UN representative stressed the private sector “are the ones creating the 
problems” so they should be engaged.  
The Adaptation Fund respondent said the private sector are “rarely” included and have 
limited participation in their projects. However, they gave a few examples of private sector 
involvement, including a cell phone agency involved in an EWS in Papua New Guinea, and 
co-financing by the hotel sector in Senegal who benefitted from a coastal project. 
One African government representative argued; “private sector finance is not predictable, that 
is why we need public finance,” thus linking private finance to unpredictability.  They argued 
private finance could be additional, but, “we need a level of public funds to give a level of 
confidence, whereas the private sector they are profit-driven so it depends on performance”.  
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On the GCF’s Private Sector Facility, one NGO respondent argued it has a “split 
personality,” with a mandate for supporting SMEs in recipient countries, and yet an 
“expectation and staff structure geared to mobilising large amounts of money from the 
international private sector”. They said civil society was pushing the GCF to focus on the first 
mandate. One NGO respondent engaged with the GCF explained the “biggest problem” was 
the risk of counting private finance towards the contribution; “developing countries are 
worried that developed countries will say private sector investment counts as climate 
finance”. Hence, the issue also links to additionality (see below). 
A NGO respondent who was closely engaged with the GCF argued strongly for public rather 
than private finance: 
“I think international climate finance for adaptation should be public money. It is unrealistic 
to expect to leverage huge amounts of FDI for adaptation for the most vulnerable people who 
are also the poorest. You might be able to get individual adaptation projects with ROI but the 
returns are going to be tiny – nothing of the scale to attract a big corporation… in terms of 
resource mobilization at international-level - it’s got to be public.” 
In terms of mobilising private funds, one innovative mechanism was identified from UNCDF 
who are trying to help local governments to mobilise adaptation finance by issuing municipal 
bonds. Whilst ‘climate bonds’ are increasingly used for mitigation, their potential for 
adaptation is largely untested. 
Another EU-based NGO respondent agreed all finance needs to be public.  However, one 
NGO respondent argued “developing countries haven’t been that confrontational yet in 
demanding public finance”.  It was unclear why this might be. There may be a collective 
action problem in that if finance is tied to mitigation commitments neither developing nor 
developed countries have a major interest in getting finance flowing.  Developing countries 
may not wish to lose sovereignty by being compelled into action, whilst developed countries 
do not wish to tie finance commitments to mitigation ambition for fear it could increase their 
liability. 
The IFAD respondent indicated; “for us smallholders are private sector entities… it is the 
presumption we work on… for us they are not victims”.  Thus, IFAD appeared to overcome 
the division between public and private, saying “we can mobilise innovation potential… we 
need to empower the little businesses in those communities”. By considering affected 
smallholder farmers as entrepreneurs rather than victims, IFAD suggested they could 
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empower them and harness their innovation potential. They recommended the GCF adopt this 
philosophy and said; “No one has an idea how the private sector facility will look but we 
would want GCF to have a way to channel climate finance to smallholder farmers”. They also 
suggested the GCF build on established mechanisms and learning; it “should not reinvent the 
wheel – we should identify the best established pathways to target smallholders”. 
At a conference in Bangkok in 2012, one NGO spoke of the risk the funds would be used as 
“subsidies for northern companies to make profit in the south”. Several US-based technology 
firms discussed how they might access funding from the Private Sector Facility – a far cry 
from the ‘smallholder farmers’ civil society hoped would be able to access funds. Similarly, 
one media respondent argued engagement of the private sector “shouldn’t be at the expense 
of public funds” but should be used to mobilise private funds. 
One donor argued the PPCR had tried to integrate the private sector as a stakeholder, but in a 
PPCR meeting in Bangladesh “all groups were represented except the private 
sector”…“people were not sure who to invite from the private sector - there should have been 
private sector engagement all the way from the plan to the implementation”. However, they 
argued it “depends on the context” whether there is “a permanent role for private sector 
company or not”. On Bangladesh, one think-tank respondent argued many companies felt 
climate change “was a problem for the government”. Another donor argued the government 
do not always see why the private sector should be engaged as; “they interpret it as thinking, 
you’re giving money to the private sector”. They added progress in this regard had been 
easier in Tajikistan, where the private sector was defined as the “hydro and energy industry”. 
In Niger, the private sector was defined as smallholder farmers, but in the case of Bangladesh 
they were “not sure” about the definition of the private sector.  
Overall there is balanced progress on cost-efficiency. One might ask; cost-efficiency for 
whom? There appears to have been value-for-money for donors as loans are widely used 
under mechanisms such as the PPCR, but many stakeholder expressed concerns about the 
equity implications. 
10.3.3. Monitoring Results/Effectiveness 
A donor representative pointed out each of the funds has different indicators and these differ 
from those of the national donors (e.g. UK, Germany). The fund-level indicators are dynamic, 
and they have to “map them” against national donor-level monitoring indicators.  One donor 
argued the “capacity at country-level to get round complex logframes is quite difficult” [sic].  
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Another highlighted; “capacity-building is bigger than just the Adaptation Fund… it includes 
governments’ ability to measure results”. One developing-country NGO argued that in their 
African country, most of the monitoring had been done by civil society and “government is 
not doing so much”.  
In terms of measuring results, the GEF representative explained their new tracking tool for 
adaptation which involved “macro-indicators,” as well as “project-specific indicators” which 
were all disaggregated by gender.  They argued these types of measurable indicators provided 
“accountability to donors too” and they highlighted the importance of monitoring results to 
“provide this data to justify scaling up”.   According to GEF, their monitoring systems had 
been devolved to “local authorities at community level” so that “monitoring is mainstreaming 
in the way governments conduct their work”. They emphasised it is important for monitoring 
and tracking systems to be “applicable and understandable to the communities as well”. 
At IFAD, the respondent said the ASAP programme has “10 outcome indicators” some of 
which are relevant for IFAD as an institution, like the amount of climate finance programmed 
in each replenishment cycle, which “indicates how well they are integrating climate issues – 
or is a proxy for that”.  Two indicators that were used by IFAD generally were the household 
asset index, and the prevalence of child malnutrition (food security indicators), which were 
used irrespective of ASAP. ASAP-specific indicators included the number of poor 
households with strengthened climate resilience. In terms of economic analysis of impacts; 
the IFAD respondent explained every IFAD project has an “economic and financial analysis” 
attached. However, they stressed this could be complicated and there is an economic burden 
attached to economic analysis itself.  The respondent said they “cannot throw endless 
amounts of money at this” and economists charge high rates for in-depth analyses, so there is 
a need for “rough but sound” assessment. 
Under the PPCR, one donor respondent argued it was a “complicated process” and the “CIF 
administration doesn’t do quality assurance, so that falls to donors who are steps removed 
from the process”.  Overall, the donor respondent argued “quality assurance ends up resting 
with donors” who “have to rely on project documents”.  One donor argued they “really 
struggle with adaptation because there are not universal metrics”.  Overall, monitoring 
capacity appeared limited amongst both donors and governments. 
At the Adaptation Fund, the respondent stated there are project-level indicators, as well as 
fund-level indicators to track and aggregate across all projects, ranging from “strengthening 
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physical assets, to number of early warning systems, to number of beneficiaries”. They stated 
these indicators are going through some refinement “because we realise it is difficult for 
proponents to report on these”. The respondent also mentioned they release the funds in 
tranches based on “performance-based disbursement” (see next section). 
In terms of the GCF, a civil society representative confirmed a draft results management 
framework had been developed and there were performance indicators for those, but they 
were not publicly available.  Overall, some progress was observed in developing indicators to 
track adaptation effectiveness, but stakeholders expressed concerns about the resource and 
capacity burden of monitoring. It was felt insufficient information was available to evaluate 
overall progress on effectiveness. 
10.3.4. Urgency and Timeliness 
It was agreed in the GCF Governing Instrument “the Fund will have a streamlined 
programming and approval process to enable timely disbursement” (Annex, Decision 
3/CP.17, UNFCCC, 2012).  However, various interviewees criticised the slow process 
through which the GCF has been launched as a new institution. One African representative 
who was closely engaged with the GCF said “institutions take time” and argued they were 
“not near” to talking about programmes and policies, as they were currently institution-
building. One GEF representative hinted that setting up a new institution may have delayed 
implementation and argued, “it took a long time and what we built now [at the GEF] is 
precious – we cannot erase and think the GCF can do that”. However, one donor 
representative responded to criticism of setting up a new institution in the GCF by saying: “I 
certainly think it [the GCF] should be learning from each of them [other funds] because 
there’s value in each of them but none of them are perfect”. Refer to the section on direct 
access (below) for the related discussion on disbursement. 
The Adaptation Fund respondent stated that the Fund disburses money in tranches “as they 
report to you year-by-year”, which is good for accountability, results, and credibility and 
avoids “moral hazard where they don’t have to do it”.  The respondent said this way, funds 
were disbursed as fast as possible, and recommended the GCF to adopt this approach as well. 
Overall, several stakeholders expressed concerns about the need for urgent and timely 
adaptation finance, but there was insufficient information available to evaluate overall 
progress. 
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10.3.5. Flexibility/Robustness 
One UN respondent pointed out the impacts of climate change are still very much uncertain 
as “we cannot quantify where and how much” so “no regrets measures are required like 
Integrated Water Resources Management”.  The respondent argued financing should look at 
‘no regrets’ measures first because “these are certain needs for developing countries… e.g. 
appropriate housing design, water supply systems and agriculture – you will not regret those 
actions”. They highlighted that many no regrets measures are not “high-tech”.  
IFAD was the only respondent who brought up the issue of climate change scenarios. They 
explained they would “contract a regional institution to analyse the climate-related risks and 
projections, for example, for coffee in Nicaragua”. They also explained they were flexible 
and did not necessarily take a “value chain” approach to food security under climate change, 
because in some countries like Least Developed Countries (LDCs) “they have basic problems 
with infrastructure… you cannot always use value chains as entry points”. Overall, several 
respondents raised the issue of ‘no regrets’ measures but insufficient information was 
available on the extent to which different scenarios were being used in planning. 
10.3.6. Adaptation/mitigation coherence 
One NGO argued “the more you mitigate now, the less adaptation requirement… the longer 
we go without mitigation the more will need to go to adaptation finance”. An NGO 
respondent who engaged with the GCF argued that mitigation, adaptation and loss and 
damage are on a “continuum”, with mitigation arguably the “most important”. They 
suggested we are now at a point where we have “already failed to do enough mitigation… so 
there is a moral obligation to help people adapt”.  
A developing-country NGO respondent argued we must consider adaptation now because 
“even if we have zero emissions what we have now will impact over the next 30-40 years”.  
They added; “projects should actually consider both [adaptation and mitigation] together as 
you cannot really isolate them” but that this was not currently being done. Another African 
government official called for greater synergies between adaptation and mitigation, arguing 
“NAPs and NAMAs should speak to each other so there are some co-benefits”, for instance, 
in terms of forestry.   
Respondents suggested that inter-institutional coordination is needed to build important 
synergies between adaptation and mitigation. One donor added that adaptation and mitigation 
funds were created in their own “silos” and the CIFs “don’t speak to each other particularly 
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well”. Another NGO, engaged with the GCF, also used the word “silo” to describe the 
adaptation and mitigation split, but argued at least the GCF is “thinking about” synergies and 
co-benefits. 
One UN representative argued governments are pushing mitigation priorities because “that is 
the way it is being advocated”. Similarly, one African government official argued whilst 
developing countries are interested in adaptation, other countries are focusing on mitigation 
“because it addresses their needs and interests”. This delegate suggested a dedicated 
proportion of GCF funds should go to adaptation (an  idea later adopted by the GCF Board).  
The GCF’s Sixth Board Meeting decided the Fund “will aim for a 50:50 balance between 
mitigation and adaptation over time” (GCF, 2014b:4).  One NGO argued this is “appropriate 
since adaptation finance got a short shrift historically”.  Another EU-based NGO explained 
this decision reflected the main ask from the CAN, the civil-society umbrella organisation 
under the UNFCCC. 
One Adaptation Fund respondent argued they “think it should be 50:50” however they 
admitted they had “not really thought about it” and it was “not an analytically arrived-at 
number just a principle”.   It might be that the decision within the GCF to split the finance 
50/50 between adaptation and mitigation was similarly decided upon based on principles 
rather than any scientific or economic comparison of the global requirements for adaptation 
and mitigation.  This hypothesis appears likely, given the lack of information available about 
how the decision was made. 
One NGO from the EU argued the issue of adaptation and mitigation synergies “is not at all 
being discussed under the UNFCCC which clearly separates adaptation and mitigation, and 
this is a huge gap to be closed as there is a lot of potential [for synergies] especially in a field 
like agriculture”.  They added the GCF mandate said it would bring “transformational” 
change - an opportunity to combine adaptation and mitigation. However, separation of 
funding in terms of designating ‘50% for adaptation’ separates the two again, as there is “not 
a mixed pool for synergies… at the moment”.  
Within funds, the Adaptation Fund respondent admitted they “haven’t given much thought” 
to adaptation and mitigation synergies, although there are “a few examples” of co-benefits 
such as “ecosystem-based adaptation which captures carbon”.  However, they argued the 
majority of work they are involved is “urgent needs for infrastructural things like coastal, 
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water, livelihoods” which arguably did not produce substantial emissions so “co-benefits are 
not required”.  
IFAD’s ASAP appears to have considered co-benefits for mitigation at the outset. The IFAD 
respondent explained, while adaptation was the focus, “mitigation is a side benefit… and we 
know we need to quantify the GHG effects of our interventions”. They were currently 
working with CGIAR to look at 11 programmed investments and do a “quick and dirty 
assessment of what is the likely GHG reduction effect of the investment”. However, the 
respondent expressed concern that IFAD targets for GHG reduction might have been set 
unrealistically too high.  Interviews also revealed GEF has not undertaken any assessment of 
the emission impact of its adaptation projects. Overall, there was some progress under the 
GCF on the issue of ‘balance’ between adaptation and mitigation, but little or no 
consideration of the need for synergies.  
10.3.7. Gender equity 
Gender sensitivity was one of the generic prioritisation criteria suggested by a donor.  The 
Adaptation Fund respondent explained one of the Fund’s review criteria is that projects must 
demonstrate benefits for the most vulnerable, including women and youth. The respondent 
gave the example of Rwanda which had submitted a ‘Gender Analysis’ along with their 
project proposal (see AF, 2013, Annex 10).  Results also have to be disaggregated by gender. 
However, the Adaptation Fund does not have a specific gender policy.  The IFAD respondent 
explained IFAD has a ‘gender strategy’ involving gender-disaggregated baselines and 
gender-sensitive indicators. 
One NGO respondent said GCF is “the first climate fund to explicitly include gender 
sensitivity in its governing instrument”.  The GCF Board commissioned a paper on how to 
operationalize gender sensitivity which included a “consultative process with civil society on 
gender” that would input into the proposed gender policy. They described this as a “bright 
spot” in the GCF and they were “hopeful” on this issue. Overall there is measurable progress 
on this issue at the level of documentation, but it is not clear to what extent gender equity is 
prioritised in actual international implementation. 
10.3.8. Practicality/Feasibility 
The issues of practicality and feasibility were not discussed directly by any respondents and 
there was insufficient data. However several respondents saw the need for project applicants 
to have sufficient implementation capacity. The issue links with the ownership issue (below) 
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as there is a need to balance stringent criteria with opportunities for learning-by-doing. A UN 
respondent also argued the “check and control should not be so stringent that it doesn’t 
release any money” [sic].  They suggested a balance between stringent fiduciary standards 
and access.  
10.3.9. Avoiding maladaptation 
According to the definition of maladaptation from Barnett and O’Neill (2010) in Chapter 7, 
maladaptation includes actions which increase emissions or inadvertently burden the most 
vulnerable, linking this to the issues of coherence with mitigation, as well as equity and cost-
efficiency. One NGO respondent argued there is “always a risk” with adaptation because we 
are not sure whether we will need to adapt to 2 or 3 degrees.  Thus, there is a need to “be as 
flexible as possible… to top it up if temperatures rise above 2 degrees”. Maladaptation was 
closely linked to flexibility in this case.   The same respondent also explained this was “not 
really an issue at the UNFCCC” and has “not really been a discussion”.   
One of the eligibility criteria under the Adaptation Fund was that the project should support 
‘concrete’ adaptation actions (see Chapter 7).   Interestingly, one donor argued “concrete 
adaptation” was a misunderstood term, because “some people think it means it has to be with 
concrete”. Few other respondents brought up maladaptation.  An NGO respondent also 
expressed concern that diversion of development aid to adaptation might result in 
‘maladaptation’ thus linking this issue to additionality. Overall, there was little evidence of 
progress in consideration of maladaptation at international-level. 
10.3.10. Transformation and Scaling-up 
The IFAD respondent explained they have a conceptual framework for scaling-up; thinking 
through the drivers, barriers and pathways for scaling-up successful elements of projects.  
The literature review revealed this was based on Linn (2012).   The IFAD respondent 
explained this was not deployed mechanistically and they were not scaling-up projects but 
rather, “scaling-up successful results from projects” and avoiding things that have not 
worked, learning from both successes and failures. Interestingly, the respondent explained 
IFAD had held a “fail fair” in 2013 in which learning from failure was a key element (see 
http://www.ifad.org/events/failfaire/).   
Learning from failure could facilitate learning on adaptation.  However, it was recognised 
there could be a “political dimension” leading to failures being brushed over. The IFAD 
respondent explained it was challenging to learn from failure as “you have an unspoken 
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barrier that when you fail you basically have made a mistake… which restricts the amount of 
information being presented and this includes governments… For politicians, the stakes are 
much higher”.   Perhaps other funds could learn from IFAD’s approach, as in the context of 
adaptive learning it was felt that increased openness about failures must be encouraged by 
funds engaging in adaptation. 
The GCF is mandated to have a “transformational impact” and the governing instrument 
speaks of a “paradigm shift” (Annex, Decision 3/CP.17, UNFCCC, 2012). One NGO 
respondent who had been closely engaged with the GCF explained they have operationalized 
this so far by identifying “performance indicators beyond the discreet project-level stuff… at 
programme and policy level as well.”  However, they were “not sure how this will play out in 
practice”.  Overall, there was insufficient information on this issue at present. 
10.3.11. Direct Access/Ownership 
Challenges relating to accessibility of finance were recognised. One NGO stated “the 
countries most vulnerable are least able to access the funds”. A developing-country NGO 
representative argued it was important for donors to “guide them and make it much easier to 
apply and to understand”. This respondent questioned the capacity of government focal 
points on climate change, arguing; “in my country some of the focal points with 
responsibility to access these funds did not have enough capacity to understand about what 
the process is itself.”  
One UN respondent agreed climate finance is not easily accessible to many countries; “either 
they don’t know the availability or how to access it”.   The GEF respondent explained the 
Small Grants Programme (SGP) has an innovative means of directing small grants for climate 
chance, but argued these funds have to stay small to ensure communities can handle the funds 
themselves, thus enhancing ownership. The GEF respondent argued GEF is starting to 
implement direct access modalities but “many cannot make it”.  One donor also suggested the 
“PPCR has some specific objectives for capacity-building, so countries might be able to meet 
the criteria for direct access”. 
The Adaptation Fund respondent argued; “direct access is great because it cuts out the middle 
man and the UNDP”. The respondent suggested that for targeting the most vulnerable even 
more closely there could be “subnational direct access for cities and communities”.  There 
were challenges in accrediting the NIE in some countries (for example Bangladesh).  The 
Adaptation Fund respondent argued that some countries “nominate the wrong entity” and 
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suggested they ought to have a process for selecting the entity before applying, because if 
countries’ simply “choose one they like” it might not have the right ficudiary or transparency 
standards.  The respondent also added; 
“…Some entities are not cooperative with the accreditation panel. Those experts on the 
accreditation panel ask for audits for the last 10 years and grievance mechanism procedures 
– some entities don’t give up that information quickly or in its entirety…Transparency is one 
[criteria] that is tough for entities to meet, even some regional development banks struggled 
on that – not because they’re not transparent but they don’t have the systems in place… or it 
is not documented.” 
One donor representative, who had also been engaged with the Adaptation Fund, argued it 
“would be easier if it [the Adaptation Fund] loosened its criteria for NIEs but quite rightly it 
doesn’t do that”.   They argued; “personally I think they need to have capacity-
building”…“the USP [unique selling point] is direct access and we need to be patient… the 
last board agreed it would explore the idea of a capacity-building programme”.   
More than half a year after this interview, the Adaptation Fund had launched a capacity-
building programme known as the ‘Readiness Programme for Climate Finance’. Under this 
programme, the Adaptation Fund respondent explained there was a plan to speak to 
accreditation experts and provide what is needed on capacity-building, as well as doing 
“south-south cooperation with existing NIEs to help other NIEs become NIEs”.  
At the June 2013 GCF Board meeting, the GCF decided in Decision B.04/06, paragraph (g) 
to consider “additional modalities that further enhance direct access”.  One NGO respondent 
from the EU stated that this “enhanced direct access goes beyond fund managers at the 
national level – enabling them to select themselves what they want to fund, and which 
communities are most vulnerable and should be prioritised”.  
One NGO representative who had been engaged with the GCF reiterated concerns about the 
difficulty of meeting direct access standards under the Adaptation Fund. In order to meet the 
obligations of direct access, ficudiary standards and social and environmental safeguards, 
they recommended a “strong readiness programme with capacity building to meet those 
standards” under the GCF.  With the Adaptation Fund’s readiness programme just launching, 
this NGO representative said it would be “interesting to see how it works and how GCF can 
learn from it”. 
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In terms of the GCF, several respondents explained there will be ‘National Designated 
Authorities’ (NDA’s) to facilitate direct access. However, one EU-based NGO respondent 
explained it is “not clear” how this will be done and “if the GCF has its own entities this will 
take a while”, especially since under the Adaptation Fund “even some MIE’s took 2 or 3 
years to accredit”.  Thus, this respondent argued if the GCF wants its own entities “it will 
really be a bottleneck for disbursing funding”.  They also explained the Adaptation Fund’s 
NIE’s were only set up to handle up to $10m  of funding for a project so “we are not sure if 
they are suitable for these sums of funding”.   This respondent pointed out the GCF is likely 
try to distribute quickly “by using multilateral entities which are used to handling those 
amounts” and developing countries “won’t like to see that but it will speed it up”.  
 
Figure 10.1  Illustration of potential negative feedbacks between direct access, lack of 
capacity and the use of multilateral implementing entities. 
While the World Bank was not mentioned regularly during these interviews, some NGO 
respondents were outspoken on its role, which they felt could undermine ownership and 
access (see 9.3.12). One NGO respondent argued the “World Bank is a master of extracting 
resources from development partners and giving a glossy spin… the gravy train for them was 
the CIF [Climate Investment Funds]”.  Overall, the evidence pointed to balanced progress on 
ownership, with particular optimism regarding the potential for ‘enhanced direct access’ 
under the GCF. 
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10.3.12. Additionality and Mainstreaming 
There are concerns adaptation finance has been diverted from development aid, so it is not 
‘additional’ to ODA. Thus, whilst additionality and mainstreaming can be considered as 
separate issues or principles, they are considered together here to improve coherence. The 
literature review revealed concerns that calling for ‘mainstreaming’ climate change into 
development aid is a ploy to avoid providing additional finance (Klein, 2010).  Furthermore, 
if funds are diverted from development aid and labelled as climate finance, the scope of 
activities they can be used for is narrower; meaning recipients are less able to use the aid for 
activities of their choosing (ibid). There can also be issues of ‘double-counting’ (ibid). One 
media respondent linked the issue of diversion of adaptation finance away from ODA to the 
lack of transparency in reporting obligations.  
GEF required applicants to demonstrate ‘additionality’ to a counterfactual, and only fiances 
the “incremental cost of those adaptation activities that generate global environmental 
benefits” (Verheyen, 2005:98). Thus there are two conceptions of ‘additionality’ (see Chapter 
7). One NGO argued applicants should “absolutely not” be required to demonstrate 
additionality to the development baseline and that driving a wedge between development and 
adaptation would be “creating a rod for your own back”. One respondent from the Adaptation 
Fund pointed out; “most developing countries have a development deficit already, so 
speaking about an incremental approach is not useful”.  One African NGO argued 
“development and adaptation are similar and should not be separated as they are 
interconnected”.  However, another UN respondent argued there are ‘budget substitution’ 
issues where funds are lumped into national funds.   
One UK-based think-tank stakeholder disagreed with the focus on additionality and said they 
were “not one who thinks that ‘new and additional’ is needed to solve things because we need 
all the money to solve things”.  They appeared to suggest there should be less focus on the 
obligations of developed-countries to provide finance and instead, even the finance from 
developing countries themselves (or development aid) should be aligned with the objectives 
of climate change. 
An NGO respondent who was closely engaged with the GCF argued; “because climate 
finance, both adaptation and mitigation, are so linked to development it would make sense for 
them to be integrated into ODA -  ideally the advocacy ask is that climate gets integrated into 
ODA and the target is increased”.  Thus, they proposed an ODA target of 0.8% with climate 
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change incorporated.  However, they recognised “we cannot make that ask now as it doesn’t 
make sense” because most countries are not even meeting the 0.7% target. Currently, they 
argued there is a “mismatch” because climate change and development are “separate at the 
top and then conflated at the bottom”. 
One NGO respondent framed it differently, saying that having a development component in 
adaptation is necessary to have legitimacy with communities on the ground. They argued; 
“convincing those groups that climate change is coming is difficult so combining it with a 
development approach gives you much more legitimacy to implement adaptation”. However, 
they said mainstreaming adaptation into development also made it easier for countries to 
claim their development aid contributes to adaptation, particularly since development flows 
were above $100Bn per year; developed countries could say “this is adaptation” and 
“legitimise themselves by saying their development did have an adaptation component”.  
Overall, this implies that committing 50% of funds under the GCF to adaptation might have 
made it easier for developed countries to meet their climate finance commitments by simply 
diverting funds from development aid.  In summary, the evidence pointed to observable 
progress on mainstreaming, but little or no progress on ensuring ‘additionality’ of finance. 
 
Figure 10.2  Illustration of possible feedbacks (reinforcing loops) between inadequate 
public finance and diversion of ODA, as well as between inadequate public finance and 
private sector engagement (from interviews and literature review, explained in text). 
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10.3.13. Harmonisation/Coordination 
According to one African NGO, coordination was challenged by the fact there are “so many 
similar instruments” with “different criteria and technicalities”.  Some funds appeared to have 
procedures in place to coordinate and harmonise at national-level. The Adaptation Fund 
respondent explained one of the Fund’s review criteria was that projects must avoid 
duplication and seek synergies, so a desk review of national and bilateral projects in the 
country was undertaken to “check to the extent possible that the project was additional and 
different” from existing projects.  Similarly, the IFAD respondent explained stakeholder 
engagement was a major part of harmonisation and coordination, as ASAP design missions 
involve participatory processes including desk research on  stakeholders in target areas who 
then become involved in the investment design (e.g. through project design workshops). 
Coordination and harmonisation of the GCF with other funds seemed to be a gap. One NGO 
respondent who was closely engaged with the GCF argued; 
“[GCF’s] Secretariat is short staffed so they haven’t done in depth consultation with other 
bodies…when they drew up the performance indicators they didn’t talk to other funds at all. 
They have a capacity problem. It takes time to reach out to other bodies and they have a time 
crunch and staff shortage. They have not done as much as they need to.  Staff at CIF’s have 
complained ‘they are not talking to us’… not learning from those failures. But it is getting a 
bit better as there has been disgruntlement on that front.” 
One EU-based NGO respondent agreed, and expressed concern that the Adaptation Fund 
should remain intact: 
“I have perceived the GCF wants to be its own entity… it doesn’t want to integrate the 
lessons from other funds over the last few years… We think the Adaptation Fund should run 
under the GCF –there should be transparency and majority of developing countries in the 
Board. It should not just be eaten by the GCF.” 
Overall the evidence was balanced; pointing to measurable progress on internal coordination 
but limited progress with regards to the GCF. 
10.3.14. Adequacy and Predictability 
In the semi-structured interviews with expert key informants the adequacy of climate finance 
was recognised as an overarching challenge, especially considering the lack of mitigation 
ambition, with one NGO saying: “what level can we actually stabilise the concentration at? It 
could be 600ppm or 4 degrees”.  An EU-based NGO respondent argued the finance was 
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“definitely not enough to keep climate change within manageable limits”. It was felt 
inadequate climate finance (both adaptation and mitigation) would make climate change 
more expensive in the long term.  Another UN respondent, touching on this point, argued the 
adequacy of finance had been affected by the recession, but pointed out “if you don’t give it 
now, you have to give later in other ways”.  Moreover, it was also felt slow progress on 
finance was holding back mitigation ambition, with one media respondent arguing “countries 
won’t do much mitigation until finance is on the table”.  
Another participant from an international organisation argued the “needs are so great that the 
GCF is a drop in the ocean”. Other stakeholders, including a think-tank respondent, stressed 
the inadequacy of the funds pledged under the GCF, saying “$100 Billion is nothing”, 
compared to flows of non-climate related finance every day.   Thus, it was argued there is a 
need for “enabling pathways for global financial flows to shift”.  The respondent argued the 
financial commitments under the UNFCCC were more about “powering the process” in terms 
of the power it could have in shifting government spending decisions, rather than the flows 
themselves. 
In terms of food security, the IFAD respondent explained “the availability of climate finance 
grants is still critical to integrating climate risk thinking into agricultural investment 
programmes” but there is a “need to avoid retrofitting”. They argued climate change needs to 
be integrated early on in country strategies to avoid “bad design”. Thus, public climate 
finance was felt to be crucial for mainstreaming of climate change into agricultural 
development. 
One respondent from a UK-based think-tank, when asked about the adequacy of climate 
finance, responded that finance was “obviously not” adequate but highlighted barriers. For 
example Bangladesh “never spends all the money it is getting... due to lack of capacity in 
government”. This respondent seemed to be apportioning some of the blame for the 
inadequacy of finance to recipients themselves. 
The adequacy of finance on the table was described as making the issue of balancing 
adaptation and mitigation somewhat a moot point. One NGO respondent said there was “only 
$100Bn available on the table in 2020 and we know that is not enough – even if all goes to 
mitigation or adaptation”.  They felt there was not enough for either. However, as outlined 
below, the GCF prioritised the decision on the percentage going towards adaptation before 
confirming the levels of public finance.  
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It emerged from the interviews and literature review there had been little progress in scaling-
up finance to 2020.  One media respondent highlighted the “gap between fast start finance 
and the GCF”. An NGO respondent expressed disappointment that submissions before COP-
19 on “strategies and approaches for mobilizing scaled-up finance” (Decision 1/CP.18, 
paragraph 67) had ended up as “really vague” (see UNFCCC, 2014).  Submissions only came 
in from 6 parties including the EU. Parties did not agree on mid-term targets for finance up to 
2020.  One NGO respondent said they were “pretty sure there won’t be 
[targets]…realistically I don’t think they will” even though “civil society is always asking for 
it”.  Some respondents hoped Ban Ki-Moon’s Summit in New York in September 2014 
would bring finance pledges, but a NGO respondent reported that the German government 
had told them; “if we don’t’ know where the money is going and how GCF will disburse it 
we don’t want to pledge now”. This emphasises that it is vitally important for “GCF to get 
facts on the table so that trust is built”.  However, Germany did make a pledge to the GCF in 
the end, demonstrating this barrier had been overcome. 
It emerged from interviews the financial flows currently going towards adaptation under the 
OECD’s ‘Adaptation Markers’ have been largely overstated.   For instance, a key term search 
of more than 6000 projects listed in the OECD dataset revealed that roughly 65% of all 
activities listed in the original OECD dataset are “unrelated to adaptation or at least do not 
state adaptation as a principal (adaptation marker 2) or significant objective (adaptation 
marker 1) (Junghans and Harmeling, 2012:4).  This observation relates to the discussion on 
mainstreaming and double-counting.  
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Figure 10.3  Illustration of possible feedbacks (reinforcing loops) between donors lack of 
clarify on GCF modalities and lack of capitalisation (drawn from interviews and 
literature review) 
In terms of emerging issues requiring finance, one EU-based NGO respondent said they have 
not seen any discussion under the GCF around ‘loss and damage’ (see Chapter 3), even 
though the Warsaw International Mechanism has been established under the adaptation 
framework, and the implication is that the funding towards adaptation will also go towards 
loss and damage. Overall, there appeared to be little progress on increasing the adequacy and 
predictability of finance. 
10.3.15. Transparency and Stakeholder Engagement 
In terms of transparency within UNFCCC climate finance negotiations, one NGO argued it 
was “the most jargon-driven process on the planet”… “even I am still perplexed by some of 
the acronyms and terms”.  They argued the process has become so complex that “the average 
person would have no idea what is going on” and as a result it is “not articulated clearly to 
the general public”. One media respondent argued; “there are few meetings open – most are 
behind closed doors” thus contributing to the lack of information for the general public.  With 
reduced information getting into the public domain, governments may also be able to avoid 
pressure from civil society to make progress.  
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It was argued by one UN respondent there is a need for greater transparency in order to 
improve coordination on-the-ground. They suggested the “One UN” concept could help in 
this regard by pushing joint programming and joint modalities.  Another UN representative 
argued communication barriers occur due to language barriers. It was noticed that where 
online information is available regarding climate finance, it is usually in English.  
Transparency appeared to be an issue for the GCF Board. One NGO pointed out the GCF is 
“not at all transparent” compared to the Adaptation Fund where “all UN observers were 
accredited immediately and could participate immediately” while the GCF took a long time.  
One NGO representative argued the GCF “Board refused to allow webcasting at their 
meetings” saying it was too expensive at first, which was “absurd” and then they “said it 
would screw up political dynamics in the room”.  Another NGO agreed this might have some 
logic as the process is “really political” and if it was webcast the members would just be 
“saying political messages and cannot negotiate”. However, the lack of transparency had 
repercussions for procedural justice, stakeholder engagement, and the fair participation of 
developing-country delegates in the GCF. One NGO argued the “lack of webcasting” meant 
“not only observers have to have money to travel to the meetings” but also they had to go 
through an accreditation process. It was a problem “not just for observers” but also for “board 
members – some of their advisors cannot go… webcasting would enable [them to have] more 
advisors”.  Issues relating to developing-country participation at the UNFCCC had already 
been highlighted in the literature review (Schroeder et al 2012; UNFairplay, 2011). 
One NGO representative who had been engaged in observing GCF meetings argued there 
were major issues relating to transparency and stakeholder engagement, and 
“the problem is that we only have two observers in the room” . They said that observers were: 
“only allowed to speak at the discretion of the co-chairs and have no decision making 
authority, unlike other funds… can only make verbal interventions if the co-chairs decide to 
let us”. 
On decision documents, they argued; “Secretariat drafts these documents – it is completely 
opaque to observers – we never see the drafts before. That is the biggest problem… Some 
funds have some way of engaging beneficiaries at the board level. GCF doesn’t have that.” 
Thus, GCF Board meetings were non–transparent, with little scope for stakeholder 
observation. The initial modalities of such structures are important as they establish the basis 
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of future work. One NGO argued there was time pressure and the GCF was “understaffed” so 
there had not been much time for a meaningful consultation process.  
Furthermore, the National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) process under the UNFCCC was 
described by one respondent as a “top-down kind of arrangement”.  Extensive stakeholder 
consultation did not appear to have taken place as this was “optional” rather than mandatory. 
They implied community involvement meant holding a meeting where stakeholders could 
merely endorse the existing plans.   
It was revealed from a donor interview that the Adaptation Fund had an enhanced process for 
stakeholder engagement: “Almost every meeting has a civil society meeting led by 
Germanwatch” and they were invited “to feed into the project proposals”. By contrast, the 
PPCR had less frequent meetings, but does have a stakeholder forum. One donor 
representative stated the PPCR was a programmatic process that was “not supposed to be 
imposed from the outside but the reality is that it is quite a lot”.  Under the PPCR, the donor 
also confirmed they were not using civil society to monitor directly but they were “invited to 
the sub-committee meetings”. 
The GEF representative argued their funds (LDCF, SCCF) had a “robust policy on public 
participation early on the project cycle” and projects were “reviewed against public 
participation and stakeholder consultation”. However, they recognised that even where 
projects were labelled as community-based they might not be: “it could be labelled as CBA 
but really a scam” so it was important to look at the quality of projects rather than the names. 
In terms of community ownership, the GEF representative recognised the benefits of smaller 
projects under the SGP: “formulation has to remain small to allow ownership of communities 
in implementation”. 
However, one international organisation representative highlighted the “problem of NGOs 
getting too involved… we need to ask, what is the role of civil society?” Another UN 
respondent argued “sometimes they [NGOs] are too vocal and sometimes not truthful… or 
governments are hiding something”.  They emphasised the need to balance governmental and 
civil society engagement. 
Few respondents raised the issue of local or sub-national government engagement. One 
example suggested by a respondent was the ‘LoCAL’ initiative by UNCDF which 
purposefully channels adaptation finance to local governments with the idea of building 
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capacity to tap into these funds.  Yet, one developing-country NGO argued; “most local 
governments some don’t see climate change as a challenge as they have so many issues they 
are battling with”. 
Overall, there appeared to be little progress in transparency and stakeholder participation, 
with concerns expressed by all stakeholders including fund representatives. The exception to 
this was the inclusive governance of the Adaptation Fund. 
10.3.16. Sustainability  
One African NGO argued national ownership was crucial for sustainability because “people 
understand the peculiarity within their own constituency and when the country owns such 
programmes then it makes it sustainable as they see it part of them”.  The Adaptation Fund 
respondent stated one of the fund’s review criteria was that applicants have to demonstrate 
how they will ensure long-term results beyond the project lifetime, including what 
government will contribute to maintain what is built, and how the project will be scaled-up 
and replicated. However, the respondent also explained it was “too early” to observe the 
results yet as no projects are fully completed. 
Only the respondent from IFAD highlighted the role of Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA) in sustainability of infrastructural projects. For example, a climate-resilient road which 
is more robust or has better drainage could cause damage to the environment, so “you need to 
check its impact”.  They gave the example of submersible roads in Bangladesh. The 
respondent also argued that adaptation processes are more sustainable by design: “adaptation 
is about dealing with change and buffering external shocks and surprises – so adaptive 
systems are more sustainable than not adaptive systems”.  Overall, however, there was 
insufficient information to draw conclusions regarding the progress on sustainability. 
10.3.17. Barriers and Challenges 
One donor highlighted capacity-building as the major challenge in scaling-up effective 
finance. They also argued education was a barrier, and “it’s also a behavioural thing - 
appetite for risk is a bottleneck… farmers don’t want to do things differently”.  Thus, they 
emphasised cognitive (social) barriers to adaptation. The respondent also argued “access to 
finance is a barrier”.  One UN representative also suggested it was important to consider 
cultural nuances and look at adaptation “from the perspective of those who have different 
perspectives and cultures”. 
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One donor respondent argued the main barriers and bottlenecks for adaptation financing were 
“capacity” and “procedures”.  The Adaptation Fund respondent argued; “The main 
bottleneck is the legal people having to look at contracts before agreements are 
signed…Disbursement itself is very easy to do. You press the button and money goes. There is 
a 9-12 month delay where the World Bank legal team goes through the contract and the 
clauses”.  Meanwhile, the IFAD respondent argued bottlenecks occurred due to human 
resources; “funds are disbursing very slowly… especially in cases where you have to 
establish a new project team”.  They stressed the need for a qualified project manager and 
M&E expert and for them to have training in processes like transparency procurement and 
reporting. 
One GEF respondent said there are “…no great barriers in scaling up horizontally. If we have 
money, we can do it”.  They argued “we have so many examples, we only need the money”.   
However, they said the major barrier was political will.  Other barriers were “knowledge and 
information” which were “removable barriers”.  They gave the example of traditional 
technologies for sustainable and climate-resilient land management in dryland Africa which 
have “been around for centuries” and questioned why they were not being adopted.  In that 
context, “knowledge is a barrier” and “land tenure issues may be a barrier to scaling up”.  
In terms of structural barriers to adaptation, a barrier that emerged unprompted from one 
interview was the issue of petrol subsidies in developing countries, with one UN official 
arguing “they need it”.  Another media respondent argued “subsidies continue to do damage,” 
however the same respondent stated they had not thought about the issue of subsidies in 
relation to adaptation. The IFAD respondent understood structural and trade barriers as a key 
impediment.  On the structural side, they felt people were investing in short-term gains at the 
expense of thinking long-term - a key barrier to sustainability.  They also highlighted the role 
of agricultural subsidies in industrialised countries which are “certainly an impediment to the 
growth of the agricultural sector in developing countries – it locks people into growing a 
narrow bandwidth of crops as they have a barrier to other ones they cannot export”. 
The IFAD respondent also raised the issue of the water-energy-food nexus as an emerging 
issue, and stated “poverty is not segmented into silos” – these issues “materialise not at the 
sector level but at the livelihood level – problems are much more interlinked there”. 
One NGO respondent, who was closely engaged with the GCF, argued trust was the main 
bottleneck: 
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“The core problem is there no trust the developed countries are actually going to provide 
finance – they haven’t given strong indications they will provide the money, and there’s lack 
of trust by developed countries who want to retain control over their money. Ownership and 
direct access, and devolving the decision-making authority make donors really nervous as 
they feel they are putting their money into a black hole. A lot of what we are hearing [at this 
conference] is we have to trust communities to manage money effectively and that is a 
message to donors. Yes, have monitoring and evaluation, but trust that recipients can manage 
this money because without that you end up with top-down donor-driven funds.” 
10.4. Feedback on Indicative Framework 
Following the international-level interviews, some of the interviewees were approached a 
second time to share the final refined version of the indicative framework for effective 
finance. The interviewees were approached based on their expertise in this regard, for 
instance, experts who were managing a major international fund.  One respondent from a 
major international adaptation fund highlighted that some of the principles are general criteria 
for development projects (like harmonisation, mainstreaming, efficiency, gender and 
sustainability); whilst others are more specific (like maladaptation, flexibility and targeting 
the most climate-vulnerable). The propositions could also be seen as on a continuum from 
development to adaptation-specific. Thus, a shortened list could include adaptation-specific 
criteria as follows:- 
 Equity and targeting the most vulnerable 
 Effectiveness in reducing vulnerability  
 Flexibility and robustness under different scenarios 
 Synergy/coherence with mitigation 
 Avoiding maladaptation 
 Transformation 
 Additionality to ODA 
 Adequacy and predictability 
In addition, one respondent suggested that resilience consists of robustness, recovering 
quickly and learning into a better state. Thus, they suggested adding ‘building adaptive 
capacity’ under effectiveness, and ‘learning from failure’ under the maladaptation criteria. 
They also suggested emphasising trackability under transparency.  These suggestions were 
added to the propositional statements and examples for operationalization in Chapter 7.   
292 
 
Furthermore, the respondent noted ‘urgency’ could be considered on the part of the funder – 
or for the receiver. They pointed out that applied criteria are different from these normative 
criteria, and political criteria often feed into donor’s allocation criteria, for instance, the 
donor’s target countries or the performance of the country. This led to a trade-off with 
capacity-building. 
10.5. Conclusions 
Evidence of the use of ‘hard bargaining’ tactics were evident in the UNFCCC negotiations 
with conflicts between developed-country donors and developing countries recipients.  This 
was to be expected from a realist interpretation of international relations.  Developing 
countries were pushing for direct access, transparency and equitability, while developed 
countries were pushing to reduce their financial obligations by any means, avoiding “scaling 
up” finance, and putting the onus on developing countries to demonstrate the results of 
finance provided.   Overall, political economy plays a major role at the UNFCCC and there 
was evidence of bargaining and negotiation tactics.  The discussions involved both 
distributive and procedural justice (Paavola, 2005). 
Different issues are interpreted differently by countries according to their interests. For 
example, on ‘additionality’, developing countries argued climate finance needs to be “new 
and additional” to development aid. However, due to a different conception of ‘additionality’ 
conception, the GEF’s SPA only funds the “additional – or incremental” benefit of a project, 
thus making it more difficult for recipients to apply for funding.   
In interviews with high-level stakeholders, it emerged the lack of progress in scaling up 
finance under the UNFCCC (including the delay in capitalising the GCF) could be driven by 
a ‘vicious cycle’ involving a lack of trust by developed countries, and concomitant lack of 
developing-country mitigation pledges. In essence, climate finance may be suffering from a 
‘chicken or the egg’ problem. Which will come first, strong mitigation commitments or 
climate finance pledges? 
One astute NGO respondent noticed that developing countries have not been vocally 
demanding public climate finance, perhaps for this very reason.  It appears we are on the cusp 
of a global ‘tragedy of the commons’ – a collective action problem in which neither 
developed nor developing countries have sufficient interest in tackling climate change due to 
the associated costs of doing so. 
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Analysis of interviews and relevant literature also highlighted another possible ‘vicious 
cycle’ in which the more public finance that is demanded, the more developed-country 
donors divert development aid away from conventional development needs.  However, it is 
quite possible this constrains the ability of developing countries to tackle the existing 
‘development deficit’ as it narrows the possible scope of activities which can be funded 
(Klein, 2010).  
The recent commitment for half of the funds under the GCF go to adaptation might have, 
ironically, made it easier for developed-countries to divert funds from ODA, since adaptation 
is more fungible with development.   Possible solutions would be for developed countries to 
increase their ODA commitment from 0.7% of GNI, or for increased transparency in climate 
finance reporting. 
The role of the private sector has also become central within discussions on the GCF, likely 
driven by the interests of donors to limit their public expenditure and count mobilised private 
investment towards their 2020 contributions. In the GCF, various respondents were hopeful 
about the potential for enhanced direct access and gender-sensitivity.  However, accrediting 
NDE’s for direct access may require implementation of a capacity-building “readiness” 
programme, much like that being rolled out in the Adaptation Fund.  Paradoxically, 
developing countries might access less overall finance this way (see Chapter 7 discussions on 
the Adaptation Fund).  There is potential for sub-national ‘direct access’ for cities or 
communities, although this might not be in the interests of the national state-actors 
negotiating at the UNFCCC.  
In terms of the research question on the progress in effectively financing adaptation, various 
stakeholders expressed concerns about lack of transparency, stakeholder engagement and 
over-stretched staff within GCF structures.  This may inhibit the ability of this politically-
important institution to learn lessons from other funds or build the trust of external 
stakeholders.  Respondents argued stakeholder engagement is vital for coordination and 
harmonisation, as well as sustainability and “scaling-up”.  If the GCF is to produce the 
mandated “paradigm shift” towards a climate-resilient low-carbon future, the research 
suggests it must pay greater attention to procedural justice. 
This study was limited by time and resources constraints, and provides a broad overview of 
some of the main considerations for effectiveness of international-level adaptation finance. 
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Future studies could go into detail in analysing particular adaptation funds, such as the GEF 
or PPCR, using these framework principles as a framework for analysis. 
10.6. Multi-Scalar Analysis: National-International and Local-International 
Linkages 
There were many linkages between the international-level and other levels. This section 
explores the linkages between the international and national-level analysis, and to a lesser 
extent, linkages between local and international-level.  
From the principles and components identified in the literature review, national ownership, 
coordination, urgency, adequacy, mainstreaming, stakeholder engagement and transparency 
of climate finance were discussed at both international and national scales.  In particular, 
many of these critical issues were mentioned specifically in the negotiations of the 
UNFCCC’s SCF.  However, different issues received more attention at international and 
national-level.  At international-level, the balance between adaptation and mitigation finance 
was a contentious debate, whereas at national-level in Bangladesh most key stakeholders 
supported the prioritisation of adaptation finance.  At international-level, the adequacy, 
predictability and additionality of climate finance were particularly high on the agenda due to 
the perceived inadequacy of financial flows, while at national-level a certain level of finance 
had already been allocated to Bangladesh. 
Various international-level respondents cited examples from Bangladesh, with one reflecting 
that the ‘private sector’ were not defined in Bangladesh’s PPCR discussions, and another 
criticising Bangladesh’s capacity to disburse climate finance. It emerged Bangladesh’s NIE 
was rejected by the Adaptation Fund and since then, they have not submitted a new 
application.  This could have implications for access to GCF funds, which involved direct 
access modalities.  Interestingly, one of the international respondents called for sub-national 
direct access mechanisms, an issue mentioned at both national and local scales. 
In terms of linkages of the local and national-level with the international-level, the issues of 
the difficulty of monitoring results, the prominent role of the World Bank, and the potential 
‘bias’ towards structural adaptation emerged at all three levels.  At international-level, the 
World Bank was selected as trustee of the GCF while at national-level the World Bank was 
overseeing the BCCRF.  
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International-level respondents highlighted social, resource-based, institutional, informational 
and structural barriers as barriers to adaptation and for scaling-up finance.  Key issues 
emerging at local-level included barriers to adaptation relating to gender rights, land rights 
and local governance.  However, as suggested in 9.6, these issues did not seem to be 
adequately considered at either international or national-scale.  Subsidies and cross-border 
issues were mentioned as barriers at national-scale but hardly mentioned at international-
level. This might suggest national and local respondents had more direct experience in 
implementing adaptation and were more adept at identifying barriers.   
Furthermore, the local-scale case showed that whilst some protection is offered by adaptation, 
loss and damage still occurs.  This suggests people may migrate if business-as-usual climate 
change projections continue, and demonstrates the importance of the emerging discussion on 
this issue at international-level. 
10.7. Synthesis of Progress at all Scales 
Following the research, an effort was made to assess the extent to which each of the criteria 
in the indicative framework for effective finance (see Section 7.7) was discussed at each 
level. Revisions to the framework were suggested in light of the evidence.  The results 
(Chapter 8-10) explored to what extent there was progress in satisfying these criteria. This 
answers the research question posed in Chapter 2 in terms of what progress across scales in 
terms of adaptation financing. Finally, policy recommendations are to be proposed in areas in 
which there was less progress. 
10.7.1. Discussion of framework principles at the three levels  
Overall, issues of adequacy and predictability of finance, urgency and timeliness, and 
additionality and mainstreaming came up more at international and national-level than at 
local-level.  However, it has to be recognised that just because a particular issue was not 
regularly discussed, it does not mean it is not important. For instance, local stakeholders did 
not discuss the adequacy of climate finance as they did not tend to have detailed knowledge 
about climate change, in general, or climate finance specifically.  Other issues such as 
feasibility were perhaps not discussed by local stakeholders due to the technicality of the 
issue. The analysis and findings were used to guide and inform the revised framework for 
effective adaptation finance (see Chapter 7). Some indicators might matter more than others; 
this is discussed further under weighting. 
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Table 10.1  Discussion of framework principles at the three levels 
 
This framework could provide decision criteria at fund-level or programme-level, in framing 
local-level programmes or as a set of exclusion criteria for determining whether a proposal is 
comprehensive.  Naturally, other criteria would come to light in choosing between adaptation 
options at project-level, for example cost-effectiveness or equity. It is important to distinguish 
between project and option decisions. For instance, stakeholder-focused cost-benefit analysis 
is one tool for determining between options (Section 8.3).  
10.7.2. Progress against the framework propositions at the three levels  
Subsequently, an effort was made to retrospectively analyse the level of progress against the 
propositional statements at the three scales (local, national and international), as shown in the 
table below, based on a qualitative judgement using all the data and evidence obtained during 
the research (see Section 8.4, Section  9.3 and Section 10.3).  This addresses the second 
research sub-question in Section 2.2. In several of the areas in which insufficient progress 
was identified, the discussion informed the resulting policy recommendations, which are to 
be outlined in the concluding chapter. 
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Table 10.2  Progress against the framework propositions at the three levels 
 
In summary, whilst there was more discussion of these criteria at the international than local-
scale, perhaps due to greater familiarity with these terms, there was deemed more progress on 
satisfaction of the propositions at local-scale.  This may be linked to insufficient information 
being available at the international scale. Yet, the information that was obtained at 
international-level (both interview and observational data) did point to concerns in relation to 
equity and transparency. Progress at national-level is also determined by international donors 
(see 9.5).  It may be that vulnerable stakeholders were able to input their knowledge and 
experience into the local-scale adaptation finance, thus ensuring ownership and equity. 
Furthermore, local-level knowledge and commitment on value-for-money by implementers 
might be higher than at international level.  However, one cannot generalise from the case 
studies, particularly since the local-scale case study was a CBA project, and results could be 
different with other case studies. 
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One media respondent argued; “both local and global [climate finance] is not transparent”.  
The study itself was therefore limited by availability of data and information on climate 
finance, including at the global level at UNFCCC and GCF meetings.  Although ‘new and 
additional’ finance had been promised at Cancun, concerns were raised in both the literature 
and respondent interviews that this came largely from loans or re-packaged development aid, 
potentially limiting its effectiveness. Further detailed analysis and policy recommendations 
are covered in the forthcoming chapter. 
10.7.3. Revising the framework 
As discussed under 10.4, some interviewees were approached to provide feedback on the 
framework. The framework could be further adapted to include only the list of directly 
adaptation-relevant criteria. In addition to these suggestions, the results in chapters 8-10 can 
be used to revise the framework for analysis (Chapter 7) could be improved; or ascertain 
whether there were any criteria missing or superfluous.  
Based on the prior analysis, the criteria on ‘practicality and feasibility’ can be considered as 
superfluous as there was little discussion on the issue at any of the scales.  The criteria could 
also be considered as being implicit in the rest of the set of indicators. However, individual 
project-level decisions on adaptation infrastructure would require a feasibility study, where 
needed, as well as a ‘fit-for-purpose’ test to determine where implementers or applicants are 
well-suited. 
At all scales, land tenure was an emerging issue in the results but was not incorporated into 
the framework. Based on these results, another additional criterion could be added to consider 
land-related risks. For instance, a criteria on ‘land risks’ could be included based on the 
proposition that to the extent that the project alters land tenure arrangements or poses risks 
for land-related insecurity for local communities, these risks should be taken into account. 
Furtermore, rather than being a separate criterion, land risks could also be incorporated under 
the operationalization of the equity criteria. 
10.7.4. Weighting of criteria 
The criteria could also be weighted to determine which criteria are most important at local-
level. Decisions on local projects might have to weight some criteria higher than others, for 
instance, equity, cost-effectiveness, gender and sustainability. Furthermore, for ‘hard’ or 
structural project types such as embankments (given in Section 8.3), criteria such as 
practicality, robustness, cost-effectiveness and equity might matter most.  At local-level, 
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additionality could be considered irrelevant as it is difficult to differentiate local-level 
adaptation from development (see Chapter 8).  However, issues relating to gender and equity 
were particularly apparent at local-level.   
At national-level, harmonisation and coordination could be particularly important as there 
may be several different sectors and funds working on similar tasks relating to adaptation (see 
Section 5.5).  Mainstreaming adaptation into development has been proposed as a solution 
(see Section 7.3) which could be particularly welcomed at national-level. At international-
level, it may be particularly important to consider issues relating to the adequacy and 
predictability of finance, as stakeholders highlighted the perceived importance of developed-
country donors fulfilling their international climate finance obligations under the UNFCCC in 
order to build trust.  The international-level case study gives some indication of how Parties 
to the COP would weigh the criteria.  National ownership was particularly important for 
developing countries as this has been a major point of discussion in the GCF.  TheThere were 
insufficient resources within the scope of this thesis to return to the case study areas to test 
these observations but this could be an area for potential future research.  
Furthermore, the preferences for weighting criteria may be different for different stakeholder 
groups. For example, marginalised groups may particularly emphasise equity in a weighting 
system.  There was evidence for this in the local case study (see 8.2.7) where several women 
interviewed were keen to discuss gender-related challenges. In weighting criteria, 
businesspeople might prioritise cost-effectiveness. Government officials may prioritise 
coordination in particular, as this is an institutional issue, but some officials might not put so 
much emphasis on stakeholder engagement as it requires additional resources. The weighting 
of criteria by different stakeholders would be an interesting topic for further research, which 
would require additional time and resources that were beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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10. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The projected impacts of climate change pose significant risks for sustainable development 
and global food security, including availability, stability, utilisation and access to food 
(Schmidhuber and Tubiello, 2007).   As detailed in Chapter 7, developed countries have 
agreed to scale-up climate finance to “USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the 
needs of developing countries” (UNFCCC, 2009; Art. 8). However, it is not yet clear how 
these funds will be mobilised or how they can be most effective. This research thesis utilised 
an innovative multi-scalar and interdisciplinary approach to analyse climate finance for 
adaptation at global, national and local levels.  Climate finance governance is occurring at 
multiple jurisdictional levels which interact with each other, while climate finance also 
involves flows of finance from international to national and local scales. 
The adequacy of the existing flows of finance has been called into question. The literature 
review revealed climate finance volumes have decreased in recent years since the end of the 
fast start finance period (2010-2012). Similarly, there are concerns that fast-start finance was 
not additional to development aid, limiting the extent to which developing-countries can 
address their climate-related needs, as well as the development deficit (see Chapter 7). 
Taking the local-level case of Kalapara (Chapter 8), where a community-based adaptation  
(CBA) project had been undertaken, it was found that climatic hazards are inter-related at 
local-level, making it difficult for people to prioritise between different adaptation needs.  
There was evidence of poverty traps resulting from climatic hazards: the cost of damage of 
Sidr was double an average household annual income. While interventions like constructing 
cyclone shelters (the first project under the national-level BCCRF) contribute to saving lives, 
there are clearly barriers to adaptation related to insufficient access resources.  Landlessness 
prevented some households from benefiting from improvements in agricultural productivity. 
The case demonstrated the importance of local governance in ensuring the sustainability of 
interventions. 
At national-scale (Chapter 9), Bangladesh provides an interesting case study as it suffers from 
food insecurity and is highly vulnerable to climate change, but has embarked on various 
adaptation interventions.  Chapter 5 reviewed financial and policy responses to climate 
change in Bangladesh.  The institutional set-up includes a nationally-funded Trust Fund 
(BCCTF) and multilateral Resilience Fund (BCCRF).  There appeared to be limited progress 
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in addressing gender equity, maladaptation risks or in private sector engagement. However, 
there has been better progress in mainstreaming adaptation into development, and addressing 
urgent needs such as cyclone shelters, as perceived priorities aligned with local perceptions.  
At international-scale (Chapter 10), the climate finance negotiations under the UNFCCC 
were characterised by hard (conflictive) bargaining strategies and continued divisions 
between developed and developing countries.  In summary, developing countries were 
pushing for ‘direct access’, transparency and equitability, while developed countries were 
trying to generally limit their financial liability by removing references to ‘adequacy’ of 
finance, and placing the onus on developing countries to demonstrate results.   The research 
demonstrates that the power relations exhibited in this context impact adversely on the 
negotiations. Transparency may be crucial for building trust between countries. 
11.1. Research Questions 
A number of sub-questions were asked in the methodology chapter in order to explore the 
primary research question: ‘In what ways can climate finance across scales (international, 
national, and local) effectively ensure food security under climate change?’  Following on 
from 10.7, this chapter attempts to summarise the responses to these questions, which are 
answered implicity and explicitly throughout the thesis. 
In terms of the first sub-question which asked ‘what issues should be taken into consideration 
in evaluating the effectiveness of adaptation finance?’ it was found a broad range of key 
issues must be taken into consideration in assessing the effectiveness of climate finance (see 
Chapter 7).  From the principles and components identified in the literature review, national 
ownership, coordination, urgency, adequacy, mainstreaming, stakeholder engagement and 
transparency of climate finance were discussed at both international and national scales.  
Many of these issues were mentioned specifically in the SCF negotiations at the UNFCCC 
(see Annex XXI). As outlined in 10.7, different issues received attention at different levels.  
Equity was considered crucial for effectiveness at all levels, including targeting the most 
climate-vulnerable stakeholders.  At international-level, adaptation and mitigation finance 
were separate, whereas at national and local-level in Bangladesh several stakeholders 
identified synergies between the two priorities.   
It was hypothesised that channelling climate finance in an appropriate and effective manner 
will be an institutional and governance challenge, as well as a logistical challenge. This 
hypothesis was confirmed in the national-level case study of Bangladesh, where issues of 
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national ownership, coordination, harmonisation and transparency appeared to be interlinked 
(see 9.5). 
The second sub-question asked ‘what progress has been made across scales (local, national, 
international) in effectively financing adaptation?’  Results chapters 8-10 answer this 
question. During the research it was found that at various scales, there was insufficient 
progress against certain criteria (see Section 10.7.2).  Although it is not possible to generalise 
from these case studies, there appeared to be better progress in addressing issues of equity, 
gender, cost-effectiveness and ownership of adaptation financing in the local-level case study 
than at national or international-level (see Table 10.2). It may be that vulnerable stakeholders 
were better able to input their knowledge and experience into financing decisions at this 
level.  Furthermore, more information was available in greater detail. Further research is 
needed to identify the unique or generalizable elements of this case study. 
At national-level, there appears to have been considerable progress in addressing urgent 
needs (such as building cyclone shelters) and these needs were verified at local-level. There 
had been less progress in consideration of gender or maladaptive risks, or in terms of national 
ownership, as this was hindered by donors’ capacity concerns. The study suggests 
international adaptation finance institutions like the Green Climate Fund (GCF) would do 
well to learn lessons from CBA initiatives and adopt bottom-up processes to better identify 
local or national needs. 
11.2. Policy Recommendations  
This section answers the final research question ‘what kinds of frameworks, institutions and 
policies are recommended to facilitate effective adaptation financing across scales?’  In 
Chapter 1, the study set out to contribute to human knowledge in this field. Whilst the 
research did not go as far as it could have in fully examining the topic - due to time and 
resource constraints – the study did address three levels of analysis (local, national and 
international).  The findings were used to inform the forthcoming policy recommendations. 
Overall, the research demonstrates a criteria-based framework such as the one outlined in 
Chapter 7 could be used to enhance the effectiveness of fund-level decision criteria or post-
project evaluation.  
Local engagement 
As posited in the literature review (Chapter 4), local households in Kalapara tended to adapt 
to climate-related risks in an integrated way making it difficult to distinguish between 
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'adaptation' and 'development'. Due to uncertainty in climate projections, it is recommended 
that fund managers should assess adaptation proposals against local priorities in order to use 
resources effectively. At both local and national-level, local government engagement is 
important for project sustainability. It is recommended that national climate funds in 
Bangladesh engage more fully with local government, including capacity-building on 
financial management and DRR. Sub-national direct access to climate finance could assist in 
this regard, whilst national-level decentralisation could enhance local governance capacity. 
Guidelines and criteria for international climate finance must not assume local stakeholders 
either do or do not have a preference for concrete (structural or ‘hard’) adaptation. The local-
level case (Chapter 8) demonstrated households had an interest in ‘hard’ or tangible 
adaptation options. However, as the broken sluice-gate demonstrated, ‘hard’ structural 
measures must be backed by institutional support to enable long-term sustainability. For 
researchers, taking a systemic approach can help identify local barriers to adaptation. 
Gender and Equity 
In terms of gender equity, it is recommended that adaptation practitioners at all levels 
mainstream gender sensitivity into adaptation finance and planning. This could include 
application of gender analysis at project design stages, as well as gender-disaggregated 
results indicators, and participatory monitoring processes (see UNDP, 2010).  In terms of 
equity, vulnerability indices were not being used at national-level to guide allocation of 
adaptation finance to the most vulnerable regions or groups. These should be used by policy-
makers in future. 
Ownership and Capacity at National-Level 
Whilst direct access modalities have been praised for enhancing ownership, there are also 
challenges because vulnerable countries or groups often have a lower capacity to access 
funds (see 10.3.11).  In Bangladesh, progress is needed in improving fiduciary standards, 
human resources and possibly civil service reform to ensure retention of skilled staff. 
Frequent travel to international conferences and workshops reduces the numbers of available 
in-country staff (see 9.3).  It is recommended that international organisations make an effort 
to reduce the international travel burden on limited staff.  Coordination between the BCCRF 
and BCCTF also remains challenging. At international and national scales, national or sub-
national direct access to climate finance has been promoted. A programme of capacity-
building is required to assist institutions to apply. Respondents initially suggested the GCF 
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should undertake a ‘readiness’ programme for National Designated Authorities (NDAs), and 
this programme is now underway. 
Monitoring and evaluation 
Monitoring and evaluation of adaptation initiatives are needed, but overall, a balance between 
oversight and flexibility is needed. Over-emphasis on monitoring of results can put a strain 
on limited resources. In particular, economic analysis can be burdensome, while the local-
level case showed cost-benefit analysis can be simplistic because of the exclusion of non-
economic factors. A flexible and stakeholder-oriented approach to cost-benefit analysis is 
therefore recommended (see Nay et al., 2014).   
In terms of monitoring implementation, community monitoring of embankment construction 
is an excellent example of how to prevent corruption because community monitoring and 
oversight provides an evidence base for project execution throughout the project execution 
process. Furthermore, the analysis suggests the SLF may form a useful basis for developing 
metrics and indicators for measuring local-level adaptive capacity. 
It is also recommended that the GCF pays attention to learning from the experiences of 
existing funds like the Adaptation Fund, CIFs and IFAD.  Respondents expressed concerns 
that this is currently not happening.   Since adaptation is a continuous process of learning, 
effective adaptation will mean learning from failures as well as successes in order to avoid 
maladaptation. 
Mitigation and adaptation synergies 
While adaptation and mitigation are divided into ‘silos’ at international-level, respondents at 
all scales suggested a need to build synergies between them, which could enhance 
cooperation and reduce duplication, as well as potentially increasing cost-effectiveness.  At 
local-scale, an engineer in Kalapara noticed afforested embankments gave greater protection 
in the event of cyclones. Such projects (including ecosystem-based adaptation) have 
enhanced co-benefits, but are not prioritised at present by national funds.   In Bangladesh, it 
is recommended the government considers integrating an afforestation element into 
embankment projects to enhance coastal resilience.  
Multiple adaptation-mitigation synergies exist, as well as inter-linkages with global food 
security, for example in terms of management and enhancement of terrestrial and soil carbon. 
These synergies provide an opportunity to make better use of scarce financial resources. It is 
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recommended that bodies such as FAO, CCAFS and IFAD consider the economic, social and 
environmental benefits of such interface opportunities. Furthermore, there are synergetic 
opportunities for achievement and financing of SDGs on food security and climate change. 
International funds like the GCF can benefit from enhancing adaptation and mitigation 
synergies. At international-level, the GCF’s recent decision to allocate 50% of climate 
finance to adaptation “over time” (GCF, 2014b:4) is thought to have been arrived at based on 
principles and political expediency, rather than an evidence-based analysis of global 
mitigation or adaptation needs. Adaptation commitments are easier to meet from existing 
development aid and adaptation finance is restricted to a smaller set of activities than 
development aid (Klein, 2010), which could undermine adaptive capacity. Furthermore, the 
less we mitigate, the more we must adapt. It is therefore recommended the GCF use 
evidence-based research to estimate what proportion of the $100Bn commitment should go 
towards adaptation or mitigation, rather than making an assumption half should go to each. 
Furthermore, the GCF should maximise adaptation-mitigation synergies to ensure effective 
use of resources. 
Transparency  
Limited transparency within international climate finance governance could have enabled 
donors to avoid adequate provision of ‘additional’ finance. Transparency was highlighted as a 
cross-cutting issue at all scales. Thus, enhanced transparency on reporting and tracking 
climate finance is recommended, as well as clear policies related to governance to avoid 
corruption as this is vital for encouraging confidence in investments. In Bangladesh, criticism 
by Transparency International might be one reason the Government cut funds under the 
BCCTF (Trust, 2014).  This could impact on Bangladesh’s capacity-building efforts. For civil 
society, constructive criticism should be balanced with the need to support governmental 
adaptation efforts, giving them a chance to learn from failures so impacts can be monitored. 
At international-level, within UNFCCC and GCF Board meetings, climate-vulnerable 
developing countries often failed to have their interests recognised. Enhancing procedural 
justice within the negotiations could enable these countries to convey their interests regarding 
the adequate and timely provision of climate finance, as well as building trust. It is 
recommended donors and civil society organisations continue to support developing-country 
negotiation capacity-building. Enhancing transparency at the UNFCCC could also enable 
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civil-society groups and media to be better informed and hence put additional pressure on 
developed-country decision-makers to provide adequate finance.  
Additionality and adequacy 
The slow progress in operationalizing the GCF may be rooted back to efforts by developed-
countries to limit their financial obligations. This demonstrates the need for increased 
advocacy and media attention, as noted above. Diverting development aid to climate change 
could also limit adaptive capacity in developing countries. As well as improving tracking of 
climate finance as distinct from development aid, one proposed solution is for OECD 
countries to agree an increase their ODA from the target of 0.7% of GNI to a higher level, 
incorporating climate change.  Mid-term targets to scale-up to $100Bn have also been 
proposed. 
Transformational impact  
The need for ‘transformation’ (see IPCC, 2014) demonstrates the need to mobilise private 
action, but civil society stakeholders expressed concerns this has become an excuse to avoid 
public finance obligations. However, public and private finance are not synonymous or 
interchangeable. Achieving the GCF’s goal of promoting a “paradigm shift towards low-
emission and climate-resilient development pathways” (UNFCCC, 2011b; Art. 2) will require 
an effective process, as well as increased volumes of climate finance.  This research 
highlights the need for effective stakeholder engagement processes to ensure ownership by 
beneficiaries and ensure long-term sustainability of results. Fund managers must also ensure 
timely disbursement mechanisms are in place. 
Overall, adaptation practices must be supported by an enabling environment (structural, 
regulatory or legislative environment) and the same applies to adaptation finance.  The 
household survey showed landless agricultural labourers are a vulnerable and food-insecure 
group. Yet, these groups are not specifically targeted by funds focused on ‘smallholder 
farmers’ or agricultural productivity. Issues such as land tenure security, gender, and local 
government capacity were identified as determinants of vulnerability at local and national-
level, but these issues cannot be addressed through a project or programme-based approach to 
adaptation. This emphasises the need for what the IPCC (2014) describes as 
“transformational adaptation” that is adopted at a much larger (national or international) 
scale. Policy-makers and development practitioners must consider structural and legal 
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measures that target landless groups, for example land reform or provision of enhanced social 
protection. 
Finally, global structural barriers to adaptation, such as trade barriers, were identified in the 
literature review. However, interviewees from international climate finance community did 
not appear to have adequately considered these issues. There is a need to reconcile post-2015 
goals with trade disciplines.  In particular, renewed focus on the WTO’s Development Round 
might have benefits for enhancing the adaptive capacity of climate-vulnerable farmers in 
developing countries. Both agricultural and fossil-fuel subsidies are cited as examples of 
important barriers to climate-resilient low-carbon economies which require renewed focus. 
To have wider, more sustainable and ‘transformational’ impact, the GCF must recognise the 
importance of broader ‘enabling environments’ as drivers or constraints to food security 
under climate change. These issues require structural, legal and/or governance interventions 
to enhance the adaptive capacity and food security of vulnerable groups, for example, 
strengthening local governance, gender equality, and land reform as a part of national 
adaptation planning. Transnationally, progress on reducing barriers to trade, and eliminating 
perverse subsidies should be taken forward by fora including the G7, OECD and WTO. 
11.3. Research Limitations 
As with any research, there were limitations and drawbacks.  The case study methodology 
has particular limitations, as a small number of cases were explored from which conclusions 
were drawn. Thus, it is not possible to generalise to other countries or similar locations. 
Furthermore, time and resource constraints limited the number of observations that could be 
made.  If the research had been extended over a longer period, it could have encompassed 
different geographical regions or cases.  This is left for future research. 
Another limitation related to data availability. Information on international and national 
climate finance was not always readily accessible or transparently reported. UNFCCC 
negotiations on climate finance were similarly opaque which limited access to information as 
an observer. For example, few meetings were webcast. This meant research had to be 
conducted using participant observation and semi-structured interviews. Another limitation 
was the potential for interview bias. Respondents, particularly at local-level, could have had 
an incentive to exaggerate the extent to which they were affected by climatic hazards with the 
prospect of enhancing future support. These limitations were acknowledged at an early stage 
and dealt with to the fullest extent possible (see Chapter 2).  
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To address challenges relating to local dialectical differences, it is recommended future 
researchers adopt the approach taken here of scoping and piloting local questionnaires prior 
to actual research, testing local nuances of terms such as ‘climate’ and ‘livelihoods’, as well 
as using local translators.  Information was triangulated wherever possible. The 
methodological approaches were selected for the various benefits for the research, noting the 
trade-off with potential drawbacks, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
11.4. Future Research Needs 
Several interesting issues were raised during the course of the research which could not be 
explored further due to time and resource constraints.  Interestingly, it was suggested there 
are maladaptation risks related to resettlement of landless people resulting from infrastructure 
projects. Further research is required on this issue. Emerging national-level issues like cross-
border water management, land rights, micro-insurance, and local governance could also 
benefit from further research on ‘transformational’ adaptation options.  At local-level, local 
issues dominate so further research is required in other cases to understand which issues have 
broader relevance. 
Evidence-based research can enhance the effectiveness of adaptation finance disbursement, 
although, as one respondent noted, the resource and time burden of research must be taken 
into consideration. Furthermore, action must not be delayed by the absence of perfect data. 
The research suggests adaptive learning will be important for adaptation to climate change, 
including learning lessons from failures. Hence, further research is required to explore a 
broader range of case studies that appear less effective in enhancing adaptive capacity, 
enhancing the knowledge base for lessons for policy-makers on effective adaptation to 
climate change.  Future research is needed explore how different stakeholders prioritise the 
criteria within the framework of analysis.  As described in 7.7, objective tests for each 
indicator can be applied if sufficient information is available, for example, using cost-benefit 
analysis. Furthermore, the innovative multi-level methodology could be applied to other 
national or international funds, such as the Adaptation Fund, if data is available, which will 
provide useful lessons for the GCF. 
Finally, further research is needed on synergies and interconnections between adaptation and 
mitigation to ensure the best use of climate finance. This emerged as a research gap which 
has not been fully considered by the international funds. Moreover, the GEF has not yet 
evaluated the mitigation co-benefits of their adaptation projects.  With the post-2015 
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Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) incorporating food security, climate change and 
resilience, as well as energy and water security, there are opportunities to understand how 
climate and development finance could contribute to multiple goals simultaneously, to 
enhance the effective use of finance and resources.   
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Annex II: Theoretical Conflicts and Synergies between Adaptation and 
Mitigation 
From the literature review, it was observed that at the global level developed countries are 
supporting mitigation efforts which could have detrimental impacts on the most vulnerable, 
for instance, if biofuel expansion leads to land grabs. In addition, agricultural development 
can result in slight increases in emissions that, but for reasons of equity, it is argued the most 
vulnerable should not be required to reduce emissions. The literature review was used to 
generate theoretical examples of policy inconsistences, in terms of conflicts between 
adaptation and mitigation, as well as synergetic examples of integrated solutions, as shown in 
the table below. 
Level Conflict between 
adaptation/mitigation 
Opportunities for Adaptation/Mitigation 
Synergies 
Global  CDM or CSA projects that 
insufficiency consider local 
vulnerability 
 Large hydro dams that reduce 
downstream sediment 
deposition and thus exacerbate 
sea level rise 
 Biofuel demand impacts on 
food security 
 Agricultural subsidies in OECD 
countries with environmental 
justifications that reduce trade 
options for poor countries 
 CDM projects with co-benefits for 
adaptation 
 Corporate strategies for supply chain 
sustainability 
 CSA projects that support the most 
vulnerable farmers 
 Green growth through 
international/regional trade or 
collaboration 
National  Mitigation costs impact on 
development capacities or 
reduce levels of ODA 
 Removal of energy subsidies 
might impact on poor (e.g. for 
agriculture impacts food 
security in short term); in long-
term energy subsidies may 
increase vulnerability 
 Climate-proofing development projects 
such as Hydro projects 
 Pro-poor mitigation policies and 
strategies or ‘green growth’ 
Local  Increased use of 
fertiliser/pesticides or over-
irrigation for agricultural 
development (maladaptation) 
 Projects requiring vulnerable 
people to relocate, e.g. 
hydropower/land-grabs for 
bioenergy. 
 Water and irrigation efficiency 
 Agricultural input 
efficiency/Sustainable intensification 
 Reducing food waste losses 
 Pro-poor mitigation technologies 
 Turning farm waste into energy 
 Energy-efficient stoves 
 AWD rice production 
337 
 
Annex III:  Mitigation in Agriculture 
In terms of mitigation, there has been particular emphasis on the production stage of the food 
chain. Options for agricultural mitigation include improved crop and grazing land 
management (e.g. nutrient use, tillage), and restoration of organic soils and degraded lands 
(IPCC, 2007a).  Improved livestock and manure management also has significant potential 
(ibid).  FAO has thus begun to promote ‘Climate-Smart Agriculture’ (CSA) (see 3.8).  The 
global technical and biophysical mitigation potential of agriculture is a massive 5500-
6000MT Co2e y-1, although this would never be realized in reality (IPCC, 2007a). 89% of 
the mitigation potential is from reduced CO2 soil emissions, 9% is from methane mitigation 
and 2% from N2O mitigation.   In the production phase of agricultural systems, there are 
GHG emissions from fertiliser usage and other inputs. Fertilizer emissions are the largest 
single source of agricultural emissions, accounting for 38% (Stern, 2007b). Fertiliser 
production contributes to around 1.2% of global GHG emissions (Wood and Cowie, 2004).  
Livestock is the second largest source of agricultural emissions (31%), whilst wetland rice 
cultivation accounts for 11%, due to emissions from anaerobic digestion (Stern, 2007b).   
Post-harvest GHG emissions per unit of consumption have been found to depend mainly on 
transport efficiency rather than distance travelled (Lybbert and Sumner, 2010). Although 
‘food miles’ have been proposed as an indicator of food’s environmental impact, and there 
have been calls to promote local food sourcing, studies have found transportation often makes 
up a small percentage of emissions in life cycle assessments (LCA) of food chains (Edwards-
Jones et al., 2008; Weber and Matthews, 2008). Dietary shifts away from meat products may 
make more difference than local sourcing (Weber and Matthews, 2008). There are also 
efficiencies from mass production (Coley et al., 2009).  Recent studies also link over-
consumption and obesity with climate change (Furlow, 2013) highlighting the links between 
dietary choices and ecological impacts. 
There is medium confidence there will be increases in agriculture emissions as diets change 
and population growth increases food demand (IPCC, 2007a).  The share of animal products 
in the diet has increased in developing countries by over 5%/year from 1967-1997, whereas it 
remained roughly constant in developed countries (ibid).  Conversion of plant matter into 
animal matter is inefficient in energy terms, with an efficiency of only ~10% (Godfray et al., 
2010).  Currently, about 1/3 of global cereal production is fed to animals.  Thus, more people 
could be supported from the same land area if the people adopted a vegetarian diet or lowered 
their meat intake (ibid). 
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Annex IV: Measuring Risk and Adaptive Capacity 
Overall, risk is mathematically formulated as a function of both likelihood and impact:- 
Risk = Likelihood x Impact 
According to Luers et al (2003), one measure of vulnerability could be:- 
Vulnerability = (sensitivity to stress/state relative to threshold) X prob. of exposure to stress 
By contrast, the IPCC Vulnerability Index (IPCC-VI) uses the following formula:  
IPCC-VI = (exposure index – adaptive capacity index) x sensitivity index  
(Lamichhane, 2010). 
Hence, methods to assess vulnerability vary.  Lamichhane (2010) argues that the indicators 
used to calculate this vulnerability index can be specific to the research site and sub-
components may be developed in collaboration with local people.  Another method that has 
been used to assess vulnerability over an area is using GIS (Metzger et al., 2004).  In this 
case, the areas exposed to potential impacts are overlapped with the map of the areas with 
lowest adaptive capacity in order to produce a map of ‘vulnerability’. An adaptive capacity 
index in this context can be based on a conceptual framework of socio-economic indicators, 
determinants and components of adaptive capacity, e.g. GDP per capita, female activity rate, 
income inequality, number of patents, and age dependency ratio (Metzger et al., 2004).  
However, it can also be argued selection of these ‘adaptive capacity’ indicators is, by nature, 
somewhat subjective.  It is not clear to what extent adaptive capacity can be quantitatively 
measurable, nor to what extent the indicators used to define adaptive capacity are cross-
comparable across different locations and countries.   
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Annex V: Sustainable Livelihoods Framework 
In the sustainable livelihood framework (below), adapted from DFID (1999), it is shown that 
the livelihood assets are made up of human, social, natural, physical and financial capital. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from DFID, 1999. 
The sustainable livelihoods concept was developed by Robert Chambers and Gordon Conway 
in 1991 as a basis for development programs and practices. Following on from this work the 
‘sustainable livelihoods approach’ (SLA) was used by DFID.  Knutsson and Ostwald (2006) 
argue that it has primarily been used conceptually. In terms of the vulnerability context, 
DFID (1999b) breaks the context down into the following three categories:- 
1) Trends; including population trends, resource trends (including conflict), economic 
trends, governance trends and technological trends 
2) Shocks; including health shocks, natural and environmental shocks, economic shocks, 
conflict, crop and livestock health shocks 
3) Seasonality; of prices, production, health and employment opportunities. 
The approach identifies five main types of capital assets (Jones et al., 2010; DFID, 1999b):-  
Asset Type Examples 
Human Capital Health, nutrition, education, knowledge and skills 
Social Capital Networks, connections, trust and support, formal and informal groups, common rules, 
collectives, extended family 
Physical  Capital Infrastructure, shelter, tools, materials, energy, communications and technologies 
Natural Capital Access to land and produce, foods, water , biodiversity, trees and forest produce, 
vegetation, ecosystem services 
Financial Capital Savings, credit, income, pensions and wages 
The vulnerability context has a direct impact on people’s asset status and livelihood options 
and climatic change can be seen as one aspect of the vulnerability context. 
- Shocks 
- Trends 
- Seasonality 
Livelihood 
Assets 
Livelihood 
Strategies 
- More income 
- Increased well-being 
- Reduced 
vulnerability 
- Improved food 
security 
- More sustainable 
use of resource base 
Transforming 
Structures and 
Processes 
Structures 
- Levels of  
government 
- Private           - Laws 
sector          - Policies 
                - Culture 
             - Institutions 
 
        Processes 
 
Influence 
& access 
 
S 
P 
H 
N 
F 
Vulnerability 
Context 
 
Livelihood 
Outcomes 
 
Key:  
H = Human Capital, N = Natural Capital, F = Financial Capital, 
P = Physical Capital, S = Social Capital 
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Annex VI: Observed Climate Data for Patuakhali 
Historical Temperature Data   (Source: http://data.giss.nasa.gov/ ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the grid coordinates for Patuakhali (22.35 N and 90.31 E) in Barisal Division, the 
following data was obtained for average monthly rainfall and temperature from 1900-2009. 
Data from 1900-2009:    Data from 1900-1930: 
Data from 1960-1990:    Data from 1990-2009: 
 
Source: World Bank, 2012 
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Annex VII: Vulnerable Infrastructure in Kalapara, Patuakhali 
 
Vulnerable infrastructures in Patuakhali (Source: CDMPR, 2008) 
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Vulnerable infrastructures in Kala Para Upazila (Source: CDMPR, 2008) 
 
Spatial distribution map of tsunami vulnerable infrastructures for Kalapara upazila 
(Polders 44, 46, and 47) Sources: http://www.cdmprm.org.bd/eq/8.pdf     
During local interviews with BWDB, it was found the Polder number in the study 
village is Polder 47/5 Section 1. 
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Annex VIII: Sea Level Rise (SLR) Attribution 
Shum and Kuo (2011) point out the currently observed SLR is approximately 1.8-2.2mm/ 
year from 1900 to the present day, higher than the IPCC’s estimates, and geophysical 
contributors include glacial isostatic adjustment and anthropogenic effects from dams.  
Global SLR has been estimated by multiple-mission satellite radar altimetry (ibid).  Khan et 
al (2000) found the mean tide level at Hiron Point (Sunderbans region) has shown a trend of 
2.5mm/year increase in May and 8.5mm/yr increase in November, whilst in Cox Bazar there 
has been a positive trend of 4.3mm/yr in May and 10.9mm/yr in November.   During the 
cyclone months of May and November, there is an increase in the sea level increment.    In 
the region as a whole, SLR in South Asia (Pakistan and India) is reported to be about 
1mm/year (Ali, 1996). The SLR (mean tide level) trend is more rapid in Cox Bazar, along the 
east coast, whilst magnitude of SST trend is slightly higher along the west coast. 
Alam (1996) argues in the Ganges-Brahmaputra Delta, the area at the Hazipur Well was 
subsiding rapidly at a rate of 2.2cm/year while the Hatiya Trough, Faridpur Trough and 
Sylhet Trough may be subsiding at higher rates.  Between 1959-82, there was a seaward 
growth (accretion) at the Noakhali coastline, perhaps due to increased soil erosion, 
deforestation or changes in the estuary circulation (ibid) but this accretion may also be caused 
by ‘channel migration’ meaning accreted land is offset by erosion elsewhere.  The data taken 
from Hazipur Well showed the rate of subsidence in the basin was 2.2cm/year since the base 
of Holocene 10,000 years ago (Alam, 1996).  The resultant rate of subsidence varies, and is 
found to be about 0.65mm/year around Dhaka City whereas it may exceed 20mm/year in the 
Sylhet trough and may be over 30mm/year at Hayita Trough (ibid).  It is argued quantitative 
data can be difficult to find. Alam (1996) estimates that 1.33 billion tons of sediment 
discharge per year through the rivers is needed to balance the subsidence of Bangladesh, and 
that sediment balance is unbalanced.   
Furthermore, certain records should be treated with caution, since the relative water level 
from some records can be contaminated by subsistence or other factors like tectonic land 
level changes (Watson, 2011). It is possible for gauges to be fitted with continuous global 
positioning system (CGPS) instruments, a precision-level technology to gain accurate data on 
vertical movement.   The information is likely to become more accurate with further use of 
this technology. 
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IPCC data showed that in the upper range of projections, global SLR by 2050 would be 
32cm, and by 2100 would be 88cm (Mohal et al., 2006).  Using this data, the NAPA team 
based at Bangladesh’s Institute of Water Modelling estimated about 11% more land would be 
permanently inundated over the next century (Mohal et al., 2006).  However the model has its 
limitations as it is a fixed model that does not include processes of land subsidence, erosion 
or accretion (ibid).  According to modelling by Tol (2007) using the FUND model, 
Bangladesh is one of the most vulnerable countries to SLR.  10% of the dryland in 
Bangladesh will be lost by 2100 which amounts to 5% of GDP (ibid).   Wetlands in 
Bangladesh are more exposed, with 46% of wetland being lost by 2100. As with most studies, 
the study stops at 2100 although SLR will extend beyond this. The problem demonstrates 
adaptation and mitigation ought to be studied together.  
World Bank (2010a) argue the impacts of cyclones will also be made worse by a potential 
SLR of 27cm by 2050. Dasgupta et al (2011) approximated 27cm of SLR and 10% 
intensification of wind speed by 2050.  Mohal et al (2006) estimated an increase of wind 
speed over 10% of the 1991 severe cyclone would increase the storm surge level by 1.7m 
along the eastern coast of Bangladesh.   
Figure showing the 33 sea-facing and 26 
interior polders calculated by Dasgupta et 
al., (2011) to be likely to be overtopped by 
2050.   
To identify which polders were likely to be 
overtopped by storm surges in a changing 
climate, the study used the differences 
between the crest level of the embankment 
for each polder and inundation depths 
projected for 2050 (ibid). The database of 
coastal polders is maintained by the BWDB. 
Ericson et al (2006) found the effective SLR in megadeltas increases the populations’ 
vulnerability to coastal erosion and land loss, combined with human pressure. They used a 
modelling approach to estimate the rate of SLR (ibid).  Construction of dams and reservoirs, 
which intercept the suspended sediment flux, as well as groundwater extraction, decrease the 
net sediment load of rivers and led to land loss which is compounded by the predicted 
increase of SLR due to climate change (Ericson et al., 2006).  Crop farming and associated 
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erosion have actually increased sediment delivery. However, mining of aggregate for 
construction, as well as competition for water resources and irrigation both reduce the 
transport of sediment which has been a key contributor to coastal erosion.  Therefore, coastal 
erosion is a complex process. Various factors are summarised below.  ‘Accelerated 
subsidence’ also occurs due to the extraction of groundwater or petroleum which leads to 
compaction of sediment (ibid).  As effective SLR increases, the delta becomes more 
vulnerable to cyclonic surge, salinity, inundation, flooding and erosion. 
Factors leading to Coastal Erosion/Land loss Factors leading to Seaward Growth 
(Accretion) 
Natural subsidence due to sediment compaction Natural growth (accretion) of sediment deposited 
by flowing water (alluvial sediment) 
Natural subsidence of the sedimentary basin 
(tectonic subsidence) 
Tectonic uplift/isostatic uplift (e.g. from glacial 
melt) 
Mining of aggregate for construction Upstream mining of aggregate leading to 
sediment delivery 
Pressure on water resources/unsustainable 
groundwater use and irrigation 
Channel migration as accretion is offset by 
erosion elsewhere  
Construction of dams and reservoirs (e.g. the 
Farakka Dam) resulting in loss of fluvial input 
Measures increasing water use efficiency so 
downstream river discharge increases 
Local groundwater or petroleum abstraction Deforestation (upstream) leading to sediment 
delivery 
Measures to avoid soil erosion in farming Crop farming and associated soil erosion leading 
to sediment delivery 
Deforestation of coastal mangrove (e.g. to shrimp 
aquaculture) 
Protection of coastal mangrove forest 
Factors leading to land loss or gain. Source: Adapted from Ericson et al (2006), Alam 
(1996), Pokhrel et al (2012) and others. 
 
The literature thus points to the range of anthropogenic and natural factors influencing coastal 
erosion, and effective SLR, and complexity in isolating the climate signal. The table above 
also offers innovative ideas for reducing some of the pressures leading to coastal erosion, 
such as reducing upstream dam construction and mangrove deforestation, which would 
counteract SLR in the face of climate change.  The literature suggests that measures to 
encourage sediment accretion would protect against SLR, such as planting mangrove trees, 
since established mangroves hasten the rate of sediment deposition by forming sediment traps 
in their root systems (Pernetta, 1993). 
Attempts have been made by economists in the realm of climate change finance to isolate the 
impact of climate change, and thus adaptation, from other factors in order to determine the 
costs.  However, Watson (2011) explains the difficulty in isolating the climate signal from the 
range of other dynamic factors affecting ocean water levels. Costing climate change is made 
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difficult by the range of other environmental stressors involved. For instance, over a year the 
level can be affected by seasonal factors, weather systems, and variability of the ocean water 
temperature and salinity. Over long time scales of up to ten years, ENSO phenomenon also 
affects water levels.  Difficulty therefore arises in attempting to isolate the climate change 
signal from dynamic influences, operating over different timescales and spatial scales 
(Watson, 2011). Longer records of over 25-60 years are recommended as guidance to 
eliminate such signals.  Palmer et al (2007) similarly found that it was difficult to isolate the 
effect of climate change from other sources of variability on ocean temperatures.  Other 
anthropogenic factors contribute to SLR, like unsustainable water use and groundwater 
extraction for irrigation, which Pokhrel et al (2012) argues have a greater contribution on 
SLR than climate change.  
In 1990, a Bangladesh Task Force estimated sea level changes would be 90% due to SLR and 
just 10% due to subsidence (Ali, 1996).  Ericson et al (2006) use the figure of 4.6mm/year as 
the mean effective SLR in Asia, but for the purposes of the model he assumed a uniform rate 
of subsidence in the basins.  Asia has the highest rate of ‘accelerated subsidence’ (ibid) and it 
is found this is the dominant factor in estimating the baseline effective SLR, of which the 
dominant factor results from reservoirs and flow diversion which reduce the ‘suspended 
load’.  It can be difficult to disentangle the influence of climate change from that of other 
changes in a catchment condition but overall, “reservoir construction currently represents the 
most important influence on land–ocean sediment fluxes” (Walling and Fang, 2003:124).  
Ericson et al (2006:p76) find that, “because Asian deltas tend to be highly populated and 
demand for water resources is correspondingly high, accelerated subsidence resulting from 
groundwater extraction plays a larger role than in other regions”. 
Overall, SLR due to climate change is a certain percentage of the already existing subsistence 
level.  IPCC estimates SLR will equate to 1-2mm/year, and by 2100 the global average SLR 
will have risen by 0.18-0.59m relative to the 1980-1999 baseline under a range of scenarios 
(Karmalkar et al., 2010).  SLR due to thermal expansion alone will be around 0.2m by 2100 
under the A2 scenario (Meehl et al., 2007). The A2 SRES scenario is at the higher end of the 
scenarios but has been described as realistic (DEFRA, 2005) and has sometimes been referred 
to as the baseline scenario. From 2080-2100, the rate of thermal expansion is projected to 
increase to 3.8 ± 1.3 mm yr–1 under the A2 scenario (Meehl et al., 2007). Projected total 
average SLR also increases with melting of glaciers and ice caps as well as melting ice 
sheets, totalling 0.4m of SLR by 2090-2099 (ibid). 
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Estimates vary of the percentage of land loss and projections of the number of people 
affected.  Milliman et al (1989) argue that due to the natural and accelerated subsistence, 34% 
of habitable land could be lost by 2100 due to 4.5m of SLR by the combination of factors 
including decrease fluvial sediment.  Titus (1990) estimated that 17% of Bangladesh would 
be lost with 1 metre of SLR.  Ali and Ahmad (1992) estimated SLR of 1.0 and 1.5 m would 
inundate 10% and 16% of the country, respectively.  By contrast, Broadus (1993) estimated 
that 7% of habitable land in Bangladesh would be lost due to a 1m rise. Mohal et al (2006) 
estimated that 11% of land will be permanently lost to SLR by the end of the century.   
However, as noted above this model does not include land subsistence, erosion, accretion and 
other natural adaptations (ibid).  It has also been projected that 1 metre of SLR could 
inundate 17.5% of the country (Salwar and Khan, 2007).   
 
Overall, it has been estimated for the Bengal delta, 3.4 million people are at risk under the 
baseline SLR conditions extended from 2000 to 2050 (Ericson et al., 2006).  This would 
account for 1.78% of the population (incorporating the expected population increase).  This is 
based on the estimate that 5.5% of the delta area would potentially be lost to climate change 
by 2050 (ibid).  However, as described previously, rising sea levels may be compensated by 
the sediment flow from the Himalayas, and is also affected by other factors such as 
deforestation and intensive cultivation since the response of the delta depends on the 
sediment input (CEGIS, 2010).  The figure below shows that the delta is highly dynamic. 
 
Thus, since we know SLR caused by climate change is not the only factor that leads to the 
subsistence of land and the effective SLR, there are adaptation options which may have been 
previously overlooked. These may include, inter alia, preventing the effect of dams and 
reservoirs, reducing the unsustainable abstraction of groundwater and oil, and increasing 
mangrove forests and other buffering effects. 
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Progradation of the delta in the last 70 years. Source: CEGIS (2010) 
Box: Impacts of Dam-Building on Coastal Erosion 
Engineering projects can have severe environmental consequences that may have made Bangladesh 
more vulnerable to coastal erosion (Alam, 1996). For example, the 1960-1970’s diversion of the 
Ganges River at the Farakka Barrage into the Bhagirathi-Hoogly river, to prevent Calcutta port from 
silting, led to severe consequences for South-West Bangladesh. Consequences included desiccation of 
tributaries, and setbacks to agriculture, fisheries, navigation and industry (Wolf and Newton, 2008) as 
well as problems of excess salination and reduced sedimentation (Alam, 1996). After protesting to the 
UN, India and Bangladesh signed the 5-year Ganges Water Agreement in 1977, however, tensions 
remained high and between 1988-1996 India granted Bangladesh only a portion of the Ganges flow 
with no special provision for drought years, until the new Ganges River Treaty was signed in 1996 
(Wolf and Newton, 2008). 
There is evidence that building reservoirs and dams, whilst they have advantages, are a cause of 
increased vulnerability to certain impacts of climate change, such as coastal erosion and land loss.  
Furthermore, planned reservoirs of the future indicate that the trapping of sediment will continue to be 
an issue (Ericson et al., 2006).  There are policy consequences for adaptation, since the adverse 
consequences of dams and reservoirs, as well as irrigation systems may come to outweigh the 
advantages and result in maladaptation.  There are transboundary implications, as Bangladesh may be 
highly vulnerable to hydropower development in Nepal.   
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Case Study of Tipaimukh Dam – Exacerbating severe climate consequences? 
Despite the historical experience of the results of upstream dam-building on downstream communities 
in Bangladesh, India is proposing and going ahead with building a dam at Tipaimukh, on the Barak 
River. The dam was initially proposed to curb flooding nearby, but hydropower capacity of 1500MW 
was later added. Political tensions have increased since it was reported India did not initially share the 
proposed water data and impact assessment with Bangladesh (Khalequezzaman, 2012).  In fact a prior 
legal agreement between Government of Manipur and National Power Corporation of India Limited 
stated that no barrage or diversion would be built on the Barak River.   It is arguably a violation of the 
UN Convention on International Watercourses for India not to provide data on their plans (Al-
Mahmood, 2012) but India itself is not a signatory to that agreement. 
The EIA in India reported the dam would reduce flash floods by controlling river flow in the monsoon 
by 30%, and increasing flow by 110% in the dry season but other experts in Bangladesh warn the 
opening of sluice gates in a severe flood, to save the dam, would have disastrous impacts (Al-
Mahmood). Increasing the water flow during the dry (rabi) season could mean wetlands are not 
drained and instead become water-logged (ibid). In the rainy season, sluice gates are likely to be 
opened to protect the dam, increasing the impact of flash floods on downstream communities (Saikia, 
2012). This may have consequences for agriculture, particularly in Sylhet where Boro rice is 
important for food security.  Therefore, such dams may exacerabate problems for Bangladesh. 
Concern has continually been expressed by downstream communities. 
In addition, the river carries sediment that is essential for the process of growth (accretion) of the 
flood plain in the face of rising sea levels (Khalequzzaman, 2012).  Indian authorities have repeated 
assurances that they will not take steps that harm Bangladesh. However, it is unlikely that the impact 
of the dam on retaining sediment could be alleviated, and this has impacts on coastal erosion due to 
reduced sediment load of the river (Al-Mahmood, 2012). Impacts on fisheries and groundwater are 
also possible.  Graf (2005) argues large regulated rivers can lead to a simplified geomorphology with 
less diverse ecosystems. Experts have argued dams reduce the natural ability of rivers to adjust to and 
absorb disturbances, and therefore basins impacted by dams could be more vulnerable to the impacts 
of climate change (Palmer et al., 2008). 
 
Annex IX: Flood Risk Management in Bangladesh 
Bangladesh experiences regular flooding, which inundates 20.5% of the country annually on 
average and can reach 70% in extreme cases like the 1998 floods (Mirza, 2002). The 1998 
flood caused an estimated $2-2.8Bn of damage; including 2.2-3.5m tons of crop damage 
which cost directly 5.5% of agricultural GDP and 1.5% of total GDP (with indirect effects of 
about 10% and 3% respectively) (Mirza, 2002).  The impacts of sea surface temperature 
(SST) and sea level rise (SLR) due to climate change are projected to increase the flood risk 
area in Bangladesh. Karim and Mimura (2008) find that for a 2
o
C SST rise and 0.3m SLR 
there would be 15.3% increase in the flood risk area.  The newly identified high risk zone 
(HRZ) would require an additional 320 shelters to protect people during extreme cyclonic 
events (ibid).  For the Meghna basin (Eastern Bangladesh) the probability of a 20-year flood 
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occurring increases tenfold under 6
o
C of warming in the HadCM2 scenario (and a 20-year 
flood causes about 1.51m tons of crop damage) (Mirza, 2002).  
Whilst embankments have been proposed to protect against flood, dams and levees can also 
increase vulnerability in the event of a breach during flooding (IRN, 2007) and thus it has 
been argued it is better to take a ‘soft’ approach to flood risk management, by slowing the 
river flow, in contrast to building ‘hard’ infrastructure for flood control.  Wetlands can play 
an important role.  In the Bengal delta ‘normal’ seasonal flooding has important benefits for 
ecosystem services including replenishment of the wetlands with nutrients.  In Bengali, there 
is a distinction between the ‘bonna’ (abnormally severe floods), and the more frequent rainy 
season floods or ‘barsha’ which Bangladeshi villagers do not consider a threat, but rather a 
necessity (ibid).   The English word ‘flood’ offers no distinction between these terms.   
Historically, the BWDB is responsible for flood and salinity management, including 
construction of embankments. The BWDB was established in 1972 when the East Pakistan 
Water and Power Development Authority was split into two agencies (Salahuddin, 1995).  
After the severe flooding of 1987-88 it was recognised most of the flood control projects had 
failed to protect their area due to lack operation and maintenance (O&M), including lack of 
resources or systems for maintenance (ibid). Arguably, this was a problem facing both large 
and small-scale projects. Salahuddin argues that water sector investments in Bangladesh are 
primarily donor-driven and donor-dependent, thus, until the 1980s, the necessity of 
subsequent O&M was not a priority agenda, as donors focused on construction alone.  There 
was also an absence of beneficiary participation in the form of mobilizing resources or active 
participation in systems operation and maintenance (Salahuddin, 1995).  Originally, sluice 
gates in the coastal zone were managed by a ‘khalasi’ who was in charge of operating the 
gate but in most cases there is no longer any khalasi in charge (ibid).  The East Bengal 
Embankment and Drainage Act (1952) states: ‘sluices constructed in any public embankment 
shall be opened or shut only by or with the general or special of the Engineer or of the officer 
in the immediate charge’ (ibid). Thus, it seems the top-down post-colonial governance 
structures did not leave any scope for decentralised governance in water management, and 
had not adequately considered maintenance of the water management structures. 
Flooding has serious consequences for food security where it destroys crops. For example, 
the flooding of July/August 2007 affected some 11.4 million people and damaged 13% of the 
total rice crop in Bangladesh (FAO, 2008a). Crops are also affected by cyclones. However 
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floods are also involved in soil fertility of the alluvial soil as described above, as long as the 
deposit is not saline. This is why exclusion of river-borne sediment by embankments has 
been argued to be a potentially negative impact of flood control in Bangladesh (Hirst and 
Ibrahim, 1996). 
Ahmad and Ahmed (2003) point out that existing flood warning and forecasting capacity 
would be greatly improved if data was available from upstream areas within the Ganges-
Brahmaputra-Maghna catchment area with greater regional cooperation.  The effects of 
increased SLR may also impact on riverbank erosion in Bangladesh, which combined with 
flooding could reduce the land available for crop production. 
Box: Bangladesh’s Flood Action Plan’ (FAP) 
The World Bank-coordinated project in 1988-89 called for ‘hard’ flood control but this could have 
caused displacement of people and damage to fisheries, so the plan was scrapped in favour of a 
process emphasising ‘flood management’ (IRN, 2007).  Boyce (1990) questioned the wisdom of a 
‘structural solution’ on environmental, technical and social grounds.   The original plan was 
developed by French engineers and would have involved construction of tall embankments along the 
rivers costing $5-10bn (ibid).  It was supported by the construction firms set to benefit from contracts.  
Softer ‘flood management’ measures were argued to be preferable, especially since the sudden failure 
of embankments can expose people living in protected areas to catastrophic floods (Boyce, 1990). Silt 
carried by floodwater plays a vital role in soil fertility and drought can be worse for rice farmers than 
flooding (ibid).  As noted previously, building barrages also reduces the sedimentation rate resulting 
from sediment delivery, thus potentially increasing the severe impacts of SLR which increase coastal 
erosion, land loss, salinisation and other harmful effects. 
Furthermore, Brammer (2010) argues damaging flooding in Bangladesh is primarily caused by heavy 
rainfall at a time when rivers are running at high levels. Brammer questions the purpose of these 
embankments when the land behind them remains flooded in heavy rainfall. There were many social, 
institutional and economic barriers to the top-down FAP approach (ibid). ‘Flood management’ 
therefore became prevalent, and the FAP evolved into a softer ‘controlled flooding’ approach instead 
of total flood control (Weibe, 2009).  Civil society groups challenged the concept that major rivers 
could be embanked sustainably despite their large sediment loads.  There was eventual acceptance of 
the need for people’s participation and these concepts were largely enshrined in the National Water 
Policy of 1999 and subsequent National Water Management Plan (ibid). 
 
Population Pressure and inundation 
Benson and Clay (2002) argue that due to population pressure, farming and other economic 
activity has been pushed onto much more marginal and sub-marginal land, where large 
numbers of people, particularly the poorest, are continuously exposed to the risk of crop 
damage, and loss of lives. This particularly concerns the unstable ‘chars’ which are 
temporary lands adjoining the major rivers which are formed by accretion of sediments.  
352 
 
Bangladesh’s population is expected to increase by 130 million over the next 50 years (IPCC, 
2007).  Therefore it may be feasible to argue whether population pressure is a greater threat 
than climate change in some areas. 
According to modelling from World Bank (2010a) on inundation risk exposure, it was found 
using GIS mapping that 18.5 million people are currently exposed to more than 1m of 
inundation during tropical cyclones and storm surges.  Under the baseline scenario, with 
population growth this will increase to 28.3 million by 2050 (53% increase) (ibid).  Climate 
change will increase this to an estimated 35.3 million by 2050 (ibid). Therefore, the impact of 
baseline population growth on vulnerability to inundation of 1m is higher than the impact of 
climate change.  The exposure under projected population growth and under climate change 
alone has been placed in the graph below. 
 
Graph to show the effect of population growth and climate change on the 18.5m people that are 
currently exposed to more than 1 metres of inundation (top two lines, in blue) and the 8.9 
million people expose to 3 metres of inundation (bottom two lines, in green), using data from 
World Bank (2010a). 
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Annex X: Cyclones and Storm Surges in Bangladesh 
Climate change increases the risk of storm surge inundation for two reasons; firstly because 
surges are elevated by rising sea levels due to thermal expansion and ice cap melt, and 
secondly because the warmer ocean intensifies the cyclone activity and heightens storm 
surges accompanied by strong winds (Dasgupta et al., 2010).  Bangladesh is particularly 
vulnerable to storm surges due to the high tidal range, shallow continental shelf, highly dense 
population and the triangular shape of the head of the Bay of Bengal (ibid). Storm surges of 
more than 10m are not uncommon in the area.   
Sea level rise also combines with storm surges to make the population more vulnerable.  Up 
to 2050, Ericson et al (2006) found that SLR increases the delta population exposed to storm 
surges from 44.9% to 47.3% and the area flooded from 47% to 49.8%; which seems like a 
small percentage, but represents an additional 4.7 million people living under conditions of 
vulnerability.   
Dasgupta et al (2010) run a hydrodynamic model incorporating SLR of 27cm and 10% 
increase in wind speed.  The results indicated by 2050 there would be a 69% increase in the 
vulnerable zone with 3m inundation and 14% increase in the vulnerable zone with 1m 
inundation (ibid).  The estimates found 8.06 million people in coastal Bangladesh are 
vulnerable to storm surges greater than 1m and this will increase by 68% with population 
growth by 2050 without climate change, and 110% with climate change and population 
growth in absence of adaptation.  The model also incorporated assumptions of 1% population 
growth p.a. and 6-8% GDP growth/year. 
About 5-6 cyclones form over the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea each year, and May, 
October and November are the most stormiest months (Khan et al., 2000).  It is also 
estimated 49% of the world’s total deaths due to cyclones occur in Bangladesh (Khan et al., 
2000; Ali, 1996).  There is grave concern that the frequency and intensity of tropical cyclones 
may increase as a result of climate change, especially sea surface temperature rise. The 
development of tropical cyclones is dependent on a warm ocean surface of over 27
o
C (Khan 
et al., 2000).  This occurs because as the SST rises, the saturation vapour pressure increases 
so more water vapour and latent heat are available.  There is also a positive relationship with 
the maximum wind speed of the cyclones, and thus cyclone intensity.  Ali (1999) also notes 
that the cyclonic storms and severe cyclonic storms show a 40-year oscillation period, 
although the reasons for this oscillation pattern are not clear, and there was a last peak in 
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1970 after which time the Bay of Bengal experienced a decreasing trend. Thus long time 
periods are needed to analyse the trends. 
Ali (1999) calculated that the maximum surge height of the April 1991 cyclone was about 
7.6m.  Based on the effect of increased SST leading to a corresponding increase in cyclone 
intensity and wind speed, it has been calculated that, without including the effect of SLR, the 
surge height increases by about 21% and 49% respectively for 2 and 4
o
C, so would be over 3 
metres higher under 4
o
C of warming (ibid).  Previous simulations of storm surges were done 
by using a small set of historical storms and adding a mean sea level or increasing wind 
speeds by 10% to account for climate change, but the IPCC argues these methods may have 
used a biased set of storms and led to unrealistic projections (Meehl et al., 2007). 
There has been a recent increase in the frequency of intense tropical cyclones affecting 
Bangladesh with the highest positive trend occurring in November (Khan et al., 2000). There 
has also been an intensification rate of the cyclones reaching the severe cyclone stage in 
November, which are increasing at the rate of 20% per hundred years (ibid).  More 
disturbances have been reaching the ‘severe’ cyclone stage so the frequency of severe 
cyclones increased faster than weaker cyclones.  Singh et al (2001) found by studying 122 
years of tropical cyclone data (1877-1998) there has been an increase in cyclones in 
November and May.  The highest increase has been in November where there has been a 
statistically significant twofold increase in frequency over this period (ibid). 
Naidu et al (2011) explain Bangladesh has seen an increased cyclogenesis trend in November 
and May.  The upward trend in tropical cyclone power dissipation index values is at least 
partly anthropogenic.  Global climate models suggest an increase in intensities of tropical 
cyclones, though there may also be a decrease in frequency (ibid).   Overall, Naidu et al 
(2011) find the SOI (Southern Oscillation Index) in April shows a signification positive 
relationship with cyclonic activity over the Bay of Bengal whereas NAOI (North Atlantic 
Oscillation Index) shows an inverse relationship. In the Global Warming era (taken as post-
1970) there has been increase in NAOI and relaxation of SOI which has reduced the 
frequency of cyclonic systems in the summer monsoon season and likely reduced the summer 
monsoon rainfall on which agriculture is dependent.  The IPCC also stated there was no 
significant change in cyclone frequency, but a large increase in the frequency of the highest 
storm surges (Meehl et al., 2007).   
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About 60% of the storm surges hit the central coastal area of Bangladesh including 
Patuakhali, Barguna, Bhola, Barisal and Noakhali district (Uddin, 2012). Cyclone Sidr in 
2007 caused an estimated $437m loss of damage in agriculture - about 90% of the total 
productivity of the sector (GoB, 2008).   
 
Annex XI: Examples of Social Impacts of Climate Change in Bangladesh: Migration 
and Health 
Impacts of Climate Change on Migration  
Migration has been argued as a potentially severe impact of climate change, particularly since 
events such as flooding and climate-induced extreme weather events have increase 
displacement both within Bangladesh and neighbouring India.  Roy (2011) argues there are 
no clear indications about how the issue of population displacement problems will be 
addressed in Bangladesh’s policies on climate change; and that internally displaced persons 
are not adequately protected by existing legislation.  Furthermore, environmental migrants to 
India face further challenges (ibid).  However, it is argued that environmental migration also 
needs to be seen in the context of changing economic opportunities, urbanisation, rising 
aspirations of the rural poor, rules on land inheritance and an on-going process of land 
alienation (IPCC, 2007; Abrar and Azad, 2004).    
McAdam (2012) argues the migration in Bangladesh does not live up to the alarmist 
predictions, as more migration is likely to be internal rather than cross-border, and 
furthermore migration may also be a means of adaptation with potentially positive benefits 
for human security, especially where it is able to be planned. The biggest cause is riverbank 
erosion and around 70% of those affected are landless, whilst the onset of cyclones means the 
migration is usually cyclical rather than linear in nature (ibid). The legal options available 
may include ‘mainstreaming’ of migration into policy, viewing it as an acceptable form of 
adaptation which may require the provision of planned rights-respecting resettlement 
schemes, and provision of lawful migration pathways involving participation of those 
affected (ibid). 
Climate Change and Health in Bangladesh 
There is also evidence that climatic events such as flooding and droughts can affect 
susceptibility to disease and health problems (IPCC, 2007; IPCC, 2014). Temperature and 
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salinity factors can impact on the concentration of cholera bacteria in water bodies.  Floods 
and drought can also affect human exposure to pathogens such as cholera as sanitation is 
affected.  Analysis of records from the International Center for Diarrheoal Disease Research 
in Dhaka found that the interannual variability of cholera coincides with the ENSO 
phenomenon in the region and identified a lag of 11 months between ENSO and cholera 
(Pascual et al., 2002).  Overall, in the highlands, cholera peaked during the monsoon, 
whereas in lowlands the opposite was the case (ibid). This may be because rainfall can also 
reduce cholera cases by diluting the concentration of the pathogen in aquatic environments 
(Pascual et al., 2002). Lower salinity and decreased pH were found to provide unfavourable 
conditions for pathogens (ibid). Thus there is also a link between water salinity and disease.   
Moreover, rainfall variability and increased temperatures have both been found to increase 
the incidence of hospital visits for non-cholera diarrhoea in Bangladesh (Hashizume et al., 
2007).  The increased incidence in cases of diarrhoea was particular high amongst vulnerable 
individuals with a lower education levels, and those with a lower sanitation status (ibid). 
It is also possible for climate stress to have an impact on food quality and crop nutritional 
value (DaMatta et al., 2010; Porter and Semenov, 2005).  Salinity stress frequently induces 
an increase in Na and Cl concentrations, but can cause a decrease in Potassium or Calcium 
levels (Lutts et al., 1996).  CO2 enrichment can lead to a reduction of grain protein in rice, 
wheat and barley, ranging from 10-15% of the value of ambient CO2 (315-400ppm) 
(DaMatta et al., 2010). For rice, which is important for Bangladesh, there is an estimated 
9.9% reduction in protein when grown at elevated CO2 (540–958 μmol mol
−1
), reflecting 
expected concentrations in 2100 (Taub et al., 2008), which has implications for nutritional 
health.
 
However elevated CO2 can also have some positive effects (ibid).  There is a scarcity 
of research on this area and this would require further research. 
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Annex XII: Examples of Adaptation Options in Agriculture 
Sample adaptation options in the agriculture sector  Profits/hectare (ibid) 
Adaptation Option:  
1. Zero or minimum tillage to cultivate potato, aroid and groundnut with 
water hyacinth and straw mulch 
$2068/ha 
(potato) 
2. Zero-tillage cultivation of mashkalai, khesari, lentil and mustard $631/ha (lentil) 
3. Modified sojan system (zuzubi garden) with vegetable cultivation in 
char land 
$3605/ha 
4. Floating bed vegetable cultivation $3867/ha 
5. Cultivating foxtail millet (kaon) in char land $365/ha 
6. Parenga practice of t. Aman cultivation system $413/ha 
7. Relay cropping of sprouted seeds of aman rice in jute fields $400/ha 
8. Raising vegetable seedlings in polythene bags homestead trellises $3781/ha 
9. Zero-tillage maize cultivation $435/ha 
10. Chickpea cultivation using a priming technique $463/ha 
11. Supplementary irrigation of t.aman from mini ponds $343/ha 
12. Year-round homestead vegetable cultivation (20 decimal area) $212-283  
13. Pond-water harvesting for irrigation to cultivate rabi vegetables $2021/ha 
14. Sorjan system for cultivating seasonal vegetables, fruits and fish $4541/ha 
Adaptation options in agriculture. Source: Yu et al., 2010 
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Annex XIII: Bangladesh Cyclone Preparedness Programme (CPP) 
Bangladesh’s cyclone preparedness programme has been recognised worldwide as a good 
example for disaster preparedness, as has been credited with saving thousands of lives during 
cyclones. Since inception in 1973, the project developed an early warning system (EWS) 
based on volunteers at village-level.  In the system, meteorological data are collected from 
the Bangladesh Meteorological Department (BMD), which issues regular bulletins that are 
transmitted to the six zonal offices and the 30 upazila (sub-district) offices over high 
frequency radio (UNFCCC, 2013a).  The upazila office passes it to unions through very high 
frequency (VHF) radios so that the unit team spreads out in villages and issues cyclone 
warnings (ibid).  Each unit serves one or two villages with a population of around 2,000-
3,000 people. The unit team leader and volunteers spread out in the villages and disseminate 
the warning door-to-door, including using megaphones, sirens and public address systems 
(IAWE, 2013).  The EWS is now a collaboration between the Bangladesh Red Crescent 
Society and the GoB. The success of the system is demonstrated by the fact that although 
almost 300,000 people died during the 1970, with a wind speed of 224km/hr, only 3,363 
people died during cyclone Sidr in 2007 which hit with a speed of 223km/hr (WMO, 2009). 
The regulatory framework which supports the Bangladesh CPP includes the policy for the 
Cyclone Preparedness Programme which was enacted in July 1973 (WMO, 2009).   In 2010, 
this was followed by the Draft of the Disaster Management Act, which provides the legal 
basis for the activities and actions undertaken during disasters, and the Standing Order on 
Disasters which describes in detail the roles and responsibilities of different committees, 
ministries and organisations in disaster-related organisations (ibid).  The National Plan for 
Disaster Management is another related plan incorporating public awareness building and 
development of planning procedures from government to grass roots levels (ibid).  It is 
evident that the EWS was in place before these laws, except for the CPP policy.    
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CPP information dissemination channels (from Haque, 1995 cited in UNEP, 2010) 
In 2002, the finance for CPP was 54% funded by the GoB (WDR, 2002) with the remainder 
funded by IDRC. Local communities do not have to contribute to the running costs but do 
raise funds for the management and maintenance of cyclone shelters (ibid).  In 2002, it was 
estimated the Red Crescent cyclone shelters costed around $78,000 to build and 
accommodated 1500 people, plus annual maintenance of about $780, so assuming these last 
10 years there is a cost of less than $6 per head for each year of protection (ibid). 
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Annex XIV: The Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Review (CPEIR) 
The Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Review (CPEIR), finalised in 2012, was 
undertaken to review the policy, institutional and financial management arrangements of 
agencies involved in climate-sensitive activity in Bangladesh, with a focus on adaptation.  
The study suggested strengthening of capacity and institutions should be focussed on the key 
mechanisms of climate finance delivery within government, namely the Finance Division, 
Planning Commission and technical functions associated with delivery of the BCCSAP 
(CPEIR, 2012).  The institutional architecture to promote accountability has been identified 
as a central aspect of a ‘Climate Fiscal Framework’ that could be put in place. The MTBF 
(Medium Term Budget Framework) is presently being strengthened and deepened through a 
financial reform project under the Finance Division (ibid).   
In relation to capacity issues, the need for increased human resource capacity in key 
ministries was highlighted. However, “whilst there is general agreement about the diagnosis, 
there is very little evidence yet of a coordinated prescription for action in respect of climate 
change skills” (CPEIR, 2012:60).  Secondly, on institutional capacity, it was argued building 
capacity takes time.  The Planning Commission is well equipped to assess projects and also 
coordinate effort across Government and the Finance Division has made good progress in 
recent years (ibid). Particular capacity issues were highlighted at the MOEF (Ministry of 
Environment and Forests), as it “does not have a track record as a spending ministry”, and 
“the convening capacity of the MoEF is limited in part because it is not a high-ranking 
ministry represented in Cabinet” (CPEIR, 2012:61). The problems of frequent moves of key 
staff, and of externally-funded projects relying on consultants were both highlighted as these 
undermine processes of building organisational learning and institutional memory (CPEIR, 
2012).  In addition, Bangladesh’s high-profile internationally ironically meant key staff were 
often “going or gone” to climate change meetings outside the country (ibid:61).  Furthermore, 
the CPEIR study highlighted donor capacity issues. Comparatively few donors operate on a 
wide scale in Bangladesh, and most operate in well-established niches with their own various 
ways of working with governance and accountability challenges (CPEIR, 2012). It was 
argued donors are also grappling with problems about how to spend their money wisely 
(ibid). 
Emerging challenges related to a competitive policy environment in which resources have 
been shifted to the power sector, with an increased in allocation under the Annual 
Development Programme of 33% between 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 (ibid). According to the 
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World Bank, power shortages pose a long-term risk for Bangladesh, with the cost of 
electricity shortages as much as 2 percentage points of annual GDP growth (World Bank, 
2008).  This creates a dilemma and potential conflict between mitigation and adaptation 
objectives. Government currently plans to reduce reliance on natural gas for power, and shift 
towards coal for both power generation and brick kilns, so it is understood a National Coal 
Policy is being developed (CPEIR, 2012). 
 
362 
 
Annex XV: Review of Related Policies in Bangladesh 
There are a range of national policies, plans and programmes in Bangladesh that could be 
affected by climate change (Haque and Haque, 2009; Karim, 2011; Mallick et al., 2012). 
Karim (2011) noted the following policies that are relevant for the agriculture sector in 
Bangladesh and thus for adaptation in agriculture: 
 National Agricultural Policy, Ministry of Agriculture, 1999 following from the New 
Agricultural Extension Policy, 1996. National Agriculture Policy 2010 (draft) 
 National water policy, Ministry of Water Resources, 1999 
 Environment policy, Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF), 1992 
 Land use policy, Ministry of Land, 2001, 
 Coastal zone policy, Ministry of Water Resources, 2005 
 National fisheries policy, Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock, 1998. 
The National Agricultural Policy (NAP) of 1999 does not specifically mention climate 
change and its impact on agriculture, though ‘environmental vulnerability’ is mentioned. 
Under section 3.5, irrigation in drought-affected areas is noted as protecting against poor 
rainfall, while section 9.1 refers to target-orientated research and extension (Karim, 2011).  
Furthermore under section 1.5 it is recognised “agriculture is dependent on the vagaries of 
nature and is risky” (NAP, 1999).  Section 2.1 identifies the objective of reducing “excessive 
dependence on any single crop to minimise the risk” as well as “environment-friendly 
sustainable agriculture (NAP, 1999).  In 2003, the Plan of Action on NAP reviews NAP and 
its implementation, whilst the Actionable Policy Brief (2004) prioritised immediate medium 
and long-term policy measures with a view to increasing productivity (Mallick et al 2012).  In 
a related initiative, the National Jute Policy (2002) aimed to keep jute production at desirable 
levels and accelerated privatisation of jute industries (ibid).  The new National Agricultural 
Policy drafted in 2010 does recognise climate change specifically under sections 1.9 and 2.4, 
and “sustainable agriculture adaptive to climate change” is a specific objective under section 
3.2 (NAP, 2010).  Furthermore climate change is a focus for research under 4.3.3 and 4.6.2 
(NAP, 2010). The National Agricultural Extension System, as articulated in the New 
Agricultural Extension Policy of 1996, is also closely linked to agricultural adaptation. The 
Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE) developed a Strategic Plan 1999-2002 with the 
intention to mainstream gender and social development issues into extension service delivery, 
while the Agricultural Extension Manual of 1999 intended to incorporate participatory 
technology development (Mallick et al., 2012).  The National Seed Policy of 1993 is likely to 
play a crucial role in adaptation in future as climate-resilient seeds are developed, under 
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which the Seed Certification Agency is the legal authority for seed certification (NSP, 1993) 
while the Seed Rules of 1997 delineates rules and regulations regarding the national seed 
board, registration of seed dealers, and seed certification (Mallick et al., 2012).  In the non-
crop agricultural sector, the National Livestock Development Policy (2007) refers to 
livestock vaccination and insurance (ibid) which are activities which may enhance adaptive 
capacity. 
The National Fisheries Policy (1998) also does not mention climate change but does refer to 
‘maintenance of ecological balance’ (Karim, 2011) as well as EIA approval for dams or water 
drainage. The policy also states that ‘Jalmohals’ designated as fish sanctuaries will be 
transferred to the Directorate of Fisheries (ibid) to conserve biodiversity. Under this policy, 
fish culture is to be prioritised on areas with 50cm of inundation for more than 3 months 
(ibid). Furthermore, extension of shrimp culture is banned completely due to the widely-
reported negative implications of shrimp aquaculture competing with agriculture. 
The National Food Policy Plan of Action (2008-2015) was created in 2008 to outline the 
National Food Policy of 2006, including priority action areas for food security. Climate 
change is mentioned under the ‘emerging issues’ (Section I.1.2) which notes climate change 
poses an additional burden on food security particularly in areas “already under stress due to 
adverse meteorological conditions” (NFPPoA, 2008). In this context, technology 
development, input supply and access, rural financing and diversification are noted (ibid). 
The Plan of Action refers to continued inadequate funding for small farmers, even though 
agricultural credit disbursement increased eleven-fold between 1980-2003 (ibid). Under the 
Action Agenda, Intervention 1.9 delivers ‘early warning system development’ including 
methodologies for assessing impacts of climate change on natural and human resources 
(NFPPoA, 2008) as well as strengthening access to information on climate change. 
The National Water Policy (NWP) (1999) makes no specific mention of climate change but 
does mention scarcity of water, bank erosion and, under section 4.6, the issue of inland 
salinity intrusion and River Basin Management under section 4.1.  Section 4.2 considers 
procedures and guidelines for planning water use of agriculture, including preparation of 
local water management plans, whilst section 4.2 (j) mentions barrages and other structural 
and non-structural measures (Karim, 2011).  Under section 4.2 (p) the government will 
designate flood risk zones to protect life, property and agriculture (NWP, 1999).  In Section 
4.3, government reserves the right to redirect use of water during natural and man-made 
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disasters (Karim, 2011).  Section 4.5 calls for use of procedures such as risk analysis in 
public water investment (NWP, 1999).  Section 4.7 (dedicated to Water and Agriculture) calls 
for the improvement of surface and groundwater utilisation such as irrigation but also 
recognises the need for tracking groundwater recharge (Karim, 2011). Section 4.13 
recognises preservation of unique natural water bodies such as “haors, baors and beels” 
(ibid). ‘Haors’ are large swamps, ‘boars’ are oxbow lakes, whilst ‘beels’ are large lakes (Dey 
et al., 2008).  The National Water Management Plan (NWMP, 2001) again did not 
specifically mention climate change, but did mention the importance of climate-related risks, 
and flood control and drainage for agriculture. 
The Environmental Policy and Implementation Programme of 1992 does not mention 
climate change directly, but consideration was given to the frequent flooding, cyclones and 
other environmental and climate-related disasters (Karim, 2011). This included provision for 
environmentally-sound flood controlling structures (Section 3.5.3), stating that such 
interventions should be removed if they have adverse effects. Conservation of wetlands and 
RAMSAR sites are considered (Mallick et al., 2012). 
The Land Use Policy (2001) also does not specifically mention climate change (Karim, 
2011). However there are indirect overlaps with adaptation as the objective of reducing the 
number of landless people and preserving ‘Khas’ (common) lands could align with adaptation 
objectives and build adaptive capacity. The policy is under the Ministry of Land (Mallick et 
al., 2012). Maintenance of existing water bodies would also be an adaptive strategy.  
The 2005 Coastal Zone Policy specifically mentions vulnerability to climate change under 
sections 1 and 4 (CZP, 2005).  Section 4.8.3 focuses on climate change in coastal areas, 
including; institutional arrangements, risk prediction, adaptive measures, sea dykes and 
contingency plans (ibid).  Afforestation and conservation of the Sunderbans are noted as well 
as water management and salinity intrusion. The Coastal Development Strategy (CDS) 
(2006) takes into account “visible climate change impacts”, recognises the NAPA process, 
and Section 3 covers man-made and natural disasters (CDS, 2006). Section 3.1.2 also 
recognises the establishment of the Climate Change Cell under the MoEF and initiates 
concept notes on “strengthening and rehabilitation of sea dykes” (CDS, 2006). Annex A, 
Section 5, states that “by 2100 rise of 88cm sea level rise would inundate 6,000 sq.km, which 
is about 16% of the total land area” and states “Patuakhali, Khulna and Barisal regions are 
most at risk from sea level rise” (CDS, 2006). 
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The National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA), created in 2005 and updated in 
2009 was, as noted previously, specifically related to climate change. Better access to 
agricultural services was a priority, as well as social protection (UNFCCC, 2005).  In the 
BCCSAP (see Chapter 5), food security also had a high priority (Mallick et al., 2012). 
It is therefore noted few of the national policies mention climate change specifically, except 
for the CZP (2005), the CDS, and the new drafted National Agricultural Policy (NAP, 2010) 
and NFPPoA (2008). Karim (2011) argues climate change has not been sufficiently 
mainstreamed into agricultural development and there is a need for greater integration, 
coordination and institutional interaction. Other relevant initiatives include the National 
Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction II (2009) which recognises agriculture as a major 
contributor to pro-poor economic growth and nutrition, as well as the ‘Vision 2020’ plan 
which aims to reduce poverty to 15% by 2021 with a strong emphasis on disasters and 
vulnerability (Mallick et al., 2012). Whilst the ADP is the cornerstone of national policy, 
there are weaknesses in the planning process. Karim (2011) notes that knowledge-sharing is 
fragmented and sporadic between the community-based adaptation projects being 
implemented, which risks the possibility of overlaps and undermines knowledge 
dissemination. 
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Annex XVI: Trade Barriers, Subsidies and Climate Adaptation in Bangladesh 
It has been suggested that trade policies, including agricultural tariffs, can pose an 
international barrier to climate change adaptation (Glatzel et al., 2012). Bangladesh still 
suffers from trade barriers that prevent free export of products to other countries. Under the 
MDG number 8 (indicator 8.6), countries are supposed to be increasing the proportion of total 
developed-country imports (by value and excluding arms) from developing countries and 
least developed countries, admitted free of duty.  Yet the graph below shows a lower 
proportion of the imports from Bangladesh are admitted free of duty compared to other 
LDCs.  
 
Proportion of imports (by value) admitted free of duty (excludes arms and oil) (Source: 
UNCTAD, 2011).  
Furthermore, under MDG goal 8 (indicator 8.7), developed countries are supposed to be 
reducing the tariffs imposed on the agricultural products and textiles and clothing from 
developing countries.  Yet data from UNCTAD (2011) shows while some products have 
preferential access, the average tariff imposed by developed countries’ on Bangladesh’s 
products remains at around 10%.  Thus it is proposed trade and tariff reform could enhance 
capacity of countries like Bangladesh to adapt to climate change through enhancing trade. 
In addition, it has also been suggested, including by the World Bank, that subsidies pose 
another barrier to climate change, and cutting subsidies would be a way to free up climate 
finance.  Fuel subsidies could make up 19.1% of the GoB budget in 2012 without price 
adjustments (IMF, 2011) amounting to 3.4% of GDP.  Subsidies are used to shield consumers 
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from price movements which are absorbed by state-owned enterprises such as the Bangladesh 
Petroleum Corporation, which receives loans and direct budget transfer from the government 
(ibid).   Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation is the sole petroleum importer and distributor in 
the country, and in 2008 it had a deficit of $1.5Bn (World Bank, 2009). The IMF argues there 
is a high degree of subsidy leakage to the mid-to-upper income households and if these fuel 
subsidies were removed, they could be redirected towards safety nets for the most vulnerable.  
Leakage can also occur by fuel smuggling to India where prices were 40% more in 
September 2011 (IMF, 2011). Switching from diesel to greener compressed national gas has 
been encouraged as Bangladesh has significant natural gas reserves (World Bank, 2009). 
However, diesel subsidies are provided directly to farmers to assist with irrigation, so subsidy 
removal could have an impact upon such users.  The Global Subsidies Initiative has found 
that once subsidies are in place they are notoriously difficult to remove, necessitating 
complementary policies to offset any undesired secondary impacts (e.g. welfare support for 
the poor, or programs to help industries diversify their energy supplies) (Laan et al., 2010).  
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Annex XVII:  Implications for adaptation evaluation criteria.  
Source: Brooks et al 2011. 
Criterion Implications for adaptation evaluation 
Feasibility The feasibility of adaptation interventions will depend on a variety of factors, the most important of 
which are likely to be technical feasibility, the existence of sufficient management capacity for 
formulation and implementation, and cost (or benefit/cost ratio). In any adaptation context, once 
climate vulnerability assessments have been made the intervention is likely to begin with the 
identification of a number of potential adaptation measures or options, which are then prioritised. It 
is during the prioritisation phase that the feasibility of different options will be assessed. 
Efficacy 
/effectiveness 
The way in which the effectiveness of adaptation interventions is assessed will depend on the 
context in which such interventions are designed and implemented. However, based on the above 
discussion, effectiveness might be assessed based on (i) the impact of an intervention at the 
institutional level, e.g. in terms of preparedness, resilience or adaptive capacity, (ii) the impact of an 
intervention on the vulnerability of individuals, groups or other entities, or (iii) the impact of an 
intervention on outcomes, where such outcomes can be measured (e.g. on mortality, health or 
poverty outcomes). All of the above three ways of assessing effectiveness may employ indicators, 
related to (i) processes associated with institutional change (ii) factors associated with vulnerability 
to climate change-related hazards, and (iii) development (or e.g. disaster) outcomes. Where 
assessment of effectiveness is based on vulnerability or development indicators (and particularly the 
latter), the effects of changing climatic and environmental baseline conditions will need to be 
accounted for, and quantitative indicator data will need to be complemented by qualitative 
information addressing attribution of vulnerability or development outcomes to interventions 
Efficiency Efficiency is most likely to be assessed in terms of the ratio of benefits to costs, and this might be 
achieved by combining data relating to effectiveness (e.g. measures of the extent to which 
vulnerability has been reduced or outcomes improved) with financial data relating to the cost of any 
particular intervention. 
Acceptability/ 
legitimacy 
The acceptability of an intervention will be a subjective matter best evaluated through engagement 
with a range of stakeholders representing all those likely to be affected by the intervention. Issues 
related to transparency and accountability are particularly important in this context. 
Equity The extent to which an intervention may be seen as equitable might be assessed in a variety of 
ways, each of which will have objective and subjective elements. Equitable interventions might be 
seen as those that provide the greatest degree of assistance to the poorest. In the context of climate 
change and adaptation, equity might depend on the extent to which an intervention targets the most 
vulnerable populations or individuals. Equity will also require that adaptation interventions do not 
result in the (further) marginalisation of certain groups (e.g. those already disadvantaged or 
particularly vulnerable), or in increased inequality. These risks can be addressed through the 
incorporation of safeguards and screening processes into evaluation. Equity might also extend to 
considerations of responsibility for anthropogenic climate change, with populations and countries 
characterised by a combination of high exposure and vulnerability to climate change-related 
hazards, and low historical responsibility for emissions, being seen as most “deserving” of 
adaptation assistance. The subjective nature of this issue means that the manner in which it should 
be adopted within evaluation efforts requires careful consideration. 
Sustainability This evaluation criterion is commonly separated into technical and institutional aspects. To what 
extent the intervention maintains its technical relevance to the problem it addresses – crucial when 
there is a shifting baseline. But also, how well the institutions involved can continue to operate the 
intervention. In the context of adaptation to climate change, sustainability requires that: 
 Adaptation interventions are compatible with environmental sustainability as usually defined (i.e. 
are not environmentally destructive, or seek to minimise environmental disruption – this might 
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also mean that adaptation should not contribute significantly to greenhouse gas emissions). 
 The benefits of adaptation interventions will continue after the termination of the projects and 
programmes under which they are implemented. 
 Interventions designed to deliver adaptation benefits in the near-term do not increase vulnerability 
or drive maladaptation in the medium to long-term. 
 Interventions can be managed by mandated organizations into the medium and long terms.  
The above risks can be addressed in a similar way to the risks associated with the potential for 
projects to result in marginalisation, via screening and the introduction of safeguards, which might 
be based on a set of criteria which must be met in order to minimise the risk of maladaptation or 
increased vulnerability. 
Institutional sustainability requires assessments of the extent to which mandated organizations are 
dependent on outside assistance to manage and implement interventions over an appropriate time 
period. 
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Annex XVIII:  Operationalisation of indicative framework for adaptation 
finance (Authors’ own) 
Criterion Examples of ways to operationalise the criteria P G E F A 
Equity in 
targeting the 
most vulnerable 
 Ensuring the project benefits the most climate-vulnerable areas and 
stakeholders within those geographical areas (e.g. using surveys or expert 
judgement to identify the vulnerable) 
 Social and environmental safeguards/screening to ensure interventions do not 
marginalise disadvantaged groups 
 Involvement of target beneficiaries in proposal design and throughout project 
cycle 
✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Efficiency and 
cost-
effectiveness 
 Minimising transaction costs 
 Leveraging co-financing contributions including in-kind contributions 
 Demonstrating a positive benefit-cost ratio (BCR) or return on investment 
(ROI) 
✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Effectiveness in 
reducing 
vulnerability;  
results and 
monitoring 
results 
 Budgeted M&E plan, participatory M&E process; independent post-project 
evaluation  
 Measurement of results against a baseline and ‘theory of change’ attributing 
outcomes to the project (e.g. benefit against measureable outcomes such as 
poverty, mortality and health)  
 Indicators at institutional/fund level and project/beneficiary level  
 Results-based disbursement year-on-year 
✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Urgency and 
timeliness 
 Rapid and timely disbursement mechanisms and processes at fund level (e.g. 
disbursement schedule with time-bound milestones) 
✓   ✓  
Flexibility and 
robustness 
 Selection of ‘no-regrets’ adaptation options  
 Use of contingency funds, mechanisms or insurance to ensure resilience of 
intervention in event of climate shocks, and ensure adaptations are resilient 
under more extreme climate scenarios 
✓   ✓ ✓ 
Synergy/ 
coherence 
between 
mitigation/ 
adaptation 
 Ensuring synergy with mitigation objectives where possible; low-carbon and 
ecosystem-based adaptation options are considered at project design stage 
where relevant, and/or projects with mitigation co-benefits are prioritised 
✓   ✓ ✓ 
Gender equity  Gender mainstreaming across the project cycle, including results 
disaggregated by gender (see UNDP guidebook) 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Practicality and 
feasibility 
 Check project applicant has financial/technical capacity to implement project 
(“fit-for-purpose” test) including trained staff, contingency budget, fiduciary 
standards in place and no record of criminal activities 
 Feasibility studies undertaken, where necessary 
✓   ✓ ✓ 
Avoiding 
maladaptation 
 Selection of ‘no-regrets’ adaptation options 
 Project risk management based on known unknowns and unknown unknowns 
 Pre-screening to ensure interventions do not reduce incentives to adapt 
 Consideration of long-term post-project monitoring processes to enable 
learning from failure 
✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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Need for 
transformation 
considered 
(scale, enabling 
environments) 
 Project applicant has considered pathways, drivers and barriers for scaling-up 
(see IFAD guidance) e.g. engagement with government, research and media 
stakeholders 
 
✓   ✓ ✓ 
Ownership and 
subsidiarity 
 Use of direct access modalities (national or sub-national direct access)  ✓  ✓  
Alignment/ 
mainstreaming 
 Close engagement or collaboration with national or local government to 
reduce duplication, and enhance mainstreaming and sustainability 
 ✓  ✓ ✓ 
Additionality  Mainstreaming into existing government planning/programmes whilst 
ensuring adaptation finance is not diverted from development finance 
 At international scale, commitment to the 0.7% ODA/GNI goal or 
measurement of the extent to which climate finance surpasses this goal 
 ✓  ✓  
Harmonisation  Pre-project mapping out similar initiatives in the area/region of 
implementation to develop synergies where possible and avoid duplication of 
efforts 
 ✓  ✓ ✓ 
Adequacy, 
precautionary 
predictability  
 At fund/international level, measurement of extent to which volumes of 
finance meet costs of climate change (use of scientific/economic literature) 
 At fund/international level, provision or commitment to provision of long 
term finance 
 ✓  ✓  
Inclusive 
governance 
(Transparency, 
accountability, 
legitimacy and 
stakeholder 
participation) 
 Transparent provision of all project documentation and reports online to 
enable trackability 
 Transparent internal and external complaint procedures or grievance 
mechanisms  
 At fund level, civil society/beneficiary representation at board meetings and 
public disclosure of meeting minutes 
 Involve beneficiaries as early as possible in project design and throughout 
project cycle 
 ✓  ✓ ✓ 
Sustainability  Environmental sustainability; use of EIA/SEA (for large projects), coherence 
with mitigation 
 Social sustainability; social safeguards 
 Economic/financial; considering long-term impact/maintenance of project 
results, post-project monitoring 
✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Note: In the right hand columns, P = prioritisation principles; G = governance principles and E = evaluation 
(monitoring) principles. F designates criteria that could be applicable/required at fund-level; A denotes criteria 
that could be applicable/required at activity level (project or programme level). 
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Annex XIX: Hazard, Agriculture and Seasonal Calendar (Translated from Bengali)
  Boishakh Joistho Asharh Srabon Bhadro Ashvin Kartik Ogrohayon Poush Magh Falgun Chaitro 
  Summer Rainy Season Autumn Late Autumn Winter Spring 
  Apr May June July August Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb March Apr 
H
A
Z
A
R
D
 
Bank erosion             
Salinity             
Cyclone             
Excessive rain             
Flood             
C
R
O
P
S
 
Aus (rice)             
Amon (rice)             
Boro (rice)             
Irri (rice)             
Sadamota (rice)             
Kajol (rice)             
Golden pulse             
Dudhkolom (rice)             
L
IV
E
L
IH
O
O
D
 
Farmer             
Fisherman             
Day labourer              
Van             
Tailor             
Mechanics             
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Annex XX: Results on Association between Livelihood Assets and Food Security  
 
Relationship tested  Proxy indicators 
used 
Pearson’s Chi Square 
Value 
Cramer’s V 
(measure of 
association) 
Physical capital and 
food security status 
Asset indicator 
(number of assets), 
and months of 
hunger 
140.5*** 0.27 
Financial capital and 
food security status 
Business-related 
cash income, and 
months of hunger 
27.3*** 0.167 
Social capital and food 
security status 
Savings group 
membership, and 
months of hunger 
1.69 0.041 
Human capital and 
food security status 
Household education 
level, and months of 
hunger 
100*** 0.23 
Natural capital and 
food security status 
Land ownership, and 
months of hunger 
164*** 0.29 
The table above shows the Chi Square Values obtained for the relationships and the measure 
of association (using Cramer’s V = φc). Cramer’s V varies from 0 (corresponding to no 
association between the variables) to 1 (complete association)
2
.  
***p < 0.001    
**p < 0.01 
Source of data: CCAFS, 2013. Refer to Wright et al (2012) for further details on the 
methodology. 
                                                 
2
 A figure of above 0.25 indicates a very strong relationship, and a value between 0.15 and 0.25 
indicates a strong relationship. 
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Annex XXI – Negotiation Text under the SCF at COP-19 
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